The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet Afghan War

by Ali Ahmad Jalali, Lester W. Grau

This book tells the story of the Soviet-Afghan war in the words of the Mujahideen guerrillas themselves. For ten years the Mujahideen fought a military superpower that had invaded their homeland. Outnumbered and outgunned, they used classic guerrilla tactics to gradually wear down and finally defeat the Soviet army. The authors interviewed Mujahideen commanders and fighters, who describe over 100 guerrilla actions, including ambushes, urban combat, hit-and-run raids, rocket attacks, strongpoint sieges, fighting off heliborne assaults, and last-ditch defenses of their hidden mountain bases. Each vignette includes an after-action analysis by the authors, pointing out where each side succeeded or failed in its mission. A final chapter analyzes how a decentralized foot-mobile insurgent force could defeat a modern fully-mechanized army that had overwhelming artillery and air support. There are 89 tactical battle maps, and a glossary of Mujahideen and Soviet Army terminology and map symbols. This is a companion piece to “The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan,” which tells the story from the other side of the war. ISBN 9781623580544

Genres: History, Military Fiction, Nonfiction, War, Military History, Middle East, Russia

505 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 1998

About the author

Ali Ahmad Jalali is a former Afghan Army Colonel. A distinguished graduate of the Military University in Kabul, he has also attended the Infantry Officers Advanced Course in Fort Benning, Georgia; the British Army Staff College in Camberley; the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California; the Frunze Academy in Moscow and the Institute of World Politics in Washington, DC. He taught in the Military Academy and advanced military schools in Kabul. He joined the Mujahideen in 1980 and served as the top military planner on the directing staff of the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen (an alliance of three moderate Mujahideen factions) during the early 1980s before he joined Voice of America (VOA). As a journalist, he has covered Central Asia and Afghanistan over the past 15 years. He is the author of several books including works on the Soviet Military, works on Central Asia and a three-volume Military History of Afghanistan.

Reviews

[Dave/Maggie Bean · Rating 5 out of 5]

Every now and then, I’ll stumble across a book that’s worth reading. Needless to say, the steadily deteriorating quality of most of the bullshit on the mass market ensures that this happens as often as certain foreigners use toothpaste and deodorant.

Fortunately, I have some very good (and very literate) friends, friends who often turn me on to books I might otherwise have overlooked. One such friend is a regular Green Hell reader, who also happens to serve in our country’s armed forces. This Bro of mine is not only highly intelligent, but a voracious reader, as well. Our telephone conversations cover everything from survival to history, religion, world politics, and Southern Boogie bands.

Not long ago, I received a package from this most admirable of young men. Being very curious, I opened it and found a selection of books. All have thus far proven interesting, but the most fascinating title of all was The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War, by Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau of the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth.

Published by the Marine Corps Studies and Analysis Division, the book is a real-life, no-bullshit look at the reality of low-intensity conflict. (That’s a fancy way of saying “guerilla warfare,” for the benefit of any booger eatin’ feebs who may not be familiar with the term.) It is divided into several chapters, each covering a certain aspect of asymmetric warfare, i.e., ambushes, raids, shelling attacks, urban combat, etc. Each chapter consists of several vignettes, firsthand accounts by the Mujahideen who did the actual fighting against the Soviets.

I recommend this book for several reasons.

First and foremost, we’re at war with the Taliban in Afghanistan. For all that the “bait and switch” game -- a game that suckered us into sending troops after Saddam Hussein before pacifying Afghanistan -– has put Iraq in the spotlight. We must never forget that it was Afghanistan that harbored Osama bin Laden, Khalil Sheikh Muhammad, Mullah Omar, Tupaste Sheikh Yerbouti, and the supporting cast of the September 11 attacks.

Ten years later, the job beyond the Khyber Pass remains unfinished, Osama's death is independently unverifiable, and in order to get our own story straight, we’ll be fighting yet more Afghans, to whom Osama-Lama-Ding-Dong is now a cross between Willy Brennan and El Cid.

Ever heard the saying “Know your enemy?”

If not, please do the rest of the world a favor and leap in front of a speeding Peterbilt.

Next, I’ll mention that while the Afghans were certainly right to defend themselves against foreign invaders (all men have the absolute right to self-defense against tyrants, criminals and invaders, as far as I’m concerned), al Qaeda and the Taliban were, to a great extent, an unintended consequence of foreign meddling in the conflict.

The core of al Qaeda was the Maqtab al Khidimat resistance group, which operated with CIA assistance, and actually had recruiting facilities in New York and Detroit.

One of the leaders of Maqtab al Khidimat?

Osama bin Laden.

Foreign assistance during the war was also largely responsible for the rise of the Taliban their twisted allies. As the USMC admits: “The Pakistani authorities favored the most fundamentalist groups and rewarded them accordingly. This aid distribution gave the Afghan religious leaders unprecedented power in the conduct of the war. It also undermined the traditional authority of the tribal and village leaders.”

An old, Southern saying holds: “If you sleep with pigs, you’ll wake up covered in shit.” This pithy proverb means, in essence, that one must be mindful of the company one keeps. It’s a lesson we should have learned after World War I, but apparently still haven’t. Until we do, we’ll need books like this to help us “wash off,” as it were.

There’s been a good bit of bitching about “terror” tactics of late, for all that they’ve been a staple feature of warfare for as long as war has been waged. This is another reason I recommend the book. On the whole, Americans are a fat, lazy, and cowardly people. Oh, they’ll wave flags and put bumper stickers on their trucks, but the ugly reality of war is something they’d rather avoid. I suppose Hollywood bullshit is far more appealing, but it has nothing to do with the reality of missing limbs, charred flesh, and bloated, malodorous corpses strewn around like toys on a sloppy child's bedroom floor.

Let’s face the facts, boys and girls: there’s no way to “prettify” war. In order to fight one – let alone win it – it must be accepted that the enemy will commit atrocities, and so will one’s own forces. Warriors -- the side they choose being largely irrelevant -- are subjected to pressures very few of us can even imagine. Hate breeds hate. Cruelty breeds cruelty. And savagery breeds savagery. Warriors are subjected to all the above, and occasionally respond in kind. It’s just the nature of the beast we call war.

I don't share Sean Hannity's chagrin at hearing John Kerry accusing our troops of "terrorizing women and children in the dead of night." In order to survive, they must do just that, and I don't fault them for it -- assuming that this war was not of their choosing. But neither do I fault the "terrorists" this approach might create. Modern "total war" is every bit as ugly as a home-invasion robbery or barroom brawl, and requires the same mindset and tactics. But as Newton has assured us: "For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction."

This maxim holds every bit as true in the realms of politics, psychology, and warfare as in physics.

Allow me the luxury of a digression. I’ll move my focus westward, to the Persian Gulf. Does any reasonable man honestly believe that every Iraqi insurgent is a so-called “terrorist”? If so, I’d invite him to imagine the following scenario:

You’re a working stiff, with a family to feed. Your government taxes the shit out of you, wastes your money, and keeps you poor, illiterate, and ignorant. (No, wait! – That sounds too much like our own government…) uh, well, let’s stick with it anyway. One day, bombs start falling, and somewhere between 30,000 and 100,000 of your countrymen – including members of your own family – are killed. Next, a bunch of foreign soldiers, soldiers who look different from you, speak a different language, and have completely different values, occupy your country. Curfew time. Censorship time. No more televised sports. No more video games. And if you dare to wander thug-infested streets with a weapon in your belt -- BRRRRRRRP!

Would you or would you not take up arms and avenge your dead? If not your dead; your Playstation? If your answer is “No,” read something else. You’ll never understand what we’re up against, or the seriousness of the Mesopotamian and Central Asian quagmires.

If your answer is “yes,” read on. You’re my kind of guy. Let’s continue with our scenario:

You and I are from the same neighborhood. These foreigners have well and rightly “shocked and awed” -- say-- your father and my brother into the afterlife. Our family honor – no, the entire culture in which we were raised – demands that we get payback, and that’s just what we’re going to do.

The enemy has armored vehicles, sophisticated communication equipment, etc. We have only what we can scavenge.

The idea is not to die – not that we have much for which to live, anymore – but, in Patton’s words, “to make the other poor son of a bitch die for his country.” Considering the imbalance, we’ll have no choice but to resort to unconventional tactics, i.e., roadside bombs, improvised explosive and incendiary devices, sniping, booby-trapping, etc. We’re also going to kill any of our countrymen we catch aiding and abetting/collaborating with those responsible for our loss.

So I ask you: Are we “terrorists”?

Of course not. We’re men with a well-justified grudge.

And so, undoubtedly, are many Iraqi insurgents.

Until we learn to understand the nature of the enemy – why he fights, what motivates him – we haven’t a hope of winning. Considering the hopelessly tangled situation in Iraq, there are many, many enemies, each with a different motivation. I’d invite the gentle reader to have a look at chapter 2, paragraphs 4-6 of the U.S. Army’s FM 31-21 Guerilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations for futher clarification.

As so very few of my countrymen are even remotely familiar with the subject – or even with what does and doesn’t constitute a “terrorist” – I’d recommend reading the entire manual, as well as FM 27-10 The Law of Land Warfare. So essential do I consider both books; I find it impossible to have a “serious” discussion of the subject with (or have any respect for the opinions of ) anyone who hasn’t read them.

This bring us to the matters of self-righteousness and squeamishness. Anyone who considers IED’s a “terrorist” weapon is a clueless moron. Wise up, blockheads. They’re perfectly legitimate weapons, and our forces use them, too. Don’t think so? Then please explain the purpose of TM 31-210, TM 31-201-1, FM 5-31, and 31-200-1.

Haven’t read ‘em?

Why not? There’s no excuse. Many of you squeal, “We’re at war!” whenever anyone challenges the latest neocon assault on the Bill of Rights, and yet you have no idea of how wars are actually fought.

Well, you can educate yourselves for five bucks per manual, at any gun show or surplus store. I’d hurry up and get ‘em before Hillarobaracksarahmittthulhu is elected, though. With *it* in the Oval Office, and a “DemonCrap” majority in the House and Senate, I’m sure we “little people” will be denied such “dangerous” material. If a neocon is elected, private sale of such manuals will probably be banned, in order to keep them out of the hands of the “evildoers” who even now threaten to take over a nation of 300,000,000 (80,000,000 of whom are allegedly gun-owers) and impose Sharia.

Pardon the digression.

I’ll leave the last word to the authors of the book I’m reviewing. From page 370, then:

“Many people find such bombing attacks morally reprehensible, yet have no qualms when much larger bombs are dropped from aircraft. Neither type of bombing attack is surgical and both types kill innocent bystanders. The only real difference is in the size of the bomb and the means of delivery.”

I sure as hell won't argue with them. The Marines have a well-established reputation for knowing their business. If they can accept the fact that war is inherently nasty, I’ll accept it right along with ‘em. Hopefully, Joe Sixpack will catch up with us someday.

This book is essential reading in that it illustrates just how soft, decadent, and effete our country has become. I’m of the opinion that until we clean up our own act, we’ll have our asses handed to us by people who, in many ways, are more like our own ancestors than we. I’ll grant that most Mideastern countries have far more than dust-motes in their collective eyes, but we have a veritable lumberyard in ours.

First, let’s discuss the matter of grit. In this very country, entire towns sat by and watched as our own government murdered religious and political dissidents in cold blood. Yes, I’m referring to Ruby Ridge and Waco. As many believe both were isolated incidents, I’d recommend The Ballad of Carl Drega, by Vin Suprynowycz as an "eye-opener" of sorts.

Americans simply don’t have the guts to resist *anything*, let alone an enemy as determined as “the terrorists” are alleged to be. The very fact that a nation of three hundred million is sufficiently terrified of a few thousand religious fanatics to surrender its freedom in the face of one attack illustrates this simple truth far more chillingly than ever I could hope to.

Unfortunately, Gentle Reader, the Spirit of ’76 has been exorcised from this once-great nation. I don’t think we’ll ever see another Boston Tea Party, Regulator Rebellion, or Lexington. I recommend The Other Side of the Mountain because it paints a picture of the kind of men of whom one would expect such deeds. Their religion, as far as I’m concerned, is wrong. Their worldview is wrong. Their ethical and moral stance is also largely wrong.

But they are brave, resolute men, while we are not.

From the book, again: “The DRA countered these [resistance] efforts where it could and Mujahideen began to coalesce into much smaller groups centered around rural villages. These small groups were armed with a variety of weapons from swords and flintlock muskets to British bolt-action rifles and older Soviet and Soviet-bloc weapons provided to Afghanistan over the years.” (Emphasis mine.)

Is there a single living American who, in this day and age, would take a sword or musket into battle against even a mugger armed with a throwaway .32, let alone a modern army? I didn’t think so. And yet we’re going to “end evil in our time,” as our talk show hosts assure us?

Sheeee-yit. As “wussified” as we’ve become, we won’t even end petty graft in our time.

Next (and last), I’ll mention that our over-centralized way of life (aided and abetted by the mass media and our disgraceful system of public education) has rendered us a nation of helpless, unthinking sheep. Consider the utter chaos that occurred in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Consider the panic that broke out as a result of the September 11 attacks – panic so severe and widespread, that a “shadow government,” in the words of our own Vice President, was brought into play. Consider both carefully, and then ponder this, my final quote from the book:

“Afghanistan’s ancient roots and strong ties of kinship provide an anchor against progress, but also the means to cope when the central authority has collapsed. Historically, the collapse of the central government of Afghanistan or the destruction of its standing armies has never resulted in the defeat of the nation by an invader. The people, relying on their decentralized political, economic and military potential, have always taken over the resistance against invaders.”

Can we say the same of ourselves?

The facts that we cringe like whipped dogs and surrender the liberty our forefathers so doggedly fought to secure us, when threatened by a ragtag band of foreign extremists, indicate that the answer to my question is an unequivocal “No.”

[Michael Burnam-Fink · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is the stronger of Grau's books on the Soviet-Afghan War by far. Based on hundreds of interviews with former mujahideen in the mid 1990s, it is an invaluble account of how asymmetric warfare looks from the guerrilla's side.

When the mujahideen had it good, they had it very good indeed. Soviet convoy tactics were laughable, and skilled fighters were able to pick trucks off with ease, while avoiding the counterfire of armored escorts. Afghan Army outposts were basically supply depots, with guards that were cowardly and unwilling to fight. Conversely, when things went poorly, they went very poorly very quickly. Soviet airborne forces were a minority in battle, but they were supremely effective. Heavy artillery and aircraft pounded anyone exposed. The mujahideen logistics system and command structure never went beyond 'ramshackle'. This was both a weakness and a strength. While the mujahideen were unable to press an operational advantage, they were also impossible to decapitate. New leaders always rose to replace casualties. The Soviets, following the adage that the guerrilla swims like a fish in the sea of the people, attempted to drain the sea. Aerial bombardment and massive mining operations turned millions of Afghans into refugees, and lead directly to the Taliban, 9/11, the American invasion, and Afghanistan today.

The Other Side of the Mountain is focused solely on tactics, and probably should be read with a broader history of the region. But for what it does, it is the best book I've read!

Oh, and one more thing.

[Shortsman · Rating 4 out of 5]

It's interesting to read how the Afghanis viewed arab volunteers, whenever they were mentioned it was in a negative light. It's also very interesting to note how the mujahideen developed after the war, with the formerly ineffective islamist factions becoming the dominant faction in Afghanistan, simply because they fought for something more than their local tribe.

[Tom J · Rating 2 out of 5]

there's a lot of qualities about this book that are rare and interesting on their own: it's a direct response to the same concept but on the russian side, it's from people who represented another country that would be in the same conflict less than a decade later, it has an astonishingly deep insight into topics and events that are normally hidden or forgotten. unfortunately, all of these qualities are marred by the thorough, uncompromising amateurism of the actual content itself.

i specifically changed the edition of the book to the audible one on goodreads so i could call out how incredibly bad the actual narration is. the narrator manages to pronounce afghani names and locations fairly well, but stumbles over simple english words and generally manages to sound like an 8 year old reading a book report. how he managed to get the job is genuinely beyond me, there are multiple times where he stumbles over his words, repeats things, or just fucking laughs at the content of the book. was everyone else taken? could you have gotten someone who sounds less concussed? genuinely distracting and bizarre.

the content and structure of the actual book doesn't help matters. copy editing appears to be a foreign concept, and the same information is repeated ad nauseum because nothing was written with the other scenarios in mind. what could be a deeply interesting look at a unique situation quickly becomes rote, bland, and boring.

this is probably the most disappointing book i've read in a few years. the concept is fantastic and the level of access they had was so unusual as to be unique, but at every single stage the implementation is horrendous. if you want to read this book you can find it for free from the wikipedia page about it, don't give anyone money for this.

also at the end the narrator says "this is the opinion of the man narrating this" as though ANYONE asked, "i don't think the taliban has the capability to control all of afghanistan and that they will fail to achieve any of their military or social goals". good to know that the narrator is just as good at military strategy as he is at narrating a book.

[Joe · Rating 4 out of 5]

I appreciate the "matter-of-fact" writing style and the use of vignettes (short stories) developed from participant interviews to communicate the tactics that the Mujahideen employed against Russian forces in Afghanistan. While I must admit that I was tripped up by the unfamiliar names of places and people (requiring careful review of the many maps and my pathetic attempt to pronounce the words...), I found the core ideas to be familiar: shoot, move, and communicate. The mujahideen had particular trouble with the communicate part but were masters at movement (concealed, covered, at night, fast, appear & disappear). While somewhat repetitious, it's useful to see the same concepts repeated but in different contexts.

[Nadir · Rating 5 out of 5]

As a companion piece to "The Bear Went Over the Mountain" this is equally compelling reading - in many cases you read the Mujahideen commander's viewpoint of the battles described in the Soviet book - getting both sides of the story, as it were.

With the exception of IED's which have become more prevalent in Afghanistan, this is also essential reading for anyone in or headed to Afghanistan as it gives the reader direct access to Mujahideen tactics and strategic thinking. Obviously the game has changed somewhat, but there is still value in understanding this material.

[Á · Rating 5 out of 5]

Yes, I read it. Does that put me on a watch list? I also read the other one in the series. A pretty interesting look at low-intensity warfare and the tactics that are still likely being used in Afghanistan and other places.

[Joseph Broderick · Rating 5 out of 5]

History repeats itself...

The Afghanistan people defeated the British , the Russians and now the Americans using the same tactics that they have used since 1895. The are very good fighters, and know their home ground well. Essential knowledge for guerrilla fighters.

[Zachary · Rating 2 out of 5]

Very useful info, but written in a way that definitely doesn't keep your attention. Good lessons, bad read.

[Richard · Rating 1 out of 5]

The problem with this book is that despite the interesting premise—a book written by an Afghan military officer based on interviews with mujahideen commanders from the Soviet-Afghan war—it simply isn't interesting. The writing style is dry, bare, charmless, uninsightful, and frankly contentless. I stopped looking at the maps pretty quickly because they added almost nothing except maybe to show that the things that are reported to have happened in this book have the ability to have poor maps drawn of them.

I feel like I am the target audience of this book: a former combat arms soldier, security studies scholar, and I did security work in Afghanistan. But it was lost on me. The vignettes are all basically written like this: I was the commander in x valley. The valley had a river in it and the hills near it had trees. Near the river was a road. I took ten men, eight rifles, and an RPG and we attacked the Soviets from a hill. We don't know how many Soviet casualties there were. We had one casualty.

Then the commentary from the U.S. military officer co-author will say something like: The mujahideen were professional because they used a hill. The attack could have gone better if they had radios. The Soviets did not adequately defend themselves by doing y or z. Reading this in 2023, the U.S. military officer critiques of the Soviet military officers did not age well.

It's a shame because I'm sure the mujahideen had fantastic stories to tell but they aren't in this book. I feel like this is written at about a sixth grade level (which isn't too abnormal for military writing) but also at maybe a sixth grader's understanding of war. Gunmen kill other gunmen with rifles, machine guns, and mortars. But that isn't what's interesting, compelling, or important about war. There's nothing to be learned from this book. There's no there there.

I guess what really bothers me about this book is that maybe that was the point. I fear that one day there will be a book written like this by a US military officer about our war in Afghanistan and it will be on military officer reading lists and they will dutifully read it and learn nothing from it too.

[J.R. · Rating 4 out of 5]

I liked this book more than it's predecessor and counterpart, "The Bear Went Over The Mountain". This is probably due to the first book being a Soviet Army publication that was translated with editor noted tacked on at the end of vignettes.

This book was wholly described and written by Lester Grau and Ali Jalali, therefore the stories appeared to be more authentic to reality and more detailed. I will say it would have been easier to understand the sketches if they had been published in color (reds and blues) and in standard US Army symbology. The use of Soviet military symbols mad sense for the first book, but was unnecessary for the second. It took a lot of the value out of the sketches because I couldn't nderstand what I was looking at as naturally as if it had been US symbols.

This book is also a fairly longer, which made me feel like it was dragging on towards the end. I didn't need 15 vignettes on ambushes and counter-ambushes, unless each had significant tactical differences and lessons learned (which ain't the case).

[Vardaan · Rating 5 out of 5]

As someone with very little small unit experience/tac knowledge this was a very interesting read. I was primarily curious about how guerillas operate with limited resources, especially in a factional area such as Afghanistan as opposed to the Viet cong (who were much more rigid in their command structure). I think the book does a great job of teaching how they fought within their means, and also how the fragmented nature of their fight led to them being much more ineffective as a whole, but more effective as an insurgency in the long term. Most vignettes have a map with a key to all the symbology used so you can learn about ordnance deployment/reasoning in addition to how small groups are split up depending on the task. Each chapter deals with different operations and of course each unit is outfitted differently, so each one serves as a lesson for how to effectively (or sometimes ineffectively) deal with a larger enemy. There’s a reason Afghanistan is referred to as the grave of empires, and reading this will give you a very good idea as to why that is.

[Monzenn · Rating 3 out of 5]

The content itself is worthy of four stars. It is a solid tale of the tactics used by Afghans to win their war against the Soviets. Information was a-plenty and the perspective was clear enough.

Unfortunately I dropped the fourth star because of the editing issues of the copy I had. Blurred maps, paragraphs that seemed to skip a sentence or two in the next page, and lots of typing (or maybe transcription) errors. The story was still readable, but the experience took a downturn because of the book itself.

[Emre Sultan · Rating 5 out of 5]

an outstanding book . Not only a Mujaheddin stories .. But a conclusive studies about them and their morale , their types and models of weapons used in every battle , the topography of the battlefield and its history , maps for illustrations .. a brief accounts about every single clash , the reasons of success or failure ..
A must read book for every revolutionary Islamist fighting against tyranny everywhere .

[Ben · Rating 3 out of 5]

A very interesting book , I personally I wanted to hear more from the Afghan fighters . I really want to hear their side of the story we’ve heard lots from our side over the years . More military tactical lessons in this book which is fascinating but can be a dry read for anyone not familiar with it.

[Mark Arbanasin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Was not quite what I was expecting but instead a very detailed series of engagements and their breakdown from a military doctrine perspective. Interesting a quick read even if a bit elusive as the various example scenarios began to reveal a pattern which was the goal odd the author.

[Andy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Informative but hard to read.

[Will · Rating 4 out of 5]

It is what it is, and it's fascinating if you're into this kind of thing.

[Norman Oca · Rating 5 out of 5]

Really interesting to read this during the US withdrawal.

[Andy Holbert · Rating 3 out of 5]

Great for work, ok for pleasure

[JMA · Rating 3 out of 5]

Also a slog, but more interesting stories. The AARs were also veru informative.

[Undisclosed Name · Rating 5 out of 5]

Brilliant piece on the technical details of Afghan people's anti-imperialist struggle against Soviet occupiers.

[Bill Evans · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a much better book than his book covering the Soviet side of the war, which I did not even finish.

[أبو محمد · Rating 5 out of 5]

an outstanding book . Not only a Mujaheddin stories .. But a conclusive studies about them and their morale , their types and models of weapons used in every battle , the topography of the battlefield and its history , maps for illustrations .. a brief accounts about every single clash , the reasons of success or failure ..
A must read book for every revolutionary Islamist fighting against tyranny everywhere .

[Ryan · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a great read for all that are interested in the current campaign in Afganistan. The mujahadeen were not a well trained or even well organized military force, yet overcame and forced out the Soviet military. This book provides insite in to how this was accomplished.

[Eric Elliott · Rating 3 out of 5]

A good history of the Afghan-Soviet War.

[Tristanb18 · Rating 5 out of 5]

I keep it in my office and read a vignette here and there.

[Steven]

Good read that details expertly with how these fighters "blend" in and out of combat situations.

[Eric Glocer · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the most interesting compilations of after action reviews I have ever seen!

[Eric Johnson · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very good book on the other side of the Soviet-Afghan war. Anecdotes and review of some of the myriad battles during that time, a great resource