What do you think?
Rate this book
U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime Change in the Cold War
Lyndon Johnson invaded the Dominican Republic. Richard Nixon sponsored a coup attempt in Chile. Ronald Reagan waged covert warfare in Nicaragua. Nearly a dozen times during the Cold War, American presidents turned their attention from standoffs with the Soviet Union to intervene in Latin American affairs. In each instance, it was declared that the security of the United States was at stake—but, as Michael Grow demonstrates, these actions had more to do with flexing presidential muscle than responding to imminent danger.
From Eisenhower's toppling of Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954 to Bush's overthrow of Noriega in Panama in 1989, Grow casts a close eye on eight major cases of U.S. intervention in the Western Hemisphere, offering fresh interpretations of why they occurred and what they signified. The case studies also include the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Reagan's invasion of Grenada in 1983, and JFK's little-known 1963 intervention against the government of Cheddi Jagan in British Guiana.
Grow argues that it was not threats to U.S. national security or endangered economic interests that were decisive in prompting presidents to launch these interventions. Rather, each intervention was part of a symbolic geopolitical chess match in which the White House sought to project an image of overpowering strength to audiences at home and abroad—in order to preserve both national and presidential credibility. As Grow also reveals, that impulse was routinely reinforced by local Latin American elites—such as Chilean businessmen or opposition Panamanian politicians—who actively promoted intervention in their own self-interest.
LBJ's loud lament—"What can we do in Vietnam if we can't clean up the Dominican Republic?"—reflected just how preoccupied our presidents were with proving that the U.S. was no paper tiger and that they themselves were fearless and forceful leaders. Meticulously argued and provocative, Grow's bold reinterpretation of Cold War history shows that this special preoccupation with credibility was at the very core of our presidents' approach to foreign relations, especially those involving our Latin American neighbors.
From Eisenhower's toppling of Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954 to Bush's overthrow of Noriega in Panama in 1989, Grow casts a close eye on eight major cases of U.S. intervention in the Western Hemisphere, offering fresh interpretations of why they occurred and what they signified. The case studies also include the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Reagan's invasion of Grenada in 1983, and JFK's little-known 1963 intervention against the government of Cheddi Jagan in British Guiana.
Grow argues that it was not threats to U.S. national security or endangered economic interests that were decisive in prompting presidents to launch these interventions. Rather, each intervention was part of a symbolic geopolitical chess match in which the White House sought to project an image of overpowering strength to audiences at home and abroad—in order to preserve both national and presidential credibility. As Grow also reveals, that impulse was routinely reinforced by local Latin American elites—such as Chilean businessmen or opposition Panamanian politicians—who actively promoted intervention in their own self-interest.
LBJ's loud lament—"What can we do in Vietnam if we can't clean up the Dominican Republic?"—reflected just how preoccupied our presidents were with proving that the U.S. was no paper tiger and that they themselves were fearless and forceful leaders. Meticulously argued and provocative, Grow's bold reinterpretation of Cold War history shows that this special preoccupation with credibility was at the very core of our presidents' approach to foreign relations, especially those involving our Latin American neighbors.
- GenresNonfictionHistory
280 pages, Paperback
First published June 1, 2008
150 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
February 1, 2026
Eighty-four years have passed since the United States last declared war, though it is a bit misleading to frame it that way. A formal declaration is a deliberately ambiguous term that obfuscates the slew of covert operations, convoluted interventions, and longstanding military conflicts the United States has engaged in since the end of World War II. Much to the chagrin of wounded veterans and protesting citizens, neither Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, Iraq, nor Afghanistan were congressionally approved wars, despite sharing all the vicious, generation-defining characteristics of one. So what accounts for the absence of congressional approval and the hasty willingness to intervene in foreign countries without any direct provocation or act of aggression?
In his historical analysis "U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions", Michael Grow provides a revelatory framework for understanding the complexities of American interventions, not only in the past, but also in ongoing and imminent conflicts. Opening with President Eisenhower’s 1953 decision to green-light a CIA operation in Guatemala, Grow methodically walks readers through eight interlinked interventions in Latin America, concentrating on both the glaring and obscure factors that shaped U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. Written in an accessible, roughly 200-page volume, his work offers an informative overview that highlights the idiosyncrasies of each conflict and how each unavoidably influenced the next.
In his farewell address in 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned against the emerging influence of the military-industrial complex, stating:
“In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.” - President Eisenhower, 1961
But what Eisenhower failed to warn us about were the underlying domestic and international pressures that have routinely led American presidents to take preemptive action. Grow alludes to these inconspicuous forces in his preface when he notes that economic and national security interests fail to tell the full story. He presents a five-prong view of influences on U.S. foreign policy, which can be outlined as: domestic political pressure, the preservation of international credibility, foreign political actors, economic interests, and national security. Each intervention encompassed a blend of these factors, setting a precedent and generating a ripple effect for how America would handle foreign opponents.
To fully grasp the decision-making process, one must consider the frenetic, tense climate of the Cold War. The close of World War II ushered in a new international order, with two global superpowers at the helm: the United States and the Soviet Union. With a heated rivalry underway, each country sought to secure hemispheric dominance and trigger favorable revolutions in neighboring nations, as if the political status of each were mere pieces on a checkerboard. In many Latin American countries that welcomed socialist revolutions, claims of a Soviet alliance or threats to U.S. security appeared weak at best. Yet Grow explains that the primary concern resided in the potential consequences of inaction:
“A weak or ineffectual U.S. response to that challenge, they believed, would encourage further Soviet adventurism and cause nervous U.S. allies to doubt the reliability of U.S. power, resulting in dangerous shifts in the global balance of power.” (p. 18)
Internally, the U.S. government believed and acted as if America’s international credibility and public image as the ‘leader of the Free World’ was always at risk. This concern was amplified and used as a formidable exigency after Cuba’s communist conversion under Fidel Castro and President Kennedy’s Bay of Pigs fiasco. The fear of another Cuba was repeatedly dangled before subsequent administrations as a cautionary tale of presidential weakness and incompetence. This “Cuban Syndrome” shaped CIA intelligence reports that grossly exaggerated Communist and Marxist influence within the Dominican Republic movement, while also pushing bellicose presidents to make good on their anti-communist campaign promises. Both Democratic and Republican presidents faced pressure from hawkish neoconservative opponents, as well as a public climate steeped in propaganda from the media, anti-regime factions within Latin America, and mega-corporations economically entrenched in the region. In each case, Grow carefully balances foreign provocations and official statements that made intervention seem favorable with the domestic pressures that pushed the final dominoes.
To round off his examination of U.S. interventions, Grow devotes nearly a quarter of his analysis to Bush’s 1989 invasion of Panama, explaining why the case stands as an outlier:
“The Panama invasion was a major departure from preceding U.S. interventions in the region in the sense that the target of U.S. hostility was not a Marxist leader or movement but a right-wing military officer who had worked closely with the United States for three decades.” (p. 160)
With the accelerating dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Communist threat, the Reagan administration found itself in firm control of the late–Cold War world, with clear intentions of shoring up U.S. hegemony. As Grow explains, the United States sought to establish a stable international system of “capitalist democracies, in which the United States, as the only remaining superpower, would utilize its overwhelming military superiority to guarantee global stability, working with cooperative allies and the United Nations to reduce international conflict, prevent aggression, and promote liberal models of national development” (p. 179) — or, in other words, to consolidate power in American hands.
In December 1989, newly elected President George H.W. Bush, formerly vice president under Reagan, seized the opportunity to deliver on his militant campaign promises by ending the dictatorship of Manuel Noriega in Panama and, in doing so, exemplify America’s resolve and legitimacy on the world stage. Despite the fact that Noriega was a rogue CIA-trained and funded ally turned foe, the invasion of Panama followed many of the same patterns as previous Latin American interventions. Bush, like every administration before him, operated under the presumption that he needed to prove his toughness and safeguard U.S. hegemony.
Insightful and brimming with nuance, Grow’s "U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions" is a refreshing, ever-relevant examination of the intricate rationale and pressures that drive American military action. Although tedious in its reporting and intentionally limited in scope, Grow provides readers with a predictive model for anticipating future U.S. responses to foreign opposition and incendiary conflicts. His incisive narrative is an invaluable resource for those seeking to look beyond propaganda and shallow political takes.
In his historical analysis "U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions", Michael Grow provides a revelatory framework for understanding the complexities of American interventions, not only in the past, but also in ongoing and imminent conflicts. Opening with President Eisenhower’s 1953 decision to green-light a CIA operation in Guatemala, Grow methodically walks readers through eight interlinked interventions in Latin America, concentrating on both the glaring and obscure factors that shaped U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. Written in an accessible, roughly 200-page volume, his work offers an informative overview that highlights the idiosyncrasies of each conflict and how each unavoidably influenced the next.
In his farewell address in 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned against the emerging influence of the military-industrial complex, stating:
“In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.” - President Eisenhower, 1961
But what Eisenhower failed to warn us about were the underlying domestic and international pressures that have routinely led American presidents to take preemptive action. Grow alludes to these inconspicuous forces in his preface when he notes that economic and national security interests fail to tell the full story. He presents a five-prong view of influences on U.S. foreign policy, which can be outlined as: domestic political pressure, the preservation of international credibility, foreign political actors, economic interests, and national security. Each intervention encompassed a blend of these factors, setting a precedent and generating a ripple effect for how America would handle foreign opponents.
To fully grasp the decision-making process, one must consider the frenetic, tense climate of the Cold War. The close of World War II ushered in a new international order, with two global superpowers at the helm: the United States and the Soviet Union. With a heated rivalry underway, each country sought to secure hemispheric dominance and trigger favorable revolutions in neighboring nations, as if the political status of each were mere pieces on a checkerboard. In many Latin American countries that welcomed socialist revolutions, claims of a Soviet alliance or threats to U.S. security appeared weak at best. Yet Grow explains that the primary concern resided in the potential consequences of inaction:
“A weak or ineffectual U.S. response to that challenge, they believed, would encourage further Soviet adventurism and cause nervous U.S. allies to doubt the reliability of U.S. power, resulting in dangerous shifts in the global balance of power.” (p. 18)
Internally, the U.S. government believed and acted as if America’s international credibility and public image as the ‘leader of the Free World’ was always at risk. This concern was amplified and used as a formidable exigency after Cuba’s communist conversion under Fidel Castro and President Kennedy’s Bay of Pigs fiasco. The fear of another Cuba was repeatedly dangled before subsequent administrations as a cautionary tale of presidential weakness and incompetence. This “Cuban Syndrome” shaped CIA intelligence reports that grossly exaggerated Communist and Marxist influence within the Dominican Republic movement, while also pushing bellicose presidents to make good on their anti-communist campaign promises. Both Democratic and Republican presidents faced pressure from hawkish neoconservative opponents, as well as a public climate steeped in propaganda from the media, anti-regime factions within Latin America, and mega-corporations economically entrenched in the region. In each case, Grow carefully balances foreign provocations and official statements that made intervention seem favorable with the domestic pressures that pushed the final dominoes.
To round off his examination of U.S. interventions, Grow devotes nearly a quarter of his analysis to Bush’s 1989 invasion of Panama, explaining why the case stands as an outlier:
“The Panama invasion was a major departure from preceding U.S. interventions in the region in the sense that the target of U.S. hostility was not a Marxist leader or movement but a right-wing military officer who had worked closely with the United States for three decades.” (p. 160)
With the accelerating dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Communist threat, the Reagan administration found itself in firm control of the late–Cold War world, with clear intentions of shoring up U.S. hegemony. As Grow explains, the United States sought to establish a stable international system of “capitalist democracies, in which the United States, as the only remaining superpower, would utilize its overwhelming military superiority to guarantee global stability, working with cooperative allies and the United Nations to reduce international conflict, prevent aggression, and promote liberal models of national development” (p. 179) — or, in other words, to consolidate power in American hands.
In December 1989, newly elected President George H.W. Bush, formerly vice president under Reagan, seized the opportunity to deliver on his militant campaign promises by ending the dictatorship of Manuel Noriega in Panama and, in doing so, exemplify America’s resolve and legitimacy on the world stage. Despite the fact that Noriega was a rogue CIA-trained and funded ally turned foe, the invasion of Panama followed many of the same patterns as previous Latin American interventions. Bush, like every administration before him, operated under the presumption that he needed to prove his toughness and safeguard U.S. hegemony.
Insightful and brimming with nuance, Grow’s "U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions" is a refreshing, ever-relevant examination of the intricate rationale and pressures that drive American military action. Although tedious in its reporting and intentionally limited in scope, Grow provides readers with a predictive model for anticipating future U.S. responses to foreign opposition and incendiary conflicts. His incisive narrative is an invaluable resource for those seeking to look beyond propaganda and shallow political takes.
November 11, 2020
This is an excellent recount of US-Latin American relations in the Cold War and I would warmly recommend it to anyone interested. It's thoroughly researched, sharply analyzed, and beautifully written.
Michael Grow writes in wonderful prose that should be textbook for history and political science. For a hardcore history book, focused mostly on US presidents' reasons to intervene in Latin America, I was surprised by how captivating the writing and structure were. Don't expect a boring, chronological recount of the facts. Though purposeful writing, Grow tells a story each time.
It also helps that he did heaps of research. Often, he pulls quotes directly, and while usually that can be shunned upon it is seamlessly weaved into the prose. Through these quotes, you really get the sense that he's put in so much time unearthing interviews, conversations, and confessions that have so far been ignored. It really makes you feel like you were "behind the scenes" of these presidential administrations.
Lastly, Grow's analysis is spot-on. His main argument is that US presidents have acted in Latin America less because of "realist" reasons of security or economic interest, but more out of domestic political gain. As someone who believes all international politics is really domestic politics, I felt more than vindicated reading this. It's hard to find IR explanations of Cold War events that treat governments as anything more than a black box, so Grow's analysis is refreshing as it is revealing.
Michael Grow writes in wonderful prose that should be textbook for history and political science. For a hardcore history book, focused mostly on US presidents' reasons to intervene in Latin America, I was surprised by how captivating the writing and structure were. Don't expect a boring, chronological recount of the facts. Though purposeful writing, Grow tells a story each time.
It also helps that he did heaps of research. Often, he pulls quotes directly, and while usually that can be shunned upon it is seamlessly weaved into the prose. Through these quotes, you really get the sense that he's put in so much time unearthing interviews, conversations, and confessions that have so far been ignored. It really makes you feel like you were "behind the scenes" of these presidential administrations.
Lastly, Grow's analysis is spot-on. His main argument is that US presidents have acted in Latin America less because of "realist" reasons of security or economic interest, but more out of domestic political gain. As someone who believes all international politics is really domestic politics, I felt more than vindicated reading this. It's hard to find IR explanations of Cold War events that treat governments as anything more than a black box, so Grow's analysis is refreshing as it is revealing.
October 10, 2021
A well-written and concise book focusing on eight US interventions in Latin America during the Cold War. Like the title of the book suggests, Grow examines the interventions focusing especially on the actions of the presidents of the USA which, in my opinion, was a fresh take on the subject.
As Grow writes, the interventions have traditionally often been explained by reasons solely concerning economy and/or national security. In this book Grow pretty much shoots these reasons down and instead provides the reader with a much more nuanced view on the reasons behind the interventions in question.
As Grow writes, the interventions have traditionally often been explained by reasons solely concerning economy and/or national security. In this book Grow pretty much shoots these reasons down and instead provides the reader with a much more nuanced view on the reasons behind the interventions in question.
August 3, 2025
Well researched analysis of US intervention in Latin America. The book follows a set case study structure and is easy to follow. I would have been interested to have seen some mention of times where Presidents did not choose to intervene in Latin America even though there were potential left wing challenges within the Cold War context.
January 19, 2021
Would be good to use individual chapters for my US-Lat Am course
May 20, 2016
I second Shannon's review about the eloquence of Grow's writing. This should be an example for academic writers of how to write. The problem with a lot of academic books is they try too hard to be fancy and verbose while muddling what should be a basic outline you learned to make in ENG 101. Get to and follow the points and do it cleanly. He has outlines within outlines you can practically see in the writing.
As far as content, I was an it-all-boils-down-to-economics person until I read this book, but now I see a lot more. Grow uses precise language and well-cited sources to frame the conditions leading up to the interventions based on his analyses that go beyond standardly scholarly renditions of economics and politics-as-usual as root causes. There are definite and surprising personal, human, global, and paradigm factors at play also, which is what Grow's thesis is all about, all while pulling in a nice mix of newly described details with little known quotes. I liked learning that JFK knew he had "fucked up" per his own words. It's not just economics, it's people and it's real.
In essence, Grow looks at freshly researched motivations and he cleanly cuts off at each intervention start before the next country chapter. This will be one to purchase for my personal library.
As far as content, I was an it-all-boils-down-to-economics person until I read this book, but now I see a lot more. Grow uses precise language and well-cited sources to frame the conditions leading up to the interventions based on his analyses that go beyond standardly scholarly renditions of economics and politics-as-usual as root causes. There are definite and surprising personal, human, global, and paradigm factors at play also, which is what Grow's thesis is all about, all while pulling in a nice mix of newly described details with little known quotes. I liked learning that JFK knew he had "fucked up" per his own words. It's not just economics, it's people and it's real.
In essence, Grow looks at freshly researched motivations and he cleanly cuts off at each intervention start before the next country chapter. This will be one to purchase for my personal library.
January 3, 2026
Grow’s contention is that the decision to intervene in Latin America time and again was not so much rooted in economics or national security, but rather in domestic politics (so as to not appear weak) and at the prompting of internal actors within those countries. Grow spends the majority of his time on the former.
The current President couldn’t be seen as weaker than the last guy, they would get torn apart in the press, at midterms, would lose reelection, it would encourage Moscow, Castro, and Beijing. Every president had to prove their mettle. So time and again the US intervened irregardless of the nature of the so called threat.
“In 1954, David Atlee Phillips overcame his personal moral qualms and participated in the Eisenhower administration's Guatemalan intervention in the belief that he was helping to protect the national security of the United States. What he did not know-and what the thousands of other U.S. intelligence operatives and military personnel who carried out their presidents' Cold War hemispheric interventions did not know-was that the policy decisions that committed them to action had been shaped predominantly by factors of image, prestige, political self-interest, and foreign manipulation.”
The current President couldn’t be seen as weaker than the last guy, they would get torn apart in the press, at midterms, would lose reelection, it would encourage Moscow, Castro, and Beijing. Every president had to prove their mettle. So time and again the US intervened irregardless of the nature of the so called threat.
“In 1954, David Atlee Phillips overcame his personal moral qualms and participated in the Eisenhower administration's Guatemalan intervention in the belief that he was helping to protect the national security of the United States. What he did not know-and what the thousands of other U.S. intelligence operatives and military personnel who carried out their presidents' Cold War hemispheric interventions did not know-was that the policy decisions that committed them to action had been shaped predominantly by factors of image, prestige, political self-interest, and foreign manipulation.”
May 11, 2010
This book attempts to cover a slew of in depth issues regarding the United States' involvement in Latin American affairs throughout the Cold War. Grow accurately examines the causation and multidimensional factors leading to these covert and overt involvements. Grow takes on an undoubtedly large feat by explaining all known U.S.-Latin American interventions during the Cold War, but he achieves this with a seamless ease and expertise. Stylistically, his paragraphs flow with cohesion and grace. While his evolution of facts flows in a non-sequential manner, flitting back and forth throughout history, it always serves to bolster previously established knowledge by filling in the gaps as he goes. He skillfully demonstrates the inconsistent, pendulum like relationship between the United States and its hemispheric neighbors while providing readers the added element of informative enjoyment.
June 9, 2009
Interesting book that challenges the argument that U.S. intervention was based on national security or economic concerns, though it leaves some questions about specific causation.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews