The Pulitzer Prize–winning author examines the cardinal failing of Washington’s war on terror
This book distills eleven years of expert reporting for The New York Times , Reuters, and The Atlantic Monthly into a clarion call for change. An incisive look at the evolving nature of war, Rohde exposes how a dysfunctional Washington squandered billions on contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, neglected its true allies in the war on terror and failed to employ its most potent nonmilitary American consumerism, technology, and investment. Rohde then surveys post-Arab Spring Tunisia, Turkey, and Egypt, and finds a yearning for American technology, trade, and education. He argues that only Muslim moderates, not Americans, can eradicate militancy. For readers of Steve Coll, Tom Ricks, and Ahmed Rashid, Beyond War shows how the failed American effort to back moderate Muslims since 9/11 can be salvaged.
David Rohde, a distinguished journalist who has covered the Middle East extensively, has written a book examining US policy and behavior in the Middle East with a particular emphasis on post 9/11 activity. In Beyond War: Reimagining American Influence in a New Middle East (Viking, 2013, 240 Pages, $27.95) David Rohde explores the systematic failures of policy in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan which have led to worsening relations in the Middle East. He concentrates on the extensive reliance on employing military contractors to undertake activities which should be dealt with by the military, intelligence, and diplomatic arms of the government, but which have become relied upon because of reduced funding and the difficulty of responding to specific needs posed by the arcane hiring practices in today's underfunded government. The examples he presents are chilling in their depiction of the devolution of U.S. influence where success would have been achievable under different circumstances. http://tedlehmann.blogspot.com/2013/0...
The author, as a NYX journalist, was invited by the Taliban to interview one of its heads. Instead, he and two Afghani colleagues were kidnapped in Pakistan. He told the story in his Pulitzer Prize-winning book A Rope and a Prayer. Those are pretty good credentials for writing this book, which calls for U.S. diplomacy with moderate Muslims to build coalitions to defeat terrorism in the Middle East.
Short and easy to read book detailing the last decade of US involvement in the Middle East. The first half should be familiar to anyone who has read anything at all about the debacle that has been US foreign policy and the revamped "Rumsfeld" military. The over-reliance on military might, the neglect of soft power, the internal bureaucratic snafus and the corruption and incompetence of independent contractors is all laid out just to refresh our memories. In the second half, you see a glimmer of hope and possible plan of action. Building upon the ideas of the late Richard Holbrooke, Rohde details how the US can make a difference and be a positive influence. However, his call for small government led projects focused on attainable goals which make a difference and are led by people committed to success and not just profit will have to go against the entrenched bureaucracy and special interests of private contractors. And at that point he is far too optimistic.
“At the peak of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2010, 46,000 American contractors and 214,000 third country and local contractors worked for the American government in both countries. At times, American government contractors outnumbered American troops. Congressional investigators later concluded that the use of contractors minimized the number of American troops and hid the wars human toll. Between 2001-2011, 8,560 U.S. soldiers and contractors died in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of the dead, 28% were contractors. While newspapers across the country faithfully printed the name of each American soldier that perished, there has been no such listing of contractors.”
“He watched cautious and overworked government contracting officers choose the same firm year after year because doing so allowed them to avoid congressional or media scrutiny. The only way to not make a mistake is to do nothing. The only way to not choose the wrong contractor is to choose the one you’re already using.”
“Politics, of course, have always driven decision-making in Washington and always will - but the intensifying partisanship, the worst some observers have seen since WWII, is creating destructive dynamics in Washington. ...The private sector is doing what it does best. Finding innovative ways to make money. The problem is that we have a private sector and military on steroids in the United States. Both are loaded with capital capacity and talent. But our public sector institutions are sclerotic, ossified and weak. I do not believe that spending more money or increasing the size of government is the answer. But we must stop disparaging public service, start paying senior government officials well and create more dynamic civilian government institutions. Overall, we need a government which is both effective and efficient. Currently, we have neither. For our own national security, that must change.”
“The central lesson that emerges from Americas decade in Afghanistan Iraq and Pakistan is that sweeping change is not possible without reliable partners in local governments. Even if the United States perfectly executes it’s policies and programs, they alone will not stabilize countries. Nations must carry out these reforms themselves. The United States never has been, and never will be, all powerful. Our hubris and inability to admit our limitations can be one of our enemies.”
I would actually say 3.5 but since it is a little dated, I rounded down. Overall, a very compelling look at how US policy in the Middle East is ignoring some of our most potent "weapons" against extremism. Also underlines how the partisanship and political posturing in Washington DC over the years have hampered both civilian aid and military efforts in the region.
I found the book easy to read, but at times it felt like it was repeating itself. I supposed that was to be expected since the similar tactics were used in multiple countries. Also found it hard to keep track of who was who and what country the individual had experience in. While I sometimes had trouble, I appreciated Rhode giving a "full story" with 1st person experiences to the best of his ability.
While the title drew my attention and my interest, expectation was for a rather dryly written non-fiction book. Instead, I rather looked forward to picking it up each evening to read the next few chapters. The topic is clearly very well researched and based on a ton of information. It manages to avoid getting its reader lost in overwhelming detail and I found it surprisingly easy to consume. I walked away with a much better understanding of US Middle Eastern policy (not something I knew much about other than headline news), USAID spending and its approaches.
An honest look at American diplomacy in the middle east and what has worked and what doesn't. This critical look points to the over militarization and lack of focus on education and other social services as well as how partisanship has ruined diplomacy in the middle time and time again. For anyone wondering about US involvement this book is a great start as well as a great literary journalism novel. It is well written and easy to read.
A bit dated as he finished the work in late 2012, but did seem to capture most of the reality of American involvement in the MIddle East. He sees the problem of doing foreign policy and aid work by contractor, but hie first response is to improve the broken system, usually with more money and government personnel.
I have to confess that I find a lot of foreign policy writing a tad dull, and I was a bit worried that, after reading the introduction, this would be another argument-based screed. But I needn't have worried.
Rhodes spent years reporting in the places he writes about. He uses interviews and real people's stories to carry forth a powerful argument. He's a firm believer in the idea that firstly, trade with the Middle East will bring peace, and secondly that there is something with the way the United States administers foreign aid.
He is clear about the fact that the privatization of the federal government has lead to mainly poor outcomes for those that the United States is supposed to be helping. The lavish federal contracts dispensed by USAID aren't competitive and are mainly used by consulting firms to line the pockets of highly paid Western workers. (Which I totally believe after seeing what houses in the D.C area go for.) Those in developing countries see very little of those contracts, Rhodes argues.
His main argument -- that Washington needs to "rethink" how it does foreign policy, while correct comes off as a bit naive. At least when it comes to the politics of the situation, it is far more complicated than that. Furthermore, he barely mentions Israel, and then really only in passing when he gets to the chapter on Egypt (which was outdated by the time the book went to press -- the danger of writing about something so politically unstable, I suppose). While I'm sympathetic to the idea that Israel plays an outsize role in our foreign policy. It seems silly to just ignore it when you are trying to argue for such a radical shift in business as usual.
Granted, Rhodes has written much more than just this book, and perhaps he addresses some of the other complexities elsewhere, but this brief book did seem a tad lacking for such big ideas.
Former NYT reporter Rohde compares and contrasts U.S. engagement in some of the most important and challenging spots in the Muslim world - Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Turkey, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt - to discuss what has worked, and unfortunately more often than not, what has not.
Rohde's examination of each of those countries is done in broad brush strokes, as must be the case in a relatively short book of 173 pages. The best take-aways for me were his conclusions about how badly the U.S. manages these foreign policy challenges:
"The problem is that we have a private sector and military on steroids in the United States. Both are loaded with capital, capacity, and talent. But our public-sector institutions are sclerotic, ossified, and weak.
I do not believe that spending more money or increasing the size of government is the answer. But we must stop disparaging public service, start paying senior government officials well, and create more dynamic civilian government institutions. Overall, we need a government that is both effective and efficient. Currently, we have neither. For our own national security, that must change." (p. 163)
"In the end, the gravest threat to America's security is Washington's partisanship, feeble civilian institutions, and failure to match its ambitions with its actual resources and capabilities. The world is changing, and Washington is not."
Wasn't impressed. The idea for the book was good, but it seemed like the author relied on too few sources and didn't stick with one topic or argument through the whole book. I expected more of the book to be about the Arab Spring and a general plan for how the US could update its foreign policy to be more supportive of mideast economic enterprises in the future as a way to build stability. Probably only 5 pages were spent talking about this. The rest seemed like a hodgepodge of stories cumulating in a book that was driven by the stories the author's sources wanted to tell, instead of being driven by the point the author wanted to make. At least in the acknowledgement the author mentions that the book didn't meet his expectations either.
There is a lot of wisdom in these pages. Focusing on non-military aspects of American foreign affairs, it provides a unique view of failed policies. Too much reliance on huge wasteful American contractors. A weakened and downsized State Dept. and USAID that can't handle its task of handling huge sums of foreign development funds. The author provides glimpses into some key personalities in the foreign development field but also guides the reader succinctly to understanding broader trends.
I thought the recap of events during the Bush-Clinton-Bush-Obama administration was useful refresher. However, the content of the book was skewed too heavy on history and too light on actionable proposals. Rohde provided a few good examples from Turkey and Tunisia, but fell flat on advocating for a grand new idea. In light of recent developments, Rohde's proposals are a disturbing reminder of how derailed relations have become and seem almost unattainable at the present time.
Short book, good ideas which should be read by people interested in how to make U.S. policies more effective in the Middle East. Does a bit to dispel the myth that the U.S. government is a hardwired machine built for specific nefarious purposes as opposed to a cacophony of different voices working in one incoherent system.
Quick, easy read given that the topic is Middle East foreign policy. Enough of an overview to communicate how complicated it is. I would like to see an update since this was published 2 1/2 years ago.
In "Beyond War", David Rohde explains how complex the Middle East can be, and makes it clear that the are no easy answers nor quick fixes for resolving all the issues at hand.
Learned a lot from this short book... heavy on importance of entrepreneurship and insight into government reliance on contracting which was really interesting and is not talked about often.