In her 2011 book Our Aesthetic Categories, Sianne Ngai offers a triptych of late capitalist aesthetic categories—"zany,” to evoke the performance of affective labour; “cute,” to denote the subject’s simultaneous consumption and mimicry of the commodity; and “interesting,” to localize an otherwise indeterminate value judgement characterized by the affectively and cognitively minimal act of selective attention. These categories are all unified by the fact of their being “weak” or pliable, running up against more classical aesthetic categories (such as the Sublime) which tend fundamentally towards the theological or which foster religious awe, fusing art with the with the discourse of spiritual transcendence. Instead, Ngai’s trio gestures towards our specific historical moment, one characterized by “hypercommodified, technologically-mediated conditions of production, distribution, and reception.” (Ngai 28) Whereas Ngai’s previous 2005 Ugly Feelings employed a psychoanalytic method of analysis, Our Aesthetic Categories approaches affect through a Marxist lend which allows her to identify and connect weak affects to corresponding trends in consumer culture or the ways in which commodities call out to and interpellate us as subjects; “a deficit of power which is significantly not the same as a suspension of power.” (Ngai 18) Indeed, this sense of powerlessness is the same avenue by which Ngai proceeds with her opening chapter on cuteness. “Cute” is an inherently unstable category, both inducing feelings of protectiveness or sympathy as well as an accompanying suspicion of an object’s capacity to manipulate us. The “oohs” and “ahhs” directed in a baby voice at a Hello Kitty plush toy, for instance, is an enactment of the object’s affective register, a mimetic act that transfers the powerlessness from the object onto the subject. For this reason, Ngai believes that “cuteness” can most readily be associated with consumption. Alternatively, as indicated in the second chapter, the “interesting” is most readily associated with circulation. Ngai identifies this aesthetic category as one characterized by ambivalence and “a lack of evidence” that problematizes the traditional boundary between knowing and feeling. Like Kant’s conception of beauty (which is, “famously, not a stylistic property but rather a compulsory sharing of pleasure that refers the subject to a relation among his subjective capacities which in turn refers him to a relation between the world in general and his ability to know it”) the “interesting” is mediated by a historical period where the “routinization of novelty, the tension between individualization and standardization, and the new intimacy between art and criticism” are dominant aspects of being art of a global community.” (Ngai 38) Our current information age is dominated by this feeling of indefinite seriality where art objects mechanically reproduced and disseminated at rapid speeds. The “ratiocinative cognition [and] the lubrication of social ties” which characterize the “interesting” help explain how it becomes the aesthetic category around which new communities begin to organize themselves. The “zany,” on the other hand, is the affective category associated with an agent or individual confronted and endangered by too many things coming at them all at once. Like Lucille Ball in I Love Lucy, Richard Pryor in The Toy, or Jim Carrey in The Cable Guy, the agent of “zany” is fueled by the “connexionist” spirit of capitalism—the idea that if the bureaucratic capitalism of the sixties in France restricted liberty and authenticity, the corporate capitalism of the nineties learned to benefit from offering workers more self-organized, creative, and fulfilling labour. Under this permutation of capitalism, a politically ambiguous convergence of occupational and cultural performance emerges, troubling the distinction between work and play through a constant and indistinct flow of activity. It is this last aesthetic category which feels most relevant to questions of aesthetics, performativity, and the production of needs (though both “cute” and “interesting” offer much to think about in terms of the cyclical subsumption of desire in Capital’s auo-expansive nature) The word “zany” derives from the word “zanni” which refers to the itinerant servant of 16th century commedia dell’arte. To have itinerancy—meaning, to some extent, placeless-ness—at the root of this word is interesting giving that this seems to be the most embodied of Ngai’s categories. Whether its disability, race, or gender, zany-ness often occurs within the context of a failure to comply with forms of embodied citizenship and the way this failure instigates still more activity, still more work. What is perhaps the most disturbing or unsettling implication of this aesthetic category is how it reveals what needs/commodities we’ve created in the form of “service work,” namely human feelings themselves—love, affection, and a sense of security.