Timely and urgent, Mayday is a clarion call to action--before it's too late. As with other powerful nations throughout history, maritime supremacy has been the key to America's rise to superpower status and the relative peace of the postwar era. Over the past two decades, however, while Washington has been preoccupied with land wars in the Middle East and targeted drone-centric operations against emerging terrorist threats, the United States Navy's combat fleet has dwindled to historic lows--the smallest since before World War I. At the same time, rival nations such as China have increased the size of their navies significantly and at an extraordinary rate. Within a matter of years or even months, China will likely have the ability to deny or substantially curtail the U.S. Navy's ability to operate in the Pacific and to project power in Asia, which could have drastic consequences for the world economy. As Seth Cropsey convincingly argues, the precipitous decline of the U.S. as a great seapower, due in large part to budget cuts, will have profound consequences sooner than we might think. In clear and concise language, Mayday tracks the modern evolution of U.S. maritime strength, where it stands now, and the likely consequences if changes are not made to both the Navy's size and shape and to the United States' strategic understanding of how to combine maritime and continental force. With the ascent of new powers not likely to slow, the best way to secure both peace and prosperity for the world may be for America to reinvest in the same naval power that made her great.
And parts were. Cropsey makes clear that this is no time for the Navy to be downsizing. He has a good handle on the history of peacekeeping navies, and how we could be challenged by the rise of China.
But, he doesn't know how to write a book. The chapters were not chapters. It's like he glued 10 white papers together and called it a book. There is no flow from chapter to chapter, no development of an argument. But there is lots of repetition. And within the chapters is no better. You have no idea what the chapter is about, where it's going, what the argument is. He neither previews nor reviews. It's like one long ramble. And within the paragraphs is no better! He doesn't know how to write concise, precise sentences.
I feel like Cropsey has something good to say. He could say it in about 75 pages with an editor and a writing tutor.
As ex-US Navy, this is a book on a subject I have a passion for. Because of this I consumed it in less than 24 hours. It is also a subject I have my own opinions on. Although I respect his input, overall, I disagree with Cropsey more than I agree. He lays out a long history from days of sail up to trying to keep the Soviet Union checked by showing how it took a large Navy to do so. That leads him to his conclussion that the US Navy should have a mandate of 350 active ships. I agree with Cropsey that the Navy is neglegted and missmanaged, but I disagree the need for such a large fleet. In the past this was only done by keeping ships in service WELL beyond their intended lifespan. I was in the Navy during Clinton/Bush terms and we still had ships that dated back to WWII and Korea! In my opinion, we do not have the need in todays world with today's adviseries to warrent such a large fleet when wars are no longer faught the same. I disagree that we need 3 Super Carrier battlegroups on patrol 24/7. Defense spending in the last 30 years has been more about lining Defense Contractor pockets then our mission. You could sit with a map and note every location you would need a battlegroup, patrol, and a forward projected power times it by 3 and STILL not hit 350 ships needed. Then there is very little mention to how we are not effectivally matching rolls vs ship class vs expense. We decommission all of our FFG's and replace their mission with DDG's that cost 6x plus to manufacture and maintain. Granted, the LCS program was supposed to fill those shoes (also much more expensive) but lets face it, it is a failed program. All the while they turn down the Legend Class Frigate (which the coast gaurd gladdly modified for themselves) that would have been able to fill that niche for a fraction of the coast. No reason we need so many expensive DDG's! We also have a silly amount of amphibious ships, espessially LHA and LHD's. Let's be honest, these are just as capable carriers as most foreign Navy's. With a reduced ship count, yes, we would not be able to field as many CVN's constantly, but we could use modified LHA's and LHD's with heavy VTOL airwings to fill most rolls that they fill when it comes to projecting US Naval power overseas with far less cost and manpower away from home. So it is an intersting read, but I just disagree a bit. I much rather have a smaller more up to date force that is used with greater wisdom and better sailor comfort than just trying to achieve a monster fleet number.
I'll say right off the bat that this book should be required reading for members of Congress and the President. The quick synopsis is that if you're going to have a navy will worldwide missions and requirements then you have to build it then support it.
Cropsey does a pretty good job of laying out his thesis that either ships needed to be added to the US Navy or the missions need to be curtailed. If the missions are curtailed then regional powers such as China would be more than happy to fill the vacuum. Missions and requirements are being met with fewer ships but at the cost of longer deployments, higher maintenance requirements and little capability to deal with two contingencies at the same time.
Cropsey basically lays it out that the US Navy is the presence that much of the rest of the world sees and the face of the role that America has assumed as world policeman. He talks about how our allies and other friendly nations have to come to expect and need that presence to maintain stability in their respective corners of the world. He writes about the consequences of what could happen if the US were to withdrawal or unable to meet those needs/expectations and that is where I find the one disappointment in the book.
As with many books about America's role as world policeman few authors address the elephant in the room. The defense and its associated cost and political perils have been slowly transferred over time to the US. Cropsey does skirt around this by bringing up examples of countries that would face regional problems if the US Navy to withdrawal but fails to follow through by moving on that we are destroying our owe future in order to preserve others' present.
This book is a good read for anyone with a interest in the US military, its role in the world and possibilities for the future. We as a country need to decide what priorities need to go forward in our interest and what needs to be transferred back to respective countries so that they can share in the financial burden along with the world opinion/political fallout when action is taken. It has become too easy for other countries to rely on the US to take action and then get beat up for being a bully.
MAYDAY comes at an important time for the Navy in light of the current budget woes on Capitol Hill. I would concur with Mr. Cropsey's premise that the US Navy is in decline and is in need of a public awareness campaign. But another book will be needed. In light of several inaccuracies, and a failure to provide any solutions to very real world problems, I was left wanting more.
Mr. Cropsey tries to make us afraid of the new Chinese carrier LIAONING, but fails to mention the carrier has no aircraft. He describes a 286 ship Navy with no context and fails to embellish as to why this is a good number of ships. He makes an unconvincing argument for the Navy in the drug war and misspells Colombia on occasion, making his knowledge of counter-narcotics suspect. He misquotes world shipping statistics and describes 20 foot containers as the primary conveyance without an understanding of the twenty equivalent unit measurement. Mr. Cropsey struggles to show an insight into maritime industry, due to his familiarity with commercial operations.
The book relies far too heavily on re-hashing Alfred Thayer Mahan's work and does not give any new insight into how this great thinker is relevant today. Casual readers do not learn more and knowledgeable readers leave frustrated that twenty (20) pages were spent on a book report rather than providing new insight.
Mr. Cropsey continues by misquoting statistics about world trade and failing to connect Wilsonian foreign policy with today's Navy. The book fails on many levels. I agree with the premise of the book but am disappointed with its execution.
The US Navy is being downsized to a level below what experts determine to be a size that that is detrimental to national defense in budget cutting in the military. As ships are being decommissioned, their replacements are not being built. The author claims that it would take over twenty-five years to rebuild the Navy to a effective size.