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The Decision Point: Six Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making
Filling a gap in the U.S. foreign policy textbook market, this innovative introduction shows students how real American foreign policy makers make real decisions. Drawing on and summarizing a vast amount of literature, author David Patrick Houghton introduces students to three basic theories of decision-making. He then applies each of these perspectives to six well-known historical cases that range from classic to the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, the Iran Hostage Crisis, the Kosovo War, and the Iraq War. Houghton uses the crucial "decision points" of these events to give students a sense of what it is actually like to make high-level decisions. He also shows how the theories discussed in the book can be applied to these case studies.
Featuring a direct, accessible writing style, coverage of recent advances in the field--including new psychological models like prospect theory and poliheuristic theory--and an affordable price, The Decision Six Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making serves as a perfect text or supplement for courses in U.S. Foreign Policy and Foreign Policy Decision-Making.
Featuring a direct, accessible writing style, coverage of recent advances in the field--including new psychological models like prospect theory and poliheuristic theory--and an affordable price, The Decision Six Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making serves as a perfect text or supplement for courses in U.S. Foreign Policy and Foreign Policy Decision-Making.
304 pages, Paperback
First published July 18, 2012
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
May 1, 2016
This book outlines major theories of decision-making and applies them to six different case studies in USFP. The first is homo bureaucraticus. This model analyzes assumes that different organizations (CIA, Defense, State, Presidency,etc.) support policies that reflect the organization's interests and standard operating procedures. Compromises between bureaucracies are needed to iron out these differences, but the resulting policies are really more like outputs than decisions. You get weird amalgams that make each branch happy but might not make much strategic sense, such as the decision to use multiple branches of the military for Operation Eagle Claw, including the switching of helicopter pilots into vehicles with which they were unfamiliar. The solution to this problem appears to be strong executive vision and balancing among these squabbling bureaucracies.
The second model is sociological. It analyzes the small group, usually the President's foreign policy team. This model focuses on the tendency of small, coherent groups under stress to value conformity and consensus over exploring all options or constantly revisiting assumptions and decisions. People act as mind guards, discouraging others from voicing their problems once a policy is agreed upon. This problem can produce bad policy decisions, such as the Bay of Pigs or the Vietnam escalation. In each of these cases, certain members of the Cabinet dissuaded or intimidated dissenters and hewed to a certain policy for much too long.
The third model is psychological. It analyzes individual emotion, cognition, and decision. Anyone who's up on cognitive psychology (Kahneman and Tversky stuff) will be very familiar with this perspective. The use of heuristics, analogical thinking, and the importance of emotion can all create problems in decision making. These problems are probably unavoidable, but they can be mitigated by open, frank, and informed discussion. I was struck by the abundance of analogical thinking in all of these cases. Following the availability bias, decision makers frequently compared current cases to past cases that were either very recent or very prominent in their memories. The problem was that the most recent or prominent case was often not the best one to compare to the present situation. This was true over and over again in regards to Munich/Hitler, Vietnam, Entebbe, and other analogies that often obfuscated the present situation rather than informing better policy. These heuristics help us digest complex information and make decisions, but they can also be very misleading if we don't interrogate these biases frequently.
The interesting thing about these models is that adopting one forces you to say that you think this level of analysis matters the most (state, organization, small group, individual). Of course, historians are skeptical of these kinds of categories, but organizing a history of foreign policy by these rough terms could be very useful. They are interesting ideas to toy around with, and Houghton outlines their strengths and weaknesses very well. He concludes that the bureaucratic and sociological models are best at explaining the processes by which policies are made, especially when bureaucratic clashes produce odd policy outcomes or when small groups create conformity around a certain consensus. On the other hand, it's the psychological model that does the best job of explaining what policy is actually chosen because it is the best at explaining how individuals read and analyze a decision situation. ILastly, I thought his case study of the decision to invade Iraq was the most thorough and compelling. I wouldn't recommend this book to people who aren't in political science or history, but it's interesting and useful in its own way.
The second model is sociological. It analyzes the small group, usually the President's foreign policy team. This model focuses on the tendency of small, coherent groups under stress to value conformity and consensus over exploring all options or constantly revisiting assumptions and decisions. People act as mind guards, discouraging others from voicing their problems once a policy is agreed upon. This problem can produce bad policy decisions, such as the Bay of Pigs or the Vietnam escalation. In each of these cases, certain members of the Cabinet dissuaded or intimidated dissenters and hewed to a certain policy for much too long.
The third model is psychological. It analyzes individual emotion, cognition, and decision. Anyone who's up on cognitive psychology (Kahneman and Tversky stuff) will be very familiar with this perspective. The use of heuristics, analogical thinking, and the importance of emotion can all create problems in decision making. These problems are probably unavoidable, but they can be mitigated by open, frank, and informed discussion. I was struck by the abundance of analogical thinking in all of these cases. Following the availability bias, decision makers frequently compared current cases to past cases that were either very recent or very prominent in their memories. The problem was that the most recent or prominent case was often not the best one to compare to the present situation. This was true over and over again in regards to Munich/Hitler, Vietnam, Entebbe, and other analogies that often obfuscated the present situation rather than informing better policy. These heuristics help us digest complex information and make decisions, but they can also be very misleading if we don't interrogate these biases frequently.
The interesting thing about these models is that adopting one forces you to say that you think this level of analysis matters the most (state, organization, small group, individual). Of course, historians are skeptical of these kinds of categories, but organizing a history of foreign policy by these rough terms could be very useful. They are interesting ideas to toy around with, and Houghton outlines their strengths and weaknesses very well. He concludes that the bureaucratic and sociological models are best at explaining the processes by which policies are made, especially when bureaucratic clashes produce odd policy outcomes or when small groups create conformity around a certain consensus. On the other hand, it's the psychological model that does the best job of explaining what policy is actually chosen because it is the best at explaining how individuals read and analyze a decision situation. ILastly, I thought his case study of the decision to invade Iraq was the most thorough and compelling. I wouldn't recommend this book to people who aren't in political science or history, but it's interesting and useful in its own way.
May 17, 2025
Argues that when analyzing foreign policy decision-making, most behavior can be explained by the three following factors:
Homo Bureaucraticus: The institutional memory of an organization, the typical "Where you stand is where you sit". The DEFSEC is generally likely to argue for actions in line with the Pentagon's culture. Book uses Kosovo as the most prime example, as Clinton wasn't involved with much of the decision-making as the impeachment was occurring. Instead, the State Department had so much say in the Kosovo campaign that it has been called "Madeleine's War" for Madeleine Albright, State Secretary at the time. Interestingly enough, in times when this factor was dominant in decision-making, it can be used to diagnose the concerns of a branch of government. The DoD overtime has grown less willing to go to war after disasters like Vietnam, while the State Department has grown more willing to, at least until the Early 2000's.
Homo Sociologicus: In the absence of constant discipline, people will naturally seek consensus. The worst decisions examined tended to follow this behavior, like the Bay of Pigs and Iraq Invasion. No one attempted to convince JFK the Bay of Pigs couldn't work, and no one could convince Dick Cheney that no one has actually found WMDs in Iraq. They knew that Al-Qaeda attacked the US, and they knew they were invading Iraq, the Government just needed a link in the middle to make it make sense.
Homo Psychologicus: Sometimes, Great (Wo)Man History prevails. Madeleine Albright's background of being displaced by the Munich Agreement made her particularly hawkish in Kosovo, and completely unwilling to negotiate or empathize with Serbian Milosevic, a figure she likened to Hitler. This behavior also deals with how historical analogies are often used to the detriment of the situation. Literally every situation was, in the halls of power, compared to either Pearl Harbor or the Munich Agreement.
Looks at the following events through these lenses:
- The Bay of Pigs
- The Cuban Missile Crisis
- Decision to Invade Vietnam
- The Iran Hostage Crisis
- The Kosovo Campaign
- Decision to Invade Iraq.
Not your average history book.
Homo Bureaucraticus: The institutional memory of an organization, the typical "Where you stand is where you sit". The DEFSEC is generally likely to argue for actions in line with the Pentagon's culture. Book uses Kosovo as the most prime example, as Clinton wasn't involved with much of the decision-making as the impeachment was occurring. Instead, the State Department had so much say in the Kosovo campaign that it has been called "Madeleine's War" for Madeleine Albright, State Secretary at the time. Interestingly enough, in times when this factor was dominant in decision-making, it can be used to diagnose the concerns of a branch of government. The DoD overtime has grown less willing to go to war after disasters like Vietnam, while the State Department has grown more willing to, at least until the Early 2000's.
Homo Sociologicus: In the absence of constant discipline, people will naturally seek consensus. The worst decisions examined tended to follow this behavior, like the Bay of Pigs and Iraq Invasion. No one attempted to convince JFK the Bay of Pigs couldn't work, and no one could convince Dick Cheney that no one has actually found WMDs in Iraq. They knew that Al-Qaeda attacked the US, and they knew they were invading Iraq, the Government just needed a link in the middle to make it make sense.
Homo Psychologicus: Sometimes, Great (Wo)Man History prevails. Madeleine Albright's background of being displaced by the Munich Agreement made her particularly hawkish in Kosovo, and completely unwilling to negotiate or empathize with Serbian Milosevic, a figure she likened to Hitler. This behavior also deals with how historical analogies are often used to the detriment of the situation. Literally every situation was, in the halls of power, compared to either Pearl Harbor or the Munich Agreement.
Looks at the following events through these lenses:
- The Bay of Pigs
- The Cuban Missile Crisis
- Decision to Invade Vietnam
- The Iran Hostage Crisis
- The Kosovo Campaign
- Decision to Invade Iraq.
Not your average history book.
June 2, 2022
This book will give you an enhanced outlook on how people deal with decisions of foreign policy
People frequently cling to their existing beliefs and preconceptions. Often rationalizing away the new information as insignificant to preserve their already existing beliefs.
Many times in the real world of decision making, social pressures can affect the ultimate decision
We don't like to be inconsistent so we become motivated to reduce dissonance and bring things back to consonance which is cognitive dissonance
People usually make better decisions when in groups; however, people also make riskier decisions in groups
Henry Kissinger's raid on the Cambodians was deemed a success by society and the presidential ratings went up 12% but was it really? He asked to bomb any ship in close proximity, but the guy in charge didn't listen and ended up saving all the hostages. If he would have listened to his commander, and blown up that boat, all of the hostages would have died. On top of that when you look at the mere numbers, more US troops died than the number of total hostages.
This book forces you to rationalize what a win or a loss really is
People frequently cling to their existing beliefs and preconceptions. Often rationalizing away the new information as insignificant to preserve their already existing beliefs.
Many times in the real world of decision making, social pressures can affect the ultimate decision
We don't like to be inconsistent so we become motivated to reduce dissonance and bring things back to consonance which is cognitive dissonance
People usually make better decisions when in groups; however, people also make riskier decisions in groups
Henry Kissinger's raid on the Cambodians was deemed a success by society and the presidential ratings went up 12% but was it really? He asked to bomb any ship in close proximity, but the guy in charge didn't listen and ended up saving all the hostages. If he would have listened to his commander, and blown up that boat, all of the hostages would have died. On top of that when you look at the mere numbers, more US troops died than the number of total hostages.
This book forces you to rationalize what a win or a loss really is
August 20, 2021
One of the books issued at the US Army War College. Establishes a foreign policy analysis framework; homo bureaucraticus, homo sociologicus, and homo psychologicus. Not sure about the utility of the name convention which is a bit distracting but the case studies are good and worth the read.
June 14, 2013
I assigned this text for the US Foreign Policy course I taught at the Air Force Academy. I highly recommend it. Houghton clearly explains the major decision-making models and theories and then illustrates these concepts through engaging case studies. He gives fair treatment to each theory and addresses the strength and weakness of each theory in a given case. A must for any student of foreign policy decision-making.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews