The Battle of An Loc

Twentieth-Century Battles

by James H. Willbanks

"The [North Vietnamese] now held most of Binh Long province from Chon Thanh north to the Cambodian border with the exception of the town of An Loc. It was clear that An Loc would be the scene of the next major North Vietnamese effort. A lot was at stake. Not only were the lives of the South Vietnamese soldiers and their American advisers on the line, but so too was the prestige of the South Vietnamese government. The loss of a province so close to Saigon would be a disastrous loss of face for President Thieu and his administration. From the American perspective, the battle would be the supreme test of Vietnamization and President Nixon's policies in Vietnam. More than that, however, was the fact that very little stood between the North Vietnamese and Saigon except the forces at An Loc." --from The Battle of An Loc

With the knowledge born of firsthand experience, James H. Willbanks tells the story of the 60-day siege of An Loc. In 1972, late in the Vietnam War, a small group of South Vietnamese held off three North Vietnamese divisions and helped prevent a direct attack on Saigon. The battle can be considered one of the major events during the gradual American exit from Vietnam. An advisor to the South Vietnamese during the battle, Willbanks places the battle in the context of the shifting role of the American forces and a policy decision to shift more of the burden of fighting the war onto the Vietnamese troops. He presents an overview of the 1972 North Vietnamese Easter Offensive, a plan to press forward the attack on U.S. and ARVN positions throughout the country, including Binh Long province and Saigon. The North Vietnamese hoped to strike a decisive blow at a time when most American troops were being withdrawn. The heart of Willbanks's account concentrates on the fighting in Binh Long province, Saigon, and the siege of An Loc. It concludes with a discussion of the Paris peace talks, the significance of the fighting at An Loc, and the eventual fall of South Vietnam.

Twentieth-Century Battles--Spencer C. Tucker, editor

Genres: History, Military Fiction, War, Nonfiction

226 pages, Hardcover

First published March 30, 2005

Reviews

[Mike · Rating 5 out of 5]

Easily 5 Stars for an excellent account of the battle, a main effort to capture Saigon and decapitate the RVN government. Good maps and interesting accounts of the participants. The book shows that the US organized the ARVN as a conventional force but also trained the forces in counterinsurgency ops to the point where many formations/leaders could not effectively employ combined operations against the very conventional attack by the North. As long as the US and allies provided advisors and airpower, ARVN forces generally fought well. When Congress pulled all support after the 1972 battles, the eventual end of the South was guaranteed. Same thing happened with the Afghan pullout in recent history.

The relative good performance of ARVN forces in the 1970 operation into Cambodia gave the US an opportunity to claim the Vietnamization program was a success and we could draw down faster. The failure of the ARVN forces in the 1971 Operation LAM SON in Laos led NVA leaders to think it was time to seize the south.

The second event that added weight to Giap’s case was Nixon’s announcement in the summer of 1971 that he would travel to China during the first half of 1972. The American president was also making overtures toward the Soviet Union. These moves had several effects. First, they convinced many in the North Vietnamese leadership that the international situation was working against them, that in effect they were running out of time and might lose their primary patrons, both of which had supplied massive amounts of military aid that permitted the North Vietnamese to sustain their war in the south. Second, as historian Dale Andradé suggests, the thawing relations between the United States and the two Communist nations had an unintended effect in that the situation “forced Moscow and Beijing to prove their revolutionary credentials by giving increased support to Hanoi without corresponding conditions.”! This situation would work nicely for Giap and Le Duan as they tried to convince their colleagues of the wisdom of a new offensive.

This sounds so similar to our recent experience in Afghanistan. The NVA understood propaganda and if a defeat could be inflicted on South Vietnam while U.S. forces were still in country, North Vietnam could claim a military victory against the Americans as well as the South Vietnamese. Thus victory, or even partial success, would humiliate Nixon and destroy his war politics and perhaps his bid for reelection in November.

The North Vietnamese are going to roll the dice and aren’t holding back on committing forces:

The offensive began as planned on 30 March 1972, when three NVA divisions attacked south across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separated North and South Vietnam toward Quang Tri and Hue in MR I. Three days later, three more divisions moved from sanctuaries in Cambodia and pushed into Binh Long Province, the capital of which was only 65 miles from the South Vietnamese capital in Saigon. Additional North Vietnamese forces attacked across the Cambodian border in the Central Highlands toward Kontum. A total of 14 NVA infantry divisions and 26 separate regiments—the equivalent of 20 divisions—would take part in the offensive. This included more than 130,000 troops and approximately 1,200 tanks and other armored vehicles. This was virtually every combat unit in the North Vietnamese Army with the exception of the 316th Division, which continued to operate in Laos for the duration of the offensive.

The NVA had a very effective deception plan, conducting a feint into Tay Ninh province, the traditional attack route to Saigon. The attacks in the north near the DMZ grabbed all the attention at first. The intel pukes did not pick up on the real threat until it started. The NVA invasion featured the use of tanks and MANPADS (SA-7) for the first time. Airpower was the one advantage the ARVN and allies could employ. ARVN leadership was varied but often the soldiers fought bravely when led by American advisors on the ground.

In the early morning hours of 5 April, the NVA gave a clear indication of their intentions in Binh Long, opening up with a heavy barrage of artillery, mortars, and rockets on the headquarters of the 9th Regiment and the Loc Ninh District compound. Almost simultaneously, there were other attacks throughout the 5th ARVN Division area of operations, including a few rounds fired at the division headquarters in Lai Khe, a sapper attack against Quan Loi, and indirect fire attacks on Phuoc Vinh, Song Be, and Bo Duc. The battle for Binh Long had started in earnest.

Shortly after the barrage began at Loc Ninh, two NVA regiments and 25 tanks supported by heavy artillery fire attacked from the west. The North Vietnamese attackers from the 5th VC Division concentrated their efforts on the regimental command post at the south end of the airstrip.” The defenders beat back the first attack with tactical air support, destroying one of the tanks, but around 0600 there was a 30-40-minute lull in aircraft support and the tanks broke through the ARVN lines.” Fortunately, more fighter-bombers arrived on station, and the tanks were driven back once again. The South Vietnamese soldiers, supported by their American advisers, acquitted themselves well and stood up against the enemy tank and infantry attack. The fighting was desperate, but the South Vietnamese soldiers for the most part hung in there and fought hard; ARVN gunners lowered the muzzles of their 105mm howitzers and fired directly at the NVA infantry advancing through the rubber trees.

“Puff the magic Dragon’s” younger, bigger brother “Spooky” was very effective. Timely CAS beat back major assaults:
Around noon on 5 April, the NVA reinforced their forces to the southwest of the town and launched another major ground assault. When the NVA tried to get through the defenses of the southern compound, an AC130 gunship, according to Major General Hollingsworth, “slaughtered” them in the wire and “destroyed the better part of a regiment.”! The four engine propeller-driven aircraft was originally designed as a transport, but it had been armed and modified earlier in the war to carry out interdiction missions against North Vietnamese men and materiel moving down the Ho Chi Minh Trail into South Vietnam. In addition to its armament, it was equipped with a variety of tracking equipment, including Black Crow radar used to pick up vehicle ignitions, a low-light-level television camera, an infrared detector, ground target radar, and a strong searchlight. These well-armed, versatile aircraft would prove crucial in the coming battle for An Loc.

Another attempt was made by the enemy to cross the runway from the west, but it was stopped cold by well-placed air strikes using CBUs. Yet another enemy assault succeeded in getting into the wire on the east side of the 9th Regiment’s command post, but it was stopped by Cobra gunships. However, during the course of this battle, the first Blue Max Cobra was lost. On a rocket run at almost 4,000 feet just south of Loc Ninh, the Cobra flown by Warrant Officer Charles Windeler and Captain Henry Spengler was hit. Told by his wingman that he was on fire, Windeler tried to get the aircraft safely to the ground, but it appeared that the controls burned through at about 1,500 feet and the helicopter hit the ground and exploded. Another Cobra from Blue Max confirmed that the two pilots did not survive the crash.

Rough justice in war, reap what you sow:
The civilian citizens of An Loc were not immune to the death and destruction going on all around them. One of the NVA T-54 tanks made it into the center of the city, where it rolled into a Catholic church. Huddled inside were old men, women, and children conducting a prayer service. According to Captain Moffett with the 3rd Ranger Group, the tank opened fire with its cannon and machine guns, killing well over 100 of the innocent civilians. Having expended its ammunition, it withdrew to the city square and put a white flag on its antenna. The FAC overhead called the 5th ARVN and asked what to do. The adviser on the radio told him to “blow it away!” The FAC proceeded to do just that, directing several air strikes on the tank.

During the course of the first two days of the battle, two province officials later reported, six young women were discovered with small radio transmitters concealed in their brassieres. They were apparently relaying information to enemy forces around the town. ARVN soldiers tied them up and left them in an open area where incoming NVA artillery subsequently killed them. “The townspeople,” according to the two officials, “who had no love for communist sympathizers or infiltrators, approved of this action.”

How terrifying it must have been for the ARVN to face tank assaults for the first time. They found a way to fight back:
While the opposing infantry fought house to house and door to door in the northern half of the city, the North Vietnamese tanks roamed the city shooting up any target. The South Vietnamese had no armor of their own; they had to rely on sheer courage and M72 LAWs. The South Vietnamese soon learned how to fight the tanks. Eventually, the ARVN and RF/PFs would form tank-killer teams that proved very effective against the repeated enemy tank attacks. Antitank weapons were set in basements, a level to which the tanks could not lower their gun tubes, or on the second or third stories of buildings, where ARVN M72 gunners tried to find a weak spot on the tank before it could elevate its guns sufficiently to engage the South Vietnamese soldiers. A fifteen-year-old Popular Force soldier, on the second story of a school, knocked out a tank with a LAW. During the first few days of the initial battle for the city, the ARVN defenders had destroyed 18 NVA tanks on the ground and the Cobras had gotten 12. Lieutenant Colonel Le Nguyen Vy, deputy commander of the 5th ARVN, personally destroyed four tanks with M72s.

The North Vietnamese continued to demonstrate difficulties in employing tanks during the battle, feeding the tanks in piecemeal, possibly because of a fear of air strikes on massed columns. They also insisted on repeatedly sending the tanks in without infantry support. Supplying the tanks also proved problematic, and many ran out of fuel before they ran out of ammunition.

B-52 ARC LIGHT missions were key to winning the battle:
As the battle inside the city raged, General Hollingsworth directed B-52 strikes on NVA staging areas around the city. The battle had stabilized somewhat by the evening of the 13th. However, the enemy continued to pour artillery, mortars, and rockets into the city. There were a number of ground probes during the day on the 14th. A number of tanks were observed in the rubber trees to the north and east. Four B-52 strikes were directed against these areas. Each ARC LIGHT mission consisted of three aircraft, each carrying a mixed load of 108 MK-82 500-pound and 750-pound conventional bombs. The devastation wrought by these strikes was immense. No accounts have been found of what it was like for the NVA at An Loc to suffer these attacks, but the description by Truong Nhu Tang, a former Viet Cong, is no doubt representative of the experience. After the war, he wrote about having survived a B-52 strike: “From a kilometer, the shock waves knocked their victims senseless. Any hit within a half kilometer would collapse the walls of an unreinforced bunker, burying alive the people cowering inside. . . . It was not just that things were destroyed; in some awesome way they had ceased to exist.”

Some back and forth between the opponents:
Even as the desperate battle for the city raged, there was some humor, even if it was of the darker variety. In the evenings, the Communists would break into the province communications frequency and demand to speak to Colonel Nhut. They would then trade insults. On one occasion, an arrogant voice shouted over the radio, “We have located your position. Surrender or die!” Hardly intimidated, Colonel Nhut invited the caller to come on over and that he would arrange for him to fulfill the dream of “being born in the North to die in the South.” These exchanges went on every night for several weeks.

[Jimmie Kepler · Rating 5 out of 5]

Here is a review I wrote on the book "The Battle of An Loc" by James Wilbanks for the Military History Book Club. A must have book for anyone with an interest in Viet-Nam. This is a very good read. The Battle of An Loc was a major battle of the Vietnam War that lasted from April 13 to July 20, 1972. It culminated in a decisive victory for South Vietnam’s Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). The struggle for An Loc was one of the most important battles of the war. It saw the introduction of conventional warfare and tanks by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). The ARVN forces halted the NVA advance towards Saigon. It delayed the war's end by three years.

The author, James Wilbanks, was present and wounded at An Loc. This is not only his account, but gives insights from the North Vietnamese and US Adviser's after action reports plus other communist documents. The role of the unending US air support, the bravery of the US air crews, and the orchestration by the Forward Air Controllers to the battle’s victory for the ARVN and US Adviser's is covered in warranted great detail. The inability of the NVA to have armor and infantry work together in more conventional warfare is clearly brought to light and documented. Wilbanks gives insights into Richard Nixon’s Vietnamization’s perceived success by the politicians and its ultimate failures. This is a must have read and must have addition to the library for anyone with interest in the war in Viet-Nam. Read by Jimmie A. Kepler in January 2006.

[Liam · Rating 3 out of 5]

The thing that I didn't like about this book is that when reading about an historical event, or series of events, that the author was a participant in or witness to, I am always waiting for the part that says something like "...while all that was happening, I was at x doing y, and I saw z" or whatever. Colonel Willbanks barely even mentioned his own experience of this battle, which omission unfortunately leaves a gaping hole in the narrative, in my view anyway. As a basic chronological report on the battle, it works fine, but I expected a bit more.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 5 out of 5]

A vivid, detailed and well-written history of the battle of An Lộc.

Willbanks served as an adviser to the ARVN during this battle, but still writes a standard narrative history of it from all sides. Like many commentators on the Easter Offensive in general, he notes the importance of American air power and advisors. Much of the book deals with the performance of South Vietnamese officers, and he does a good job highlighting both successes and failures here. He notes the tenacity of South Vietnamese soldiers, often contrasting it with the poor performance of many of their officers.

The narrative is balanced, insightful and pretty straightforward. The coverage of the fighting is pretty vivid. He also does a good job explaining NVA plans and operations for the offensive, at a time when the US was making plans to withdraw.

A clear, coherent and well-researched work.

[Justin]

Really interesting account of the late war - the Easter Offensive in the spring of '72 - carefully documented by an eye-witness. Waves of conventional NVA forces besieged An Loc, which was defended by ARVN (Army of the republic of Vietnam), their American advisers, and mixed Air Power. In contrast with the operation in Laos (OPERATION DEWEY CANYON II/LAM SON 719), the siege of An Loc showed how successful the policy of Vietnamization could be when backed by embedded American advisers and American Air Power.

[Jan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent, concise account of a crucial but by now forgotten battle.