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439 pages, Kindle Edition
First published February 19, 2013
This is one of the books published recently and based on restricted World War II archive information only recently declassified and made available to the public. This information has substantially rewritten the history of this period of history. I believe the author has done a masterful job of interweaving a number of narratives into an absorbing story of how the skilful of use of analytical minds Britain’s scientists tilted the odds of victory in the country's favour. Plus, the book is filled with interesting facts and analysis as to how and why some of the key decisions that set the course of the war were made and the consequences of those decisions. There is significant book with a lot of information packed into its short 261 pages.
The book contains a biography of Nobel Prize winning physicist, Patrick Blackett. This man has been largely written out of history. However, he championed the application of scientific analysis to military strategies and tactics. In doing so, he founded the discipline of ‘Operations Research’. (Today, a core component of any business degree and the nemesis of many students who are mathematically challenged.) His key message to those in power was that “Britain didn’t need fancier and more expensive, complex weapons”. It just needed to efficiently use what it already had. His focus on making decisions based on facts did not always go down well with a military hierarchy who made decisions based of gut feel and did not appreciate feed back on areas where they needed to improve.
The British Air Force’s fighter command were the initial adopters of the use of civilian scientists to investigate their operation problems. I did not realise, as the author points out with a quote from Harold MacMillan:
‘During the 1930s, Harold Macmillan would recall many years later, “we though of air warfare…rather as people think of nuclear warfare today”.
This attitude was based on the theory expounded Italian Giulio Douhet that “Nothing man can do on the surface of the earth can interfere with a plane in flight, moving in the third dimension.” Blackett and his colleagues did not accept this defeatist attitude. Once invited by Fighter Command to look at the issue, they came up with radar and more importantly developed the procedures and processes to use it as a force multiplier for Britain’s meagre fleet of fighters. In the Battle of Britain for control of the air over the country, the system worked well and the German bombers found they consistently encountering things the “interfered with a plane in flight”. It was the first time anyone had effectively opposed a German bomber force and caused them to lose this vital conflict.
The key focus of the book is the “Battle of the North Atlantic” where German U-boats commanded by the fanatical NAZI Admiral Karl Donitz came very close to cutting the vital sea lines to North America by sinking massive tonnages of British shipping. Thus winning the war. Following on from the experience of their Fighter colleagues, Coastal Command were keen to use scientific analysis in this conflict. It quickly became apparent that air patrols were the key to eliminating the U-boat threat. What I find interesting is that because all the physicists were working on radar and the like, the scientists used by Coastal Command where odds and sods such as biologists and psychologists. Never the less, they made game changing contributions to the battle. For example, a biologist looked at maintenance procedures that were restricting flights by anti-submarine patrol planes. The air force had a practice of standing down a squadron which had less than 70% of its planes available for combat. The antisubmarine squadrons where often in this situation when 30% or more of their planes had been involved in protecting a large convoy returned to base, (Despite the fact that the majority of the planes in the squadron were still available to fly.) This practice made sense for fighter squadrons where the fighters attacked enemy bombers as a massed force but not for patrol aircraft which operated alone. Removing this restriction for the patrol squadrons doubled the available of anti-submarine patrol aircraft and had a dramatic effect on reducing the effectiveness of the German U-boats.
Another narrative is the role of civilian mathematicians as code breakers. Before the war scientists and mathematicians were not used in this role. The code breakers were a cosy collection of old boys from Oxford with classic degrees. The change to a scientific approach to decrypting the German messages did not happen easily. The resulting success of the mathematical code breakers at Bletchley Park in breaking the German ENIGMA code is widely known. However, I did not know until reading the book that because of slack radio procedures by the naval radio operators, the Germans had successfully broken the British and US naval codes and could read every radio transmission for large periods during the war. It was not until scientific analysis of German actions in the last year of the war showed that chance alone could not account for their successes, that the US and British Navies were persuaded to change their procedures and increase the security of their crypts.
Yet a further interesting narrative is the conflict between the British scientific establishment and Winston Churchill and his scatterbrained tame scientist Fredrich Lindemann. (Lindemann was given the title “Lord Cherwell” by Churchill. However, the author makes his opinion on Lindemann quite plain by never refer to him by his title.) Lindemann never let the facts stand in the way of any scatter brain scheme that he and Churchill dreamed up. Blackett and fellow scientists needed to constantly battle to prevent scarce resources being wasted on these follies.
Part of the book devoted to the case for strategic bombing This is one argument the facts presented by the British scientific establishment never really won over the proponents for this wasteful and largely ineffective activity. The hubris about winning the war by bombing Germany into defeat remained dominant right through to the end of the war. Air Vice Marshall Harris and his colleagues at Bomber Command were strong adherents to Douhet’s misguided writings on the use of bombing of civilians to cause panic and destroy a country’s will to fight. However, a team of scientist analysed German bombing of the cities of Hull and Birmingham. According to J.D. Bernal one of the scientists in question, they covered everything down to “the number of pints drunk and aspirins bought”. What they found was:
“In neither town was there any panic. Nor had worker productivity suffered. The only reduction in industrial production that occurred was the direct result of physical damages to plants. Moreover, the actual number of casualties inflicted remarkably small given the 717 tons of bombs, the Germans dropped on the two towns during the period examined.”
The author highlights the most tragic result from this misallocation of resources. This was the failure to allocate long range four engine bombers to anti-submarine patrols over the North Atlantic. This resulted in a gap in the middle of the Atlantic where the U-boats could operate unhindered. Analysis by the scientists showed that 300 long range bombers would be required to close this gap. (Less that a couple of weeks losses over Germany by Bomber Command!) The issue was not addressed until May 1943 when the army demanded that something must be done about shipping losses otherwise the D Day landings would need to be abandoned. Once planes were allocated and the gap closed, the amount of shipping lost in the North Atlantic dropped to almost nothing. The Battle of the North Atlantic had been won. The statistics quoted by the author on the impact this had on the German U-boat crews are appalling:
“Over the course of the war 830 U-boats took part in operations; 784 of them –94 percent – were lost. Of the 40,000 men who served on U-boats, 26,000 were killed and 5,000 taken prisoner.”
Despite, his role in winning the Battle of the North Atlantic, the author states that Blackett felt personally responsible for not pushing harder and influencing the decision makers earlier to allocate long range bomber to close the gap much earlier. He believed that the war could have been shorted by at least six months is the North Atlantic air patrol gap had been closed a year earlier.
The book concludes with the fact that after the war the scientists largely went back to their classrooms and their labs. Attempts to use their expertise in the post war reconstruction did not work well as they were not equipped to handle the randomness of peace time democratic society. However, one legacy remains, Operation Research practices are now a standard part of every business’s toolkit.