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Revolt on the Right - Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain
Winner of the Political Book of the Year Award 2015 The UK Independence Party (UKIP) is the most significant new party in British politics for a generation. In recent years UKIP and their charismatic leader Nigel Farage have captivated British politics, media and voters. Yet both the party and the roots of its support remain poorly understood. Where has this political revolt come from? Who is supporting them, and why? How are UKIP attempting to win over voters? And how far can their insurgency against the main parties go? Drawing on a wealth of new data – from surveys of UKIP voters to extensive interviews with party insiders – in this book prominent political scientists Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin put UKIP's revolt under the microscope and show how many conventional wisdoms about the party and the radical right are wrong. Along the way they provide unprecedented insight into this new revolt, and deliver some crucial messages for those with an interest in the state of British politics, the radical right in Europe and political behaviour more generally.
318 pages, Paperback
First published November 12, 2012
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April 17, 2018A slightly odd book and certainly not what I had expected. Slower and lazier in places that I expected. The subtitle promises that we will go on a hunt for the elusive supporter of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) (either something like a deer or a mushroom depending on your feelings about blood sports or metaphors), however the text seemed to obscure rather than reveal the prey and I was haunted by the sense that the target was to be observed in the gaps between the words rather than in what the authors actually wrote. Since the book has two authors, I wondered at times if they both came to the project with different ideas, wrote their sections separately but decided to deal with any differences in their opinions by ignoring them.
With a nod to Why the Dutch are different an alternative title for this book might be Here's another way in which the British are bloody weird, lets struggle to understand ourselves badly, because a starting point for this book is Adam Przeworski's Capitalism and Social Democracy (1985). Przeworski argued that in Europe centre left parties had traditionally based their support on working class/blue collar workers but with the decline of mass industrial employment that centre left parties would increasingly target middle class / white collar workers, instead however such a shift would risk alienating their traditional supporters (pp112-4). Hence Przeworski said there would be an increasing pool of alienated voters, dissatisfied with the traditional political parties and system, with concerns that were ignored by political parties. New parties or renewed parties tapped into such voters all across Europe (classically the National Front in France, or the Freedom Party of Austria) but not in Britain, until , a-ha, cry the authors with some evident excitement, UKIP comes on to the scene. There was a view in the media that support for UKIP came mostly from former supporters of the Conservative party, and so we can picture the authors pushing past various reporters saying, 'sorry guys, but you're wrong, Britain is basically in tune with European currents - Przeworski was right, UKIP voters aren't old Tories, they're Old Labour'.
But naturally there's a problem here since as per the title UKIP is described as a revolt on the right, but their voters we're told are (or were) basically left-wing it is only in the last chapter that this is acknowledged and we're told that UKIP support isn't drawing from left vs right ideological divisions but on the financially secure and better educated vs the financially insecure and less educated. In short the term populist is more useful maybe (p.270). But I found it a little grating that there was frequent reference to UKIP as on the political right without the authors ever saying why - Eurosceptism and opposition to dominant political elites are feelings which cross party lines even if the third policy strand of anti-immigrant sentiment is more associated with the right.
Looking between the gaps certain things become clearer - UKIP's internal politics has been and may well still be, famously fractious and factional which makes sense if the activists are described as 'Libertarian' while their voters have a hankering for big state redistribution . Ford and Goodwin spend some time looking at a cadre of 'left-behind' voters, mostly older if not elderly, white men who escaped from school as young as possible and had blue collar jobs. They establish how thanks to a wandering American who had worked on Bill Clinton's campaign to become Governor, they hand crafted a message of three nos, no to the EU, no to traditional Westminster political elites, and no to immigration, they explain that 30% percent of the British population are very sympathetic to any two of those nos and 20% like all three of them. At which the reader sits back and thinks 'well why the hell has UKIP been such a damp squib in elections then, "these Britons are crazy" as Obelix observed' , sadly the book doesn't address this, they argue there is a big pool of potential voters for them out there they also tell the long story of how UKIP bumped around in political obscurity before lurching between drunken exuberance funded by donations from millionaire backers in elections for the EU parliament to near catatonic hangovers afterwards, barely able to stand for local or national elections, I had forgotten or possibly never noticed in first place that UKIP predated the short lived Referendum Party of the 1990s. However the book isn't interested in the question of how angry rebellious voters don't match up with angry rebellious party and fail to form a perfect couple. But between the author's words one gets the sense that something weird is going on, the authors point out that UKIP has failed to appeal to women, ethnic minorities, or the young, which may be part of the problem, then again their core basis for support was meant to be older white men, so maybe not. Hanging over the whole book I felt was a sense that UKIP was a still birth, or a missed opportunity. The book served to remind me that my long standing prejudice about UKIP was that this was not the result of catastrophic incompetence on the part of its leadership, but quite deliberate - conspiracy, not cock-up. From the beginning there was a division within the party between wanting to be a super-pressure group that obliged other political parties to move in a Eurosceptic direction, and wanting to be a new parliamentary force, I think the author's cite Paul Nuttell, who got his turn to be UKIP leader, as wanting to see UKIP replace the Conservative party as the dominant force in right-wing politics. Three of the UKIP party leaders Lord Pearson (p.81), Jeffrey Titford, and Roger Knapman had all come from the Conservative Party, while the millionaire donors who would occasional chuck the party a million or two so they could outspend other parties for the European Elections, I imagine didn't come from the ranks of working class, unemployed, financially insecure voters (p.47).
If Ford and Goodwin are right then there remain in the UK a pool of untapped voters ripe to be swept up in a new political party, or by an existing one that strives to capture their votes. I think if one takes those three nos and inverts them and looks for the positive point , then I guess that new movement would be a patriotic party broadly speaking and if the political consensus since the 1980s has been the victory of social liberalism and economic liberalism and if these voters are alienated from that, then the movement would be I guess socially conservative and economically illiberal - and as such not in line with the Libertarian outlook of Nigel Farage and the UKIP activists. To my mind that explains why UKIP didn't attract many votes in Scotland - the place for a Patriotic party there had already been occupied by the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP), but equally why it could in Wales, as there the Welsh Nationalists remain strongly associated with speaking Welsh .
The story of the history of the part with its repeated conflicts between 'authoritarian' party leaders and rebellious party membership, felt extremely long and repetitive, but in hindsight maybe that was the point, a movement that is drawing support from across party lines is going to be full of tensions and contradictions as well as potential.
Obviously the book has been undone by the events since publication, but Ford and Goodwin do make clear that winning a referendum to leave the EU was always going to be the biggest existential threat to the future of the party. Can they turn their three nos in to a positive? Or find a new no? Or will they simply split and quarrel there way into irrelevance leaving a pool of angry elderly voters fuming in a Britain where young men don't use enough Brylcreem and women sometimes wear trousers?
As is the rule in The hunting of the snark you can leave your favourite spear, blunderbuss or wicker basket at home quite safely. Overall a strong reminder that political parties don't own the loyalty of their voters it has to be repeatedly earnt, but also that voters don't own the parties they vote for, the relationship between the two can be awkward and inconvenient.
With a nod to Why the Dutch are different an alternative title for this book might be Here's another way in which the British are bloody weird, lets struggle to understand ourselves badly, because a starting point for this book is Adam Przeworski's Capitalism and Social Democracy (1985). Przeworski argued that in Europe centre left parties had traditionally based their support on working class/blue collar workers but with the decline of mass industrial employment that centre left parties would increasingly target middle class / white collar workers, instead however such a shift would risk alienating their traditional supporters (pp112-4). Hence Przeworski said there would be an increasing pool of alienated voters, dissatisfied with the traditional political parties and system, with concerns that were ignored by political parties. New parties or renewed parties tapped into such voters all across Europe (classically the National Front in France, or the Freedom Party of Austria) but not in Britain, until , a-ha, cry the authors with some evident excitement, UKIP comes on to the scene. There was a view in the media that support for UKIP came mostly from former supporters of the Conservative party, and so we can picture the authors pushing past various reporters saying, 'sorry guys, but you're wrong, Britain is basically in tune with European currents - Przeworski was right, UKIP voters aren't old Tories, they're Old Labour'.
But naturally there's a problem here since as per the title UKIP is described as a revolt on the right, but their voters we're told are (or were) basically left-wing it is only in the last chapter that this is acknowledged and we're told that UKIP support isn't drawing from left vs right ideological divisions but on the financially secure and better educated vs the financially insecure and less educated. In short the term populist is more useful maybe (p.270). But I found it a little grating that there was frequent reference to UKIP as on the political right without the authors ever saying why - Eurosceptism and opposition to dominant political elites are feelings which cross party lines even if the third policy strand of anti-immigrant sentiment is more associated with the right.
Looking between the gaps certain things become clearer - UKIP's internal politics has been and may well still be, famously fractious and factional which makes sense if the activists are described as 'Libertarian' while their voters have a hankering for big state redistribution . Ford and Goodwin spend some time looking at a cadre of 'left-behind' voters, mostly older if not elderly, white men who escaped from school as young as possible and had blue collar jobs. They establish how thanks to a wandering American who had worked on Bill Clinton's campaign to become Governor, they hand crafted a message of three nos, no to the EU, no to traditional Westminster political elites, and no to immigration, they explain that 30% percent of the British population are very sympathetic to any two of those nos and 20% like all three of them. At which the reader sits back and thinks 'well why the hell has UKIP been such a damp squib in elections then, "these Britons are crazy" as Obelix observed' , sadly the book doesn't address this, they argue there is a big pool of potential voters for them out there they also tell the long story of how UKIP bumped around in political obscurity before lurching between drunken exuberance funded by donations from millionaire backers in elections for the EU parliament to near catatonic hangovers afterwards, barely able to stand for local or national elections, I had forgotten or possibly never noticed in first place that UKIP predated the short lived Referendum Party of the 1990s. However the book isn't interested in the question of how angry rebellious voters don't match up with angry rebellious party and fail to form a perfect couple. But between the author's words one gets the sense that something weird is going on, the authors point out that UKIP has failed to appeal to women, ethnic minorities, or the young, which may be part of the problem, then again their core basis for support was meant to be older white men, so maybe not. Hanging over the whole book I felt was a sense that UKIP was a still birth, or a missed opportunity. The book served to remind me that my long standing prejudice about UKIP was that this was not the result of catastrophic incompetence on the part of its leadership, but quite deliberate - conspiracy, not cock-up. From the beginning there was a division within the party between wanting to be a super-pressure group that obliged other political parties to move in a Eurosceptic direction, and wanting to be a new parliamentary force, I think the author's cite Paul Nuttell, who got his turn to be UKIP leader, as wanting to see UKIP replace the Conservative party as the dominant force in right-wing politics. Three of the UKIP party leaders Lord Pearson (p.81), Jeffrey Titford, and Roger Knapman had all come from the Conservative Party, while the millionaire donors who would occasional chuck the party a million or two so they could outspend other parties for the European Elections, I imagine didn't come from the ranks of working class, unemployed, financially insecure voters (p.47).
If Ford and Goodwin are right then there remain in the UK a pool of untapped voters ripe to be swept up in a new political party, or by an existing one that strives to capture their votes. I think if one takes those three nos and inverts them and looks for the positive point , then I guess that new movement would be a patriotic party broadly speaking and if the political consensus since the 1980s has been the victory of social liberalism and economic liberalism and if these voters are alienated from that, then the movement would be I guess socially conservative and economically illiberal - and as such not in line with the Libertarian outlook of Nigel Farage and the UKIP activists. To my mind that explains why UKIP didn't attract many votes in Scotland - the place for a Patriotic party there had already been occupied by the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP), but equally why it could in Wales, as there the Welsh Nationalists remain strongly associated with speaking Welsh .
The story of the history of the part with its repeated conflicts between 'authoritarian' party leaders and rebellious party membership, felt extremely long and repetitive, but in hindsight maybe that was the point, a movement that is drawing support from across party lines is going to be full of tensions and contradictions as well as potential.
Obviously the book has been undone by the events since publication, but Ford and Goodwin do make clear that winning a referendum to leave the EU was always going to be the biggest existential threat to the future of the party. Can they turn their three nos in to a positive? Or find a new no? Or will they simply split and quarrel there way into irrelevance leaving a pool of angry elderly voters fuming in a Britain where young men don't use enough Brylcreem and women sometimes wear trousers?
As is the rule in The hunting of the snark you can leave your favourite spear, blunderbuss or wicker basket at home quite safely. Overall a strong reminder that political parties don't own the loyalty of their voters it has to be repeatedly earnt, but also that voters don't own the parties they vote for, the relationship between the two can be awkward and inconvenient.
March 8, 2017
This is a much-needed academic analysis of the rise of UKIP, and it is clear why it was voted Politics Book of the Year 2014. It starts with a frankly excellent historical perspective on the party through an objective narrative, before moving on to a much deeper analysis of support and political consequences.
However, at times the objectivity of the authors can be called into question, as it often slips into a celebratory tone - it is easy to see why UKIP sell copies at their conferences and on their website. Furthermore, as a reader approached the end, the book can be regarded as rather repetitive, with no particularly fresh insight that hasn't already been voiced by journalists and political commentators. When regarding the social origins I would prefer that they including some 'voices from below' rather than relying solely on statistical analysis, interviewing UKIP supporters rather than containing a solitary and fictional account of a character they named 'John'.
The publication of this book was timed with a cute precision to coincide with the 2014 elections to the European Parliament, which UKIP performed extremely well in, and this was a brilliant marketing strategy. It does mean that the book is unable to offer any insight to their momentous breakthrough since then, and I think we can fully expect a more detailed second edition to be published soon after the general election, which does call into question why I bothered putting all that time into reading the first. As is often the case with political books, this edition is already out of date, and it would surprise me if the authors and publishers decide not to capitalise on UKIP's success with a slightly modified and extended edition.
However, at times the objectivity of the authors can be called into question, as it often slips into a celebratory tone - it is easy to see why UKIP sell copies at their conferences and on their website. Furthermore, as a reader approached the end, the book can be regarded as rather repetitive, with no particularly fresh insight that hasn't already been voiced by journalists and political commentators. When regarding the social origins I would prefer that they including some 'voices from below' rather than relying solely on statistical analysis, interviewing UKIP supporters rather than containing a solitary and fictional account of a character they named 'John'.
The publication of this book was timed with a cute precision to coincide with the 2014 elections to the European Parliament, which UKIP performed extremely well in, and this was a brilliant marketing strategy. It does mean that the book is unable to offer any insight to their momentous breakthrough since then, and I think we can fully expect a more detailed second edition to be published soon after the general election, which does call into question why I bothered putting all that time into reading the first. As is often the case with political books, this edition is already out of date, and it would surprise me if the authors and publishers decide not to capitalise on UKIP's success with a slightly modified and extended edition.
April 28, 2014
Caveat: I am probably not the best reviewer for this book, as it is aimed at a non-expert audience and I am an expert.
Revolt on the Right is the much-advertised and much-debated first academic book on the rise of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) by two young British political scientists, Rob Ford and Matt Goodwin. They have published many academic articles and op-eds on the topic for the past years and are generally perceived as the leading scholars on the party and phenomenon. The book is based on solid scholarly theories and empirical research, but written is an accessible, if somewhat dense, style. To a large extent, it brings far right studies into British politics and British politics into far right studies. Still, I think it is more innovative for British politics than for far right studies.
The book does a great job at putting the rise of UKIP in a broader social development, which has led to a change in (class) composition of the British electorate, which has led to a change in attitudes and preferred issues, which have been ignored by the major British parties. This combination of Euroscepticism, xenophobia, authoritarianism and political dissatisfaction was never fully exploited by the British National Party (BNP), because of incompetence and ideological extremity. UKIP has so far only benefited in European elections. Whether it can also make inroads in national elections remains to be seen.
As a party scholar with a particularly interest in ideology, I was kept a bit wanting for a more thorough analysis of UKIP's ideology and internal party structure. Also, while the author's discuss the differences between UKIP and BNP, they do not really address the differences between UKIP and non-British (populist) radical right parties, leaving open the question: where does UKIP fit? It is more moderate than BNP, but so are FN and PVV.
The book is also a bit too long and repetitive, which will probably keep many non-specialist readers from fully reading it. The chapters discuss different aspects of the same process, which can be analytically separated, but do overlap in essence.
This all notwithstanding, Revolt on the Right is a great addition to the academic study of British politics and a good example of how to make solid academic research accessible (and marketed) to a non-academic audience. Must read for anyone interested in UKIP and the transformation of British party politics.
Revolt on the Right is the much-advertised and much-debated first academic book on the rise of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) by two young British political scientists, Rob Ford and Matt Goodwin. They have published many academic articles and op-eds on the topic for the past years and are generally perceived as the leading scholars on the party and phenomenon. The book is based on solid scholarly theories and empirical research, but written is an accessible, if somewhat dense, style. To a large extent, it brings far right studies into British politics and British politics into far right studies. Still, I think it is more innovative for British politics than for far right studies.
The book does a great job at putting the rise of UKIP in a broader social development, which has led to a change in (class) composition of the British electorate, which has led to a change in attitudes and preferred issues, which have been ignored by the major British parties. This combination of Euroscepticism, xenophobia, authoritarianism and political dissatisfaction was never fully exploited by the British National Party (BNP), because of incompetence and ideological extremity. UKIP has so far only benefited in European elections. Whether it can also make inroads in national elections remains to be seen.
As a party scholar with a particularly interest in ideology, I was kept a bit wanting for a more thorough analysis of UKIP's ideology and internal party structure. Also, while the author's discuss the differences between UKIP and BNP, they do not really address the differences between UKIP and non-British (populist) radical right parties, leaving open the question: where does UKIP fit? It is more moderate than BNP, but so are FN and PVV.
The book is also a bit too long and repetitive, which will probably keep many non-specialist readers from fully reading it. The chapters discuss different aspects of the same process, which can be analytically separated, but do overlap in essence.
This all notwithstanding, Revolt on the Right is a great addition to the academic study of British politics and a good example of how to make solid academic research accessible (and marketed) to a non-academic audience. Must read for anyone interested in UKIP and the transformation of British party politics.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
May 5, 2014
UKIP have made an impact on British politics equalled only by the SDP in living memory. In just over 20 years they’ve risen from a group of academics clueless about the mechanics of politics to an organisation which has made breakthroughs in local and European elections, but as yet has no impact on the national political scene.
Ford and Goodwin’s book divides into two sections. The first couple of chapters are a very readable and fascinating history of the party, detailing the often fractious nature of the party and their often surprising levels of naivety. It’s a juicy account which veers easily into comedy at times. The second section, the bulk of the book, is by necessity more heavy going, as it seeks to analyse the party’s history and support and is thus heavy on data and tables.
This is fascinating stuff as it draws some slightly surprising conclusions, not least on UKIP’s appeal to traditional Labour support, the working class. It outlines their successes and failures and where they have and haven’t learned from them and where they might get better results in the future. In that sense it’s a potentially dangerous book as it’s an outline to other radical parties as to how they might best play the British electoral system. Ford and Goodwin are excellent on the point that while it remains a reassuring bulwark against the rise of parties advocating extreme views, that system now fails to provide adequate representation for a growing swathe of society; a power gap UKIP are happy to exploit.
After exploring the history and rise of the party the authors ask questions as to where UKIP go next, what would happen if their main purpose was accomplished and whether they could sustain any hint of power. Again, it’s a thoughtful section which raises issues for UKIP and the wider political scene.
An intelligent analysis which cuts through the hot air generated by both UKIP and its opponents. Sadly for UKIP, if the author’s conclusions hold true, few of their supporters will be reading it to gain a perspective.
Ford and Goodwin’s book divides into two sections. The first couple of chapters are a very readable and fascinating history of the party, detailing the often fractious nature of the party and their often surprising levels of naivety. It’s a juicy account which veers easily into comedy at times. The second section, the bulk of the book, is by necessity more heavy going, as it seeks to analyse the party’s history and support and is thus heavy on data and tables.
This is fascinating stuff as it draws some slightly surprising conclusions, not least on UKIP’s appeal to traditional Labour support, the working class. It outlines their successes and failures and where they have and haven’t learned from them and where they might get better results in the future. In that sense it’s a potentially dangerous book as it’s an outline to other radical parties as to how they might best play the British electoral system. Ford and Goodwin are excellent on the point that while it remains a reassuring bulwark against the rise of parties advocating extreme views, that system now fails to provide adequate representation for a growing swathe of society; a power gap UKIP are happy to exploit.
After exploring the history and rise of the party the authors ask questions as to where UKIP go next, what would happen if their main purpose was accomplished and whether they could sustain any hint of power. Again, it’s a thoughtful section which raises issues for UKIP and the wider political scene.
An intelligent analysis which cuts through the hot air generated by both UKIP and its opponents. Sadly for UKIP, if the author’s conclusions hold true, few of their supporters will be reading it to gain a perspective.
May 11, 2017
I liked how this book was written for the most part. It didn't get too caught up in ideological positions on the political spectrum, and just tried to get to the root of what is motivating people in increasing numbers to vote for a more right wing, nationalist/populist party. There is some caricature of these people as left behind voters, which I am not sure is very reflective of what is going on with it. And there is also an emphasis on strategic means of placing these voters, rather than on values and beliefs that may be involved in their decisions. But it does make clear where things stand, and the contrast with the other book I am reading currently on the left wing side, back to the future of socialism, Peter Hain, is stark. This latter goes in for pure ideological caricaturisations of neo-liberalism, and "little England isolationists", to give himself nice easy strawmen to knock down, all the time ignoring his own ideological prejudices, swaying him on many topics.
I think we see now, getting back to this book, that the conservatives are largely going to swallow UKIP up at the next election, now they have made an assertive clear stance in favor of Brexit, and now that UKIP , having got what they wanted, are going to struggle to find a new motivating goal for people to vote for them. Will the conservatives continue to reap the rewards of claiming this new electorate territory? This election and the next 4-5 years will show. Depending on how brexit goes for us economically, and depending how they commit to it. If they start to fall off it, then it will be certain that UKIP support will increase again in future elections.
I think we see now, getting back to this book, that the conservatives are largely going to swallow UKIP up at the next election, now they have made an assertive clear stance in favor of Brexit, and now that UKIP , having got what they wanted, are going to struggle to find a new motivating goal for people to vote for them. Will the conservatives continue to reap the rewards of claiming this new electorate territory? This election and the next 4-5 years will show. Depending on how brexit goes for us economically, and depending how they commit to it. If they start to fall off it, then it will be certain that UKIP support will increase again in future elections.
November 20, 2017
This is a highly readable account of the rise of UKIP from the year of its foundation - 1991 - until the date of publication in 2014.
It is a case study of a very English version of right wing populism, tracing a line of development from single issue obsession with the European Union on the part of a group of libertarian academics and a small group of backers. The authors' (there are two of them - Matthew Goodwin alongside Robert Ford) point to their limited appeal as long as they appeared in this guise. Years of pretty fruitless activity fighting parliamentary seats never secured more that one or two percent of the vote, showing that voters really care very little about the EU question right up until the time around 2004.
Things changed when the EU issue became entangled with the extension of free movement rights to nationals of the eight countries which acceded to membership at that time. As the migration of Poles and others rose into the hundreds of thousands during this time public opinion began to register anti-EU feelings more strongly.
But populism requires more than just an issue to secure greater support - it also needs charismatic personalities to get the message across in ways that resonate with public moods and begin to facilitate the emergence of new collective identities. For a brief period this was secured for the party in the shape of the former daytime TV show host (and one-time Labour MP), Robert Kilroy-Silk. According to Ford and Goodwin, the brief period of his flirtation with UKIP brought home the importance of anti-immigrant sentiment to the party's longtime leaders, with who it had not registered so strongly up until that time.
RKS blundered through the headlines and eventually went off in his won egocentric direction, but left things behind which at least one of the established members of the UKIP leadership circle began to brood more deeply on - the idea of identity politics. The time was ripe for Nigel Farage to come to the forefront as a much more dynamic figure who could represent in his own persona the image of the British people he stood for - affably patriotic, long-suffering, patient, who had just-about-had-it-up-to-here with all this PC nonsense about multiculturalism and regulations about straight bananas, etc.
More importantly, the Farage group had a better sense of where the audience for these messages were really at. The notion of the 'left-behind' people - the biggest idea in Ford and Goodwin's book - is the big idea here. Beyond the reaches of the south-east metropolitan elite there were towns populated by disgruntled folk who hadn't seen any of the benefits of the New Labour adventure in globalised modernisation. A big segment of the working class voters in the run down parts of the Midlands, northern England and Wales fell into this category and began to play a role in supporting the UKIP 'insurgency' by voting for it in increasing numbers - ironically drawn most to backing it in elections to the reviled European Parliament.
The book concludes at a time when it seemed possible that UKIP might breakthrough the notoriously difficult first-past-the-post election system and begin to garner enough support in a dozen or so constituencies to elect MPs. It seemed that it had transcended its original position as a single issue group and now had a political platform that addressed a broader range of social issues - most from a deeply right wing standpoint but mixing this with pro-public spending demands when necessary in order to provide better services for their suffering target group.
Farage played a deft hard in responding to the social liberalism of the Cameron Conservatives and the role they were playing in the coalition government elected in 2010 and still in power at the time of writing. What the authors didn't forsee (who did?) was Cameron's election victory in 2015 which allowed him to form a solely Conservative government. But rather than liberating the prime minister he discovered he was shackled to promises made to the right wing of his party to hold a referendum on EU membership which he had been able to avoid holding because of his up until dependence on support from the pro-EU Liberal Democrats. A majority Conservative government now had to deliver on that promise.
This was really the moment that UKIP had been born for. Throwing themselves body and soul into the referendum campaign, not being constrained by any ethical consideration to tell something that could plausible be presented as the truth about the EU, UKIP grabbed all the headlines about how a UK outside the EU would be able to stop immigration in its tracks and invest stacks on money in rebuilding the NHS and other public services.
The victory of the Leave vote has proven to be the end of the line for the Ukippers. Despite Ford and Goodwins' speculation that there might just have been enough in their political platform across a spectrum of issues to build an enduring right wing movement party with strong support among working class voters, the Brexit outcome had the effect of shattering a brittle formation even whilst the champagne corks celebrating the referendum vote were still popping. UKIP has been dead but not properly buried since that date.
Populism is still very much the way politics in the UK is now being done. On the right wing the banners are being held aloft by the hardline Brexiteers who have made the cause of ultra-nationalist patriotism all their own. On the left Jeremy Corbyn has surprised many by rebuilding the fortunes of the Labour Party and putting it a position where it will be a real contender for government office at the next election. Populism pervades everything, even though the rump of UKIP finds itself without an invitation to the party.
It is a case study of a very English version of right wing populism, tracing a line of development from single issue obsession with the European Union on the part of a group of libertarian academics and a small group of backers. The authors' (there are two of them - Matthew Goodwin alongside Robert Ford) point to their limited appeal as long as they appeared in this guise. Years of pretty fruitless activity fighting parliamentary seats never secured more that one or two percent of the vote, showing that voters really care very little about the EU question right up until the time around 2004.
Things changed when the EU issue became entangled with the extension of free movement rights to nationals of the eight countries which acceded to membership at that time. As the migration of Poles and others rose into the hundreds of thousands during this time public opinion began to register anti-EU feelings more strongly.
But populism requires more than just an issue to secure greater support - it also needs charismatic personalities to get the message across in ways that resonate with public moods and begin to facilitate the emergence of new collective identities. For a brief period this was secured for the party in the shape of the former daytime TV show host (and one-time Labour MP), Robert Kilroy-Silk. According to Ford and Goodwin, the brief period of his flirtation with UKIP brought home the importance of anti-immigrant sentiment to the party's longtime leaders, with who it had not registered so strongly up until that time.
RKS blundered through the headlines and eventually went off in his won egocentric direction, but left things behind which at least one of the established members of the UKIP leadership circle began to brood more deeply on - the idea of identity politics. The time was ripe for Nigel Farage to come to the forefront as a much more dynamic figure who could represent in his own persona the image of the British people he stood for - affably patriotic, long-suffering, patient, who had just-about-had-it-up-to-here with all this PC nonsense about multiculturalism and regulations about straight bananas, etc.
More importantly, the Farage group had a better sense of where the audience for these messages were really at. The notion of the 'left-behind' people - the biggest idea in Ford and Goodwin's book - is the big idea here. Beyond the reaches of the south-east metropolitan elite there were towns populated by disgruntled folk who hadn't seen any of the benefits of the New Labour adventure in globalised modernisation. A big segment of the working class voters in the run down parts of the Midlands, northern England and Wales fell into this category and began to play a role in supporting the UKIP 'insurgency' by voting for it in increasing numbers - ironically drawn most to backing it in elections to the reviled European Parliament.
The book concludes at a time when it seemed possible that UKIP might breakthrough the notoriously difficult first-past-the-post election system and begin to garner enough support in a dozen or so constituencies to elect MPs. It seemed that it had transcended its original position as a single issue group and now had a political platform that addressed a broader range of social issues - most from a deeply right wing standpoint but mixing this with pro-public spending demands when necessary in order to provide better services for their suffering target group.
Farage played a deft hard in responding to the social liberalism of the Cameron Conservatives and the role they were playing in the coalition government elected in 2010 and still in power at the time of writing. What the authors didn't forsee (who did?) was Cameron's election victory in 2015 which allowed him to form a solely Conservative government. But rather than liberating the prime minister he discovered he was shackled to promises made to the right wing of his party to hold a referendum on EU membership which he had been able to avoid holding because of his up until dependence on support from the pro-EU Liberal Democrats. A majority Conservative government now had to deliver on that promise.
This was really the moment that UKIP had been born for. Throwing themselves body and soul into the referendum campaign, not being constrained by any ethical consideration to tell something that could plausible be presented as the truth about the EU, UKIP grabbed all the headlines about how a UK outside the EU would be able to stop immigration in its tracks and invest stacks on money in rebuilding the NHS and other public services.
The victory of the Leave vote has proven to be the end of the line for the Ukippers. Despite Ford and Goodwins' speculation that there might just have been enough in their political platform across a spectrum of issues to build an enduring right wing movement party with strong support among working class voters, the Brexit outcome had the effect of shattering a brittle formation even whilst the champagne corks celebrating the referendum vote were still popping. UKIP has been dead but not properly buried since that date.
Populism is still very much the way politics in the UK is now being done. On the right wing the banners are being held aloft by the hardline Brexiteers who have made the cause of ultra-nationalist patriotism all their own. On the left Jeremy Corbyn has surprised many by rebuilding the fortunes of the Labour Party and putting it a position where it will be a real contender for government office at the next election. Populism pervades everything, even though the rump of UKIP finds itself without an invitation to the party.
January 13, 2018
Started as bunch of eurosceptics, UK Independence Party or UKIP had successfully fused their core value of euroscepticism with stance against immigration and westminster politics, thus making themselves a more populist party. In 2010 General Election, they even emerged as the party with the third largest share of votes. UKIP managed to tap into the left-behind voters from both Labour and Conservative Parties, people who felt that the world they know is slowly fading, who felt that the past governments under Blair, Brown and Cameron did not hear their sound. However, this did not translate into many seats in Parliament, for the British system of first-past-the-post election remained a large hurdle for any third party trying to break through into Westminster. Votes for UKIP, while large, were evenly spread and not concentrated enough to win UKIP many seats. The author also pointed out, quite rightly, that the Conservatives’ promise for referendum on EU put UKIP in a dilemmatic position. Which was vindicated by the fact that although british people voted to leave EU, UKIP lost one of its cause of existence, while itself imploding because the leadership void left by its former leader, Nigel Farage.
August 19, 2017
I only finally got round to reading this book after the General Election which saw UKIP nearly wiped out (LOL). It's an interesting read about the foundations of the radical right generally, though some of the conclusions it draws are, to me, slightly simplistic. Reading the conclusion, written in late 2013, is hilarious though. It states that Ed Miliband is likely to become Prime Minister; there is simply no way, even in a referendum, that people would vote to leave and the future of the Labour Party is essentially over, because there is no way. they can win back the traditional working class base, especially when they have North-London elites in charge. The best thing about reading with the knowledge of events is that I'm even more convinced that Ford and Goodwin haven't got a clue, just like the rest of them.
December 29, 2018
Maybe two stars is a bit harsh, but given the endorsements and for an allegedly academic book this was a disappointment. the conclusion is that ukip voters are predominantly, male, old(ish), without university education and blue collar that feel left behind. they are anti-brexit, anti-immigration and anti-westminster elite. what of this is new? (especially for observers of the european right populists). although the book oddly enough does not draw one conclusion: once the european topic is out of the way, younger and educated generations are coming through - how many people are left to vote for UkIP? not a lot i would say( as per recent results). the real unanswered question for me is - do young(ish) “left behind” voters turn more naturally to right or left populism? and do they become more right-leaning (and nationalistic, protectionist) the older they become?
June 8, 2020
Incredibily detailed analysis, but also manages to stay accessible to as well. Might seem irrelevant in current times, due to the falling away of UKIP on the political scene. However, it helps to explain how parties of the right parties can mobolise a lot of support within the working classes and middle classes
March 23, 2023
A good book overall mapping changes in political voting in the UK including the rise of UKIP and other factors. It is a book that is somewhat dated given that UKIP isn't around any more but useful for those who are interested in British politics and want to understand the background behind why Britain voted to Leave the EU.
September 12, 2019
A very English-centric take on UKIP, but that is to be expected with a party that focused its efforts in specific English regions.
December 27, 2019
Detailed yet accessible.
Excellent, highly recommended.
Don't really want to write anymore but there are 8 more words required for this review to
Excellent, highly recommended.
Don't really want to write anymore but there are 8 more words required for this review to
August 3, 2020
fascinating.
May 7, 2022
A bit repetitive, but much needed and very persuasive!
December 30, 2014
If this book had been written by a couple of Fleet St political hacks with axes to grind - either for or against right wing polemics - it may have been given a rather more mixed critical reception. But you can't really argue with dispassionate academic analysis based on verifiable polling statistics and other credible information sources. This explains why, as one commentator observed recently, the book is now being digested by every head scratching special adviser and election strategist right across the Westminster village.
The authors have clarified why many so people have loosened their ties and allegiances with the major parties, especially Labour and the Conservatives, both of whom are now perceived as mainly about pursuing and protecting the interests of their respective elites, big business and the politically correct metropolitan liberal minded chattering classes. The book identifies the various groups who now make up the so called "left behind" and thoroughly fed-up voters, including blue collar white working class people who were basically ignored by New Labour for 10 years, ex-Thatcherite "white van men" and others who feel that their sense of Britishness has been unfairly scorned and who never really bought into globalisation, European integration, multi-culturalism, and the benefits of unrestricted immigration.
The book is extremely good on UKIP's rise from a coffee house debating club to a major electoral force in British politics, their ultimate defeat of the BNP at local level, the internal fratricides, leadership changes and the development of grass roots campaigning and core messages about EU withdrawal, opposition to uncontrolled immigration and suspicion of the Westminster elites. That the authors' predictions about UKIP's continued rise during 2014 were proved correct - winning the European elections and more recently securing their first two MPs - is a testament to the book's place among the very best of political commentary in recent years.
The authors have clarified why many so people have loosened their ties and allegiances with the major parties, especially Labour and the Conservatives, both of whom are now perceived as mainly about pursuing and protecting the interests of their respective elites, big business and the politically correct metropolitan liberal minded chattering classes. The book identifies the various groups who now make up the so called "left behind" and thoroughly fed-up voters, including blue collar white working class people who were basically ignored by New Labour for 10 years, ex-Thatcherite "white van men" and others who feel that their sense of Britishness has been unfairly scorned and who never really bought into globalisation, European integration, multi-culturalism, and the benefits of unrestricted immigration.
The book is extremely good on UKIP's rise from a coffee house debating club to a major electoral force in British politics, their ultimate defeat of the BNP at local level, the internal fratricides, leadership changes and the development of grass roots campaigning and core messages about EU withdrawal, opposition to uncontrolled immigration and suspicion of the Westminster elites. That the authors' predictions about UKIP's continued rise during 2014 were proved correct - winning the European elections and more recently securing their first two MPs - is a testament to the book's place among the very best of political commentary in recent years.
October 19, 2014
While it’s almost impossible to produce such a study without value judgements on the underpinning ideology and policies bring analysed somehow seeping through, this book makes pretty good stab at a dispassionate analysis of where UKIP votes have come from over time.
I love the analogy that up till now many had viewed the regular UKIP success in euro elections as: “like the mythical town of Brigadoon: it emerges from the mist for one day every five years, generates great excitement, but then fades from view again as soon as polling day passes”. However the authors make a convincing case that UKIP are now drawing not just on disaffected Conservative votes but a substantial disenchanted “left behind” blue collar vote that would previously have voted for Labour or even the BNP.
While many have seen this book’s statistical analysis as focusing too much on UKIP’s surprising mounting draw on blue collar Labour voters as a sort of wake up call to Labour that is somewhat unfair. The book also acknowledges the still significant UKIP draw on disenchanted Conservatives (while saying this maybe plateauing), its ability to gain from the collapse in BNP votes, and that they are also picking up votes from those who saw the Lib Dems as the plucky outsiders before they entered government.
I love the analogy that up till now many had viewed the regular UKIP success in euro elections as: “like the mythical town of Brigadoon: it emerges from the mist for one day every five years, generates great excitement, but then fades from view again as soon as polling day passes”. However the authors make a convincing case that UKIP are now drawing not just on disaffected Conservative votes but a substantial disenchanted “left behind” blue collar vote that would previously have voted for Labour or even the BNP.
While many have seen this book’s statistical analysis as focusing too much on UKIP’s surprising mounting draw on blue collar Labour voters as a sort of wake up call to Labour that is somewhat unfair. The book also acknowledges the still significant UKIP draw on disenchanted Conservatives (while saying this maybe plateauing), its ability to gain from the collapse in BNP votes, and that they are also picking up votes from those who saw the Lib Dems as the plucky outsiders before they entered government.
October 6, 2014
This is an era where democratic societies are giving birth to new political parties that are attracting broad support as they challenge the political status quo. The Tea Party, Le Pen (France), and UKIP in the United kingdom. Robert Ford does a very good job explaining the successful rise of UKIP. In very short order, UKIP has gone from being defined as an opponent of the European Union to a full-fledged opposition party that will have a huge impact in the next national election.
How did UKIP develop from a fringe party into a mainstream powerhouse? Mr. Ford provides many compelling insights.
For one, UKIP did not marginalize itself the way the British National Party did. And in a society where the establishment has failed to keep the loyalty and respect of voters, UKIP is seen as an advocate for the legitimate desires of law abiding, taxpaying British.
Revolt on the Right presents a convincing explanation of why UKIP has developed into a political powerhouse.
Americans can learn a great deal about the changes in our relationship with our government from this insightful book.
How did UKIP develop from a fringe party into a mainstream powerhouse? Mr. Ford provides many compelling insights.
For one, UKIP did not marginalize itself the way the British National Party did. And in a society where the establishment has failed to keep the loyalty and respect of voters, UKIP is seen as an advocate for the legitimate desires of law abiding, taxpaying British.
Revolt on the Right presents a convincing explanation of why UKIP has developed into a political powerhouse.
Americans can learn a great deal about the changes in our relationship with our government from this insightful book.
February 24, 2016
argues that UKIP attracts support from the white working-class which feels is left behind. I felt it needed more on which parts of the working class it attracts and which parts of the working class are repelled by UKIP
June 1, 2015
The sheer amount of tables and evidence throughout the main body became so extensive it became meaningless. Nonetheless a good insight, explanation and history of UKIP.
September 20, 2015
Does what it says on the tin.
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