Deterrence

by Lawrence Freedman

As a concept, deterrence has launched a thousand books and articles. It has dominated Western strategic thinking for more than four decades. In this important and groundbreaking new book, Lawrence Freedman develops a distinctive approach to the evaluation of deterrence as both a state of mind and a strategic option. This approach is applied to post-cold war crisis management, and the utility and relevance of the concept is addressed in relation to US strategic practice post-9/11, particularly in the light of the apparent preference of the Bush Administration for the alternative concept of pre-emption. The study of deterrence has been hampered by the weight of the intellectual baggage accumulated since the end of the Second World War. Exaggerated notions of what deterrence might achieve were developed, only to be to knocked down by academic critique. In this book, Freedman charts the evolution of the contemporary concept of deterrence, and discusses whether - and how - it still has relevance in today's world. He considers constructivist as well as realist approaches and draws on criminological as well as strategic studies literature to develop a concept of a norms-based, as opposed to an interest-based, deterrence. This book will be essential reading for students of politics and international relations as well as all those interested in contemporary strategic thought.

Genres: International Relations, Nonfiction, Politics

Paperback

First published May 28, 2004

About the author

Sir Lawrence David Freedman, KCMG, CBE, PC, FBA is Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King's College London.

Reviews

[James Voorhees · Rating 5 out of 5]

Short, insightful, and well written. You can't ask for much more from a book on international political theory. Published in 2004, Deterrence addresses the theory of deterrence as it was shortly the United States invaded Iraq, animated by the alternative idea of pre-emption.

Freedman is not beholden to a single theory of international relations unlike many other scholars in his field. He has a more practical bent in his analysis of the ideas behind the theory. At one point he says that practitioners will find case studies more valuable than attempts to codify the concept.

The first half of the book gives the history of deterrence, describes different types, and contrasts the concept with its competitors, including prevention, pre-emption, and compellence. He also draws on the literature from criminology, which is rarely considered in the international context. In the end, he sketches out an approach to deterrence based on norms and the idea that deterrence must be understood in the context of a wide set of relationships. That context is not only broader than the strategic relationship between two countries, it also encompasses relationships between other allies and enemies. It should even include domestic political relationships.

As this summary must suggest, Freedman gives the interested reader much to think about, particularly in today's world, where the question whether the ability of the United States to deter countries like North Korea, Iran, and Russia is becoming increasingly important.

[Brian Thorson · Rating 5 out of 5]

Freedman is a big thinker. Often, big thinkers struggle to communicate their ideas clearly to those who have not received as much training in their field of expertise - not Freedman. In this book, he clearly presents the fundamentals of deterrence theory weaved throughout history and ends with a look to the future.

I found the entire book to be informative but the two sentences that resonate most with me are the last two in the book.

"Success will be judged by good behaviour resulting not from a sharp adjustment in the course of an immediate crisis, but through the internalizing of the norms to the point where they no longer need external reinforcement. Deterrence then will not be the driver of foreign policy but the benign consequences of its underlying consistency and coherence."

[Rich · Rating 5 out of 5]

Even if you are unaccustomed to Lawrence Freedman, or even the deeper workings of deterrence-related theories, recognize that as a reader you will contextualize the concepts that are presented in this short book.

An adjacent review of this book, by someone who is more familiar with Freedman than myself, laments the lack of context. I believe Freedman resists providing the reader too much context because the typical reader has already been inundated with control dogma that passed as viable theory with regards to deterrence.

As an example, from the book:

Deterrence can be a technique, a doctrine and a state of mind. In all cases it is about setting boundaries for actions and establishing the risks associated with the crossing of those boundaries. These are key activities in all societies. In international relations these activities dominate diplomatic activity and military provisions. During the cold war, this effort became focused on the superpower confrontation, dominated by nuclear deterrence, to the point where it sucked in all theory. The study of deterrence became synonymous with the study of the strategic conduct of the cold war. The confrontation defined the concept rather than the concept the confrontation.

What really impressed me about Freedman's book is his resistance to join the chorus of dogmatic deterrence blather. There is compelling reason to believe that deterrence theory is compatible with post-cold war interactions; and all puns aside, the author does well to reiterate to the reader that its application is dependent upon the novel situation presented at the time. International relations is dominated by uncertainty and constantly changing values and interests. The author beats the repetitive drum that there is little hope of determent should the implementer of the policy ignore the intricacies of the situations and over-rely upon cold war dogma.

The multifacted nature of strategic relationships requires accomodating a variety of pressures and considering a range of possible responses. Governments may incline towards certain types of strategic posture, or at least acquire a reputation for being too trigger-happy or too soft, but in the end whether they opt to coerce, control or conciliate will depend on their assessments of the situations in which they find themselves, in all their complexity.

Freedman frames the discussion by traversing the topic of deterrence from its historical roots, through its dogmatic (yet successful) bi-polar cold war application, to the present day application. His brief segue into the concepts of preventative war and pre-emption was particularly fruitful in distinguishing the two concepts from one another, as well as clarifying its possible interaction with deterrence and compellence with laser focus upon clarifying the outcomes in terms of control or coercion. This discussion naturally compels the reader into considering second- and third-order effects for the parties involved within the mechanisms of control or coercion.

Lawrence Freedman closes out his brief book by asking the reader the question: what is the future of deterrence? This is properly understood as: what can deterrence offer the post-cold war world?

It is certainly possible to come up with propositions about when, in particular conditions, certain types of deterrence are more or less likely to work. But the concept requires considerable differentiation, according to the ambition of the task, the number of actors involved and the degree of the antagonism. Students of international relations may find this interesting and worthwhile, but practitioners may find it frustrating, as [deterrence theory] provides little reliable guidance for policy other than to suggest that close attention is paid to the specifics of a situation rather than a reliance on vague generalizations.

I believe this final statement is of particular importance because of the amount of uncertainty and chaos that swirling within international interactions of concern. Freedman's statement develops strong recall of concepts from James Gleick's Chaos, Sun Tzu, John Boyd's Discourse on Winning and Losing, Thomas Schelling's The Strategy of Conflict and Arms and Influence, and especially Bruce Bueno de Mesquita's The War Trap, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's War and Reason.

Game theory (see Schelling and Bueno de Mesquita) could possibly provide practitioners insights (but not prescriptions) for strategies involving deterrence. "As a strategy," Freedman explains that deterrence "provides one option among many, possibly appropriate in particular circumstances." Game theory is a tool that can aid in discerning the connections, assessing the possibilities, weighing the outcomes, and predicting several possible outcomes to incorporate into the decision process for foreign policy practitioners. I think Freedman would concur with this, as he makes it quite clear: within the vast complexity of the world, antiquated and black and white dogmatic approaches to deterrence are foolhardy.

This is not your father's deterrence.

[Ian Taylor · Rating 3 out of 5]

It's a pretty decent, short book on the concept of deterrence. It's only about 130 pages and is easily readable in a day. I wonder if Lawrence Freedman ever feels bound to stay within one area of international relations/history. He's written a great work on the foreign policy crises of the Kennedy administration, a new and very readable book on the American experience in the Middle East in the contemporary era, and extensively written on nuclear strategy. But this very short work on the concept of deterrence is simply too brief to be a definitive work. He provides a decent, albeit brief, survey of the history of the concept. But, the problem with this work is that it is very unreadable without context. Though context would stretch out this work to immense proportions, I would really like to understand concepts like "narrow deterrence" and "general deterrence" in specific historical contexts. It's a little like Andre Beaufre's Introduction to Strategy, which was also very difficult to read without context. What I don't understand, however, is why Freedman, who has never shied from going into context in his previous works, doesn't just go ahead and run the extra mile by putting in the context. As such, you can receive the same treatment on the subject in dull essays in political science and foreign policy journals. They are also very brief and devoid of context. I found myself immensely relieved when I reached the end of this book and wouldn't recommend it to anyone who isn't a die hard student of strategy.

[Liquidlasagna · Rating 3 out of 5]

beware his short books
Especially if it is a single WORD!

but its the best one of his criminally skimpy booklets

He's best at writing huge books

and any stuff that avoids very recent history
maybe it's some deathwish to be topical to current events

[John DeRosa · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not your normal deterrence read. Freedman tries to revive a theory for post 9/11. Enough tidbits of value.

[Strick · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very thought provoking explanation of a key strategic concept.

[Christian · Rating 4 out of 5]

Short, concise, readable. Not up to date anymore, but a very good primer nonetheless.

[Darrell E. · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book has a very niche audience and is not particularly interesting.