A masterful analysis of leadership of a class, class leadership over other classes, the positioning of states against others, and the determinants of state form in this process. It presents a narrative of Bismarck's unification of Germany as a case study in how reconfigurations of politics and strategy occur in history. Engels' treatment of political-economic social relations and interests is a key part of the text, the text being intended as a part of Anti-Duhring. A crucial concept in a materialist conception of politics, the balance of forces, is affirmed in the analysis. Here Engels the historian and military strategist is on display: a strategic approach to politics requires a materialism which is confident to make assessments of the balance of forces. On this, it's notable against accusations of determinism that the political-economic is not the total, but more like the beginning (and the end) of the story. Strategic politics also requires an understanding of political-economic factors as being the material of action rather than the end of analysis. It's striking how much Engels considers political and strategic competition between states in the narrative. Even personal character plays a role when situated in historical context. There's a lot to take here from how Engels wields important concepts in Marxism.
A passage characteristic of the text:
"A brilliant career lay before our Brandenburg Junker, if only he had the courage and sense to help himself to it. Had not Louis Napoleon become the idol of the bourgeoisie precisely because he dispersed their parliament while raising their profits? And did not Bismarck possess the same business talents which the bourgeois admired so much in the false Napoleon? Was he not attracted to his Bleichröder as much as Louis Napoleon to his Fould? Was there not in 1864 a contradiction in Germany between the bourgeois representatives in the Chamber, who, out of stinginess, wanted to reduce the service term, and the bourgeois outside, in the National Association, who demanded national action at any cost, action for which an army was essential? Was it not a contradiction quite similar to the one that existed in France in 1851 between the bourgeois in the Chamber who wanted to keep the power of the President in check and the bourgeois outside who wanted peace and quiet and a strong government, peace and quiet at any cost — a contradiction which Louis Napoleon solved by dispersing the brawlers in parliament and giving peace and quiet to the mass of the bourgeois? Were not things in Germany much more assuredly in favour of a bold move? Had not the plan for the reorganisation been supplied ready-made by the bourgeoisie, and were not the latter themselves calling loudly for an energetic Prussian statesman who would carry out their plan, expel Austria from Germany and unite the small states under Prussia’s supremacy? And if this demanded that the Prussian constitution be treated a bit roughly, that the ideologists in and outside the Chamber be pushed aside according to their deserts, was it not possible to rely on universal suffrage, just as Louis Bonaparte had done? What could be more democratic than to introduce universal suffrage? Had not Louis Napoleon proved that it was absolutely safe — if properly handled? And did not precisely this universal suffrage — offer the means to appeal to the broad mass of the people, to flirt a bit with the emerging social movement, should the bourgeoisie prove refractory?"