The Defense of Moscow 1941: The Northern Flank

by Jack Radey, Charles C. Sharp

There was only one point in the Second World War when Nazi Germany had a chance of winning. That point was October 1941, when most of the Red Army's forces before Moscow had been smashed or encircled, and no reserves were available to defend the capital. All that stood in Hitler's way were a handful of Soviet rifle divisions, tank brigades and hastily assembled militia. According to German accounts, their spearheads were stopped by the mud, but a close examination of German records shows this was not so. Instead it is clear that it was the resistance of the Red Army and bad, arrogant planning that halted the Wehrmacht. This is the dramatic story that Jack Radey and Charles Sharp tell in this compelling study of a previously unknown part of the Battle of Moscow. Using archival records from both sides, they reveal how the Soviets inflicted a stunning defeat on a German plan to encircle six Soviet armies the middle of October 1941.

About the authors:
Jack Radey has researched deeply into the history of the Second World War in general and has made a particular study of the conflict on the Eastern Front. He has written many games, articles and film scripts on subjects as wide ranging as the Korsun Pocket, Borodino '41, American Civil War battlefields, D-Day, Iwo Jima, and Barbarossa. Charles Sharp has a long-standing interest in military history. He spent twenty years in the US Army from the Vietnam War. He served in the army through the end of the Cold War and the first Iraq War, retiring in 1992. Since then he has written fifteen books on the Soviet and German armies in the Second World War, published in the Soviet Order of Battle series, and lectured on military history.

Genres: World War II, Unfinished, Military Fiction, History

320 pages, Hardcover

First published November 1, 2012

Reviews

[Mike · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book recounts the battles to the Northwest of Moscow, southeast from Leningrad. These actions have been overlooked in favor of the main objectives of taking Moscow and Leningrad. The Germans thought they could bag another large chunk (7 armies) of the Soviet forces and leave the main targets of Moscow/Leningrad as easy picking:

…successful northwestward advance by XXXXI Corps to the Vyshniy Volochek and Bologoye regions would link up with the divisions of Army Group North’s XXXIX Motorized Corps attacking southeastward and thus envelop the Soviet Western Front’s 29th and 22nd Armies and Northwestern Front’s 27th, 34th, 11th, and 52nd Armies and the Novgorod Operational Group, the latter two under direct control of the Stavka. Indeed, this ‘bag’ would be larger than the one being mopped up at Vyazma, even though the armies Western Front had lost at Vyazma had contained more rifle divisions and more tank brigades. If successful, this operation would encircle and presumably destroy the remnants of Western Front’s entire right wing and much of the forces on Northwestern Front’s left wing, putting the Valdai Hills in German hands, removing the threat to the northern flank of Army Group Center and tearing a hole between the reconstituting Western Front and Soviet forces defending Leningrad that could not be repaired.

The book has a striking “Glantzian” feel so I was not surprised to see Col Glantz as the main instigator of this book theme and a significant contributor when I got to the acknowledgements at the end. Thankfully the authors have a few personal accounts scattered within to make the reading easier. Also a positive is the many maps included. Definitely better than the Glantz-type unreadable maps. These maps showed German and Soviet moves with towns/villages/rivers/etc clearly marked. But much of the book deals with units and locations at various times--boring. A much more readable book than the typical Glantz.

Why read this book? I think it gives a very good picture of the reasons why the Eastern campaign was doomed to failure from the start:

(The German commander) made a gamble, staking his spearhead that speed and German tactical competence would triumph over distance, logistics, the bad roads and weather, and the Red Army.

This is fundamental to understanding the Battle of Kalinin. The Germans assessed the situation and concluded that they were involved in a pursuit against a beaten enemy. This sort of situation required audacity, risk taking, and speed. The enemy was believed to have no significant reserves, so the security of the forces conducting the pursuit was of less significance. Serious resistance was not expected, and even when it came, on October 15th and 17th, it was seen as a temporary phenomenon. The failure to discuss the potential enemy resistance is striking in Reinhardt’s operational orders. The only obstacles that were discussed were the shortage of fuel and the condition of the roads.

The Soviet assessment of the situation was very different from the German one. Despite the chaotic conditions, very weak communications, and limited ability to gather intelligence, the Stavka determined that the situation was essentially a meeting engagement, and acted accordingly. They threw everything they could spare in the direction of the key point: the city of Kalinin. Their intention was offensive from the very beginning. Their assessment was fundamentally correct, and even though they lacked the ability to coordinate their forces, or even to establish clear command relations, they succeeded in demolishing the ambitious German plan.

More good reasons to learn about the Kalinin battle:
The most striking feature of the Battle of Kalinin is that, to date, historians writing from both the German and Soviet perspectives have almost completely ignored its significance. Histories based primarily on German sources have viewed the battle as a sideshow to the Battle of Moscow, a neat triumph of German tactical daring and courage, but little else. German memoirists, and those who relied on their accounts, maintained that the city was seized by a small force (whose strength is usually much understated) and then held successfully against daunting odds. This treatment of the battle barely if ever mentions German plans to capture Torzhok, much less to conduct an even grander encirclement of all Soviet forces north of Ostashkov and in the Valdai Hills. If discussed at all, both gambits are perceived simply as errors on the part of 9th Army’s commander, General Strauss. The fact that the Germans succeeded in holding on to the city caps their triumph and ends the story so far as these historians tell it. The German view overlooks the reason that Panzer Group 3 conducted its thrust northward to Kalinin in the first place: to fulfill the grand plan of encircling and destroying seven Soviet armies (Western Front’s 22nd and 29th, and Northwestern Front’s 27th, 34th, and 11th, plus 52nd Army and the Novgorod Operational Group under direct control of the Stavka) east of Lake Ilmen and in the Valdai Hills. This concept was entirely consistent with Hitler’s views of Operation Barbarossa, as outlined in the December 5th, 1940 planning conference, where he insisted that it was necessary to ‘liquidate all large Red Army forces on Army Group Center’s flanks before proceeding to Moscow.’ Like his strike into the rear of Southwestern Front in September, the drive to Kalinin in October was a logical consequence of the idea of clearing the flanks of the eastward thrust to Moscow.

In many ways the Battle of Kalinin was a microcosm or fractal of the larger mosaic of Operation Barbarossa, and, indeed, of the entire first period of what the Soviets called ‘The Great Patriotic War.’ From the German side, at the lowest tactical level there was almost always a combination of sound doctrine, good training, experience and confidence, while at the top, at the operational and strategic levels, there was a wildly unrealistic optimism, based on unfounded assumptions of enemy inferiority and willful disregard of the constraints of time, distance, and logistics. Pushing a pencil across a map to draw a big circle around your opponent’s armies is much easier than actually providing the fuel, ammunition and food to sustain the forces represented by the point of the moving pencil. And, like the German assumptions undergirding all of Plan Barbarossa, the underlying assumption of the offensive toward Kalinin, Torzhok, Bologoye, and indeed Moscow, was that, faced by ‘Blitzkrieg’ tactics and operational maneuvers, the Red Army would inevitably collapse.

Consequently, when Operation Typhoon began, the relatively easy penetration of Western Front’s defenses and the ensuing encirclement of the Soviet armies standing in front of Moscow gave the Germans, from the simplest foot soldier to the Führer himself, a sense of euphoric relief. Now, finally, it was done, the ‘Russians’ were defeated, Moscow was about to fall like a ripe plum, and perhaps the entire war would all be over before Christmas. This was the German mindset on the eve of the Battle of Kalinin. The official story, repeated constantly by German memoirists and historians who followed their lead, was that only the intervention of ‘General Mud’, and, later, ‘General Winter’, prevented German forces from seizing Stalin’s capital. This has been repeated so often that it is pretty much accepted, without careful examination, as conventional wisdom.

Along virtually every major axis leading into the Soviet capital, they found determined defenders blocking the road, defenders who refused to roll over and play dead. Not only did Zhukov and the Stavka stitch together a thin line in front of the Germans that decisively delayed them but they also inflicted such casualties on the German spearheads that they rendered them incapable of taking the last steps to their final objective.

A couple things I learned: 1) The Soviets intended to use a remotely piloted aircraft to take out a bridge. My uninformed assumption was this was a capability of the western Allies only towards the end of the war:

On the ‘other side of the hill,’ Stalin, livid at the German capture of both Kalinin bridges despite preparations to blow them up, ordered the Gorbatov and rail bridges across the Volga destroyed by bombing. A plan was developed to use a remotely piloted TB-3 four-engined bomber loaded with explosives, controlled from a DB-ZB bomber, to crash into the Gorbatov Bridge. However, the Soviets liberated Kalinin before this materialized.

I also never realized there were significant formations of motorcycle troops on the German side. I haven’t seen or read about these before.

Some stirring accounts of the Soviet defenders. Even if embellished, there had to be this kind of all-out effort to stop the German war machine:

The determination and courage of the tank crews of 8th and 21st Tank Brigades were remarkable. It cannot be said that either brigade was handled brilliantly tactically, although the lack of radios and the lack of experience of the 21st meant that once committed into action control was largely lost and the companies and platoons fought independently. Despite this both units fought with exceptional courage and determination. One T-34, hit and immobilized in Mednoye, fought on despite German calls for the ‘Russians’ to surrender. When their ammunition ran out, they responded to renewed calls to come out with their hands up by singing The International, even while the Germans piled brushwood under the tank and set it afire. The bravery of the crews of 21st Tank Brigade, both those who fought their way into the city, and others who fought their way out of captivity with only their hands, speaks loudly of their dedication.

A virtual suicide attack, nevertheless it caused all sorts of problems and let the Germans know the enemy wasn’t going to fold:

Spotting a gap in the German column, Lukin keyed his microphone and broadcast to Captain Agibalov, ‘Forward, my friends, for the Motherland! Death to the German occupiers!’ Orders were not to open fire, but to fall in with the German column and get as close to the city as possible. A little south of the village of Pushkino, 32 kilometers (20 miles) south of Kalinin, a German antitank gun opened fire, and Lieutenant Kireeva’s T-34 went into the ditch, smoking. Three red flares went up, and the Soviet tanks spurred forward, shooting up and crushing German trucks in their path with their treads. In Pushkino the brigade claimed to have shot up a German headquarters. Agibalov then ordered his tanks to increase their speed. At some point cohesion must have been lost, and the tank riders desperately clinging to the charging T-34s either bailed out, fell off, or were shot off. But the tanks plunged ahead, destroying German transport, guns, tanks and personnel, mostly by simply running over them. By now, however, the Germans were aware that they had a tiger on their tail. At 1055 hours, German time, Luftwaffe reconnaissance spotted 21st Tank Brigade’s advance, and soon bombs were raining down on Lukin’s column, knocking out at least one tank. As they approached the village of Troyanovo, 15 kilometers (9 miles) south of Kalinin, Lukin’s speeding T-34s ran into a wall of fire as they crossed the small Kamenka River, just south of the village. Near the bridge, Lukin’s tank was hit and immobilized in an exchange of fire with the 10.5cm guns of 611th Artillery. After using up its fairly ineffective 57mm HE rounds on the German guns, Lukin ordered the crew to bail out and tried to cover their retreat but he was cut down by machinegun fire. The Germans subsequently stripped his body of its insignia, medals, and boots, but several teenagers were able to get the body away three nights later and bury it by the river, from where it was retrieved for burial with honors after the liberation of the area in January, 1942.

Overall a 3+ Star read and definitely worth it. P.S. I really hate it when Amazon adds it to my currently reading or closes it with "read" when I finish without my permission. Stop trying to do what you think I want!

[Les · Rating 5 out of 5]

An important contribution to the new level of WWII scholarship made possible by the opening of Soviet archives, the book is a detailed study of a well defined period of time and a narrow geographic area - the point in time when Barbarossa ground to a halt, and the Kalinin front North and West of Moscow.

The authors have achieved two things that are in my mind extraordinary. First they have achieved a balance in sources that lets the see what is happening from both German and Soviet points of view. This is a commonplace in histories of, say, Normandy; it is still a rarity among books on the East. Second, they have selected a critical action which illustrates general principals typical of the last stages of the German offensive but is small enough to be in an understandable level of detail.

This should not be your first book on the Great Patriotic War (my favorite for that purpose is Glantz's Before Stalingrad) but should be high on your list if you want to understand the campaign in real detail.

[Eric Walters · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a ground-breaking piece of research and writing on the Battle of Kalinin in October 1941. Elements of XXXXI Motorized Corps made a hard left turn on the way to Moscow to take the city and then launched an ill-fated expedition along the Torzhok Road to the northWEST to link up with Army Group North and bag a couple Soviet armies. Of course, it didn't happen. The German XXXXI Motorized Corps got hammered, with 1st Panzer Division, 36 Motorized Division, and 900 Lehr Brigade getting mauled by forces of Ivan Konev's Kalinin Front. For English-speaking readers, this is a revelation since the available translated accounts do not talk about this. Radey and Sharp provide a lively and detailed narrative on why and how this happened. It will change your perspective on what really caused the failure of the German offensive against Moscow in the waning months of OPERATION BARBAROSSA.

[Shrike58 · Rating 4 out of 5]

It turns out that this book is rather narrower than the title suggests, as it concentrates on the battle at Kalinin between the German XXXXI Motorized Corps and its Soviet opposition. However, this monograph is very much part of the new operational military history that is unwilling to give the Wehrmacht a pass for its own blind spots of gross arrogance and incompetent logistics, while at the same time respecting the Soviets for their drive and doggedness; even when Soviet command and control arrangements left a lot to be desired.

Originally written: July 1, 2020.

[Carl Martz · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very good book that clearly exposes the German command hubris and the Soviet's dogged determination. Groundbreaking in the use of Soviet archival material, there still are vague areas and unresolved contradictions. The maps are rather poor makes following the action a bit difficult.

[Dachokie · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book focuses on what the author refers to as a “piece of the Battle of Moscow mosaic” … the northwestern region of the battle centering on the city/town of Kalinin, which served as the last obstacle before a clear route to Moscow itself.

The book is authoritative/scholarly and is heavily sourced from both the German and Soviet sides. While I certainly appreciated the microscopic examination of on small, but critically important aspect of a larger campaign, I found the book to be a tedious read and could only consume it small doses.

The author certainly illustrates the slugfest nature of this front in the Battle of Moscow resulting in attrition ultimately playing a pivotal role in buying time for the Soviet Union. Depleted Soviet units wearing down the Germans, giving the Soviet high command time to amass fresh forces that would ultimately deliver the decisive blow to the German plan to take Moscow.

[Eric Olsen · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very well written account of Operation Typhoon. I picked this because I had particular interest in the actions of the 129th Infantry Division, which only had a minor role in the operation.

[Iain · Rating 1 out of 5]

I found this book disappointing on several fronts. It gets bogged down in details, often redundant details, as though it were trying to prove it substance while at the same time it failed to engage the reader with a cohesive narrative. It was quite redundant in its structure as well having whole sections that essentially repeated prior material. Finally it contained several faux pas such as inconsistency describing weapon bore diameters, using both centimeters and the more commonly accepted millimeters. It could have used more and graphically better maps as well.

[Emil Emilsen · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the best military history books I have ever read. Absolutely fantastic book to read. Waiting for more from these writers...