Hector Bywater, in this 1925 follow up novel to Sea-power in the Pacific: a study of the American-Japanese naval problem, adroitly tells the story of a fictional war between the Japanese Empire and the United States of America that begins six years hence, in 1931. He is mostly on target with his strategic narrative, including the early fall of the Philippines and Guam to the Japanese, as actually happened sixteen years later in 1941. This is no real surprise, as most American strategists right up until the fall of Corregidor in June of 1942 predicted the Philippines to fall to the Japanese early. He also includes ancillary attacks on Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands, similar to what happened in 1942. Perhaps being heavily influenced by the Orange War Plan of the time, his American forces send out a straight forward and risky attack directly upon Guam, only to be beaten back with heavy losses. This is the low point for the Americans. Similar to what happened to Admiral Kimmel in 1941, Admirals are scapegoated and new commanders take over. A new incremental plan (similar to island hopping) is developed, relying heavily on the deception of the Japanese. The American re-conquest of lost possessions begins in Tutuila (Samoa), not too far from the American World War II base of Tonga in the South Pacific. There is a surface action when both sides advance headlong into each other West of Samoa. Much like the battles of Coral Sea and Guadalcanal in 1942 (strategically speaking), the Japanese advance no further, and spend the remainder of the war defending islands. The Americans, much through the use of misdirection, advance through the Japanese Mandates with relatively (to World War II) few casualties, claiming the “little known” base of Truk in the Caroline Islands as a major base. In World War II, the Americans bypassed this major Japanese base by pummeling it from the air. The Imperial Japanese Navy is finally lured out to sea in defense of the Island of Yap and the Philippines, fighting the major Mahanian surface action predicted and studied for a quarter of a century; the Jutland of the Pacific, if you will. Strategically like the aftermath of the Battle of Leyte Gulf in 1944, the remnants of Imperial Japanese Navy limp back to Japan, while the Americans invade Leyte. In weeks, they liberate Manila, but with ten times the number of ground casualties of the actual campaign in 1944-1945. Afterwards, American carriers harass the waters surrounding Tokyo much like Mitscher’s fast carriers did in 1945, except they drop leaflets instead of bombs, advising the Japanese people to surrender. The Japanese take the advice and sue for peace within a month of the fall of Manila. In the peace treaty that follows several months later, the Japanese, like in 1945 give up their Mandates, but unlike 1945, they are not occupied, and become a good nation again through internal politics. Bywater’s technical knowledge of the vessels of the time is unmatched, and all of the ships that he mentions were real ships at the time, many seeing action later in World War II. He even uses the Coast Guard Cutter, U.S.S. Bear, a sailing ship built in 1874, as part of the action. Unbelievably, this ship actually served with the U.S. Navy during World War II. He does miss on three major items though. First, he overestimates the unity of the Chinese (who are also at war with Japan in this book) to such a degree that it actually hastens the Japanese capitulation much more than what would actually take place in World War II. Secondly, he severely underestimates the will and fanaticism of the Japanese, who could never be conquered by leaflets. Lastly, his use of poison gas attacks, both air to ship and air to air, are fanciful, and take away from the good strategic predictions in the book. I guess that he can be forgiven for this last inaccuracy, as the terrible gas attacks of World War I were only seven years removed at the time of his writing. Bywater passed away in 1940, and never got to analyze his own predictions with reality. Unfortunately, the book is being sold today (2024) with blatant falsehoods printed on both covers. On my copy (Applewood Books) the cover states that “Originally Published In 1925 The Incredible Book That Predicted Pearl Harbor.” The rear cover states in part “Bywater predicted a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor 16 years before it happened.” To my dismay, there is no Battle of Pearl Harbor or a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in this book. Once in the book, a Japanese submarine lays a few mines outside of Pearl Harbor, but they are quickly swept, being nothing more than a minor annoyance, and truly irrelevant to any of the coming strategy. There are other very interesting actions in this book that I enjoyed thinking about, but have left out of this review. It's up to the reader to find them. I highly recommend this book and its predecessor for anyone studying the Pacific Theatre of World War II.