This absolute gem of a little book, published by Univocal Press (2013), contains a new translation (Ira J. Allen) of a single essay penned by Nietzsche in 1870, “The Dionysian Vision of the World.” This essay is also contained in Oscar Levy’s (ed.) The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche (eighteen volumes) with a different translation. Importantly, this new text contains a unique, if not refreshingly idiosyncratic introduction (Friedrich Ulfers), which works, along with the lively translation, to highlight, in a consistent manner, the decidedly metaphysical, ontological, and even proto-phenomenological elements of Nietzsche’s early thought.
I note for readers unfamiliar with Nietzsche scholarship, such metaphysical issues are usually ignored in favor of “psychology” within the voluminous secondary Nietzsche scholarship produced with monotonous regularity, exceptions are to be found, however, in the exhilarating contemporary writings of S. D. Kirkland, “Nietzsche and the Drawing Near to the Personalities of the Pre-Platonic Greeks” (2011) and John Sallis’ recently published lecture course, Nietzsche’s Voices (2022), to provide but two examples.
To clarify these aforementioned issues, I want to briefly turn to Ulfers’ concise and enlightening introduction, since it is the case that the ideas contained in the 1870 essay form the philosophical foundation of Nietzsche’s 1972 version of The Birth of Tragedy, where the case can be made that in that extended format, the actual process of “aesthetic transformation/ekstatic attunement,” linked with tragedy and the encounter with Dionysian primal Unity (Ur-Eine), is at times unclear and even inconsistent. However, as Michael Tanner once pointed out, at certain points when reading/experiencing Nietzsche’s “intoxicated” paean to the tragic Greeks, tragedy, and Dionysus, it is perhaps best to simply release ourselves over to the transformative force of Nietzsche’s poetic and intoxicating writing: “It will never repay a certain kind of close-reading…that looks for aporias, fissures, self-subversions, and the rest of the deconstructionist’s toolkit” (Nietzsche, 1996, p. 26).
Yet, the content of Nietzsche’s essay, as expressed through Ulfers’ interpretation comprising the introduction, presents these dense ontological concepts in a way that is, as stated above, consistent and will be accessible to all interested readers of Nietzsche. I now present a brief review of key tenets comprising Ulfer’s “phenomenological” reading of Nietzsche’s early essay.
The aesthetic forces of the Apollonian and Dionysian, which work through a harmonious and “dissonant” counter-striving interaction or dance, are interpreted in terms of an overarching “ontology of music” or aesthetic ontology. Here, Nature is conceived as a primordial artist, which unlike the human artist, brings forth the world in an “unaided,” but not uninspired, fashion.
The former relates to the dream world, imagistic artforms, and conceptual imagery; the tone of the Apollonian is expressed through speaking a conceptual language and walking in carefully measured steps. Here, beauty, order, stasis, and moderation are stressed, the conception (appearance) of a unified self (principium individuationis) is derived from the ontological mode of the Apollonian. Ulfers claims that the Apollonian not only gives structure to appearances, but it is also linked with “substance ontology,” as might be related to a doctrinal metaphysical reading of Plato’s Forms (eidoi - to ontōs on), which the so-called “eternal” world of becoming does not substantiate.
The latter, associated with boundary shattering orgiastic intoxication, is non-imagistic, and its unique tone is expressed through song and dance - Dionysian music. “It is Dionysian intoxication that comes closest to grasping the insubstantive primary appearing that is all that world is” (p. 4), and here we might imagine the overwhelming power that tragic music holds and releases! It is the Dionysian that becomes essential when attempting to understand Greek tragedy, and specifically the historical manifestation of the “Hellenic Will,” which in the experience of tragedy, is related to the harmonious interaction between the two originary and oppositional aesthetic forces in their polemical unfolding.
Interestingly, Ulfers makes no mention of Schopenhauer when discussing the “world Will,” but provides an extensive list of ideas or philosophical tenets that Nietzsche draws directly from Heraclitus, and some of these are as follows (derived from Nietzsche’s unfinished book, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks): (1) all things have their opposite with them, and there is a denial of static Being and the so-called “ontological distinction,” this in favor of the affirmation of eternal “becoming” (2) the world “worlds” through the ontological process of warfare or strife (polemos). However, this polemos, as opposed to purely destructive in nature, is a process that is both constructive-and-destructive, creative and artistic, and ultimately gives birth to the world, and (3) there is the interplay of “antinomies,” where the radical antipodal difference and line between Being and non-Being blurs - Being and non-Being are at once the same and not the same.
The bulk of the essay concerns “presence” or Nature’s (physis) coming-to-present and the ineluctable connection that music - specifically, Dionysian (“tragic”) music - has with this ever-renewed and ongoing “aesthetic” phenomenon. As stated, Nietzsche’s essay offers a more concise and consistent view of “presencing” than is offered by Nietzsche in the full-length Birth of Tragedy, and it will be helpful to briefly explore these issues.
It is the counter-striving activity of the Apollonian and Dionysian forces that is responsible for “presencing” or the world’s “worlding,” and several aspects of the Ulfers’ interpretation of Nietzsche’s view on this issue, which includes certain technical phenomenological terms, seem as if they had been inspired by Heidegger’s important reading of the forces of “World” and “Earth” as presented the 1936 version of “The Origin of the Work of Art” (Basic Writings, 2008).
Crucially, there are two distinct notions of oppositional relations in this essay: First, the opposing emotions, feelings, or attuning pathea of pleasure (joy) and pain (suffering) common to the Dionysian - inspiring tragic or “Dionysian wisdom,” a mode (Stimmung) of “ekstatic intoxication” - which in harmony with the Apollonian, dominates Nietzsche’s aesthetic ontology. Second, the world-giving opposition enacted between the metaphysical forces of the Apollonian and Dionysian, which precedes and always exceeds human intervention. The counter-striving strife (polemos) or primordial dance between these two forces, gives voice to, when bringing the world to “presence,” the “musical expansion that is the entanglement of dissonance [which dominates] and consonance” (p. 2). In Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche makes clear that both the Apollonian and Dionysian, “walk side by side, usually in violent opposition to the other, inciting one another to even more powerful births” (1993, p. 14).
Nietzsche claims the Greeks grasped this in terms relating to harmony, or the “chiasmic unity” of opposites, which remain together in a way that allows each to retain the essential elements defining it. In the notes compiling Will to Power (1967), Nietzsche claims that one of the most important differences between the two forces, which relates to the theme of music/dance, is the tempo at which each moves or unfolds.
Harmony is not therefore a “consonance of opposites, but rather a troubled unity, a unity that does not synthesize [is never fully resolved] without remainder” (p. 7). The counter-striving between the forces shelters a sense of radical disquiet, described by Ulfers as “overfullness,” which is related to the unique notion of the pathos (suffering) of physis (Nature), and we note that pathein indicates a “suffering and undergoing of pain or a burden we bear up.” This indicates that Nature expresses a “desire” for worlding or manifesting phenomena, harboring a “compulsion to manifest, so that worlding, or becoming [Werden] is this inquietude [pathos] of being divided against itself [in polemos], relieving itself as appearance of Schein” (p. 1). Because of the creative tension, and here we might imagine this phenomenon in the original Greek sense of archē, “the heart of Nature [is] a creative, desiring, a will [Wille] or a wanting [Wollen] to manifest” (p. 16). The willing and original unfolding of Nature is “in” appearances, and it is also - as ontological excess - beyond appearances, thus it can never be brought to stand in a full conceptual understanding, e.g., in terms of the Apollonian drive for completeness, stasis, and conceptual clarity, in the Apollonian “light of truth,” as it were.
The Apollonian, however, serves as a necessary aesthetic-and-illusory prophylactic against the overwhelming force and terrible truth of the rising Dionysian force, an instance where a “new transfiguring illusion becomes necessary,” for through the Apollonian, “the will has another task - to keep us in the business of living on by helping hold the disgust of Silenus at bay even as we move through it” (p. 19). But Dionysian “immoderation” always exceeds the moderation of Apollo’s truth, by reveling a “contradiction that is not a logical truth, but rather a “chiasmic, ontological one” (p. 15), and this truth of the “Heart of Nature, or Will, or “Primal Unity”. Both drives work to inspire humans, if they are attuned to the experience, to higher possibilities of their being, and then, as in Attic Greek tragedy, are presented with the potential to reach still higher glorification through art, but never as a means of escape, by glossing over or obscuring, “the [primordial] suffering of coming-to-be and passing-away” (p. 19). Music, for Nietzsche, is both the supreme aesthetic instantiation and expression of Nature’s force, it communicates insights into the chiasmic unity of will, symbolizing the “will outside of and prior to the world of appearances, outside of the realm of image-making or visual art; in a domain where the will “makes itself immediately understandable” (p. 21), in the experience of the rise of the Dionysian intoxication of pleasure-cum-pain.
If readers focus on one of Ulfers claims: “In contrasting the ‘heart of nature’ – the ‘Will’ or ‘primordial unity’ – with ‘appearance,’ Nietzsche is not participating in the traditional Western opposition of Being and appearance [Sein and Schein], all references to ‘essence’ notwithstanding” (p. 16). Much in the manner of Heidegger, it is possible to level a critique of Nietzsche grounded in what might be fittingly termed, “The Heraclitean Fallacy.” It appears that in establishing “becoming” as the most primordial, permanent, and “eternal” condition of the world, it is inevitable that the idea of Being (as in substance ontology), as understood in metaphysical readings of Plato, is smuggled in - and so, the ontological distinction, the hallmark of traditional metaphysics, is retained. All that occurs, albeit in a highly creative manner, is a reversal of the well-established privileging of the poles of Being and becoming. Nietzsche thus remains, although undeniably pushing boundaries, within the parameters established by the Western metaphysical tradition.
However, Ulfers ends his introductory analysis with a unique interpretation that I have not encountered in many years of reading Nietzsche and the secondary literature, which might serve to rescue Nietzsche from the foregoing critique: To reiterate, at the heart of the primordial unity (Ur-Eine) is neither a being nor substance, but rather a feeling, an emotion or attuning pathos, a wanting or Wollen that defies classification as an existent: “We can only imagine that Nietzsche means that the Ur-Eine…driving all appearing, all becoming, is itself not an appearing or a becoming. The truly existent, then, is neither some form of static Being [Sein] nor the specific ephemera of Appearing [Schein]. It is truly existent insofar as it never belongs to the appearances it generates; and yet ‘existence’ still does not denote substance or grounding being” (p. 22-23).
To conclude: Great care is taken in both the preparation and production of the book: (1) Ulfers incorporates footnotes in the introduction to facilitate reading ease, and all footnotes/endnotes serve the ultimate task of elucidating the main text, and are not used in a way to “showcase” the advanced erudition of the scholars, (2) Allen’s translation incorporates endnotes, so as not to interrupt the flow of Nietzsche’s work, and (3) the choice of typesetting (spacing of characters) highlights and emphasizes the musicality of the original writing, and Allen explains this in the “Translator’s Preface,” stating that the book is typeset according to “Nietzsche’s own typographic preference” (p. viii). There is, undeniably, an elevated sense of spirit one gets from reading Nietzsche, for me, particularly when reading his works on aesthetics, and this lively translation - that both walks with measured steps and then dances when appropriate - of Nietzsche’s essay does not disappoint! This book, with new translation of and introduction to Nietzsche’s early essay of 1870, is well-worth reading; it will greatly appeal to scholars and intelligent laypersons alike.
Dr. James M. Magrini
Former: Philosophy/College of Dupage