What do you think?
Rate this book
Force: A Fundamental Concept of Aesthetic Anthropology
The book aims at a new exposition of the basic idea of modern aesthetics by way of a reconstruction of its genesis in the 18th century, between Baumgarten’s Aesthetics and Kant’s Critique of Judgment. The claim is that the historical invention of aesthetics was not about expanding the range of legitimate objects of philosophical inquiry―these objects all existed before aesthetics. Rather, aesthetics, by introducing the category of the “aesthetic,” fundamentally redefined these objects. But most importantly, the reconstruction of the historical genesis of aesthetics shows that the introduction of the category of the “aesthetic” required nothing less than a transformation of the fundamental terms of philosophy. What begins in―or as―aesthetics is modern philosophy.
More precisely, Force shows that in―or as―aesthetics modern philosophy began twice, in two different, even opposite forms. On the one hand, Baumgarten’s Aesthetics is organized around the new concept of the “subject”: the concept of the subject as the totality of faculties, as the agent defined by his capabilities; of the subject as one who is able. By conceiving sensible cognition and (re)presentation as the exercise of subjective faculties acquired in practice, Baumgarten has framed the modern conception of human practices (and of philosophy as the inquiry into the conditions that enable the success of these practices). That is why aesthetics, the reflection upon the aesthetic, is a central pillar of modern in aesthetics, the philosophy of the subject or of the subject’s faculties assures itself of its own possibility.
Yet here, in the aesthetic and the reflection on it, the aesthetics “in the Baumgartian manner” (Herder), as the theory of the sensible faculties of the subject, at once faces a different the aesthetics of force, which conceives the aesthetic not as sensible cognition but instead as a play of expression―propelled by a force that, rather than being exercised, like a faculty, in practices, realizes itself; a force that does not recognize or represent anything because it is “obscure” and unconscious; a force not of the subject but of man as distinct from the same man as subject. The aesthetics of force is a science of the nature of of his aesthetic nature as distinct from the culture, acquired by practice, of his practices.
That is the hypothesis the six chapters of Force intend to unfold. The first chapter, analyzing the rationalist concept of the sensible, recollects the point of departure of the sensible is that which is without determinable definition or measure. The second chapter reconstructs Baumgarten’s aesthetics of sensible cognition as a theory of the subject and its faculties. The third and fourth chapters draw on writings by Herder, Sulzer, and Mendelssohn to develop the basic motifs of a counter-model, an aesthetics of the aesthetic, as the operation of an “obscure” force, is a performance without generality, divorced from all norm, law, and purpose―a play. And the aesthetic, as the pleasure of self-reflection, is a process of the transformation of the subject, of its faculties and practices―a process of aestheticization.
The aesthetics of force founds an anthropology of between force and faculty, between man and subject. The two concluding chapters explore the for the idea of philosophical aesthetics; and for ethics as the theory of the good. The fifth chapter engages Kant to show that an aesthetics conceived as an aesthetics of force is the scene of an irresolvable aesthetics unfolds within philosophy the contention between philosophy and aesthetic experience. The sixth chapter draws on Nietzsche to demonstrate the ethical import of aesthetic experience as the experience of the play of it teaches us to distinguish between action and life; it teaches the other good of life. – “The last word of aesthetics is human freedom.”
More precisely, Force shows that in―or as―aesthetics modern philosophy began twice, in two different, even opposite forms. On the one hand, Baumgarten’s Aesthetics is organized around the new concept of the “subject”: the concept of the subject as the totality of faculties, as the agent defined by his capabilities; of the subject as one who is able. By conceiving sensible cognition and (re)presentation as the exercise of subjective faculties acquired in practice, Baumgarten has framed the modern conception of human practices (and of philosophy as the inquiry into the conditions that enable the success of these practices). That is why aesthetics, the reflection upon the aesthetic, is a central pillar of modern in aesthetics, the philosophy of the subject or of the subject’s faculties assures itself of its own possibility.
Yet here, in the aesthetic and the reflection on it, the aesthetics “in the Baumgartian manner” (Herder), as the theory of the sensible faculties of the subject, at once faces a different the aesthetics of force, which conceives the aesthetic not as sensible cognition but instead as a play of expression―propelled by a force that, rather than being exercised, like a faculty, in practices, realizes itself; a force that does not recognize or represent anything because it is “obscure” and unconscious; a force not of the subject but of man as distinct from the same man as subject. The aesthetics of force is a science of the nature of of his aesthetic nature as distinct from the culture, acquired by practice, of his practices.
That is the hypothesis the six chapters of Force intend to unfold. The first chapter, analyzing the rationalist concept of the sensible, recollects the point of departure of the sensible is that which is without determinable definition or measure. The second chapter reconstructs Baumgarten’s aesthetics of sensible cognition as a theory of the subject and its faculties. The third and fourth chapters draw on writings by Herder, Sulzer, and Mendelssohn to develop the basic motifs of a counter-model, an aesthetics of the aesthetic, as the operation of an “obscure” force, is a performance without generality, divorced from all norm, law, and purpose―a play. And the aesthetic, as the pleasure of self-reflection, is a process of the transformation of the subject, of its faculties and practices―a process of aestheticization.
The aesthetics of force founds an anthropology of between force and faculty, between man and subject. The two concluding chapters explore the for the idea of philosophical aesthetics; and for ethics as the theory of the good. The fifth chapter engages Kant to show that an aesthetics conceived as an aesthetics of force is the scene of an irresolvable aesthetics unfolds within philosophy the contention between philosophy and aesthetic experience. The sixth chapter draws on Nietzsche to demonstrate the ethical import of aesthetic experience as the experience of the play of it teaches us to distinguish between action and life; it teaches the other good of life. – “The last word of aesthetics is human freedom.”
- GenresAnthropologyPhilosophy
160 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2008
2 people are currently reading
39 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
August 12, 2020
For a harsh review, see Cronan's "Third-way aesthetics" in Radical Philosophy (https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/rev...). Here I attempt a more sympathetic reconstruction of the text's genealogical project. Since Menke's style is aphoristic, I have structured the references in a suitably free standing form, my comments indicated by a double hyphen.
+"The discipline of aesthetics is the aesthetics of discipline." - - Pithy formulation.
+"Aesthetic representation must be thought of as representation without cognition, without a defined object." - - Yes and no. If art does not carry thought, then we remain in the mindlessness of creative capitalism.
+"What takes place in poesy is a collapse of practical subjectivity." - - Surely that's partially what takes place, but not all?
+"The first philosopher to express the major contribution that will answer this question — and provide the fundamental concept that will set and keep aesthetics in motion — is Leibniz. His decisive contribution is the idea that, just as the self- conscious and self- guided “actions of the intellect” have an “internal principle,” so, too, do the sensible ideas." - - Leibniz's notion of unconscious internal principles is an important contribution, granting aesthetics a novel dignity.
+"This ancient debate will come to an end only when both sides, exhausted by the endless thrust and parry, begin to conceive of themselves in different terms — when both art and philosophy stop claiming that they and they alone can ensure the success of praxis and, instead, start seeing themselves as forms of reflection on praxis." - - This articulation has the virtue of bringing together a Deleuzian approach (art as formalization of percepts) and the legacy of German Idealism (“mythology must become philosophical, and the people reasonable, and philosophy must become mythological in order to make philosophy sensual.”)
+"an aesthetics that does “what its name declares” is an investigation of the obscure. The program of an anthropological genealogy of the subject can be realized only as an aesthetics because aesthetics is the science of the obscure and because it is only on the basis of the obscure that we can gain an understanding of clarity, including and especially the clarity of sensible cognition. One central argument for the reconception of anthropology as aesthetics or of aesthetics as anthropology is Herder’s claim that the obscure mechanism of the soul is not merely the “beginning,” the precondition for the formation of the subject, but its “ground” because it is the “permanent basis in the soul”" - - This is helpful, aesthetics as genealogical investigation of the dark grounds of being.
+"Practice, habit, and frequent use — aesthetics learns with regard to the arts — are the ways, indeed the only ways, to perfect the per for mances of sensibility. Practice, habit, and frequent use, then, are the aesthetic alternatives to the principle that had framed the rationalist project of reform: of either sensibility receiving external guidance from reason or reason progressing methodically within itself. The right practice is the right way to exercise “sovereign command, not despotic rule [imperium . . . non tyrannis]” (§12) over the sensory world: by power of sensibility itself, as aesthetically educated sensibility. The attention to artistic practice offers aesthetics an insight not merely into the only adequate way of perfecting sensible per for mances but also into the “tyranny” — that is, the illegitimacy and, hence, inefficiency — of the program of guidance propagated by rationalism." - - Menke's differentiation between imperium (translated as sovereignty) and tyranny stacks the deck against rationalism. One wonders if the interrogation of sovereignty initiated by Bataille might change the terms of this question in ways that make possible an aestheticization of rationalism.
+"The discipline of aesthetics is the aesthetics of discipline." - - Pithy formulation.
+"Aesthetic representation must be thought of as representation without cognition, without a defined object." - - Yes and no. If art does not carry thought, then we remain in the mindlessness of creative capitalism.
+"What takes place in poesy is a collapse of practical subjectivity." - - Surely that's partially what takes place, but not all?
+"The first philosopher to express the major contribution that will answer this question — and provide the fundamental concept that will set and keep aesthetics in motion — is Leibniz. His decisive contribution is the idea that, just as the self- conscious and self- guided “actions of the intellect” have an “internal principle,” so, too, do the sensible ideas." - - Leibniz's notion of unconscious internal principles is an important contribution, granting aesthetics a novel dignity.
+"This ancient debate will come to an end only when both sides, exhausted by the endless thrust and parry, begin to conceive of themselves in different terms — when both art and philosophy stop claiming that they and they alone can ensure the success of praxis and, instead, start seeing themselves as forms of reflection on praxis." - - This articulation has the virtue of bringing together a Deleuzian approach (art as formalization of percepts) and the legacy of German Idealism (“mythology must become philosophical, and the people reasonable, and philosophy must become mythological in order to make philosophy sensual.”)
+"an aesthetics that does “what its name declares” is an investigation of the obscure. The program of an anthropological genealogy of the subject can be realized only as an aesthetics because aesthetics is the science of the obscure and because it is only on the basis of the obscure that we can gain an understanding of clarity, including and especially the clarity of sensible cognition. One central argument for the reconception of anthropology as aesthetics or of aesthetics as anthropology is Herder’s claim that the obscure mechanism of the soul is not merely the “beginning,” the precondition for the formation of the subject, but its “ground” because it is the “permanent basis in the soul”" - - This is helpful, aesthetics as genealogical investigation of the dark grounds of being.
+"Practice, habit, and frequent use — aesthetics learns with regard to the arts — are the ways, indeed the only ways, to perfect the per for mances of sensibility. Practice, habit, and frequent use, then, are the aesthetic alternatives to the principle that had framed the rationalist project of reform: of either sensibility receiving external guidance from reason or reason progressing methodically within itself. The right practice is the right way to exercise “sovereign command, not despotic rule [imperium . . . non tyrannis]” (§12) over the sensory world: by power of sensibility itself, as aesthetically educated sensibility. The attention to artistic practice offers aesthetics an insight not merely into the only adequate way of perfecting sensible per for mances but also into the “tyranny” — that is, the illegitimacy and, hence, inefficiency — of the program of guidance propagated by rationalism." - - Menke's differentiation between imperium (translated as sovereignty) and tyranny stacks the deck against rationalism. One wonders if the interrogation of sovereignty initiated by Bataille might change the terms of this question in ways that make possible an aestheticization of rationalism.
March 24, 2018
This book is simultaneously the most difficult work of philosophy I have read in my (young) academic career and one of the most generative. To quote the ending, "The beginning and ending of aesthetics is human freedom," this book gives life to those who make their way through its pages. Menke's prose is simultaneously very clear and difficult to parse. He makes you do your research and come to him as a curious scholar, but the work is very rewarding. I highly recommend this to anyone interested in thinking about how we think about beauty.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews