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The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy
First published 20 years ago, Lawrence Freedman's Evolution of Nuclear Strategy was immediately acclaimed as the standard work on the history of attempts to cope militarily and politically with the terrible destructive power of nuclear weapons. It has now been rewritten, drawing on a wide range of new research, and updated to take account of the period following the end of the cold war, taking the story to contemporary arguments about missile defense.
584 pages, Paperback
First published October 1, 1981
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About the author
Lawrence Freedman
95 books251 followersSir Lawrence David Freedman, KCMG, CBE, PC, FBA is Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King's College London.
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Displaying 1 - 21 of 21 reviews
March 15, 2018
One of the strong points of Freedman’s (The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy) examination of nuclear strategy is his treatment of the term “strategy” itself. He compares two definitions, one that was used since classical times that essentially means the art of the general, and another used by Basil Liddel Hart which is “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill ends of policy.”
Often within the debate on nuclear weapons, there was a discussion over “strategic” and “tactical” nuclear weapons (p. xviii). What does this general distinction mean if any? What are we to make of the debate? Freedman leaves us with lingering question if there is any meaningful sense in which “nuclear strategy” can be considered at all, and whether they are any use other than in deterring other nuclear armed states.
Freedman demonstrates how much of early nuclear strategy draws from work on aerial bombardment. What World War II demonstrated was that so long as people could gradually adjust to their situation, bombardment wasn’t very effective (p. 18); what was needed was an effective shock to the system. World War II demonstrates that as the war wore on, norms against the targeting of civilians eventually eroded as well, eventually peaking with the decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Air Force’s lukewarm attitude toward intercontinental missiles and their preference for the airman and the bomber shows how the parochial military establishment continues to appear as an ideal type throughout the literature. Because there was no conceivable defense against nuclear weapons it was seen as an ideal weapon for aggressor states—like the Soviet Union; the weapons gave the advantage to the enemy with the least inhibitions against using it (p. 33). Though the basic outlines of nuclear warfare were apparent—the hopelessness of defense, the attraction of sudden attack (p. 42), attempts to twist these nuclear weapons into things that could be workable for traditional conceptions of war were largely failures (counterforce, civil defense, tactical nuclear weapons, defense with nuclear weapons).
A constant question is why did the nuclear bomb have such strong limitations early on—because the bomb could not help the US with defense more than its conventional weapons already did, and because for the US it lacked credibility as a means of employment for coercion, especially on low or medium priority interests. There remained strong normative reason (both internally and externally) why the US could not simply bully others around; the Korean War demonstrated this. Thus, it was quickly relegated to a weapon of last resort until Eisenhower (p. 49). In the policy context of Eisenhower, and the French War with the Vietminh in Indochina, the question remains: was the nuclear option considered? Or, could Eisenhower have tried mad-man politics?
Stalin’s dogma of “permanently operating factors” and Leninist-Marxism had a crippling effect on the ability of the armed forces to develop strategic concepts. Meanwhile, Paul Nitze’s ideologically laden NC-68 presented the Soviet Union as an ideal aggressor; the Soviet Union had a comparative advantage over open societies in their ability to strike with stealth—the document rejected the call for a no first use policy (p. 67).
Throughout the debates on tactical nuclear weapons, extended deterrence, and the rejection of a no first use policy, there was a developing taboo against nuclear use. While it was hoped that adding the word “tactical onto the word nuclear would make it easier to think about their use during warfare—it was frighteningly clear that the term tactical nuclear war was a misnomer (112-113). The issue of counterforce, as a way of winning a nuclear war, continually came up. As in other debates, much of the impetus came from the military as a way of trying to reestablish the cult of the offensive.
Throughout the strategic debates, World War I as an analogy for predetermined offensive strategies getting away from policymaker was repeated (p. 389). While the logic of extended deterrence and an assumption that US and European conventional forces were inferior to Soviet Forces continued to drive nuclear strategy, some liberal defense specialists (McNamara is one) tried to push for a no first strike policy. The question still remains how much the SDI did to push the Soviet political system into its death throws; did the intimation of the SDI really touch a nerve in Soviet strategy?
In any event, the collapse of the Soviet Union brought new problems. One of which was to what extent nuclear weapons were still relevant—and especially how to protect the nuclear arsenal of a weak Russian state. Since the end of the Cold War some interesting ideas have floated about regarding how to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether—one key idea is that of progressive restraint, where through a regular habit of not brandishing nuclear weapons, states would convince themselves of their non-utility (425).
This an outstanding book for anyone looking for a window into nuclear strategy. The book will appeal well to students and academics of the subject who need a handy desk reference. Balanced and well-researched. But that is to be expected from anything by Lawrence Freedman.
Often within the debate on nuclear weapons, there was a discussion over “strategic” and “tactical” nuclear weapons (p. xviii). What does this general distinction mean if any? What are we to make of the debate? Freedman leaves us with lingering question if there is any meaningful sense in which “nuclear strategy” can be considered at all, and whether they are any use other than in deterring other nuclear armed states.
Freedman demonstrates how much of early nuclear strategy draws from work on aerial bombardment. What World War II demonstrated was that so long as people could gradually adjust to their situation, bombardment wasn’t very effective (p. 18); what was needed was an effective shock to the system. World War II demonstrates that as the war wore on, norms against the targeting of civilians eventually eroded as well, eventually peaking with the decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Air Force’s lukewarm attitude toward intercontinental missiles and their preference for the airman and the bomber shows how the parochial military establishment continues to appear as an ideal type throughout the literature. Because there was no conceivable defense against nuclear weapons it was seen as an ideal weapon for aggressor states—like the Soviet Union; the weapons gave the advantage to the enemy with the least inhibitions against using it (p. 33). Though the basic outlines of nuclear warfare were apparent—the hopelessness of defense, the attraction of sudden attack (p. 42), attempts to twist these nuclear weapons into things that could be workable for traditional conceptions of war were largely failures (counterforce, civil defense, tactical nuclear weapons, defense with nuclear weapons).
A constant question is why did the nuclear bomb have such strong limitations early on—because the bomb could not help the US with defense more than its conventional weapons already did, and because for the US it lacked credibility as a means of employment for coercion, especially on low or medium priority interests. There remained strong normative reason (both internally and externally) why the US could not simply bully others around; the Korean War demonstrated this. Thus, it was quickly relegated to a weapon of last resort until Eisenhower (p. 49). In the policy context of Eisenhower, and the French War with the Vietminh in Indochina, the question remains: was the nuclear option considered? Or, could Eisenhower have tried mad-man politics?
Stalin’s dogma of “permanently operating factors” and Leninist-Marxism had a crippling effect on the ability of the armed forces to develop strategic concepts. Meanwhile, Paul Nitze’s ideologically laden NC-68 presented the Soviet Union as an ideal aggressor; the Soviet Union had a comparative advantage over open societies in their ability to strike with stealth—the document rejected the call for a no first use policy (p. 67).
Throughout the debates on tactical nuclear weapons, extended deterrence, and the rejection of a no first use policy, there was a developing taboo against nuclear use. While it was hoped that adding the word “tactical onto the word nuclear would make it easier to think about their use during warfare—it was frighteningly clear that the term tactical nuclear war was a misnomer (112-113). The issue of counterforce, as a way of winning a nuclear war, continually came up. As in other debates, much of the impetus came from the military as a way of trying to reestablish the cult of the offensive.
Throughout the strategic debates, World War I as an analogy for predetermined offensive strategies getting away from policymaker was repeated (p. 389). While the logic of extended deterrence and an assumption that US and European conventional forces were inferior to Soviet Forces continued to drive nuclear strategy, some liberal defense specialists (McNamara is one) tried to push for a no first strike policy. The question still remains how much the SDI did to push the Soviet political system into its death throws; did the intimation of the SDI really touch a nerve in Soviet strategy?
In any event, the collapse of the Soviet Union brought new problems. One of which was to what extent nuclear weapons were still relevant—and especially how to protect the nuclear arsenal of a weak Russian state. Since the end of the Cold War some interesting ideas have floated about regarding how to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether—one key idea is that of progressive restraint, where through a regular habit of not brandishing nuclear weapons, states would convince themselves of their non-utility (425).
This an outstanding book for anyone looking for a window into nuclear strategy. The book will appeal well to students and academics of the subject who need a handy desk reference. Balanced and well-researched. But that is to be expected from anything by Lawrence Freedman.
March 8, 2024
An all-encompassing book about nuclear weapons and war strategy. The author’s narrative begins even before the first nuclear explosion and follow-up Hiroshima when most were quite oblivious to the workings and power of nuclear fission lest foresaw how the development of a while range of technically different nuclear weapons and delivery systems would change the nature of warfare. This book explains how nuclear strategy (the goals and usage of such weapons) transformed since their inception until modern times. The strategy was surprisingly chameleonic, ever-changing, as it needed to accommodate and adept not only to new and novel nuclear weapon systems and changing priorities and focus on conventional armed forces but also political changes on the world stage. In between a strategy of nuclear monopoly to a strategy of massive retaliation and even a strategy of restraint, much thought went into maximizing the effect of this deadly weapon. I found it especially interesting to learn how nuclear weapons were implemented in the early NATO defense strategy and the reasons their possible usage would have favored the West more than their initial adversaries, the Warsaw pact members.
Desiring neither to be dead nor red, the West faced a great many dead-end options that could have left them ending up just that - either or. This is just one instance where the author used an aphorism that was spot on.
Historically inclusive and embracing in scope, this work gives many examples on how nuclear weapons would and could have been used in past conflicts from Korea to Vietnam and on several occasions against the Soviet union. It also tells a detailed story of several US presidencies’ and their major constituents and advisors pondering not only the dilemmas of a possible usage of such weapons but also their maintenance and proliferation in peace time.
Nevertheless, this is not merely about the Western powers and the Soviet-unions considerations, Asiatic nuclear powers such as 🇮🇳 India, Pakistan 🇵🇰 and China 🇨🇳 and their nuclear acquisition and strategy are also analyzed and detailed.
It is also very update, as it also tackles the Russia 🇷🇺-Ukraine 🇺🇦 war, why the Ukraine 🇺🇦 decided to forego becoming a nuclear power by ridding itself of its nuclear arsenal it inherited and how this decision affected its future.
All in all, this is a great work that I can recommend to both readers, newbies to the matter and the more well-read on this critical subject.
Desiring neither to be dead nor red, the West faced a great many dead-end options that could have left them ending up just that - either or. This is just one instance where the author used an aphorism that was spot on.
Historically inclusive and embracing in scope, this work gives many examples on how nuclear weapons would and could have been used in past conflicts from Korea to Vietnam and on several occasions against the Soviet union. It also tells a detailed story of several US presidencies’ and their major constituents and advisors pondering not only the dilemmas of a possible usage of such weapons but also their maintenance and proliferation in peace time.
Nevertheless, this is not merely about the Western powers and the Soviet-unions considerations, Asiatic nuclear powers such as 🇮🇳 India, Pakistan 🇵🇰 and China 🇨🇳 and their nuclear acquisition and strategy are also analyzed and detailed.
It is also very update, as it also tackles the Russia 🇷🇺-Ukraine 🇺🇦 war, why the Ukraine 🇺🇦 decided to forego becoming a nuclear power by ridding itself of its nuclear arsenal it inherited and how this decision affected its future.
All in all, this is a great work that I can recommend to both readers, newbies to the matter and the more well-read on this critical subject.
December 11, 2022
This book delivers a comprehensive look at nuclear strategy! If you're down to read almost 700 pages on the topic, look no further. From a student's perspective, the chapters are well-organized and the index is very detailed. So, this is a great desk reference that can give an understandable and well-documented explanations of nuclear concepts. The 4th edition is from 2019, so most information is current and relevant.
April 22, 2024
Wow it dragged on on on on on and on at the end. When I'm so sick of the book I'm getting angry I have my headset on, you lose the half point.
Otherwise, it was a good review of the history of the cold war as told from the natural history of the nuclear weapon. Shit, for the fourth ed., bring in Mark Kurlansky!
Otherwise, it was a good review of the history of the cold war as told from the natural history of the nuclear weapon. Shit, for the fourth ed., bring in Mark Kurlansky!
September 9, 2025
Before we get started, it's important that you understand that this is a textbook dense enough to shield you from nuclear heat. Only the stodgiest nuke geeks would pick this up and read it for fun. It is full of important insights and the analysis of trends in nuclear warfighting, but nothing in here even approaches a "story."
This is an academic's history of nuclear war, its strategy, and the policies that govern it. It starts with the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and proceeds through the present day. While this textbook is good for any reader, its target audience are those who are experienced enough to understand the various nuclear strategies (MAD, damage limitation, etc.) but not yet familiar enough to understand the context that surrounds each strategy. This is also a good reference for academics and nuclear operators with a desire to quickly grasp the prevailing thoughts on the subject.
This is an academic's history of nuclear war, its strategy, and the policies that govern it. It starts with the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and proceeds through the present day. While this textbook is good for any reader, its target audience are those who are experienced enough to understand the various nuclear strategies (MAD, damage limitation, etc.) but not yet familiar enough to understand the context that surrounds each strategy. This is also a good reference for academics and nuclear operators with a desire to quickly grasp the prevailing thoughts on the subject.
November 13, 2024
Extremely comprehensive book on how the nuclear strategy evolved over time. With all the nuclear players and technological improvements over time, the changing rhetoric and political debates. Very well done!
March 16, 2013
A good, if limited book, which would perhaps better be entitled "The Evolution of American Nuclear Strategy." It provides a comprehensive summary overview of the currents of American debate on nuclear issues, with a cursory inclusion of European and Soviet perspectives. This paucity of Soviet information may be ascribed to the book's original Cold War-era publication, but it is clear that it has not been particularly heavily revised for the 3rd (2003) edition. Ironically enough, the essentially tacked-on chapters on the post-Cold War era are the most engaging in style.
Nonetheless, it remains a valuable guide to the basic currents of American nuclear debate, within these limitations.
Nonetheless, it remains a valuable guide to the basic currents of American nuclear debate, within these limitations.
May 16, 2022
This review is for the 4th edition, 2019 which is a more recent edition than the Goodreads thumbnail shows.
This book does a thorough job in covering the history of thinking about nuclear strategy from WWII to present day even including Trump's moves many of which were a continuation of Obama's. Although most of the discussion is naturally on the United States, as it has always had the most powerful arsenal despite fears at times that it did not, there is coverage of nearly every other nation that has ever had or even seriously contemplated a nuclear program: even including Sweden, Taiwan, Argentina and Brazil.
The book is objectively written and avoids cheerleading for the west. For example, North Korea's initial desire for a nuclear program makes more sense once its history including threats during the Korean War and South Korea contemplating a nuclear program before it is considered. Along similar lines, the United States is definitely portrayed as the more aggressive super power during the Cold War when it comes to nuclear strategy: for instance not announcing a no first use policy even as its enemies including China and the Soviet Union did.
There were some historical facts I did not expect going into this book: for example Reagan's strong revulsion for nuclear weapons and just how unrealistic his SDI vision was. The book also makes it clear that SDI was not really part of a strategy to cause the Soviet Union's collapse. Most thinking on nuclear strategy is fairly intuitive, although this may come from the benefit of hindsight. Some things which are at first slightly counter-intuitive, for example that missile defense is destabilizing, can be seen to follow easily from some basic logic.
I rate the book five stars because it does an excellent job of thoroughly presenting its subject. The subject itself can, however, become rather frustrating at times. I could only read a chapter or two a day because the same patterns seemed to emerge time and time again and it seemed like reading the same old thing:
Nobody is really sure how the other side might react in a nuclear war, what events could cause escalation or even where a threat might one day emerge. Thus it is generally decided that it is best to go with all classes of weapons and, except for upgrades, to never really get rid of existing ones: rather merely "undeploy" weapons which were previously deployed. Thus nuclear arsenals and especially the United States's mostly just ratchet up over time. At the same time it interesting that some countries are okay with the United States assuring their security in exchange for them not developing their own nuclear weapons. In particular, the book discusses the many reasons behind Ukraine's decision to give up its nuclear weapons in part due to the United States's security guarantee.
This book does a thorough job in covering the history of thinking about nuclear strategy from WWII to present day even including Trump's moves many of which were a continuation of Obama's. Although most of the discussion is naturally on the United States, as it has always had the most powerful arsenal despite fears at times that it did not, there is coverage of nearly every other nation that has ever had or even seriously contemplated a nuclear program: even including Sweden, Taiwan, Argentina and Brazil.
The book is objectively written and avoids cheerleading for the west. For example, North Korea's initial desire for a nuclear program makes more sense once its history including threats during the Korean War and South Korea contemplating a nuclear program before it is considered. Along similar lines, the United States is definitely portrayed as the more aggressive super power during the Cold War when it comes to nuclear strategy: for instance not announcing a no first use policy even as its enemies including China and the Soviet Union did.
There were some historical facts I did not expect going into this book: for example Reagan's strong revulsion for nuclear weapons and just how unrealistic his SDI vision was. The book also makes it clear that SDI was not really part of a strategy to cause the Soviet Union's collapse. Most thinking on nuclear strategy is fairly intuitive, although this may come from the benefit of hindsight. Some things which are at first slightly counter-intuitive, for example that missile defense is destabilizing, can be seen to follow easily from some basic logic.
I rate the book five stars because it does an excellent job of thoroughly presenting its subject. The subject itself can, however, become rather frustrating at times. I could only read a chapter or two a day because the same patterns seemed to emerge time and time again and it seemed like reading the same old thing:
Nobody is really sure how the other side might react in a nuclear war, what events could cause escalation or even where a threat might one day emerge. Thus it is generally decided that it is best to go with all classes of weapons and, except for upgrades, to never really get rid of existing ones: rather merely "undeploy" weapons which were previously deployed. Thus nuclear arsenals and especially the United States's mostly just ratchet up over time. At the same time it interesting that some countries are okay with the United States assuring their security in exchange for them not developing their own nuclear weapons. In particular, the book discusses the many reasons behind Ukraine's decision to give up its nuclear weapons in part due to the United States's security guarantee.
April 12, 2025
Rather than a history of nuclear weapons themselves, Freedman as he always does, gives us a chronicle of the intellectual debate surrounding nuclear weapons. Those looking for technical information about nuclear weapons, or anecdotes from near mishaps, decision making in crises, etc. should look elsewhere.
Most of the book details the public debate that played out in the roughly twenty years or so after the end of World War Two. Footnotes of this section are full of references to classical cold warriors like Bernard Brodie, Robert Oppenheimer, Edward Teller, Basil Liddell Hart, Henry Kissinger, Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlsetter, and Thomas Schelling - theorists who were forced to completely reinvent their themselves upon the advent of Nuclear weapons. The book can be confusing at times because, despite being some of the brightest minds ever, the Cold Warriors were confused themselves. The pace of change was rapid, writings were hotly contested in public forums like Foreign Affairs and Scientific American, and good, intelligent people changed their minds as they grappled with the issues.
In some ways, the book leaves even the careful reader unsatisfied in the end. Just like the Cold War, the debate surrounding nuclear weapons seemed to just end before any real resolution could be achieved. Reading this book makes it clear that society has not come up with good answers to the main questions of the Cold War - Can there be any such thing as a “Nuclear Strategy?” Can any rational actors wield nuclear weapons to achieve rational ends? Would the United States risk nuclear war to defend one of its Allies? Is strategic defense actually destabilizing? When the Cold War ended, these questions, which the Cold Warriors spent their lives wrestling with, were left largely unanswered and public debate simply moved on.
For anyone looking for exposure to Cold War thinking, or anyone just looking for an example of how intellectual titans grappled with each other in great debates of their time, this book will have you well on your way.
Most of the book details the public debate that played out in the roughly twenty years or so after the end of World War Two. Footnotes of this section are full of references to classical cold warriors like Bernard Brodie, Robert Oppenheimer, Edward Teller, Basil Liddell Hart, Henry Kissinger, Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlsetter, and Thomas Schelling - theorists who were forced to completely reinvent their themselves upon the advent of Nuclear weapons. The book can be confusing at times because, despite being some of the brightest minds ever, the Cold Warriors were confused themselves. The pace of change was rapid, writings were hotly contested in public forums like Foreign Affairs and Scientific American, and good, intelligent people changed their minds as they grappled with the issues.
In some ways, the book leaves even the careful reader unsatisfied in the end. Just like the Cold War, the debate surrounding nuclear weapons seemed to just end before any real resolution could be achieved. Reading this book makes it clear that society has not come up with good answers to the main questions of the Cold War - Can there be any such thing as a “Nuclear Strategy?” Can any rational actors wield nuclear weapons to achieve rational ends? Would the United States risk nuclear war to defend one of its Allies? Is strategic defense actually destabilizing? When the Cold War ended, these questions, which the Cold Warriors spent their lives wrestling with, were left largely unanswered and public debate simply moved on.
For anyone looking for exposure to Cold War thinking, or anyone just looking for an example of how intellectual titans grappled with each other in great debates of their time, this book will have you well on your way.
May 25, 2025
I've read a few "history of nuclear strategy" type books. This is by far the best.
We start with the obvious points that it's not a moralizing book; it tells you about the subject without feeling compelled to tell you every chapter that "war is bad, mkay".
But it goes far beyond that. The average such book takes from about 1945 to (maybe) the early 60s. You hear about the history, the early days on unipolarity, the discussion of stategy in the context of bombers. However 1965 was a long time ago! This book keeps going, while explaining how the history played out. How things that today we take for granted (like MAD) took time to be accepted. How doctrine had to change as technology changed (not so much in the weapons themselves; the arrival of fusion weapons did not seem to change much; but in the delivery systems, from bombers to missiles [of various ranges] to submarines). The differences in the various attitudes in the 70s vs the 80s vs the 90s, and even today (the book goes all the way to Trump 1, even though, to be honest, people seem to have stopped thinking much about the issue since the end of the Cold War).
Also covered is other countries. What Britain and France thought they were achieving with their weapons programs, likewise for Israel, with valiant attempts at trying to understand China, Pakistan, and India. Even South Africa's (now shut down) attempt is explored, along with brief discussions of Iran and North Korea.
We start with the obvious points that it's not a moralizing book; it tells you about the subject without feeling compelled to tell you every chapter that "war is bad, mkay".
But it goes far beyond that. The average such book takes from about 1945 to (maybe) the early 60s. You hear about the history, the early days on unipolarity, the discussion of stategy in the context of bombers. However 1965 was a long time ago! This book keeps going, while explaining how the history played out. How things that today we take for granted (like MAD) took time to be accepted. How doctrine had to change as technology changed (not so much in the weapons themselves; the arrival of fusion weapons did not seem to change much; but in the delivery systems, from bombers to missiles [of various ranges] to submarines). The differences in the various attitudes in the 70s vs the 80s vs the 90s, and even today (the book goes all the way to Trump 1, even though, to be honest, people seem to have stopped thinking much about the issue since the end of the Cold War).
Also covered is other countries. What Britain and France thought they were achieving with their weapons programs, likewise for Israel, with valiant attempts at trying to understand China, Pakistan, and India. Even South Africa's (now shut down) attempt is explored, along with brief discussions of Iran and North Korea.
May 26, 2021
1983 edition came out at the most dangerous time to have a nuclear war. The Soviets and US had combined arsenals with tens of thousands of bombs. If WWIII had broken out then (and it almost did see video) it would have been the worst possible time during the cold war for it to happen. This book covers the history of nuclear strategy from early cold war planning Eisenhowers' new look to ease military spending in the fifties to invest in nukes instead to free up the economy for the postwar boom. The growing realization in the sixties and seventies that nuclear war would end both superpowers and the policy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and deterrence as policy up the dangerous moment early in the Reagan administration at the time of publishing. I will drop a video on a what-if nuclear war broke at the time of the book's publication (a very real what-if).
https://youtu.be/e3AzwBPnUxs
https://youtu.be/e3AzwBPnUxs
July 28, 2020
An important presentation of the history of nuclear strategy in the 20th century. I cannot stress how important it is to unwind what governments rationalise out of powers that could lead to catastrophic scenarios. At the end of the day logic is filtered through simple stories many of which really make no sense.
This book can help understand how farming of the stories can lead closer to disarmament, mitigated global risk. I wish there was a continuation of this text to cover contemporary nuclear strategies.
This book can help understand how farming of the stories can lead closer to disarmament, mitigated global risk. I wish there was a continuation of this text to cover contemporary nuclear strategies.
August 13, 2024
A massive history of the changes in nuclear strategy and deterrence over time with an amazing level of coverage of the reasoning behind decisions to adjust US and Soviet nuclear capabilities. To a lesser extent, it also covers other nuclear states as well as the new nuclear challenges arising after 1991.
June 3, 2021
I picked up three of these titles recently, this one is a series of articles, based on research, mostly on things that concerned the RAND Corp. think tank on nuclear strategy, though topics seem to range as far as cyberwar. The selection of journals, in the bibliography, was extremely useful.
April 8, 2024
Definitely need to re-read.
September 1, 2020
In addition to this work there is
Nuclear Strategy: The Jim King Manuscripts
Authors Glen Segell and James Edward King
Glen Segell Publishers, London 2006
183 pages
.....
Lawrence Freedman wrote in his acclaimed book The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy ‘James King permitted me to read a copy of his own masterly unpublished study entitled The New Strategy’, (London. Macmillan in association with the International Institute for Strategic Studies. 1981) p.xii.
There were in fact nine drafts of the manuscript written by James E. King Jr (Jim) from 1948 to 1988. Correspondence indicates that Lawrence Freedman probably read a copy in 1976 of a version given by Jim King to Ken Booth in 1973. Jim King obtained a BA and a MA from both Harvard and Oxford Universities and held the Italian Order of Merit. His PhD became a victim of World War II when he volunteered for service and was subsequently injured in Germany.
His last job was in the CIA, following a successful career that included positions at the Institute of Defence Analysis, the Naval War College, John Hopkins University, and the Military Commission set up in Germany after World War II.
Nuclear Strategy: The Jim King Manuscripts
Authors Glen Segell and James Edward King
Glen Segell Publishers, London 2006
183 pages
.....
Lawrence Freedman wrote in his acclaimed book The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy ‘James King permitted me to read a copy of his own masterly unpublished study entitled The New Strategy’, (London. Macmillan in association with the International Institute for Strategic Studies. 1981) p.xii.
There were in fact nine drafts of the manuscript written by James E. King Jr (Jim) from 1948 to 1988. Correspondence indicates that Lawrence Freedman probably read a copy in 1976 of a version given by Jim King to Ken Booth in 1973. Jim King obtained a BA and a MA from both Harvard and Oxford Universities and held the Italian Order of Merit. His PhD became a victim of World War II when he volunteered for service and was subsequently injured in Germany.
His last job was in the CIA, following a successful career that included positions at the Institute of Defence Analysis, the Naval War College, John Hopkins University, and the Military Commission set up in Germany after World War II.
September 8, 2014
Tremendous historic perspective. The book describes superbly the cycles of strategy from biblical and acient greek (deceptive) times till today. Onething is for sure. To strategize or understand strategy per se, still the mandatory reading is Clausewitz's On War reading...and re reading...
November 13, 2019
The second time around, Freedman comes with the "true" evolution. And if he does not get it right this time, he will completely revise a new edition.
January 18, 2016
Read the 2nd Edition would like to read the latest edition
October 26, 2017
Freedman, no doubt, is an intelligent and thoughtful scholar. As such, his book is a tragedy as it makes Freedman seem to be neither. There appears to be little structure. Timelines regularly jump several years forward and back with little rhyme or reason for the time skips. There are several instances where Freedman shorts his own explanations. For example, he'll state there are 4 reasons why X occurred, then proceed to give 3 reasons. Due to the number of times it happens in the book, it's hard to tell whether it was a lack of editing or if Freedman can count in general. Additionally, his logic is often difficult to follow and goes on tangents so far from his original point that entire chapters are lost.
Overall, rather than a book for the public, Freedman's work is more of an elaborate set of personal notes. For everyone else, it's like an inside joke to which you're not privy to.
Overall, rather than a book for the public, Freedman's work is more of an elaborate set of personal notes. For everyone else, it's like an inside joke to which you're not privy to.
Read
November 18, 2018Comprehensive analysis of the different strands of thought that directed nuclear weapons policy throughout the cold war. Some reviews of this book have complained that it jumps around chronologically; this is true, but it does that to discuss different themes in each chapter and is not an impediment to understanding.
This is a book for those already familiar with nuclear weapons history. If you're not, you may want to start with something like Eric Schlosser's book Command and Control, or for a more comprehensive introduction, Richard Rhodes' four books on the history of nuclear weapons.
This is a book for those already familiar with nuclear weapons history. If you're not, you may want to start with something like Eric Schlosser's book Command and Control, or for a more comprehensive introduction, Richard Rhodes' four books on the history of nuclear weapons.
Displaying 1 - 21 of 21 reviews