Macarthur's War: The Flawed Genius Who Challenged The American Political System

by Bevin Alexander

Douglas MacArthur famously said there is no substitute for victory . . . As a United States general, he had an unparalleled genius for military strategy, and it was under his leadership that Japan was rebuilt into a democratic ally after World War II. But MacArthur carried out his zero-sum philosophy both on and off the battlefield. During the Korean War, in defiance of President Harry S. Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he pushed for an aggressive confrontation with Communist China—a position intended to provoke a wider war, regardless of the cost or consequences. MacArthur’s ambition to stamp out Communism across the globe was in direct opposition to President Truman, who was much more concerned with containing the Soviet Union than confronting Red China. The infamous clash between the two leaders was not only an epic turning point in history, but the ultimate struggle between civil and military power in the United States. While other U.S. generals have challenged presidential authority—from Zachary Taylor in the Mexican War and George B. McClellan in the Civil War to General Stanley A. McChrystal in Afghanistan—no other military leader has ever so brazenly attempted to dictate national policy. In MacArthur’s War , Bevin Alexander details MacArthur’s military and political battles, from the alliances he made with Republican leaders to the threatening ultimatum he delivered to China against orders—the action that directly led to his dismissal on April 11, 1951.

INCLUDES PHOTOGRAPHS

Genres: Military History, Biography

256 pages, Hardcover

First published May 1, 2013

About the author

Bevin Alexander is an American military historian and author. He served as an officer during the Korean War as part of the 5th Historical Detachment. His book Korea: The First War We Lost was largely influenced by his experiences during the war.

Bevin has served as a consultant and adviser to several groups due to his military expertise, including work for the Rand Corporation, work as a consultant for military simulations instituted by the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, and as director of information at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia. .

He was formerly on the president’s staff as director of information at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., and is a retired adjunct professor of history at Longwood University, in Farmville, Virginia.

Reviews

[Roger · Rating 2 out of 5]

I wasn't expecting this book to be such a polemic - it's truly a hatchet job on General Douglas MacArthur, and in the process of chopping him up Alexander makes some strange bedfellows and comes to some interesting conclusions.

This book is ostensibly about the removal of MacArthur from his role leading the United Nations troops in Korea, and the clashes he had with President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff before that occurred.

After a long introduction that mostly concerns the Chinese Civil War and the Nationalist's retreat to Taiwan, Alexander ventures into American diplomacy after WWII, with an emphasis on the Kennan "Long Telegram", and the ensuing American policy, if that's the right word, of containment.

Alexander posits that the North Koreans basically acted alone in starting the Korean War, having advised the USSR that the USA would not respond to their aggression. Thanks to tactical blunders in the UN by the Soviets, the Americans passed a resolution that allowed a UN force to be sent to help the Koreans. It was at this moment that MacArthur showed his brilliance as a field commander, with the Inchon landings, which, at a stroke, changed the picture in Korea and allowed the UN forces to advance into North Korean territory.

It is here that Alexander seems to me to be blinded by his dislike of MacArthur. MacArthur always danced to the beat of his own drum, and rarely allowed wider perspectives to interfere with what he thought was best, usually for him. As a General, he naturally wished to completely defeat the enemy, and what better way than to occupy North Korea. Alexander makes much of his earlier discussion of the American policy of containment of Communism, and accuses both Truman, Acheson and the JCS of grievous wrong by going against that policy. He almost writes as if they were breaking the law by changing their minds, but surely the President makes foreign policy, and if events change the policy too would surely change. The complete collapse of the North Korean armed forces certainly changed events, and I don't think MacArthur can be held responsible for pushing the US into something it didn't want to do - it seems clear that both Truman and Acheson saw that uniting Korea was a positive, and now within their grasp. The JCS didn't see any reason not to agree with that change of heart.

Alexander then pillories MacArthur for not foreseeing that China would intervene in the war if the UN forces approached the Yalu River. He makes much of the lack of US intelligence gathering, and that if they had been more subtle they would have perceived what the Chinese were thinking, and in fact that if they had moved up to the Yalu with South Korean forces only, the Chinese would not have intervened. This is all a little hard to understand. MacArthur was not the only senior commander or diplomat who did not foresee Chinese involvement - in fact there was really only one voice in the US administration who was warning of the probability. Chinese intelligence on US intentions was equally as faulty as the US intelligence on China - the US never intended crossing the Yalu (despite what MacArthur might have thought), so there was no immediate threat to China. And I also wonder, if China wasn't going to intervene until the UN approached the Yalu, why they had nearly half a million troops gathered at the border?

When the Chinese wave broke over the UN troops, it does seem that MacArthur almost underwent some sort of breakdown - after the initial shock and ragged retreat, the UN and Korean forces soon stabilised as the Chinese outran their primitive logistical supply, and a status quo was reached. MacArthur, on the other hand, seemed to think that Korea was lost, and this was when he started to seriously vent his ideas about blockading China, and attacking the Chinese mainland.

One wonders what was going through MacArthur's mind at this stage of proceedings, as he was clearly contradicting his civilian superiors - Alexander doesn't much go in for psychological theories, but here's a couple from someone much less qualified - 1. MacArthur was well known for his narcissistic personality, and after the shock of the Chinese intervention, he was looking for a way for him to regain his glory, or "face". Alexander doesn't discuss MacArthur's WWII record in this book, but it is clear from that time that wherever MacArthur was and whatever he was doing was the most important place, battle, or struggle in the World. Therefore it is not surprising in the slightest that he still saw things that way. 2. Again going back to WWII - in that struggle the aim was total destruction (unconditional surrender) of the enemy, and every means and effort was expended to that aim, without political interference. Korea was a totally different time and place, but it could be that MacArthur expected the political side of the coin to react to his ideas in the same way as they did during the earlier conflict. It's clear that MacArthur was wrong, and Truman and co. were right, but a small amount of thought goes a ways to understanding MacArthur's actions and words at this time.

Alexander doesn't seem to have considered these things, in fact he expends far more words attempting to explain away the Chinese activities than he does trying to understand MacArthur - he spends much more time on the "flawed" than the "genius" of his title.

Alexander finishes the book with a description of the hearings in Washington, which laid out in full the distance between MacArthur's thoughts, and those of the President and the JCS. In his conclusion he makes the claim that MacArthur was trying to usurp the elected President of the United States and create a military dictatorship. This is palpably a ridiculous claim - the quote from MacArthur that Alexander uses as a basis for this proposition clearly relates to civilian interference in battlefield decisions, not grand strategy or political control. The fact that MacArthur, when relieved of his command, made no protest, did not, as most military dictators would, take an army to the capitol, or even encourage his supporters to rebel. In fact, as related by his successor General Ridgeway "He [MacArthur] was entirely himself - composed, quiet, temperate, friendly, and helpful to the man who was to succeed him."

While this book was disappointing in many ways, like all good polemics it has much truth in it, and has driven me to widen my reading on this now little known controversy.

Check out my other reviews at http://aviewoverthebell.blogspot.com.au/

[James Rooney · Rating 5 out of 5]

Long ago I read a book by Bevin Alexander and thought I'd give him another try. Recently it was my grandfather's birthday, and as both of my grandfathers served in Korea I thought it would be a good opportunity to revisit the conflict.

My grandfather had William Manchester's classic 'American Caesar,' which I read while I was a teenager and which I surely mostly didn't understand at the time, and I wonder what he thought of the general.

MacArthur is an enigma, he is very much hit or miss. Inchon has to rank as one of the most inspired operations in military history, a perfect use of seapower and a crowning achievement for MacArthur who frequently employed amphibious operations in the Southwest Pacific to confound and bypass strong enemy forces.

At Inchon it resulted in the total destruction of the North Korean Army, but then the opportunity was missed to achieve something great.

One cannot help but recall Clemenceau's famous quip that war is far too important to be left to the generals, and Alexander makes frequent appeal to Clausewitz's dictum of war being politics by other means.

The thesis is that MacArthur attempted to pursue his own policy in regards to the war and to Communist China that was at variance with the President, the State Department, and the Joint Chiefs.

He cites numerous evidence to advance this line of argument. He notes that MacArthur would make frequently public statements, often leaked in the press, which contradicted the statements of Truman or the US Government, or were ambiguous as to intent.

MacArthur mostly stayed in Japan during the war, only infrequently flying to Korea for very brief recons, defied orders such as to only advance over the 38th Parallel if no resistance from China or Russia was anticipated, or to send Americans to the Yalu when he was told only to send ROK forces to the Sino-Korean border, and his very dramatic journey to Taiwan to personally confer with Chiang Kai-Shek.

Alexander contends that Truman's policy was in line with Kennan's ideas of containment, and though the State Department was deceived as to China's subservience to the Kremlin, this policy was nonetheless sound.

The book starts by explaining Mao's triumph in China, the bankruptcy of Chiang's regime, the break between Mao and Stalin, and the misreading of the international situation by all sides.

MacArthur claimed that Communist China was aggressive and imperialist, that she was Moscow's stooge, and that Korea was a testing ground for American resolve. Alexander suggests the evidence is otherwise. Mao's policy was cautious and restrained. We might nit-pick here with some of his points, such as that Tibet was always part of China. Communist China certainly looks very imperialist in her dealings with Tibet, but the overall picture is convincing. Mao did not want a general war with the United States, much less did Stalin.

The evidence suggests that Kim Il-Sung decided to invade South Korea on his own initiative and that neither Mao nor Stalin were enthusiastic. Alexander notes that the Soviets withdrew their advisors before the start of the war, and were reluctant to provide aid to North Korea.

In the diplomatic sphere I am sometimes skeptical of Alexander's narrative. He is given to much speculation about Chinese motives and intentions.

He claims, for instance, that had the ROKs crossed the 38th Parallel without American troops, that Mao might have even permitted a reunion of Korea under Syngman Rhee. Well, possibly, but one is suspicious. He says that had the ROKs advanced to the Yalu without the Americans the Chinese would not have resisted. We will never know this counterfactual, and where is the evidence? A few statements made by Zhou Enlai to the Indian Government.

He says that the Chinese made their intention to resist an American invasion of North Korea plain as day. But having read a number of works on intelligence and deception, I suspect that this was much less plain to the officials at the time.

No doubt that the pieces of evidence that Alexander cites are genuine. The Chinese did make a number of somewhat vague statements about their intention to prevent the US from reaching the Yalu. They released some statements about Japanese imperialism, and Japan using Korea to attack China which the US, they alleged, was repeating.

These do not strike me as very clear explicit indications that China intended to intervene in Korea with enormous force. But even if they were, it is easy to see how these remarks could have been buried under the mountain of reports coming in.

This same consideration, Roberta Wohlstetter's concept of 'noise,' incidentally explains how the United States was taken by surprise first by the initial North Korean invasion, and again by the Chinese intervention.

The evidence for both was there, but nobody had the time or the insight to identify the wheat from the chaff. The genuine information was drowned in a sea of noise.

China might have done better to make a direct unambiguous statement to the United States. But she never did.

Alexander suggests that Truman lapsed from the sound strategy of Kennan and allowed himself to be carried away in the flush of victory after Inchon. Then after the intervention of China there was a chance for a ceasefire, but it was squandered by both China and the US.

Here Alexander talks of Mao being a diplomatic novice and being outwitted by Acheson and his maneuver to accept the proposals made by a group of states that even suggested giving Taiwan to Mao.

Yet, he also, at other points, argues that Mao was sagacious and his policy well-founded. Was he a novice or a visionary? Some consistency here would have been appreciated.

The link of Taiwan with Korea is a major and important theme. The China Lobby was very powerful and was the primary support for MacArthur. It likely encouraged his intransigence.

MacArthur, of course, was dismissed because he wanted to extend the war against China. He wanted to blockade the Chinese coast, to bomb targets in China (possibly with nuclear weapons), and to use Nationalist Chinese forces based in Taiwan to either reinforce the UN forces in Korea or to make amphibious landings on the Chinese coast.

Alexander does not discuss the infamous controversy of MacArthur's proposal to use nukes on China. MacArthur himself has denied ever suggesting this, but even conventional munitions would have greatly expanded the conflict.

We see here that MacArthur was profoundly mistaken as to his conclusions. He believed that the Chinese would not intervene, and this optimism was replaced by pessimism when he reported that Korea could not be held during the Chinese New Year Offensive of 1951.

This may have been a ploy by MacArthur to gain permission to expand the war against China, ostensibly to avoid imminent defeat in Korea. Alexander notes that it prompted the Joint Chiefs to consider doing just that. But after examining the situation on the ground the Joint Chiefs were convinced that MacArthur was wrong and Korea could be held.

MacArthur's failings as a general are also curiously juxtaposed alongside his masterstroke at Inchon. Why did he insist on an amphibious operation against Wonsan that wasted everyone's time? Why did he insist on keeping the 10th Corps and 8th Army separate? Why did he advance towards the Yalu in two large concentrations separated by impassable mountains?

These are all very amateurish mistakes, and when we read the account of how he was the driving force behind Inchon and carried it out against the opposition of the Joint Chiefs and everyone else, it is difficult to get a measure of MacArthur as a commander.

The first stages of the Korean War were certainly 'MacArthur's War,' and he is to be credited with the courageous and seemingly nonsensical strategy of sending units piecemeal to slow the enemy down while strengthening the perimeter at Pusan, buying time for the masterful counterstroke at Inchon which he had conceived of very early on (under the initial name Operation Bluehearts, later changed to Chromite).

But then he wasted his success on a clumsy advance towards the Yalu that exposed his forces to a major surprise and defeat in detail by Chinese forces.

Alexander says Mao did not intend to overrun South Korea in turn, and that his goals were limited. This seems like more speculation. He notes that the Chinese New Year Offensive broke down due to the primitive logistics of the Chinese Army and the lack of airpower and artillery. Was the limited Chinese success due to Mao's cautious policy or due to limited Chinese capabilities?

The true heart of the book, however, is, of course, the thread connecting MacArthur and Truman. The emphasis is on the continued and repeated insubordination of MacArthur to policy directives which finally lead to his ultimate removal as commander-in-chief in the Far East.

It was another enigma, given his sterling record in democratizing Japan. How ironic that the man who brought modern democracy to Japan was to undermine democracy in his own country.

The final section involves MacArthur's return to the United States, his celebrated address to Congress (which Truman amusingly summed up as 'a bunch of bullshit'), and the inquiries set up by the US Government.

This was the most interesting section to me, because in the proceedings it was shown that MacArthur, who was wildly popular on his return and who received widespread acclaim, demonstrated that his proposals were sheer lunacy and that they had the backing of no professional soldier or diplomat.

MacArthur's stellar career thus ended in quiet ignominy, as his views were treated almost like the rantings of a senile old man. His talk of appeasement, incidentally, was wholly off the mark. His belief that China would start bigger and bloodier wars has not been borne out, and one would do well to recall Bismarck's famous quip that a pre-emptive war is like committing suicide due to fear of death. It is an apt phrase in this instance, for MacArthur would have begun a war with China that was, in the event, wholly unnecessary.

I am not entirely convinced by Alexander's claims that Mao was sensible and restrained. He does not provide any documentation to establish the Chinese policies in any way. Understandably so because historians likely are unable to access the records of this period. Thus the Chinese policies remain a secret, but the idea that Mao was a sort of Kennan in reverse, who hoped to leverage Korea for a seat in the UN and for Taiwan, seems to credit the man with too much cleverness. Especially when Alexander himself later calls Mao a dupe of Acheson.

Overall, however, this book is a very interesting foray into the constitutional crisis between MacArthur and Truman, a solid vindication of Truman's policy and an strong indictment of MacArthur's, as well as providing a useful narrative of the military operations during the first stages of the Korean War.

Whether there would have been a united Korea and a peaceful friendly China, as Alexander argues, had MacArthur not been in command, if Truman abandoned Taiwan as he had planned, if, if, if, is another question that I don't think the author or anybody else can answer to any satisfactory degree.

[Michael Delaware · Rating 2 out of 5]

The book was historically accurate on some accounts, but the author thoughout the book interjects a lot of opinion and bias of his own that is a constant distraction.
As a reader I had grown used to reading objective historical books where the author relays the events, gives contrary viewpoints and then lets the reader decide what they think. Bevin Alexander tends to state the facts, or some of them, gives one viewpoint and then states an opinion as fact.
It is obvious throughout the book that he has a profound bias against Macarthur, and also the Republicans.
However, truthfully looking back from a historical perspective, Macarthur was not entirely wrong in his viewpoint of attacking communism and driving them out of Korea. Truman abandoned the goal of a reunitied Korea, and it has been a divided nation for 50 years since. Now, the possibility of reunification between the two countries is highly unlikely, as the South has become very developed with Western progress, and the North became a stagnant impoverished dictatorship because of Truman and the JCS at the time decision to leave the whole conflict unfinished.
I agree with the authors' assertion that the civilians needs to elect the government and install a commander in chief that sets policy, but I can also see the viewpoint that this system has its flaws too and cost the lives of soldiers by micro-managing from Washington. The Generals the field need to have freedom to win, and the citizens need to have the freedom to choose who leads them as Commander in Chief.
This would have been a better book had the author overall taken the approach of objectivity, and left his own bias at outside the door. It could have been a great book.

[Stacy · Rating 3 out of 5]

An interesting read about Macarthur's actions during the first year of the Korean Conflict. The General was a brilliant strategist, who correctly assessed that landing at Ichon would confuse the North Koreans and end the conflict quickly. However, his ego and hatred of Communism would cause him to overstep his authority and force the President to remove him from his command. This book lays out the series of choices made by the Soviets, Red Chinese and the U.S. that helped to drag out the conflict for 3 years and has left the world with the North & South Korea, we know today. A good read has we approach the 60th Anniversary of the seize fire which ended the conflict.

[Tony Smith · Rating 2 out of 5]

The book is reasonably decent with regards to the depiction of events between the President and his General; however, the author definitely has an extremely low opinion of military leaders as a segment of the population. Rather than just use history to prove his points, the author repeatedly makes unfounded all-encompassing statements about all military leaders clearly showing he really doesn’t like the group as a whole for some unexplained reason.

From the epilogue, “The path of all military leaders is straight to coercion and dictatorship.”

[Don Glenn · Rating 5 out of 5]

Interesting to read. Not so much about the Korean War but how MacArthur handled the good (Inchon), the bad (Chosin) and the ugly (his grandstanding on the counterattack and with Congress).
The first part covers the history of the Chinese Communist takeover which is not really anything about MacArthur or the Korean War.

[Andrea Wilkes · Rating 5 out of 5]

Clear, concise writing about why Truman fired MacArthur. He did the right thing. Civilian policy rules military action. Otherwise we have a dictatorship. It is in the Constitution for a reason.

[Mary Montgomery H. · Rating 3 out of 5]

Some worthwhile history. Unfortunately much of the narrative is stained with the author’s own biases, including a subtle reverence for Communist China.

[Sean O'Hara · Rating 2 out of 5]

Someday somebody will write a book showing just how awful MacArthur was (seriously, his failure to prepare the Philippines for attack was far worse than Kimmel and Short's failures in Hawaii), but unfortunately this isn't it. Alexander is the sort of author who spends half his time second guessing and hind-sighting the decisions not only of MacArthur, but Truman and his administration. At points the book reads like a counter-factual, with Alexander asserting that if only Truman had stuck to this policy, or not asserted a position more forcefully, or just understood the Chinese better, that Korea and indeed the whole Cold War could've worked out so much better. Hey, I like alt-history novels, but I recognize it's fiction and not real history.

[Jim Kahn · Rating 4 out of 5]

The first book I have ever read about the Korean War, I found this to be very insightful and well written. The author underscores that one of the primary goals of the US Constitution was to protect it from becoming a military dictatorship, which is why our military is strictly controlled by elected civilians and not generals. MacArthur's egomaniacal and violent tendencies caused a dramatic increase in the scope of this war and directly caused the death of hundreds of thousands of people. A chilling but important lesson in the inherent danger posed by those who choose the violent profession of the paid killer; all volunteer soldiers.

[Maxanna · Rating 4 out of 5]

I have never read much about the Korean War. This book was an excellent introduction! Not only was the issue of the role of the President versus the General carefully examined, the introduction to the complexity of the "slippery slope" of our fight against communism was carefully discussed. I'll be reading more about this time.

[Chris · Rating 2 out of 5]

Thought it'd be interesting. Not so much.