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Monadoloji - Metafizik Üzerine Konuşma
Düşünce tarihinde, arkasında bıraktığı yazılı çalışmalar bakımından Leibniz kadar üretken bir başka zihne nadiren rastlanır. İlginçtir ki yaşamını düşünmeye ve yazmaya adamış bu büyük dehanın hayattayken yayınlattığı çalışmaların adedi ardında bıraktığı devasa külliyatla mukayese kabul etmez. Söz konusu yayınları birkaç risalesiyle Tanrı'nın bir deyimle "avukatlığı"nı yaptığı Essais de Theodicee İllahi Adalet üzerine Denemeleri başlıklı eserinden ibarettir. Geride bıraktıklarının yayınlanması ise günümüzde bile sürmekte olan uzun soluklu bir çalışmaya konudur. Kendisinin de hoşlandığı adlandırmayla "önceden tesis edilmiş ahenk sisteminin müellifi" Leibniz, insan aklını kurcalayan onlarca farklı ve büyük meseleye cesaretle el atmış, çağının önde gelen entelektüelleriyle durmaksızın mektuplaşmış, teorik meşguliyetleri yanında pratik çalışmalara, gözlemlere ve -hesap makinesi gibi- icatlara da mesai harcamıştır.
Leibniz'in matematik ve mantık gibi aksiyomatik disiplinlerle, fizik ve psikoloji gibi bilimlerdeki geleceğe ışık tutarı başarıları bir yana bırakıldıgında, onun felsefe ve teoloji alanındaki en büyük başarısının, dünyada "kötülüğün" varlığının Tanrı'nın mevcudiyetine antitez olarak kullanılmasına karşı rasyonel bir savunma yapmak oldugu söylenebilir. Mümkün dünyaları temaşa edip, onlar arasında bir-arada-mümkün azami miktarda varlık içeren dünyayı tercih etmesi bakımından, Tanrı mümkün dünyaların en iyisini yaratmıştır.
İşte Monadoloji ve Metafizik Üzerine Konuşma, Leibniz`in bu alandaki metafizik düşüncelerini ana çizgileriyle göz önüne seren iki temel metnidir.
Leibniz'in matematik ve mantık gibi aksiyomatik disiplinlerle, fizik ve psikoloji gibi bilimlerdeki geleceğe ışık tutarı başarıları bir yana bırakıldıgında, onun felsefe ve teoloji alanındaki en büyük başarısının, dünyada "kötülüğün" varlığının Tanrı'nın mevcudiyetine antitez olarak kullanılmasına karşı rasyonel bir savunma yapmak oldugu söylenebilir. Mümkün dünyaları temaşa edip, onlar arasında bir-arada-mümkün azami miktarda varlık içeren dünyayı tercih etmesi bakımından, Tanrı mümkün dünyaların en iyisini yaratmıştır.
İşte Monadoloji ve Metafizik Üzerine Konuşma, Leibniz`in bu alandaki metafizik düşüncelerini ana çizgileriyle göz önüne seren iki temel metnidir.
128 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1714
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About the author
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
1,268 books541 followersGerman philosopher and mathematician Baron Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz or Leibnitz invented differential and integral calculus independently of Isaac Newton and proposed an optimist metaphysical theory that included the notion that we live in "the best of all possible worlds."
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, a polymath, occupies a prominent place in the history. Most scholars think that Leibniz developed and published ever widely used notation. Only in the 20th century, his law of continuity and transcendental homogeneity found implementation in means of nonstandard analysis. He of the most prolific in the field of mechanical calculators. He worked on adding automatic multiplication and division to calculator of Blaise Pascal, meanwhile first described a pinwheel in 1685, and used it in the first mass-produced mechanical arithmometer. He also refined the binary number system, the foundation of virtually all digital computers.
Leibniz most concluded that God ably created our universe in a restricted sense, Voltaire often lampooned the idea. Leibniz alongside the great René Descartes and Baruch Spinoza advocated 17th-century rationalism. Applying reason of first principles or prior definitions, rather than empirical evidence, produced conclusions in the scholastic tradition, and the work of Leibniz anticipated modern analytic logic.
Leibniz made major contributions to technology, and anticipated that which surfaced much later in probability, biology, medicine, geology, psychology, linguistics, and computer science. He wrote works on politics, law, ethics, theology, history, and philology. Various learned journals, tens of thousands of letters, and unpublished manuscripts scattered contributions of Leibniz to this vast array of subjects. He wrote in several languages but primarily Latin and French. No one completely gathered the writings of Leibniz.
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, a polymath, occupies a prominent place in the history. Most scholars think that Leibniz developed and published ever widely used notation. Only in the 20th century, his law of continuity and transcendental homogeneity found implementation in means of nonstandard analysis. He of the most prolific in the field of mechanical calculators. He worked on adding automatic multiplication and division to calculator of Blaise Pascal, meanwhile first described a pinwheel in 1685, and used it in the first mass-produced mechanical arithmometer. He also refined the binary number system, the foundation of virtually all digital computers.
Leibniz most concluded that God ably created our universe in a restricted sense, Voltaire often lampooned the idea. Leibniz alongside the great René Descartes and Baruch Spinoza advocated 17th-century rationalism. Applying reason of first principles or prior definitions, rather than empirical evidence, produced conclusions in the scholastic tradition, and the work of Leibniz anticipated modern analytic logic.
Leibniz made major contributions to technology, and anticipated that which surfaced much later in probability, biology, medicine, geology, psychology, linguistics, and computer science. He wrote works on politics, law, ethics, theology, history, and philology. Various learned journals, tens of thousands of letters, and unpublished manuscripts scattered contributions of Leibniz to this vast array of subjects. He wrote in several languages but primarily Latin and French. No one completely gathered the writings of Leibniz.
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December 17, 2016
What a delightfully bizarre reading experience this has been. Who needs mind-altering substances when you have Leibnizian metaphysics? I doubt any psychoactive chemicals could take one on a trip into as queer realms as this work opens up. Surely among the strangest species of metaphysical cartography in existence, and this says a lot, since the category of metaphysical queerness is a very competitive category indeed.
And what is even more bizarre is how much sense this makes. Stranger still is that he is right on so many points, particularly in his sustained argument against reductionism, which still seems relevant to helping us gain traction on some of the dilemmas that plague us today, as inheritors of the Cartesian mechanist, reductionist paradigm for describing nature. His metaphysical project here basically outlines the conceptual parameters for an alternative, dynamic systems approach to the description of nature which intriguingly seems to avoid some of the contradictions inherent in our view. No wonder a version of the Leibnizian view is having a come-back, via systems theory.
First of all, I'll try to provide a working definition of a monad, as best as I understand it, since this seems to be a point of confusion among many (as it has been for me, for the longest time). A monad seems to have three functions in Leibniz's system.
First, a monad is an irreducible unit of being. In more Leibnizian terminology, it is a fully determinate individual substance. Numerical identity isn't enough to distinguish individuals, for Leibniz. Monads are, according to him, what supply us with the logic for singling out individual existents in their fullness.
Second, a monad is a fully determinate causal agent which possesses an internal principle for its change of states. I can't help but agree with Leibniz that, at the least, something like his view makes better sense of causality than does the Cartesian view which registers nature solely as an inert heap of automata. Automata make for notoriously poor causal agents. Not even efficient causation can be sufficiently grounded in mechanistic structures, because you'll always need to postulate a prime mover outside the system to set into motion the otherwise inert aggregate of parts that is nature on such a view. Leibniz's monads, at the least, are genuine causal agents.
Third, and most intriguingly, perhaps, a monad is a point of view in the universe. His is the only metaphysics I know of that acknowledges perspective as a fundamental metaphysical principle:
"Just as the same city viewed from different directions appears entirely different and, as it were, multiplied perspectively, in just the same way it happens that, because of the infinite multitude of simple substances, there are, as it were, just as many different universes, which are, nevertheless, only perspectives on a single one, corresponding to the different points of view of each monad (or individual existent)."
Fourth, monads are defined by their position in a universal web of relations and interchanges. Every individual part of the universe is, in his system, causally affected by the subtlest change in every other part, however distant. Moreover, monads seem to have an almost fractal structure:
"This interconnection or accommodation of all created things to each other, and each to all the others, brings it about that each simple substance has relations that express all the others, and consequently, that each simple substance is a perpetual, living mirror of the universe."
Monads can as such be said to be microcosms, with each part of the universe reflecting the whole. Thus, Leibniz rethinks the whole concept of the part/whole, or finite/infinite relation, that is arguably the basis of any paradigm. Leibniz even prefigures chaos theory by describing every monad, or part, as being defined by its relation to every other part. Also, being characterized by "a multitude in the unity" as they are, they evince a systems logic, and general laws seems to emerge from their collective behaviour.
Monads, in being fully individual and yet defined by their interconnection with every other monad or, part of the universe, provide the ultimate basis for conceiving the unity of phenomena. Without this unitary substantial basis, Leibniz argues, we're left with an incoherent conception of the world as a scattered, disconnected aggregate of parts. Such a metaphysical worldview, Leibniz argues, in offering us no basis for conceiving the underlying unity of this aggregate of phenomena, makes it impossible to explain the basis for scientific laws, which now become ontologically groundless. He argues that in the underdetermined mechanistic metaphysical picture, all unity, causal necessity, and law can only be accounted for as artifacts of the mind. Thus, his concept of an essentially unitary monad implies a critique of the Cartesian concept of nature as extension.
Leibniz proposes this redefinition of substance as monad as a solution to the problem of "the labyrinth of the composition of the continuum," ie, of accounting for the continuity of reality via any reductionist approach, in terms of the composition of the continuum through either mathematical points or atoms. This additive approach already presupposes a continuous basis to support the progressive addition of parts, whether conceived as points or as atoms. Cartesian mechanism, in particular, was plagued by the problem of the infinite divisibility of extension. This divisibility made it possible to specify stable structures or starting points for any chain of causation within the undifferentiated sea of extended matter. Monads, as irreducible units, offer an end to divisibility, while at the same time offering a basis for conceiving the cohesion of reality as well as for the beginning of any given chain of causation.
By far the most noteworthy part of his project, for me, was his effort to articulate what a first person view of the interiority of nature might look like. In other words, his is an effort to see nature from the inside out, from the level of the interiority of objects. This perspectival shift is what motivates his description of the monads, or fundamental units of existence, in mentalistic terms. His model for the universe is a pond filled with a density of microscopic life that is as inexhaustible as it is unfathomable. His whole system seems to imply a description in terms of a variety of anthropic principle, ie, what structures we must presuppose to exist in nature if we're to account for organic and mental phenomena.
The motto "Nature is alive" is, perhaps, Leibniz' philosophy in a nutshell. "There is nothing fallow, sterile, or dead in the universe, no chaos and no confusion except in appearance, almost as it looks in a pond at a distance, where we might see the confused and, so to speak, teeming motion of the fish in the pond, without discerning the fish themselves."
It is interesting that a great logician, and co-inventor of calculus, embarks on such an endeavour. From a post-Kantian, metaphysically-skeptical, contemporary standpoint, it must seem that Leibniz went off his rocker one day and decided to write the Monadology for diversion. Interestingly though, Leibniz identifies the function of this metaphysical project as one of supplying his logical, scientific, and mathematical systems with sufficient rational foundations without which these could not be fully rational. He claims that he is merely stating what Quine would call the ontological commitments we make in these disciplines (such as a commitment to the reality of possibles, of causality, and thus of fully determinate individual agents). Herein lies his defense for metaphysics as a whole. This defense, I think, deserves some attention, although I must confess that I am of a more mainline Kantian persuasion on the matter. Now that I think of it though, if taken as a knee-jerk response, even Kantianism can be a dogmatism. I guess, then, that the most pernicious dogmatism is supplied by the thing that purports to inoculate us from dogmatism, but I digress.
If you're curious, open-minded, and a fan of experiments with drastically different perspectival lens, try Leibniz on for size, just for the heck of it. At the least, a mind-trip is guaranteed wherein you'll feel someone just lit and dumped a bag full of firecrackers in your brain. You might be surprised to find what a great teacher a metaphysician can be in the art of seeing. I know I was. Try and look at the world -as if- monadic rather than mechanistic structures characterized the pattern of ultimate reality, and see for yourself the magic a metaphysical perspective shift can effect.
And what is even more bizarre is how much sense this makes. Stranger still is that he is right on so many points, particularly in his sustained argument against reductionism, which still seems relevant to helping us gain traction on some of the dilemmas that plague us today, as inheritors of the Cartesian mechanist, reductionist paradigm for describing nature. His metaphysical project here basically outlines the conceptual parameters for an alternative, dynamic systems approach to the description of nature which intriguingly seems to avoid some of the contradictions inherent in our view. No wonder a version of the Leibnizian view is having a come-back, via systems theory.
First of all, I'll try to provide a working definition of a monad, as best as I understand it, since this seems to be a point of confusion among many (as it has been for me, for the longest time). A monad seems to have three functions in Leibniz's system.
First, a monad is an irreducible unit of being. In more Leibnizian terminology, it is a fully determinate individual substance. Numerical identity isn't enough to distinguish individuals, for Leibniz. Monads are, according to him, what supply us with the logic for singling out individual existents in their fullness.
Second, a monad is a fully determinate causal agent which possesses an internal principle for its change of states. I can't help but agree with Leibniz that, at the least, something like his view makes better sense of causality than does the Cartesian view which registers nature solely as an inert heap of automata. Automata make for notoriously poor causal agents. Not even efficient causation can be sufficiently grounded in mechanistic structures, because you'll always need to postulate a prime mover outside the system to set into motion the otherwise inert aggregate of parts that is nature on such a view. Leibniz's monads, at the least, are genuine causal agents.
Third, and most intriguingly, perhaps, a monad is a point of view in the universe. His is the only metaphysics I know of that acknowledges perspective as a fundamental metaphysical principle:
"Just as the same city viewed from different directions appears entirely different and, as it were, multiplied perspectively, in just the same way it happens that, because of the infinite multitude of simple substances, there are, as it were, just as many different universes, which are, nevertheless, only perspectives on a single one, corresponding to the different points of view of each monad (or individual existent)."
Fourth, monads are defined by their position in a universal web of relations and interchanges. Every individual part of the universe is, in his system, causally affected by the subtlest change in every other part, however distant. Moreover, monads seem to have an almost fractal structure:
"This interconnection or accommodation of all created things to each other, and each to all the others, brings it about that each simple substance has relations that express all the others, and consequently, that each simple substance is a perpetual, living mirror of the universe."
Monads can as such be said to be microcosms, with each part of the universe reflecting the whole. Thus, Leibniz rethinks the whole concept of the part/whole, or finite/infinite relation, that is arguably the basis of any paradigm. Leibniz even prefigures chaos theory by describing every monad, or part, as being defined by its relation to every other part. Also, being characterized by "a multitude in the unity" as they are, they evince a systems logic, and general laws seems to emerge from their collective behaviour.
Monads, in being fully individual and yet defined by their interconnection with every other monad or, part of the universe, provide the ultimate basis for conceiving the unity of phenomena. Without this unitary substantial basis, Leibniz argues, we're left with an incoherent conception of the world as a scattered, disconnected aggregate of parts. Such a metaphysical worldview, Leibniz argues, in offering us no basis for conceiving the underlying unity of this aggregate of phenomena, makes it impossible to explain the basis for scientific laws, which now become ontologically groundless. He argues that in the underdetermined mechanistic metaphysical picture, all unity, causal necessity, and law can only be accounted for as artifacts of the mind. Thus, his concept of an essentially unitary monad implies a critique of the Cartesian concept of nature as extension.
Leibniz proposes this redefinition of substance as monad as a solution to the problem of "the labyrinth of the composition of the continuum," ie, of accounting for the continuity of reality via any reductionist approach, in terms of the composition of the continuum through either mathematical points or atoms. This additive approach already presupposes a continuous basis to support the progressive addition of parts, whether conceived as points or as atoms. Cartesian mechanism, in particular, was plagued by the problem of the infinite divisibility of extension. This divisibility made it possible to specify stable structures or starting points for any chain of causation within the undifferentiated sea of extended matter. Monads, as irreducible units, offer an end to divisibility, while at the same time offering a basis for conceiving the cohesion of reality as well as for the beginning of any given chain of causation.
By far the most noteworthy part of his project, for me, was his effort to articulate what a first person view of the interiority of nature might look like. In other words, his is an effort to see nature from the inside out, from the level of the interiority of objects. This perspectival shift is what motivates his description of the monads, or fundamental units of existence, in mentalistic terms. His model for the universe is a pond filled with a density of microscopic life that is as inexhaustible as it is unfathomable. His whole system seems to imply a description in terms of a variety of anthropic principle, ie, what structures we must presuppose to exist in nature if we're to account for organic and mental phenomena.
The motto "Nature is alive" is, perhaps, Leibniz' philosophy in a nutshell. "There is nothing fallow, sterile, or dead in the universe, no chaos and no confusion except in appearance, almost as it looks in a pond at a distance, where we might see the confused and, so to speak, teeming motion of the fish in the pond, without discerning the fish themselves."
It is interesting that a great logician, and co-inventor of calculus, embarks on such an endeavour. From a post-Kantian, metaphysically-skeptical, contemporary standpoint, it must seem that Leibniz went off his rocker one day and decided to write the Monadology for diversion. Interestingly though, Leibniz identifies the function of this metaphysical project as one of supplying his logical, scientific, and mathematical systems with sufficient rational foundations without which these could not be fully rational. He claims that he is merely stating what Quine would call the ontological commitments we make in these disciplines (such as a commitment to the reality of possibles, of causality, and thus of fully determinate individual agents). Herein lies his defense for metaphysics as a whole. This defense, I think, deserves some attention, although I must confess that I am of a more mainline Kantian persuasion on the matter. Now that I think of it though, if taken as a knee-jerk response, even Kantianism can be a dogmatism. I guess, then, that the most pernicious dogmatism is supplied by the thing that purports to inoculate us from dogmatism, but I digress.
If you're curious, open-minded, and a fan of experiments with drastically different perspectival lens, try Leibniz on for size, just for the heck of it. At the least, a mind-trip is guaranteed wherein you'll feel someone just lit and dumped a bag full of firecrackers in your brain. You might be surprised to find what a great teacher a metaphysician can be in the art of seeing. I know I was. Try and look at the world -as if- monadic rather than mechanistic structures characterized the pattern of ultimate reality, and see for yourself the magic a metaphysical perspective shift can effect.
December 22, 2023
Very humbling - think I was able to understand about 5% - still glad I stuck it out. Another 'Jonny - gets - humbled - because - he - realizes - there - are - really - a - lot - of - people - who - are - a - lot - smarter - than - he - is' book. But hey...the guy helped 'develop' calculus; guess old Jonny never stood a chance!
November 6, 2016
من اصلا و ابدا صلاحيت نظر دادن در اين مورد ندارم، اما فكر مى كنم تا حدى خنده دار باشه كه رشناليست ها كه اولين پرچم دارشون (دكارت) به عنوان ويران كننده فلسفه معقود و غيرمعقول مدرسى شناخته ميشه، بر اثر دنبال كردن مفاهيم و مبانى همين دكارت، تا كجا پيش رفتن! و دست فلاسفه مدرسى رو در معقود و غيرمعقول بودن نظام هاى فلسفى از پشت بستن.
August 24, 2025
دو نوع از بسطیافتگی؛
اهمیت تاریخ فلسفه و نسبت آن با مسائل فلسفی
0- داشتم با خودم فکر میکردم.
- باید جسور بود دیگه. تا کی باید از اسامی بزرگ در هراس بود؟
نه گذاشتم نه برداشتم و جواب دادم:
+ تا همیشهٔ تاریخ
1- گوتفرید ویلهلم فون لایبنیتس (1646–1716) از فلاسفهایست که میتوان لقب پل را به آنان داد. برخی فلاسفه مثل دکارت یا هیوم و برکلی بیشتر نُمایندهٔ گسستهای عمیق اند و با گسستی که در تاریخ فلسفه ایجاد کرده اند به پیوستگی مسیر تاریخ فلسفه مساعد رسانده اند. اما برخی فلاسفه مانند لایبنیتس شاید به بنیانبرافکن بودن و موسس بودنِ کسانی امثال دکارت نباشند، اما با تغییرات به ظاهر کوچک اما عمیق خود، پلی میشوند که امکانات بعدی جهان فلسفه تنها در صورت ظهور حضور آنان مجال بروز پیدا میکنند.
میتوان نشان داد هر فیلسوفی در سیری از فلاسفه قرار دارد، لایبنیتس عقلگرا مانند دیگر فلاسفه از سقراط و افلاطون ریشه میگیرد تا در عصر مدرن دکارت و اسپینوزا امکانات عقلگرایی را رها کنند و لایبنیتس به همراه دیگر فلاسفه زمین را مساعد برآمدن ِ کانت کنند.
2- مونادولوژی از مهمترین مقالات و رسالههای فلسفی اوست. این مقاله به نوعی در حکم جمعبندی نظام فلسفی اوست (لایبنیتس در قیاس با برخی دیگر از فلاسفه، آثار مفصل ندارد که تمام سیستم فلسفی او را در بر داشته باشد.).
مفاهیم اصلی مونادولوژی چنین است (بدیهی است بسیار ساده و خلاصه):
اول- بنیان فلسفه او بر فهمی است که از جوهرهای بسیط دارد. جوهرهایی که آنها را "موناد" مینامد؛
دوم- رابطه و نظمی پیشبنیاد به جهان نظم داده است؛
سوم- بحثی در شناختشناسی. در دستگاهِ لایبنیتس، جهان نه در ظرفهای مستقلِ «زمان» و «مکان» و نه با دوگانهٔ خامِ سوژه/ابژه فهمیده میشود؛ فهمْ بر دوشِ بازنماییهای مونادی است: هر موناد از منظرِ خود کل عالم را ادراک میکند و «پنجره»ای به بیرون ندارد، و سازگاریِ این بازنماییهای بیواسطه را هماهنگیِ ازپیشبرنهاده/پیشبنیاد تضمین میکند. در همین چارچوب، مکان صرفِ نظمِ همبودگیها و زمان نظمِ توالیجوهرهاست. اینان روابطی ایدهآل اند، نه موجوداتی واحدهای مستقل (از اینجا میتوان نقبی با پدیدارشناسی زد).
در کنار اینان لایبنیتس در حساب دیفرانسیل و انتگرالگیری (کلا مباحث پیوستگی در ریاضیات) از اثرگذارترین متفکرین عصر مدرن بوده است.
3- حال این موناد چیست؟ بر اساس فهم ناقص من و البته با کمک ترم ششم از "تاریخ انتقادی فلسفه غرب" که توسط محمدمهدی اردبیلی ارائه شده است.
لایبنیتس واژه «موناد» را برای تعریفی ویژه از جوهرهای بسیط بهکار برد. مونادها واحدهایی بنیادی، بیاجزاء، فاقد پنجره اند، که هیچگونه تأثیر مستقیم بر یکدیگر ندارند، اما هر یک جهان را بازتابِ همه میکند؛ یعنی هر موناد یک «آینهی تمامنما» از کل کیهان است
به بیانی لایبنیتس میخواسته به یکی از مسائل اساسی تاریخ فلسفه فهم و صورتبندی جوهرهای بسیط بوده است و لایبنیتس برای اینکه بحث خود و مباحث نوینی که به میان آورده است را از دیگران تفکیک کند، لفظ موناد را جعل کرده و در ادامه توصیفات و تعاریف خود را بر لفظ مجعول خود بار کرده است.
حال این مونادهای بیپنجرهای که نسبت و ��ابطهای با هم ندارند چگونه با یکدیگر نظم کلی جهان را ایجاد میکنند (لایبنیتس همچون اسپینوزا، فیلسوفی کلگرا است)؟ نظم پیشبنیاد/pre-established harmony که توسط خدا ایجاد شده است، ناظم رابطهٔ میان مونادهاست. خدا هماهنگی از پیشبرنهاده/پیشبنیادی را مقرر کرده است که به موجب آن، مونادها بدون تأثیر متقابل، در هماهنگی کامل با یکدیگرند.
نکته: بخشی از آتار لایبنیتس به زبان فرانسه است و مانند هر متن و مشخصا هر متن فلسفیای در ترجمه و برابرنهادهای او باید بحث تخصصی کرد. من بر اساس ترجمه رشیدیان و بحثهای اردبیلی پیش خواهم رفت. ادعایی بیشتر ندارم.طبیعیه دیگه!
4- از مباحث به غایت جذاب و چشمگیر فلسفه لایبنیتس برای من فهمی است که لایبنیتس از منظر و POV در شناخت دارد. هر موناد نهتنها وجود دارد، بلکه از یک «دیدگاه» (POV) منحصربهفرد به کل واقعیت مینگرد. هر موناد یک برداشت منحصر به فرد دارد، که نشان میدهد واقعیت مولتیپرسپکتیو (چنددیدی) و بازنمایی است. این دیدگاهگرایی از اصول بنیادین فلسفه مونادولوژی است، چرا که جوهر (موناد) ذاتاً ناظر است و همهچیز را بازمییابد، نه از طریق تبادل محسوس بلکه از خلال انعکاس درونی.
حال چرا این بحث برایم قابل توجه است؟ زیرا طرز تفکر و فلسفه پدیدارشناسانه به نظر من امکانات تفهمی، فلسفی و توصیفی شگفتانگیزی دارد و این فقره که لایبنیتس را میتوان به نوعی خواند که به این پرسشهای پدیدارشناسانه و ناظر به آگاهی و مشخصا وجه پدیداری آن توجه کرد، برایم چشمگیر است.
از این مسیر به ضرورت تاریخ فلسفه میرسیم. حداقل از دو سمت میتوان فلسفه را گسترش داد، یا در تاریخ به عقب به رویم یا در یک مسئله فلسفی در عرض حرکت کنیم. ایده کلی و بعدا بیشتر این مورد را شرح خواهم داد اگر عمری بود. اکنون میخواهم با بر شمردن برخی آثار و ایدههای کلیآنان از این نظر که نسبتی ولو حداقلی با لایبنیتس و پدیدارشناسی (مشخصا پدیدارشناسی هوسرل) دفاع کنم.
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منبع اول: انتشارات Springer در همین سال 2025 کتاب منتشر کرده است با عنوان "Husserl and Leibniz Metaphysics, Monadology and Phenomenology" که محمد شفیعی و Iulian Apostolescu به عنوان ویراستاران آن سعی کرده اند مجموعهای از نوشتهها را جمع کنند که به تعامل و نسبت تفکر میان لایبنیتس و هوسرل بپردازند. در فصول مختلف این کتاب نویسندههای هر فصل سعی کرده اند وجوه مختلفی از نسبت تفکر میان این دو نفر را فهم کنند. این کتاب در سه بخش اصلی:
بخش اول: "ارتباط کلی [میان هوسرل و لایبنیتس]"،
بخش دوم: "مسائل متافیزیکی و هستیشناختیِ [مشترک میان هوسرل و لایبنیتس]" و
بخش آخر با عنوان "لایبنیتس در حلقه پدیدارشناسی" این نسبت را کاویده است.
در بخش اول عناوین فصول اولیه چنین است:
فصل اول: "تفاوتهای مهم میان مونادولوژی هوسرل و لایبنیتس"،
فصل دوم: "مونادولوژی و بیاسوژگی"،
فصل سوم: "میراث مونادولوژیکال در هوسرل و وایتهید"
در بخش دوم به همین منوال:
فصل اول: "موناد و جهان"،
فصل دوم: "هوسرل و «غایتشناسیِ جهانشمولِ پایا»"،
فصل سوم: "فردیتیابی بهمثابهٔ هستیزایی: تأملاتی دربارهٔ مفهومِ هوسرلیِ «موناد»"
در بخش سوم داریم:
فصل اول: "تأثیر لایبنیتس بر «تئودیسهٔ» برنتانو"
فصل دوم: "پاسخ پدیدارشناختی رایناخ به لایبنیتس"
فصل سوم: "لایبنیتس و مسئلهٔ متافیزیک: تفسیرهای هایدگر در سالهای ۱۹۲۸ و ۱۹۵۵–۱۹۵۶"
نکته: علت این که عنوان برخی از فصول این کتاب را بیان کردم این است که فلسفه لایبنیتس از شئون بسیاری با پدیدارشناسی در ارتباط است.
منبع دوم: کتاب Leibniz, Husserl, and the Brain از Norman Sieroka است. این کتاب در سال 2015 منتشر شده است.
منبع سوم: کتاب Essays on Gödel’s Reception of Leibniz, Husserl, and Brouwer از Mark van Atten که ایشون نیز سال 2015 منتشر شده است.
منبع چهارم: Leibniz on Phenomenal Consciousness از Christian Barth که در سال 2014 منتشر شده است. هدف اصلی این مقاله این است که به صورت مشخص و واضح حیث پدیداری آگاهی را از فلسفه لایبنیتس استخراج کند.
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با این اوصاف قطعا کلی منبع دیگر نیز توان یافت لکن صرفا الان میخواستم خیال خودم رو راحت کنم :)
5- یه سوال؟ چگونه میشود یک متن کلاسیک و بنیادین در تاریخ فلسفه را خواند و چیزی جز کلیات بدیهی و مشهور نگفت؟ شاید لازم باشد با ذهنی پرسشگرتر، نکتهبینتر و پر مسئله به سراغ متون برویم. متن فلسفی لزوما پاسخ به سوال نمیدهد، بلکه امکان تفکر به مسائل را ایجاد میکند؛ لااقل من اینگونه فکر میکنم.
یا نخوانیم یا وقتی میخوانیم حداقل اپسیلونی حق مطلب را باید ادا کنیم.
6- رشیدیان علاوه بر خود مونادولوژی مقالات و رسالههای دیگری از لایبنیتس را نیز ترجمه کرده است. من صرفا مونادولوژی و بخشهایی پراکنده و به فراخور کند و کاو از جستار/مقالههای دیگر را خواندم. متنی هم که نوشته ام خیلی ادعایی نداره. واضحه دیگه. انقدر میفهمم که نباید ادعای توخالی و پوچ کرد!
نسبت به امیتازی هم که دارم به کتاب میدم حس عجیبی دارم. آخه چجوری باید به متن کلاسیک امتیاز داد؟ امتیاز بدم که چی بشه :)
اهمیت تاریخ فلسفه و نسبت آن با مسائل فلسفی
0- داشتم با خودم فکر میکردم.
- باید جسور بود دیگه. تا کی باید از اسامی بزرگ در هراس بود؟
نه گذاشتم نه برداشتم و جواب دادم:
+ تا همیشهٔ تاریخ
1- گوتفرید ویلهلم فون لایبنیتس (1646–1716) از فلاسفهایست که میتوان لقب پل را به آنان داد. برخی فلاسفه مثل دکارت یا هیوم و برکلی بیشتر نُمایندهٔ گسستهای عمیق اند و با گسستی که در تاریخ فلسفه ایجاد کرده اند به پیوستگی مسیر تاریخ فلسفه مساعد رسانده اند. اما برخی فلاسفه مانند لایبنیتس شاید به بنیانبرافکن بودن و موسس بودنِ کسانی امثال دکارت نباشند، اما با تغییرات به ظاهر کوچک اما عمیق خود، پلی میشوند که امکانات بعدی جهان فلسفه تنها در صورت ظهور حضور آنان مجال بروز پیدا میکنند.
میتوان نشان داد هر فیلسوفی در سیری از فلاسفه قرار دارد، لایبنیتس عقلگرا مانند دیگر فلاسفه از سقراط و افلاطون ریشه میگیرد تا در عصر مدرن دکارت و اسپینوزا امکانات عقلگرایی را رها کنند و لایبنیتس به همراه دیگر فلاسفه زمین را مساعد برآمدن ِ کانت کنند.
2- مونادولوژی از مهمترین مقالات و رسالههای فلسفی اوست. این مقاله به نوعی در حکم جمعبندی نظام فلسفی اوست (لایبنیتس در قیاس با برخی دیگر از فلاسفه، آثار مفصل ندارد که تمام سیستم فلسفی او را در بر داشته باشد.).
مفاهیم اصلی مونادولوژی چنین است (بدیهی است بسیار ساده و خلاصه):
اول- بنیان فلسفه او بر فهمی است که از جوهرهای بسیط دارد. جوهرهایی که آنها را "موناد" مینامد؛
دوم- رابطه و نظمی پیشبنیاد به جهان نظم داده است؛
سوم- بحثی در شناختشناسی. در دستگاهِ لایبنیتس، جهان نه در ظرفهای مستقلِ «زمان» و «مکان» و نه با دوگانهٔ خامِ سوژه/ابژه فهمیده میشود؛ فهمْ بر دوشِ بازنماییهای مونادی است: هر موناد از منظرِ خود کل عالم را ادراک میکند و «پنجره»ای به بیرون ندارد، و سازگاریِ این بازنماییهای بیواسطه را هماهنگیِ ازپیشبرنهاده/پیشبنیاد تضمین میکند. در همین چارچوب، مکان صرفِ نظمِ همبودگیها و زمان نظمِ توالیجوهرهاست. اینان روابطی ایدهآل اند، نه موجوداتی واحدهای مستقل (از اینجا میتوان نقبی با پدیدارشناسی زد).
در کنار اینان لایبنیتس در حساب دیفرانسیل و انتگرالگیری (کلا مباحث پیوستگی در ریاضیات) از اثرگذارترین متفکرین عصر مدرن بوده است.
3- حال این موناد چیست؟ بر اساس فهم ناقص من و البته با کمک ترم ششم از "تاریخ انتقادی فلسفه غرب" که توسط محمدمهدی اردبیلی ارائه شده است.
لایبنیتس واژه «موناد» را برای تعریفی ویژه از جوهرهای بسیط بهکار برد. مونادها واحدهایی بنیادی، بیاجزاء، فاقد پنجره اند، که هیچگونه تأثیر مستقیم بر یکدیگر ندارند، اما هر یک جهان را بازتابِ همه میکند؛ یعنی هر موناد یک «آینهی تمامنما» از کل کیهان است
به بیانی لایبنیتس میخواسته به یکی از مسائل اساسی تاریخ فلسفه فهم و صورتبندی جوهرهای بسیط بوده است و لایبنیتس برای اینکه بحث خود و مباحث نوینی که به میان آورده است را از دیگران تفکیک کند، لفظ موناد را جعل کرده و در ادامه توصیفات و تعاریف خود را بر لفظ مجعول خود بار کرده است.
حال این مونادهای بیپنجرهای که نسبت و ��ابطهای با هم ندارند چگونه با یکدیگر نظم کلی جهان را ایجاد میکنند (لایبنیتس همچون اسپینوزا، فیلسوفی کلگرا است)؟ نظم پیشبنیاد/pre-established harmony که توسط خدا ایجاد شده است، ناظم رابطهٔ میان مونادهاست. خدا هماهنگی از پیشبرنهاده/پیشبنیادی را مقرر کرده است که به موجب آن، مونادها بدون تأثیر متقابل، در هماهنگی کامل با یکدیگرند.
نکته: بخشی از آتار لایبنیتس به زبان فرانسه است و مانند هر متن و مشخصا هر متن فلسفیای در ترجمه و برابرنهادهای او باید بحث تخصصی کرد. من بر اساس ترجمه رشیدیان و بحثهای اردبیلی پیش خواهم رفت. ادعایی بیشتر ندارم.طبیعیه دیگه!
4- از مباحث به غایت جذاب و چشمگیر فلسفه لایبنیتس برای من فهمی است که لایبنیتس از منظر و POV در شناخت دارد. هر موناد نهتنها وجود دارد، بلکه از یک «دیدگاه» (POV) منحصربهفرد به کل واقعیت مینگرد. هر موناد یک برداشت منحصر به فرد دارد، که نشان میدهد واقعیت مولتیپرسپکتیو (چنددیدی) و بازنمایی است. این دیدگاهگرایی از اصول بنیادین فلسفه مونادولوژی است، چرا که جوهر (موناد) ذاتاً ناظر است و همهچیز را بازمییابد، نه از طریق تبادل محسوس بلکه از خلال انعکاس درونی.
حال چرا این بحث برایم قابل توجه است؟ زیرا طرز تفکر و فلسفه پدیدارشناسانه به نظر من امکانات تفهمی، فلسفی و توصیفی شگفتانگیزی دارد و این فقره که لایبنیتس را میتوان به نوعی خواند که به این پرسشهای پدیدارشناسانه و ناظر به آگاهی و مشخصا وجه پدیداری آن توجه کرد، برایم چشمگیر است.
از این مسیر به ضرورت تاریخ فلسفه میرسیم. حداقل از دو سمت میتوان فلسفه را گسترش داد، یا در تاریخ به عقب به رویم یا در یک مسئله فلسفی در عرض حرکت کنیم. ایده کلی و بعدا بیشتر این مورد را شرح خواهم داد اگر عمری بود. اکنون میخواهم با بر شمردن برخی آثار و ایدههای کلیآنان از این نظر که نسبتی ولو حداقلی با لایبنیتس و پدیدارشناسی (مشخصا پدیدارشناسی هوسرل) دفاع کنم.
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منبع اول: انتشارات Springer در همین سال 2025 کتاب منتشر کرده است با عنوان "Husserl and Leibniz Metaphysics, Monadology and Phenomenology" که محمد شفیعی و Iulian Apostolescu به عنوان ویراستاران آن سعی کرده اند مجموعهای از نوشتهها را جمع کنند که به تعامل و نسبت تفکر میان لایبنیتس و هوسرل بپردازند. در فصول مختلف این کتاب نویسندههای هر فصل سعی کرده اند وجوه مختلفی از نسبت تفکر میان این دو نفر را فهم کنند. این کتاب در سه بخش اصلی:
بخش اول: "ارتباط کلی [میان هوسرل و لایبنیتس]"،
بخش دوم: "مسائل متافیزیکی و هستیشناختیِ [مشترک میان هوسرل و لایبنیتس]" و
بخش آخر با عنوان "لایبنیتس در حلقه پدیدارشناسی" این نسبت را کاویده است.
در بخش اول عناوین فصول اولیه چنین است:
فصل اول: "تفاوتهای مهم میان مونادولوژی هوسرل و لایبنیتس"،
فصل دوم: "مونادولوژی و بیاسوژگی"،
فصل سوم: "میراث مونادولوژیکال در هوسرل و وایتهید"
در بخش دوم به همین منوال:
فصل اول: "موناد و جهان"،
فصل دوم: "هوسرل و «غایتشناسیِ جهانشمولِ پایا»"،
فصل سوم: "فردیتیابی بهمثابهٔ هستیزایی: تأملاتی دربارهٔ مفهومِ هوسرلیِ «موناد»"
در بخش سوم داریم:
فصل اول: "تأثیر لایبنیتس بر «تئودیسهٔ» برنتانو"
فصل دوم: "پاسخ پدیدارشناختی رایناخ به لایبنیتس"
فصل سوم: "لایبنیتس و مسئلهٔ متافیزیک: تفسیرهای هایدگر در سالهای ۱۹۲۸ و ۱۹۵۵–۱۹۵۶"
نکته: علت این که عنوان برخی از فصول این کتاب را بیان کردم این است که فلسفه لایبنیتس از شئون بسیاری با پدیدارشناسی در ارتباط است.
منبع دوم: کتاب Leibniz, Husserl, and the Brain از Norman Sieroka است. این کتاب در سال 2015 منتشر شده است.
منبع سوم: کتاب Essays on Gödel’s Reception of Leibniz, Husserl, and Brouwer از Mark van Atten که ایشون نیز سال 2015 منتشر شده است.
منبع چهارم: Leibniz on Phenomenal Consciousness از Christian Barth که در سال 2014 منتشر شده است. هدف اصلی این مقاله این است که به صورت مشخص و واضح حیث پدیداری آگاهی را از فلسفه لایبنیتس استخراج کند.
________
با این اوصاف قطعا کلی منبع دیگر نیز توان یافت لکن صرفا الان میخواستم خیال خودم رو راحت کنم :)
5- یه سوال؟ چگونه میشود یک متن کلاسیک و بنیادین در تاریخ فلسفه را خواند و چیزی جز کلیات بدیهی و مشهور نگفت؟ شاید لازم باشد با ذهنی پرسشگرتر، نکتهبینتر و پر مسئله به سراغ متون برویم. متن فلسفی لزوما پاسخ به سوال نمیدهد، بلکه امکان تفکر به مسائل را ایجاد میکند؛ لااقل من اینگونه فکر میکنم.
یا نخوانیم یا وقتی میخوانیم حداقل اپسیلونی حق مطلب را باید ادا کنیم.
6- رشیدیان علاوه بر خود مونادولوژی مقالات و رسالههای دیگری از لایبنیتس را نیز ترجمه کرده است. من صرفا مونادولوژی و بخشهایی پراکنده و به فراخور کند و کاو از جستار/مقالههای دیگر را خواندم. متنی هم که نوشته ام خیلی ادعایی نداره. واضحه دیگه. انقدر میفهمم که نباید ادعای توخالی و پوچ کرد!
نسبت به امیتازی هم که دارم به کتاب میدم حس عجیبی دارم. آخه چجوری باید به متن کلاسیک امتیاز داد؟ امتیاز بدم که چی بشه :)
November 13, 2015
نمره ی واقعی: دو و نیم
چند سالی می گذره از آخرین باری که منادولوژی رو باز کردم - سال ها پیش که بابت تحقیق واحد درسی مربوطه به سراغش رفته بودم؛ این بار هم البته درس و مدرسه علت دوباره ی سر زدن به این کتاب بود - این بار برای پایان نامه
چنانکه در مقدمه ی مهدوی آمده، چهار ترجمه از این کتاب هست که یکی قدیمی تر و بقیه نسبتا متأخرن. ترجمه ی مهدوی آخرین ترجمه ی چاپ شده است. من جز این ترجمه، فقط ترجمه ی رشیدیان رو از نزدیک دیدم. اون چه که مسلمه اینه که خواننده ی خواهان آشنایی با لایبنیتس باید به ترجمه ی مهدوی مراجعه کنه؛ نه به دلیل اینکه ترجمش بهتر از رشیدیانه - که البته بدترم نیست - بلکه به این دلیل که حواشی زیاد و واقعا مفیدی رو از چند شرح ترجمه کرده. خود منادولوژی در حد بیست صفحه است اما با شروح و مقدمه این کتاب نزدیک دویست صفحه شده
به نظرم اهمیت منادولوژی اولا در اینه که یه سری گزینه های جدیدی رو مطرح می کنه و مسیری رو می ره که آینده ی فلسفه رو از خودش متأثر می کنه - گوشه گوشه می شه چیزهایی رو دید که مثلا یادآور کانت، هگل و ... هستند؛ و دوما در استفاده ی خاصش از برخی جزئیات فلسفه ی قبلی ها - چه ارسطو و چه اسپینوزا. اما اینکه آیا نظام لایبنیتسی، حداقل در این کتاب، روشن تبیین و تعلیل شده باشه محل بحثه - البته اختصارش واقعا کتاب رو مختصر و مفید کرده
متأسفانه لایبنیتس در تبیین هاش به مراتبی که خودش در واقعیت بنا کرده وفادار نیست؛ یعنی تبیین هاش به جای آنکه صرفا مبتنی بر مناد و ویژگی های بنیادین باشه، گاه مبتنی بر سطح پدیداری و گاه مبتنی بر سطح بنیادینه ( یادآور قضیه ی آناکساگوراس و عقل و واکنش سقراط ). همینه که آدم گاهی به خودش می گه طرف آدم باهوشی نبوده که اینجوری چیزها با هم قاطی شدن؛ اما از طرف دیگه نکاتی می گه که نشان از ذکاوتش داره؛ این تقابل رو بعضی اینجوری حل کردن که لایبنیتس اهل سیاست بوده - به معنای عام - یعنی مصلحت رو می سنجیده و با مخاطب مطابق ذائقه اش حرف می زده
September 22, 2016
So that's what monads are! Leibniz is one of the best thinkers I have ever come across and he's a very clear writer. This book makes me think of the line, "besides that Mrs. Lincoln how did you like the play". Because, if you can get past the "best possible of all worlds", the necessary and absolute that he claims he gets from 'a priori' and 'a posterior' knowledge, his 'efficient and final cause', and his entelechy (think Bergson's 'elan vital') and his other religious items his monads make an incredible amount of sense in our current understanding of the quantum world.
There are definitely hints of the MWI (multi world universe) of Hugh Everett III and also hints of the Copenhagen Interpretation and at the basic level that our existence comes about because of our placement within the universe.
I stumbled onto this book because I'm currently reading Hegel's Science of Logic and it's clear that Spinoza's Ethics, Kant's Reason, and a Leibniz's monads play a central role for Hegel. Leibniz knows the truth to theTruth and Method belief that "in order to understand the sentence one must first understand the words, and in order to understand the words one must first understand the sentence". Monads are the words and the universe is the sentence.
LibriVox has a very good copy of this book. It's only an hour long.
There are definitely hints of the MWI (multi world universe) of Hugh Everett III and also hints of the Copenhagen Interpretation and at the basic level that our existence comes about because of our placement within the universe.
I stumbled onto this book because I'm currently reading Hegel's Science of Logic and it's clear that Spinoza's Ethics, Kant's Reason, and a Leibniz's monads play a central role for Hegel. Leibniz knows the truth to theTruth and Method belief that "in order to understand the sentence one must first understand the words, and in order to understand the words one must first understand the sentence". Monads are the words and the universe is the sentence.
LibriVox has a very good copy of this book. It's only an hour long.
March 29, 2016
مراجعة كتاب “ المونادولوجيا” للفيلسوف الألماني لايبنتز
قد يبدو عنوان هذا الكتاب غامضاً بعض الشيء إلا أن لايبنتز يقدم تعريف لما يسميه بالــ “المونادا” و هي الجواهر البسيطة غير القابلة للتجزئة ، حيث يطرح فكرة الجوهر البسيط مقابل المركب. و يقصد بالجوهر البسيط الروح أو النفس أو العنصر الأساسي من مادة معينة، ذلك العنصر الغير قابل للتغير و التبدل و الغير قابل للفناء بعوامل الفناء الطبيعية.
و هو بذلك في المقابل بعكس المركبات التي تتغير و تتبدل و تؤثر فيها عوامل الزمان و المكان و هي التي يمكن تجزئتها لأجزاء و أجزاء. و من أمثلة المركبات : الأجسام و الأجساد.
ثم يذكر بعد ذلك أن يدرك أن التغيرات التي تحصل في الجواهر البسيطة تعود إلى أسباب داخلية فقط ، لعدم استطاعة أي علل خارجية أن تؤثر في هذه الجواهر. و يعرج على تحليل الادراك و علاقته بالنفس و الروح أو الجسد و كيف ان الادراك الحقيقي قد يتجلى في أوقات الغيبوبة أو لحظات تحرر الروح من الجسد. حيث أن تلك الادراكات التي عرفتها النفس “الجوهر البسيط” ستبقى تلازم النفس في كل الأحوال.
يتعرض أيضاً لذكر العلة الأخيرة أو علة العلل و هو واجب الوجود و هو الجوهر أيضاً حسب ما يذكر لايبنتز - و هو السبب الكافي لكل وجود، و بناءً على ذلك فلا يوجد سوى إله واحد.
الكتاب يتعرض بعمق لإشكالية كمال المخلوقات و نقصها ، حيث أنه يرجع سبب كمالها لتأثير الله و عدم كمالها لصدوره من طبيعتها الخاصة نتيجة للقصور الذاتي في أجسام المخلوقات و عدم قابليتها لأن تكون في منتهى الكمال كما هو الكامل المطلق.
يناقش أيضاً مسألة فلسفية مهمة و هي العلل الفاعلية مقابل العلل الغائية و يرجع وقوف الفيزيائيين على العلل الفاعلية لعدم مقدرتهم الغوص لأبعد من ذلك و التعمق في ماهية العلل الغائية - هذه الجزئية ذكرتني بطرح شوبنهاور عن توقف الأيتولوجيا عند تفسير العلل بردها لأسبابها المادية و عدم مقدرتها على مواصلة ذلك و ردها للأسباب الغائية الميتافيزيقية ، بل هي الفلسفة - حسب شوبنهاور - التي تبدأ عملها عند انتهاء عمل الايتولوجيا.
و يعرج في النهاية على حكمة الله السامية و هو ما يميز الفلسفة اللايبنتزية - حيث أنها فلسفة عرفانية عميقة تؤمن دائماً بأن أفعال الله حكيمة و في موضعها و تؤمن بتوافق العلل الفيزيائية مع الأسباب الميتافيزيقية الغائية.
“ إن حب الله يملأ آمالنا و يقودنا في الطريق إلى السعادة السامية ، لأنه بفضل النظام الكامل الموجود في العالم كل شيء جُعل في أحسن حال ممكن سواء للصالح العالم أو لأكبر صالح خاص” هكذا يختتم لايبنتز كتابه.
Αωαςhι
٢٩ آذار ٢٠١٦
قد يبدو عنوان هذا الكتاب غامضاً بعض الشيء إلا أن لايبنتز يقدم تعريف لما يسميه بالــ “المونادا” و هي الجواهر البسيطة غير القابلة للتجزئة ، حيث يطرح فكرة الجوهر البسيط مقابل المركب. و يقصد بالجوهر البسيط الروح أو النفس أو العنصر الأساسي من مادة معينة، ذلك العنصر الغير قابل للتغير و التبدل و الغير قابل للفناء بعوامل الفناء الطبيعية.
و هو بذلك في المقابل بعكس المركبات التي تتغير و تتبدل و تؤثر فيها عوامل الزمان و المكان و هي التي يمكن تجزئتها لأجزاء و أجزاء. و من أمثلة المركبات : الأجسام و الأجساد.
ثم يذكر بعد ذلك أن يدرك أن التغيرات التي تحصل في الجواهر البسيطة تعود إلى أسباب داخلية فقط ، لعدم استطاعة أي علل خارجية أن تؤثر في هذه الجواهر. و يعرج على تحليل الادراك و علاقته بالنفس و الروح أو الجسد و كيف ان الادراك الحقيقي قد يتجلى في أوقات الغيبوبة أو لحظات تحرر الروح من الجسد. حيث أن تلك الادراكات التي عرفتها النفس “الجوهر البسيط” ستبقى تلازم النفس في كل الأحوال.
يتعرض أيضاً لذكر العلة الأخيرة أو علة العلل و هو واجب الوجود و هو الجوهر أيضاً حسب ما يذكر لايبنتز - و هو السبب الكافي لكل وجود، و بناءً على ذلك فلا يوجد سوى إله واحد.
الكتاب يتعرض بعمق لإشكالية كمال المخلوقات و نقصها ، حيث أنه يرجع سبب كمالها لتأثير الله و عدم كمالها لصدوره من طبيعتها الخاصة نتيجة للقصور الذاتي في أجسام المخلوقات و عدم قابليتها لأن تكون في منتهى الكمال كما هو الكامل المطلق.
يناقش أيضاً مسألة فلسفية مهمة و هي العلل الفاعلية مقابل العلل الغائية و يرجع وقوف الفيزيائيين على العلل الفاعلية لعدم مقدرتهم الغوص لأبعد من ذلك و التعمق في ماهية العلل الغائية - هذه الجزئية ذكرتني بطرح شوبنهاور عن توقف الأيتولوجيا عند تفسير العلل بردها لأسبابها المادية و عدم مقدرتها على مواصلة ذلك و ردها للأسباب الغائية الميتافيزيقية ، بل هي الفلسفة - حسب شوبنهاور - التي تبدأ عملها عند انتهاء عمل الايتولوجيا.
و يعرج في النهاية على حكمة الله السامية و هو ما يميز الفلسفة اللايبنتزية - حيث أنها فلسفة عرفانية عميقة تؤمن دائماً بأن أفعال الله حكيمة و في موضعها و تؤمن بتوافق العلل الفيزيائية مع الأسباب الميتافيزيقية الغائية.
“ إن حب الله يملأ آمالنا و يقودنا في الطريق إلى السعادة السامية ، لأنه بفضل النظام الكامل الموجود في العالم كل شيء جُعل في أحسن حال ممكن سواء للصالح العالم أو لأكبر صالح خاص” هكذا يختتم لايبنتز كتابه.
Αωαςhι
٢٩ آذار ٢٠١٦
June 4, 2012
Those monads drove me nuts in my undergraduate Early Modern Philosophy class, where I was perfectly beguiled by Locke and Hume. I remember sitting in the class on Leibniz day being like, "So, WHAT ARE THE MONADS? Am I a monad? Is the table a monad? Are the atoms that make up the table monads?" "Yes." "HOW? THIS IS INSANE!!!!" I will also never forget Leibniz's bypassing of cause and effect via the notion that monads do not interact; they only appear to through the conjunction of the "unfolding" of their individual natures. Trippy stuff. Wow, this is actually making me miss my undergrad years.
November 5, 2021
Súper based philosophy 😎💯
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April 26, 2018سو كيوت
November 6, 2018
It was recommended that I read Leibniz to prep for Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant, so I checked out this short summary of his work. I listened to the audiobook, which was just under an hour in length. The preface claimed that it wouldn't make a good first reading of Leibniz because its condensed nature was not descriptive enough. This was partially true. Although fascinated, I didn't even know what a monad really was after completing it. So, I listened to a "Partially Examined Life" podcast episode on Monadology and it helped fill in the blanks.
Monads are sort of like atoms, the building blocks of all matter. They are similar to human souls in that they have a kind of consciousness that can act and react on its own. They make up organic and inorganic matter, but the monads that make up humans and animals are "like-minded", so they work together to breathe life into the organism. The monads that make up inorganic matter don't cooperate this way. I'm unsure of how solid this philosophy is, but I give it 4 1/2 stars for introducing me to a unique and important school of metaphysics I was unaware of.
Monads are sort of like atoms, the building blocks of all matter. They are similar to human souls in that they have a kind of consciousness that can act and react on its own. They make up organic and inorganic matter, but the monads that make up humans and animals are "like-minded", so they work together to breathe life into the organism. The monads that make up inorganic matter don't cooperate this way. I'm unsure of how solid this philosophy is, but I give it 4 1/2 stars for introducing me to a unique and important school of metaphysics I was unaware of.
May 22, 2021
Descartes’ın cevher kavramından hareketle geliştirdiği monad teorisi üzerine bir deneme olan Leibniz’in "Monadoloji", ilginç anektodlar barındırmasına rağmen zaman aşımına uğramış bir eser. Monadları birleşik şeylere giren, parçaları olmayan basit tözler olarak tanımlandığı eserinde Leibniz bir nevi kavram yaratma sanatı icra ediyor. Okunması oldukça zor ve üzerine derinlemesini düşünülmesi gereken felsefi notların biraz daha ilgili okuyucuyalara uygun olduğunun altını çizmek gerek. Düşünce biçiminin nasıl evrimleştiğinden çok felsefenin temel prensipleriyle ilgili bir kitap olan "Monadoloji", atomdan farklı olarak yer kaplamayan ve şekilden yoksun monadları daha detaylı öğrenmek isteyenlerin ilgisini çekecektir.
22.05.2021
Londra, Birleşik Krallık
Alp Turgut
22.05.2021
Londra, Birleşik Krallık
Alp Turgut
June 11, 2025
Je note juste « Causa Dei », c’est de la grosse frappe , Leibniz passe en super sayajin divin pour montrer que Dieu n’est pas responsable du mal présent dans le monde.
Je pleure sur le poulet des dichotomies 🤓
Je pleure sur le poulet des dichotomies 🤓
June 19, 2025
À ce stade on dirait juste que Leibniz est amoureux de Dieu bref
December 31, 2021
A machince constructed by man’s skill is not a machine in each of its parts; for instance, the teeth of a brass wheel have parts or bits which to us are not artificial products and contain nothing in themselves to show that the use to which the wheel was destined in the machine. The machines of nature, however, that is to say, living bodies, are still machines in their smallest parts ad infinitum. Such is the difference between nature and art, that is to say, between divine art and ours.
Starting from a simple, indivisible entity, the monad, through a series of short paragraphs, Leibniz builds up a theory about:
- the soul (a monad that has perception and memory, and that is reduced to a monad during sleep),
- the senses (exist so as to prompt us from the stupor that we would otherwise sink into without them),
- the principles of reasoning (that of contradiction, and that of sufficient reason),
- the kinds of truths (of reasoning, which are necessary, and of facts, which are contingent),
- of action and causality (the more perfect acts upon and induces the less perfect),
- of God (the ideal, ultimate cause in the limit, and who should be seen “also as our Lord and the Final Cause, who ought to be the whole goal of our will, and who alone can make us happy”).
Curious, philosophically riveting, and historically relevant.
June 9, 2019
Leibniz's mature philosophical system, written for the "serious metaphysician".
Leibniz discusses in depth Monads, souls, minds, arguments for God, the universe as pre-established harmony and man's relationship to God.
Leibniz discusses in depth Monads, souls, minds, arguments for God, the universe as pre-established harmony and man's relationship to God.
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July 30, 2023فقط مونادولوژی را خواندم.
ولی اردبیلی در درسگفتارش اشاره کرده که مقاله 《 طبیعت چیست 》مهمه و الهام بخش هگل بوده.
ولی اردبیلی در درسگفتارش اشاره کرده که مقاله 《 طبیعت چیست 》مهمه و الهام بخش هگل بوده.
May 18, 2023
Leído en la edición de Pentalfa, con una detallada introducción de Gustavo Bueno que merece mucho la pena.
November 4, 2023
Everything is beautiful just when I’m reading this I am doubting that statement. Yet I still enjoyed the struggle and the intellectual pathway it sent me on. This is an interesting read, had to do it for my modern philosophy class. Would advice!
November 28, 2021
Leibniz's Monadology is notoriously difficult reading. Even students that have a basic understanding of the development of the notions of substance and body, from Aristotle through Descartes and Newton, have trouble grasping Leibniz's views on monads and aggregation; even more so how such concepts relate to, and are attempts to solve problems associated with, Aristotelian hylomorphism, Scholastic substantial forms, Cartesian extension, and mechanistic corpuscularianism, to name just a few key notions.
Rescher's text, however, is a welcome addition for the student of early modern philosophy. Rescher's text is a reference work that consists of the Monadology, collections of passages from Leibniz's other writings (including passages from letters, essays, and various philosophical writings), as well as Rescher's own erudite (though brief and sparse) comments on particular salient passages that are often problematic for students. The compiled material and comments by Rescher accompany the text of the Monadology, giving one a more illuminated reading than if one were reading solely the Monadology.
It is an idespensible (though not exhausitive) guide to understanding the complicated metaphysics and physics of Leibniz. This is not, however, a secondary source (except in a weak sense). Rescher's text is neither a critical nor historical treatment of the philsophical and scientific issues found in the Monadology; rather it is a guidebook, and an excellent one at that.
If you are reading the Monadology, and if you are not a grad student specializing in the rationalists, early modern in general, or other related fields, this book is a must. Even grad students who have had a couple of classes in early modern can still benefit from this book as well; I certainly did.
Rescher's text, however, is a welcome addition for the student of early modern philosophy. Rescher's text is a reference work that consists of the Monadology, collections of passages from Leibniz's other writings (including passages from letters, essays, and various philosophical writings), as well as Rescher's own erudite (though brief and sparse) comments on particular salient passages that are often problematic for students. The compiled material and comments by Rescher accompany the text of the Monadology, giving one a more illuminated reading than if one were reading solely the Monadology.
It is an idespensible (though not exhausitive) guide to understanding the complicated metaphysics and physics of Leibniz. This is not, however, a secondary source (except in a weak sense). Rescher's text is neither a critical nor historical treatment of the philsophical and scientific issues found in the Monadology; rather it is a guidebook, and an excellent one at that.
If you are reading the Monadology, and if you are not a grad student specializing in the rationalists, early modern in general, or other related fields, this book is a must. Even grad students who have had a couple of classes in early modern can still benefit from this book as well; I certainly did.
September 2, 2016
هذا الكتيب الصغير الذى إحتوت أكثر من نصف صفحاته على مقدمة المترجم واحتوت نصف صفحات الترجمة على هوامش من وضع المترجم فكان ما فهمته من موضوع الكتاب لا يتعدى نقاطاً قليلة معدودة فى فلسفة ليبنتز الميتافيزيقية لكنها بالضرورة لقوتها وأصالتها تقود العقل لمسائل أخرى كالمسألة الأخلاقية وحرية الإرادة ومسألة المعرفة وعلاقة النفس بالبدن ومسائل أخرى قليلة أكثر جزئية .
والفلسفة بشكل عام عند ليبنتز كانت محاولة ذات قدر معين من النجاح او الفشل كباقى الفلسفات خصوصا تلك التى كان لها هدف مشابه وهو بنظريته فى المونادات التى هى جواهر مفردة لكل ما فى الوجود من اشياء بسيطة او مركبة كل منها له مونادته الخاصة التى هى مستقلة تمام الاستقلال بذاتها عن كل المونادات الاخرى وحتى المونادة الجامعه الكامله التى هى الله الخالق لا تتبعه او تتعلق به الا من حيث الوجود لكنها تستقل عنه بمجرد خلقه لها لكنها تسير فى علاقاتها بالمونادات الاخرى على اساس القوانين التى خلقها الله بها ووضعها فيها ومن اهم هذه القوانين هو قانون الانسجام المسبق الذى يضمن استقلال كل مونادة ويضمن انسجام علاقات المونادات بصورة باطنية فالتأثيرات المادية الفيزيائية او الروحية كلها ليست الا ظاهرية والحقيقة ان كل مونادة تتصرف بدافع باطنى فهى تدرك ما عليها من فعل او تغير او رد فعل تجاه المونادات الأخرى
انه ملخص بسيط لقواعد فلسفة ليبنتز الأساسية .
والفلسفة بشكل عام عند ليبنتز كانت محاولة ذات قدر معين من النجاح او الفشل كباقى الفلسفات خصوصا تلك التى كان لها هدف مشابه وهو بنظريته فى المونادات التى هى جواهر مفردة لكل ما فى الوجود من اشياء بسيطة او مركبة كل منها له مونادته الخاصة التى هى مستقلة تمام الاستقلال بذاتها عن كل المونادات الاخرى وحتى المونادة الجامعه الكامله التى هى الله الخالق لا تتبعه او تتعلق به الا من حيث الوجود لكنها تستقل عنه بمجرد خلقه لها لكنها تسير فى علاقاتها بالمونادات الاخرى على اساس القوانين التى خلقها الله بها ووضعها فيها ومن اهم هذه القوانين هو قانون الانسجام المسبق الذى يضمن استقلال كل مونادة ويضمن انسجام علاقات المونادات بصورة باطنية فالتأثيرات المادية الفيزيائية او الروحية كلها ليست الا ظاهرية والحقيقة ان كل مونادة تتصرف بدافع باطنى فهى تدرك ما عليها من فعل او تغير او رد فعل تجاه المونادات الأخرى
انه ملخص بسيط لقواعد فلسفة ليبنتز الأساسية .
August 29, 2013
Atakan ismindeki birinden böyle geleneksel terimlere sahip çıkan bir çeviri beklemezdim, ne yalan söyleyeyim. Bir de üstüne önsözde, okurdan geleneksel terimleri tercih ettiğim için beni anlayışla karşılamalarını umarım, demiş. Abicim ne anlayışı, sevincimden hopladım yerimde sjffhd.
Yaa bir de, kitap bana acayip çikolata hatırlatıyor. Adamın adını nerelerde kullanmışlar, aklıma evvela hep bu geliyor http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia...
:(~
Yaa bir de, kitap bana acayip çikolata hatırlatıyor. Adamın adını nerelerde kullanmışlar, aklıma evvela hep bu geliyor http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia...
:(~
April 1, 2018
أول كتاب فلسفي أقرأه و الكتاب فعلاً جميل و لا تشعر بالغربة عنعصرنا رغم فارق قرنين من الزمن. و قد احتفظت ببعض الفقرات أعيد قرأتها . لفت نظري عبارة " الله صانع ساعات مجيد، صنع ساعتين منضبتان و تركهما تعملان بدقة" و قد ذكرتني علي طول بكتاب ريتشارد دوكينز " صانع الاسعات العمي" و الذي يدور حول قانون الانتخاب الطبيعي
March 31, 2018
الكتاب جميل، هي رسالة مقتضبة تحتوي على ٩٠ فقرة، مع وجود هوامش تشرح بعض المفاهيم بشكل أكبر.
تحتوي فلسفة ليبنتز على معرفة العلل، وبمعرفة العلل يُحلّل النفس والجسد وتفاعلهما مع الكون، وعليه يستنتج وجود واجد الوجود، كامل الكمال وهو الله.
تحتوي فلسفة ليبنتز على معرفة العلل، وبمعرفة العلل يُحلّل النفس والجسد وتفاعلهما مع الكون، وعليه يستنتج وجود واجد الوجود، كامل الكمال وهو الله.
March 3, 2022
فلسفهٔ لایبنیتس را با محوریتِ مقالهٔ «مونادولوژی» مطالعه کردم، و نگاهی مختصر نیز به مقالهٔ «طبیعت چیست؟» داشتم. فلسفهٔ لایبنیتس امکانات نهفته و خلاقانهای در بطن خود دارد و باید در فرصتهایِ دیگری نیز به آن رجوع کنم.
Read
February 10, 2020for my philosophy class. the only thing getting me through this book was that it would make chidi proud. also! this is the guy voltaire satirized in candide (which made it a little more funny)
Read
April 16, 2021caralho
May 24, 2024
Probably the most banging 26 pages ever written
December 27, 2024
This is an easy, short work but one that can be difficult to fully comprehend. So much of it goes against the widely accepted atomic view of the universe, although quantum mechanics and computer science have developed the idea that information is fundamental to reality. If one wants to appreciate the depth of Leibniz's system, a knowledge of some of Aristotle's and Descartes' ideas is necessary, as is a familiarity of the competing materialist/atomist system of the time via John Locke and others.
First off, the monad is originally a Pythagorean idea. It is a point, self contained and the first of anything. Everything is equidistant from this point and this point precedes all constructions we make. It is represented as a point surrounded by a circle. Whatever is is in the monad. This point has zero dimensions of space; it is not extended. A one dimensional object would be a line with two points, a dyad. It isn't something in relation to something else, as say a line exists between two points.
Leibniz used monad in a different way. A monad is a first of its kind, not first in terms of anything existing which is what the Pythagorean monad sounds like. There can be more than one monad because they are unique. In fact there are seemingly an infinite number of monads. A monad is a created thing in that its nature is the same throughout its existence until its non-existence. Its time begins and ends with its existence, and so is timeless one could say except relative to another monad.
The monad is defined by what describes it, using subject predicate logic. A predicate is either contained in a subject, or the subject is predicated of another subject. The monad contains all of its predicates. What describes it does not change because of anything except for itself. Monads cannot destroy themselves and are not affected by anything else. What is destroyed are combinations of different monads. Space does not exist without or independently of monads since space is only a relation of different things, which is contrary to Newtonian absolute space but presaged Einstein’s relativity.
Anything that exists is either a monad or a complex of monads. Complexes are what we call bodies, which are composed of smaller parts and differ from one another by size, shape, and arrangement of parts. These complexes do not change the nature of the monads, its simple parts. Something can change over time in its size, shape, and arrangement of parts and be the same thing. This is all very similar to atoms except that atoms are extended things in empty space.
This leads to a crucial distinction which is central to understanding the monadology and I think is original to Leibniz. The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic difference. This is now called Leibniz's Law or the Identity of Indiscernibles: if everything about something can be said about something else, then they are the same thing. In other words, an external difference does not make things different. There has to be an internal difference, of kind and not number.
"There are never in nature two beings which are precisely alone, and in which it is not possible to find some difference which is internal, or based on some intrinsic denomination"
A monad is not a physical thing at least in the sense of locality. A monad does not causally affect other monads and is not affected by others. This is the strangest part of the work which leads to an even stranger explanations but no more than quantum mechanics.
There are gradations of monads solely on their power to perceive other monads clearly and distinctly (language borrowed from Descartes). This is a very important concept to grasp in Leibniz's philosophy. Everything has a degree of perception. This is how things interact with one another. They don't actually change, but are affected by other monads by varying degrees of perception. All monads reflect each other, that is they contain in themselves knowledge of every other monad. When it seems like a monad is affected, it is merely acting in accordance with the perception of the monad. Monads have the power to represent everything else. Just like in dreams and hallucinations where the mind can simulate powerful experiences, though this is only the workings of the mind itself and nothing externally is causing everything in the dream or the hallucination.
Monads can't affect each other because they are the unique ground for every single thing that can be said of the universe. There is something for each self-contained subject which needs no further explanation.
All monads are entelechies, a term borrowed from Aristotle who used it to describe the potential for action. Leibniz uses it to describe "incorporeal automata" which have the power of appetition, of going from one perception to another. Entelechies have perception and appetite, of being affected and attaining new affections. Entelechy is the innate potential everything has, which today we might call energy.
From the entelechy and Aristotle's potential/actual distinction, Leibniz lays out what would later be called the unconscious. Leibniz describes consciousness as apperception, a seizing of perception. Consciousness is essentially an intensification of attention on an object, an act of will or appetite which makes things clear and distinct, whereas unconsciousness is not a state of non-existence, but of indistinct and unclear perception.
Mind begins with memory, which repeats perceptions and can associate them with similar perceptions. Our mind seizes upon the strongest perceptions, determined by the nature of the body of other monads the mind is surrounded by and perceives strongest. These associations produce habits of behavior and the nature of "brute" organisms.
Humans however by reflection can abstract from experience and discover the necessary truths behind such associations. Souls however are only monads "whose perception is more distinct and is accompanied by memory." Thus gradations of being are determined by power to represent from the basic nature of each created monad.
We are unique among living things, for everything is alive in an unconscious sort of way, because we can raise our perception to comprehend God, and in that way we are "made in His image." Leibniz's argument for God is an ontological one; God must exist if he is possible. Instead of a first cause, God is a necessary substance from which everything comes, whose non-existence is inconceivable. By the power of our own mind, we discover what is behind the power of anything that exists in the universe, which of course is God.
It is still odd that every monad doesn't interact with one another, and yet it sure seems that way. Leibniz introduces the even more strange explanation that God creates the harmony between monad's perceptions of each in creating the universe. This is related to the famous "best of all possible world" principle of Leibniz, or "principle of the best" which corresponds to the problem of evil under God's existence. God being a perfect and all good being would never create a world where our thoughts didn't align with the actions of bodies. Knowledge would be impossible, and there could no rewards and punishments for good behavior, making justice impossible. "And it is this which causes the existence of the best, which God knows through his wisdom, chooses through his goodness, and produces through his power." In physics this is related to the principle of least action which was influenced by Leibniz’s principle.
Mind and body are not detached because the distinction arises from representation. The soul is the dominant entelechy, which is in parallel harmony with the entelechies it perceives stongest. Nothing in the universe is lifeless and mechanical, bodies are composed of unconsciously perceiving simple monads. Because of this, there isn't a transmigration of souls, as the soul is always with entelechies which can change without changing the nature of the soul or mind. This relates to George Berkeley a fellow idealist who defined the soul as singular and unitary as well.
The monadology, as bizarre as it sounds, was a proposed alternative to the corpuscular or atomic theory of the universe, where everything is made of the same fundamental particles and differ only in arrangements and forces between the particles which isn’t that different than the logic of the monads, Leibniz just didn't like a mechanistic universe which is externally determined. His predicate logic seemed to necessitate the existence of unique things and so relies on an essentialism, though a relatively limited one, and the existence of God particularly for his resolution of the mind-body problem.
Regardless of one’s opinion of these conclusions the Monadology is still worth reading for three ideas. One is the unconscious which Leibniz is the first to really lay out. Second is the suggestion that it is possible for the mind to understand the entire universe if one thinks clearly and distinctly enough, and thirdly the distinction of intrinsic and extrinsic difference in the principle of the identity of indiscernible. I think these concepts made their way into German idealism and even continental philosophy by way of influence or criticism.
First off, the monad is originally a Pythagorean idea. It is a point, self contained and the first of anything. Everything is equidistant from this point and this point precedes all constructions we make. It is represented as a point surrounded by a circle. Whatever is is in the monad. This point has zero dimensions of space; it is not extended. A one dimensional object would be a line with two points, a dyad. It isn't something in relation to something else, as say a line exists between two points.
Leibniz used monad in a different way. A monad is a first of its kind, not first in terms of anything existing which is what the Pythagorean monad sounds like. There can be more than one monad because they are unique. In fact there are seemingly an infinite number of monads. A monad is a created thing in that its nature is the same throughout its existence until its non-existence. Its time begins and ends with its existence, and so is timeless one could say except relative to another monad.
The monad is defined by what describes it, using subject predicate logic. A predicate is either contained in a subject, or the subject is predicated of another subject. The monad contains all of its predicates. What describes it does not change because of anything except for itself. Monads cannot destroy themselves and are not affected by anything else. What is destroyed are combinations of different monads. Space does not exist without or independently of monads since space is only a relation of different things, which is contrary to Newtonian absolute space but presaged Einstein’s relativity.
Anything that exists is either a monad or a complex of monads. Complexes are what we call bodies, which are composed of smaller parts and differ from one another by size, shape, and arrangement of parts. These complexes do not change the nature of the monads, its simple parts. Something can change over time in its size, shape, and arrangement of parts and be the same thing. This is all very similar to atoms except that atoms are extended things in empty space.
This leads to a crucial distinction which is central to understanding the monadology and I think is original to Leibniz. The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic difference. This is now called Leibniz's Law or the Identity of Indiscernibles: if everything about something can be said about something else, then they are the same thing. In other words, an external difference does not make things different. There has to be an internal difference, of kind and not number.
"There are never in nature two beings which are precisely alone, and in which it is not possible to find some difference which is internal, or based on some intrinsic denomination"
A monad is not a physical thing at least in the sense of locality. A monad does not causally affect other monads and is not affected by others. This is the strangest part of the work which leads to an even stranger explanations but no more than quantum mechanics.
There are gradations of monads solely on their power to perceive other monads clearly and distinctly (language borrowed from Descartes). This is a very important concept to grasp in Leibniz's philosophy. Everything has a degree of perception. This is how things interact with one another. They don't actually change, but are affected by other monads by varying degrees of perception. All monads reflect each other, that is they contain in themselves knowledge of every other monad. When it seems like a monad is affected, it is merely acting in accordance with the perception of the monad. Monads have the power to represent everything else. Just like in dreams and hallucinations where the mind can simulate powerful experiences, though this is only the workings of the mind itself and nothing externally is causing everything in the dream or the hallucination.
Monads can't affect each other because they are the unique ground for every single thing that can be said of the universe. There is something for each self-contained subject which needs no further explanation.
All monads are entelechies, a term borrowed from Aristotle who used it to describe the potential for action. Leibniz uses it to describe "incorporeal automata" which have the power of appetition, of going from one perception to another. Entelechies have perception and appetite, of being affected and attaining new affections. Entelechy is the innate potential everything has, which today we might call energy.
From the entelechy and Aristotle's potential/actual distinction, Leibniz lays out what would later be called the unconscious. Leibniz describes consciousness as apperception, a seizing of perception. Consciousness is essentially an intensification of attention on an object, an act of will or appetite which makes things clear and distinct, whereas unconsciousness is not a state of non-existence, but of indistinct and unclear perception.
Mind begins with memory, which repeats perceptions and can associate them with similar perceptions. Our mind seizes upon the strongest perceptions, determined by the nature of the body of other monads the mind is surrounded by and perceives strongest. These associations produce habits of behavior and the nature of "brute" organisms.
Humans however by reflection can abstract from experience and discover the necessary truths behind such associations. Souls however are only monads "whose perception is more distinct and is accompanied by memory." Thus gradations of being are determined by power to represent from the basic nature of each created monad.
We are unique among living things, for everything is alive in an unconscious sort of way, because we can raise our perception to comprehend God, and in that way we are "made in His image." Leibniz's argument for God is an ontological one; God must exist if he is possible. Instead of a first cause, God is a necessary substance from which everything comes, whose non-existence is inconceivable. By the power of our own mind, we discover what is behind the power of anything that exists in the universe, which of course is God.
It is still odd that every monad doesn't interact with one another, and yet it sure seems that way. Leibniz introduces the even more strange explanation that God creates the harmony between monad's perceptions of each in creating the universe. This is related to the famous "best of all possible world" principle of Leibniz, or "principle of the best" which corresponds to the problem of evil under God's existence. God being a perfect and all good being would never create a world where our thoughts didn't align with the actions of bodies. Knowledge would be impossible, and there could no rewards and punishments for good behavior, making justice impossible. "And it is this which causes the existence of the best, which God knows through his wisdom, chooses through his goodness, and produces through his power." In physics this is related to the principle of least action which was influenced by Leibniz’s principle.
Mind and body are not detached because the distinction arises from representation. The soul is the dominant entelechy, which is in parallel harmony with the entelechies it perceives stongest. Nothing in the universe is lifeless and mechanical, bodies are composed of unconsciously perceiving simple monads. Because of this, there isn't a transmigration of souls, as the soul is always with entelechies which can change without changing the nature of the soul or mind. This relates to George Berkeley a fellow idealist who defined the soul as singular and unitary as well.
The monadology, as bizarre as it sounds, was a proposed alternative to the corpuscular or atomic theory of the universe, where everything is made of the same fundamental particles and differ only in arrangements and forces between the particles which isn’t that different than the logic of the monads, Leibniz just didn't like a mechanistic universe which is externally determined. His predicate logic seemed to necessitate the existence of unique things and so relies on an essentialism, though a relatively limited one, and the existence of God particularly for his resolution of the mind-body problem.
Regardless of one’s opinion of these conclusions the Monadology is still worth reading for three ideas. One is the unconscious which Leibniz is the first to really lay out. Second is the suggestion that it is possible for the mind to understand the entire universe if one thinks clearly and distinctly enough, and thirdly the distinction of intrinsic and extrinsic difference in the principle of the identity of indiscernible. I think these concepts made their way into German idealism and even continental philosophy by way of influence or criticism.
April 15, 2025
letztes semester hatte ich ein seminar zu aristoteles de anima, nach dem ich fast immer geweint hab, weil ich das gefühl hatte, nichts zu verstehen. nach der lektüre der monadologie sehe ich, dass die göttliche monade eine scharfe und stetige apperzeption hat und alles im universum verständig eingerichtet hat, denn hätte ich letztes semester nicht wegen aristoteles geweint, hätte ich hier auf jeden fall sehr viel geweint. so konnte ich es jedoch genießen und ich freu mich jetzt schon, nervige anspielungen auf die monadologie in meine alltagskonversationen einfließen zu lassen (einfließen zu lassen wie die körper, die in einem ewigen fluß sind wie die wasserströme §71)
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