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Афины и Иерусалим
Wznowienie najwybitniejszego dzieła rosyjskiego egzystencjalisty, w którym zastanawia się on, czy można pogodzić wiarę z rozumem, religię z filozofią. Ten problem od wieków zajmował zarówno filozofów, jak i teologów, między innymi Tertuliana, który wyraził go w słynnym pytaniu: "Co mają ze sobą wspólnego Ateny i Jerozolima?". Szestow podobnie jak Tertulian sądzi, że wiary, którą symbolizuje Jerozolima, nie da się pogodzić z wiedzą ani z instynktem moralnym, symbolizowanymi przez Ateny. Mimo to Szestow opowiada się za wiarą, krytykując panowanie rozumu. Wiara to dar, coś tajemniczego i niezrozumiałego, co nie zależy od naszej woli.
441 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1938
24 people are currently reading
957 people want to read
About the author
Lev Shestov
74 books219 followersLev Isaakovich Shestov (Russian: Лев Исаа́кович Шесто́в), born Yehuda Leyb Schwarzmann (Russian: Иегуда Лейб Шварцман), variously known as Leon Shestov, Léon Chestov, Leo Shestov.
A Ukrainian/Russian existentialist philosopher. Born in Kiev (Russian Empire). He emigrated to France in 1921, fleeing from the aftermath of the October Revolution. He lived in Paris until his death.
A Ukrainian/Russian existentialist philosopher. Born in Kiev (Russian Empire). He emigrated to France in 1921, fleeing from the aftermath of the October Revolution. He lived in Paris until his death.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
March 24, 2017
Shestov is vital reading for anyone interested in the relationship between religion and philosophy. His prose is rich and at times difficult to follow but never boring or obscure. This is a four part work. In the first part he lays out the terms of his arguments by demonstrating how Aristotle and other ancient philosophers attempted to discover necessary truths that would "constrain" humanity. In the second part Shestov examines both the early modern philosophical project and demonstrates how even would be rebels like Nietzche and Kierkegaard still end up endorsing the "necessary truths" they set out to fight against. In the third part Shestov present's a review of Gilson's "The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy" and demonstrates how the scholastic project of making revelation more rational betrayed the essential message of Christianity. In the fourth part Shestov lays out the more positive aspects of his philosophy which constitutes truth as beyond reason and utterly particular. You'll read this book spellbound by Shestov's energy and acerbic wit, reacquainted with authors that you thought you knew (Spinoza, Aristotle, Plotinus, Luther, Liebnitz, Seneca, Descartes, Nietzche, Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, Augustine, Duns Scotus, Peter Damian), and given a radically new perspective to understand the both the limits and the possibilities of human philosophizing. Highly recommended to all students of ideas.
August 5, 2018
Read your bible. Plato is divine. Nietzsche should have been a Christian like Dostoevsky and Kierkegaard. Unified theories of knowledge lead us deeper into hell.
August 17, 2024
Lev makes Søren look like Immanuel. I can do metaphysics again.
June 14, 2014
This text intelligently explores tensions between Hebrew and Greek influences on Western Christianity.
Shestov maintains that a concept imported from ancient Greek philosophy, 'Necessity,' has diminished the power of God in the minds of Christians. He does not explain the term at length; various places suggest a force invented by man to constrain truth and impose a semblance of order on reality. Although Necessity is broadly present in all of the laws of logic, Shestov identifies the inability of God to change the past as its most unacceptable dictum. Bible verses supporting God's unqualified omnipotence and meticulous sovereignty are contrasted with quotations from Greek thinkers asserting the limitations of God's nature.
Instead of appealing to a personal, approachable God, humanity has invented impersonal laws of logic and subjected itself to them. This is incomprehensible to Shestov. Aside from suggesting that people are afraid to trust God, he does not attempt to explain why people venerate Necessity above God's will. I think this lack of explanation is both the strength of the work and its fundamental weakness. In one respect, it attests to the sincerity and purity of Shestov's convictions. But with regard to the quality of his argument, it leaves a lot to be desired.
Aside from not presenting the merits of divine essentialism, Shestov does not consider the implications of pure voluntarism. A God unconstrained by any concept is not obligated to act in any sense of the term. However, Shestov seems to believe that God will behave graciously toward people. The strength of his central claim--the superiority of a personal God to impersonal logic--rests on this assumption. But is a God who must necessarily answer the cries of people perfectly free? And if he can refuse to answer people, then how is He any better than impersonal logic?
This is the perennial problem for voluntarists: how may a perfectly free God not be arbitrary? Shestov denies the arbitrariness of God, so in some sense, God is not free to do just anything--He is constrained by a gracious nature. Shestov adduces the parable of the laborers who received the same pay despite working various amounts to reveal a subjective God whose will is not arbitrary. Yet he does not seem to recognize that denying the purely arbitrary will of God is tantamount to conceding the (partial) truth of Necessity.
In any case, Shestov's work is the most compelling of any voluntarist I've read. While it is not particularly satisfying, it merits four stars for its originality. At the very least, the intensity and passion of Shestov's prose is worth the read.
Shestov maintains that a concept imported from ancient Greek philosophy, 'Necessity,' has diminished the power of God in the minds of Christians. He does not explain the term at length; various places suggest a force invented by man to constrain truth and impose a semblance of order on reality. Although Necessity is broadly present in all of the laws of logic, Shestov identifies the inability of God to change the past as its most unacceptable dictum. Bible verses supporting God's unqualified omnipotence and meticulous sovereignty are contrasted with quotations from Greek thinkers asserting the limitations of God's nature.
Instead of appealing to a personal, approachable God, humanity has invented impersonal laws of logic and subjected itself to them. This is incomprehensible to Shestov. Aside from suggesting that people are afraid to trust God, he does not attempt to explain why people venerate Necessity above God's will. I think this lack of explanation is both the strength of the work and its fundamental weakness. In one respect, it attests to the sincerity and purity of Shestov's convictions. But with regard to the quality of his argument, it leaves a lot to be desired.
Aside from not presenting the merits of divine essentialism, Shestov does not consider the implications of pure voluntarism. A God unconstrained by any concept is not obligated to act in any sense of the term. However, Shestov seems to believe that God will behave graciously toward people. The strength of his central claim--the superiority of a personal God to impersonal logic--rests on this assumption. But is a God who must necessarily answer the cries of people perfectly free? And if he can refuse to answer people, then how is He any better than impersonal logic?
This is the perennial problem for voluntarists: how may a perfectly free God not be arbitrary? Shestov denies the arbitrariness of God, so in some sense, God is not free to do just anything--He is constrained by a gracious nature. Shestov adduces the parable of the laborers who received the same pay despite working various amounts to reveal a subjective God whose will is not arbitrary. Yet he does not seem to recognize that denying the purely arbitrary will of God is tantamount to conceding the (partial) truth of Necessity.
In any case, Shestov's work is the most compelling of any voluntarist I've read. While it is not particularly satisfying, it merits four stars for its originality. At the very least, the intensity and passion of Shestov's prose is worth the read.
April 6, 2015
His masterpiece.
March 29, 2025
When my friend Sam Frost recommended I get this book and read it I immediately did so. (At least I consider Sam my friend; I hope he considers me a friend.) I have immense respect for Sam, even though he is a believer and I am not. Sam is a fine writer in his own right and is much smarter than I am. Since I met him on a Facebook forum which discusses early Christianity I just assumed this book was about early Christianity. Not at all. Lev Shestov was a Russian existentialist philosopher, and this book is about religious philosophy. This is fine with me: I have an avid interest in existentialism and have read Nietzsche and Kierkegaard with relish. (Sadly no Sartre, and I gave up on the Myth of Sisyphus.)
One feature of this book that one could either love or hate is that Shestov frequently refers to earlier philosophers. If, like me you have no or only passing familiarity with these philosophers it could be very annoying, but for the fact that Shestov generally explains the position of these philosophers so that one is not left in the dark about where he was going. I was grateful that I had read Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysical of Morals just prior to reading this volume. Shestov frequently refers to Kant in the first section of this book, entitled Parmenides in Chains. Shestov more frequently refers to Critique of Pure reason and especially the Critique of Practical Reason than the Groundwork, but nevertheless I felt I had a handle on Shestov's criticisms of Kant because of my prior reading.
The next section, In the Bull of Phalaris, contains an evaluation of Nietzsche’s and Kierkegaard’s philosophies. I was rather surprised that Shestov rakes Kierkegaard over the coals (or so it seemed to me) because I think Shestov and Kierkegaard are rather close to each other. At least both of them seem to oppose faith and rationality.
The third section On the Philosophy of the Middle Ages interested me the least. I’m sure a medievalist would find it fascinating, but I am far from being a medievalist. I know a little bit about Thomas Aquinas, and that’s about it. But again, this wasn’t a great impediment to understanding because Shestov always made it clear why he was citing a particular philosopher or historian. As the introduction said, Shestov style displays a classic simplicity.
The fourth section is written in an aphoristic style (maybe inspired by Nietzsche?) I generally liked Nietzsche’s aphorisms better (except for the misogynistic ones of course), but nonetheless I found a couple of Shestov’s aphorisms incisive enough to write into my notes.
Shestov is an anti-rationalist philosopher. He makes frequent reference to the maxim Credo quia absurdum (I believe because it is absurd). He opposes faith to reason and especially knowledge (the tree of knowledge chokes the tree of life), and suggests that we should not fear contradiction, noting that the God of the Old Testament contradicts himself. Shestov's anti-rationalism suggests a new method for looking at biblical texts. Modern exegetes, Shestov points out, assume that the biblical authors approached their task with the same sort of rationality as we moderns do, when in fact they were not afraid to contradict themselves. I think this is especially evident in the writings of Paul. In his book A Radical Jew, Daniel Boyarin struggles with might and main to make Paul’s statements about the law cohere. I suspect this is an impossible task.
Sam Frost writes: "There is an existential component rooted in the subjective that must be taken seriously within the collective mind of those that have encountered God. And no 'argument' can assail such 'faith' when it is anchored deep in the soul by God Himself - which leaves us, as Him, 'vulnerable' to attacks, criticism, and the cross." As an unbeliever, I don’t have any room for faith in my moral reckoning. As to whether morality is ultimately subjective or objective, I don’t know. Sam Harris has made a pretty good argument for objective morality in an atheistic framework, I think, but he has been much criticized. I don’t think that one can base morality solely on reason, but I would juxtapose reason not to faith, but to emotion. In the Kant book I recently read, reference was made to moral sentimentalism, an ethical theory with which I was previously unfamiliar and which emphasizes the primacy of emotions in the anatomy of morality. I don’t know whether emotions play the lead role in our moral lives, but I do believe that they do play some role.
I often read books at least twice, especially books on philosophy. This book was written clearly enough that I don’t feel the need to do so, at least not immediately. Perhaps I will revisit it one of these years.
One feature of this book that one could either love or hate is that Shestov frequently refers to earlier philosophers. If, like me you have no or only passing familiarity with these philosophers it could be very annoying, but for the fact that Shestov generally explains the position of these philosophers so that one is not left in the dark about where he was going. I was grateful that I had read Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysical of Morals just prior to reading this volume. Shestov frequently refers to Kant in the first section of this book, entitled Parmenides in Chains. Shestov more frequently refers to Critique of Pure reason and especially the Critique of Practical Reason than the Groundwork, but nevertheless I felt I had a handle on Shestov's criticisms of Kant because of my prior reading.
The next section, In the Bull of Phalaris, contains an evaluation of Nietzsche’s and Kierkegaard’s philosophies. I was rather surprised that Shestov rakes Kierkegaard over the coals (or so it seemed to me) because I think Shestov and Kierkegaard are rather close to each other. At least both of them seem to oppose faith and rationality.
The third section On the Philosophy of the Middle Ages interested me the least. I’m sure a medievalist would find it fascinating, but I am far from being a medievalist. I know a little bit about Thomas Aquinas, and that’s about it. But again, this wasn’t a great impediment to understanding because Shestov always made it clear why he was citing a particular philosopher or historian. As the introduction said, Shestov style displays a classic simplicity.
The fourth section is written in an aphoristic style (maybe inspired by Nietzsche?) I generally liked Nietzsche’s aphorisms better (except for the misogynistic ones of course), but nonetheless I found a couple of Shestov’s aphorisms incisive enough to write into my notes.
Shestov is an anti-rationalist philosopher. He makes frequent reference to the maxim Credo quia absurdum (I believe because it is absurd). He opposes faith to reason and especially knowledge (the tree of knowledge chokes the tree of life), and suggests that we should not fear contradiction, noting that the God of the Old Testament contradicts himself. Shestov's anti-rationalism suggests a new method for looking at biblical texts. Modern exegetes, Shestov points out, assume that the biblical authors approached their task with the same sort of rationality as we moderns do, when in fact they were not afraid to contradict themselves. I think this is especially evident in the writings of Paul. In his book A Radical Jew, Daniel Boyarin struggles with might and main to make Paul’s statements about the law cohere. I suspect this is an impossible task.
Sam Frost writes: "There is an existential component rooted in the subjective that must be taken seriously within the collective mind of those that have encountered God. And no 'argument' can assail such 'faith' when it is anchored deep in the soul by God Himself - which leaves us, as Him, 'vulnerable' to attacks, criticism, and the cross." As an unbeliever, I don’t have any room for faith in my moral reckoning. As to whether morality is ultimately subjective or objective, I don’t know. Sam Harris has made a pretty good argument for objective morality in an atheistic framework, I think, but he has been much criticized. I don’t think that one can base morality solely on reason, but I would juxtapose reason not to faith, but to emotion. In the Kant book I recently read, reference was made to moral sentimentalism, an ethical theory with which I was previously unfamiliar and which emphasizes the primacy of emotions in the anatomy of morality. I don’t know whether emotions play the lead role in our moral lives, but I do believe that they do play some role.
I often read books at least twice, especially books on philosophy. This book was written clearly enough that I don’t feel the need to do so, at least not immediately. Perhaps I will revisit it one of these years.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews