A rich and surprising portrait of the little-known institution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Deep inside the Pentagon an alarming story is told of how the military has fought itself and its civilian leaders throughout the postwar period.
Mark Perry (1950 – 8 August 2021) was an American author specializing in military, intelligence, and foreign affairs analysis.[1][2]
He authored nine books: Four Stars,[3] Eclipse: The Last Days of the CIA,[4] A Fire In Zion: Inside the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process,[5] Conceived in Liberty,[6] Lift Up Thy Voice,[7] Grant and Twain,[8] Partners In Command,[9] Talking To Terrorists,[10] and The Most Dangerous Man in America: The Making of Douglas MacArthur.[11]
Perry’s articles have been featured in a number of publications including The Los Angeles Times, The Washington Post, The Nation, Newsday, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the Christian Science Monitor, and The Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio).
Background Perry was a graduate of Northwestern Military and Naval Academy and of Boston University.
Career Perry was the former co-Director of the Washington, D.C., London, and Beirut-based Conflicts Forum,[12] which specializes in engaging with Islamist movements in the Levant in dialogue with the West. Perry served as co-Director for over five years. A detailed five-part series on this experience was published by the Asia Times in March and in July 2006.[13] Perry served as an unofficial advisor to PLO Chairman and Palestinian President Yasser Arafat from 1989 to 2004.[14][15]
An important and controversial look at the history and evolution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an organization that, even today, remains opaque and poorly understood by the general public. The book is filled with fascinating insights into the the personalities and policy battles that shaped the JCS and, most importantly, highlights the skirmishes, battles, and campaigns between the JCS and their civilian masters on the major issues that defined civil-military relations over the course of four crisis-filled decades, 1947-1987 (e.g. the development of new weapons systems, the conduct of military operations, crisis response, the sizing of the military establishment, etc). The narrative ends in 1988 and, as a result, does not include an analysis of the Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986), a transformative piece of legislation that increased the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and brought sweeping changes to the way the US military organized its forces. The work also suffers from a curious and unsatisfying approach to footnotes. But these are minor quibbles. This is an excellent book and a good read.