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The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir
The first detailed Iranian account of the diplomatic struggle between Iran and the international community, The Iranian Nuclear A Memoir opens in 2002, as news of Iran's clandestine uranium enrichment and plutonium production facilities emerge. Seyed Hossein Mousavian, previously the head of the Foreign Relations Committee of Iran's Supreme National Security Council and spokesman for Tehran's nuclear negotiating team, brings the reader into Tehran's private deliberations as its leaders wrestle with internal and external adversaries. Mousavian provides readers with intimate knowledge of Iran's interactions with the International Atomic Energy Agency and global powers. His personal story comes alive as he vividly recounts his arrest and interrogations on charges of espionage. Dramatic episodes of diplomatic missions tell much about the author and the swirling dynamics of Iranian politics and diplomacy―undercurrents that must be understood now more than ever. As intense debate continues over the direction of Iran's nuclear program, Mousavian weighs the likely effects of military strikes, covert action, sanctions, and diplomatic engagement, considering their potential to resolve the nuclear crisis. Contents 1. The Origin and Development of Iran's Nuclear Program 2. The First Crisis 3. From Tehran to Paris 4. From the Paris Agreement to the 2005 Presidential Election 5. The Larijani Period 6. To the Security Council 7. Back to the Security Council and a New Domestic Situation 8. Iran The Jalili Period 9. U.S. Engagement 10. The Crisis Worsens 11. Conclusion
612 pages, Paperback
First published June 4, 2012
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
February 1, 2024
Very informative
October 7, 2012
This is a very interesting book and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace deserve great credit for publishing it. The author brings to bear an extremely detailed knowledge of the Iranian nuclear crisis, and its interplay with domestic Iranian politics, even if, as he admits, he was not entrusted himself with full knowledge of Iran's nuclear programme. The book is very clearly written, even if it is fairly dry stuff.
Mousavian is right that the crisis is primarily presented in the international media from a Western viewpoint which obscures several crucial facets of the crisis. Namely that Western demands in effect require Iran to give up its legal rights under the NPT. The problem, although he doesn't state it quite explicitly, is that the current NPT regime basically allows states to get to a point where a nuclear weapon could be produced very quickly and without much chance of detection. And though his point about Western hypocrisy over Pakistan and India is fair enough, he doesn't really address quite a fundamental concern which is the one over wider proliferation - if Iran gets the ability to get the bomb (should it choose) that will likely further destabilise the Middle East.
Mousavian does eventually concede that one motivation for Iran is the ability to have the option to build a weapon if it wants to. And he points out that Gaddafi learned the hard way that doing what the West on nuclear weapons meant NATO could attack him in 2011. One can understand the Iranian view.
The problem is quite acutely summarised on pages 463-4 where Mousavian sets out the "red lines" of each side. Depressingly, personally I can't see how confrontation can be avoided. It seems the problem with his programme on page 464, is that it would leave Iran with the option of leaving the NPT with its relatively invulnerable nuclear facilities intact, and building a weapon.
Mousavian is right that the crisis is primarily presented in the international media from a Western viewpoint which obscures several crucial facets of the crisis. Namely that Western demands in effect require Iran to give up its legal rights under the NPT. The problem, although he doesn't state it quite explicitly, is that the current NPT regime basically allows states to get to a point where a nuclear weapon could be produced very quickly and without much chance of detection. And though his point about Western hypocrisy over Pakistan and India is fair enough, he doesn't really address quite a fundamental concern which is the one over wider proliferation - if Iran gets the ability to get the bomb (should it choose) that will likely further destabilise the Middle East.
Mousavian does eventually concede that one motivation for Iran is the ability to have the option to build a weapon if it wants to. And he points out that Gaddafi learned the hard way that doing what the West on nuclear weapons meant NATO could attack him in 2011. One can understand the Iranian view.
The problem is quite acutely summarised on pages 463-4 where Mousavian sets out the "red lines" of each side. Depressingly, personally I can't see how confrontation can be avoided. It seems the problem with his programme on page 464, is that it would leave Iran with the option of leaving the NPT with its relatively invulnerable nuclear facilities intact, and building a weapon.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews