THE PHILOSOPHER/HISTORIAN LOOKS AT A “SCIENTIFIC” TOPIC PHILOSOPHICALLY
Robin George Collingwood (1889-1943) was an English philosopher and historian, who wrote other books such as 'An Essay on Metaphysics,' 'The Idea of History,' 'The Idea of Nature,' 'An Autobiography,' etc.
This book was published posthumously, and was mostly written in 1933-1934; he presented much of the material in lectures in 1934 and 1937. He had begun revising the manuscript for publication at the time of his death.
He wrote in the first chapter, “in the nineteenth century a fashion grew up of separating natural scientists and philosophers into two professional bodies, each knowing little about the other’s work and having little sympathy with it. It is a bad fashion that has done harm to both sides, and on both sides there is an earnest desire to see the last of it and to bridge the gulf of misunderstanding it has created. The bridge must be begun from both ends; and I, as a member of the philosophical profession, can best begin at my end by philosophizing about what experience I have of natural science.” (Pg. 3)
He states, “This new conception of nature, the evolutionary conception based on the analogy of history, has certain characteristics which follow necessarily from the central idea on which it is based. It may be useful to mention a few of these. i. Change no longer cyclical, but progressive… ii. Nature no longer mechanical. A negative result… was the abandonment of the mechanical conception of nature. It is impossible to describe one and the same thing … as a machine and as developing or evolving.
"Something which is developing may build itself machines, but it cannot be a machine. On the evolutionary theory… there may be machines in nature, but nature itself cannot be a machine, and cannot either be described as a whole or completely described as to any of its parts in mechanical terms… iii. Teleology reintroduced. A positive corollary of this negative result is the reintroduction into natural science of an idea which the mechanical view of nature had banished: the idea of teleology.” (Pg. 13-15)
He argues, “The conception of development is fatal to materialism… development implies an immaterial cause. If a seed is really developing into a plant, and merely changing into it by pure chance owing to the random impact of suitable particles of matter from outside, this development is controlled by something not material, namely the form of a plant… which is the Platonic idea of the plant as the formal cause of the full-grown plant and the final cause of the process by which the seed grows into it.” (Pg. 83-84)
He asserts, “On the ground of philosophy, I think it is fair to say that the conception of vital process as distinct from mechanical or chemical change has come to stay, and has revolutionized our conception of nature. That many eminent biologists have not yet accepted it need cause no surprise. In the same way, the anti-Aristotelian physics … was rejected by many distinguished scientists of that age… who were making important contributions to the advancement of knowledge.” (Pg. 136)
He observes, “But although the doctrine expressed by scientists like Eddington and Jeans that nature or the material world depends on God is welcome as marking their rejection both of materialism and of subjectivism, these are merely negative merits. If the doctrine is to stand for anything positive, we must know not only that God is something other than either matter or the human mind, but what that other is. For Eddington… the non-material reality on which material nature depends is mind: that is to say, he conceives God as mind.” (Pg. 156-157)
He says, “This evolutionary process is theoretically infinite. At present, it has reached the state of mind; but it only goes forward at all because at every stage there is a forward movement or impulse… towards the realization of the next… This next higher order of quality, as yet unrealized, is deity, and thus God is the being towards whose emergence the evolutionary nisus of mind is directed.” (Pg. 161) He concludes, “that is why I answer the question, ‘Where do we go from here?’ by saying, ‘We go from the idea of nature to the idea of history.’” (Pg. 177)
Although the work is somewhat disjointed, it will be of keen interest to anyone studying Collingwood’s philosophy.