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Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order
From Robert Kagan, a leading scholar of American foreign policy, comes an insightful analysis of the state of European and American foreign relations. At a time when relations between the United States and Europe are at their lowest ebb since World War II, this brief but cogent book is essential reading. Kagan forces both sides to see themselves through the eyes of the other. Europe, he argues, has moved beyond power into a self-contained world of laws, rules, and negotiation, while America operates in a “Hobbesian” world where rules and laws are unreliable and military force is often necessary.
Tracing how this state of affairs came into being over the past fifty years and fearlessly exploring its ramifications for the future, Kagan reveals the shape of the new transatlantic relationship. The result is a book that promises to be as enduringly influential as Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.
Tracing how this state of affairs came into being over the past fifty years and fearlessly exploring its ramifications for the future, Kagan reveals the shape of the new transatlantic relationship. The result is a book that promises to be as enduringly influential as Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.
176 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2003
38 people are currently reading
1557 people want to read
About the author
Robert Kagan
28 books239 followersRobert Kagan is an American historian and foreign policy commentator. Robert Kagan is the son of Yale classical historian and author, Donald Kagan. He is married to Victoria Nuland, the former U.S. ambassador to NATO, and has two children. He is the brother of political commentator Frederick Kagan.
Kagan is a columnist for the Washington Post and is syndicated by the New York Times Syndicate. He is a contributing editor at both The New Republic and the Weekly Standard, and has also written for the New York Times, Foreign Affairs, the Wall Street Journal, Commentary, World Affairs, and Policy Review.
Kagan is a columnist for the Washington Post and is syndicated by the New York Times Syndicate. He is a contributing editor at both The New Republic and the Weekly Standard, and has also written for the New York Times, Foreign Affairs, the Wall Street Journal, Commentary, World Affairs, and Policy Review.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 95 reviews
January 18, 2016
I'm not giving a star-rating for this one. You see, I'd need to give it two distinct ones for my review to make any sense.
Is this a fair and balanced account of the differences between America and Europe when it comes to foreign policy ? No. Not even close. It's a book-length defence of Americas policy and a book-length critique of everything the author perceives as wrong with Europe, and when it comes down to it, the entire book can be summarized as "Europe should double it's military budget, and be much more willing to use it aggressively outside their own territory, the way USA does."
If judged as an attempt at what the book-title and the cover claims it's going to do, namely to contrast and compare, naming advantages and disadvantages of both approaches, this book is a failure. 1 star. It also does not help that the book, despite its shortness, has an AMAZING number of repetitions. Europe is "weak", USA is "strong" he says. I ran grep on the book, he uses the word "weak" 1117 times.
It's also somewhat amusing to note that he critiques Europe harshly for not propery recognizing the massive threat to the west posed by Saddams weapons of mass destruction. (Is Iraq today a bigger or a smaller threat to "the west" than it was before the second gulf war ?)
The book also suffers from a severe lack of organization. It reads like a unstructured ramble. Not a series of clearly defined chapters about different aspects, instead you have the feeling that the same points are repeated in every chapter. For this reason too: 1 star.
When the book nevertheless has some value, it's because it offers a glimpse into how hawkish conservatives in USA think. It's interesting, not for what he says about foreign-policy, but for what the book says about the author, and others like him. You don't learn anything worthwhile about foreign policy from this book (beyond "be more militaristic", and that's a sentence, not a book), but if you're unfamiliar with the way neocons in USA think, then it'll teach you, by way of showing an example. Judged by this criteria it deserves 3 stars.
Is this a fair and balanced account of the differences between America and Europe when it comes to foreign policy ? No. Not even close. It's a book-length defence of Americas policy and a book-length critique of everything the author perceives as wrong with Europe, and when it comes down to it, the entire book can be summarized as "Europe should double it's military budget, and be much more willing to use it aggressively outside their own territory, the way USA does."
If judged as an attempt at what the book-title and the cover claims it's going to do, namely to contrast and compare, naming advantages and disadvantages of both approaches, this book is a failure. 1 star. It also does not help that the book, despite its shortness, has an AMAZING number of repetitions. Europe is "weak", USA is "strong" he says. I ran grep on the book, he uses the word "weak" 1117 times.
It's also somewhat amusing to note that he critiques Europe harshly for not propery recognizing the massive threat to the west posed by Saddams weapons of mass destruction. (Is Iraq today a bigger or a smaller threat to "the west" than it was before the second gulf war ?)
The book also suffers from a severe lack of organization. It reads like a unstructured ramble. Not a series of clearly defined chapters about different aspects, instead you have the feeling that the same points are repeated in every chapter. For this reason too: 1 star.
When the book nevertheless has some value, it's because it offers a glimpse into how hawkish conservatives in USA think. It's interesting, not for what he says about foreign-policy, but for what the book says about the author, and others like him. You don't learn anything worthwhile about foreign policy from this book (beyond "be more militaristic", and that's a sentence, not a book), but if you're unfamiliar with the way neocons in USA think, then it'll teach you, by way of showing an example. Judged by this criteria it deserves 3 stars.
September 13, 2020
Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus
Robert Kagan is a neo-conservative foreign-policy commentator. Although, he, prefers the term "liberal interventionist" to describe himself. Tony Blair (Former Prime Minister of Britain) read this book around the start of the second Iraq war and boasted that he was able to capture the real meaning of American interventionism while thinking of war and the yearning for political dominance. This is a move away from the establish post war political culture that had come to dictate the European collective outlook.
This piece of work sets out the political relationship between European powers and US hegemony. Much of the conversation hedges around the idea of defining the different principles the two entities pursue for dominance, co-operation, and control of nation states. It sets the scene of how Europe and the US have transacted politics in the way they now influence the political landscape across the world. Kagan offers in the opening page a succinct image of his daring, and contentious view:
“On the all-important question of power – the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power – American and European perspectives are diverging. Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and international negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Immanuel Kant's "perpetual peace." Meanwhile, the United States remains mired in history, exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable, and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might”.
The book is written with a wider perspective of political power in mind whilst comparing the relationship between the American perception of weak European states and the military might of the US. Niccolò Machiavelli (The Prince) wrote that when a ruler who wishes to maintain power should not always be good. This point adheres closely to the principle to which Kagan also subscribes, when he claims, it is the Americans who hold together the European agenda without whom the Europeans ‘would be nothing more than dishwashers in a place where the Americans do all the cooking’. The debate targets the illustration of military might rather than military cooperation between the two allies. It is in this respect that the Americans see military strength as a political hammer and all problems start to look like nails. Consequently, Europeans are being considered as a collection of nails at the disposal of the Americans. This neo-conservative approach is no different to the way the current US President Donald Trump sees the world through the lens of economic might and not just military strength.
James Nolt looks upon the principle of Kagan’s view differently when he points towards Realism (Kagan’s View of America) and liberalism (The European approach to political cooperation) share the idea of state and market as distinct realms, but they can also differ in their respective roles. The realists see the state as a strategic actor in international relations. This approach explains patterns of behaviour by the changes in political strategies and the balance of power among states. However, liberalism emphasises concessions to the neo-conservatives notion of state power. This philosophy argues that domestic politics influences state behaviour. The conversation which Kagan continues in his book dismisses any liberalist thought and concentrates on the realist concept of US influence in Europe, which is exactly the same principle the neo-conservatives believe under the George W. Bush doctrine. In the language of Aristotle, most realist’s political regimes (neo-cons) are considered as unethical or have a desire for self-interest. They seldom play-act consistently in the interest of a collective entity, or a nation-state. The debate stretches towards an attempt to justify why America is the stronger nation, and although military power maybe the pseudo description aimed to serve the purpose of the state. It is also said in ‘The Prince’, where Machiavelli underlines a leader’s main concern to be his national security by any means necessary. This view endorses Kagan's approach to go full-throttle on how the American interventionist model opens the way towards hawkish politics from its political leadership in Washington.
The book attempts to revive the realm of a fighting spirit where hawks firmly believe that whilst the Americans spend billions on protecting Europe, the Europeans themselves spend their billions on welfare programmes, vacations and short working weeks, they wish only to come along for the free ride. Kagan spends much of his time in the book deriding the post war European philosophy of compromise, cooperation and reconciliation. He believes this approach is wasted and compares neo-conservatism, by suggesting, while the Europeans spend their money on Arab Projects but in the end, it is the Arabs who always turn to the Americans for solutions to the Palestinian/Arab problem. The Americans forget that the conflict is not about who spends the most on Arab projects, the realpolitik aims to find collective resolutions to a decades old problem.
Kagan may have a point that realism is one way of resolving the dilemma of conflict where you have a ‘bully in the school yard making the rules’. But this tactic has always proven to fail until the crisis itself is not resolved. Real solutions can only happen when you have parallel and equal negotiators who are not attempting to make the other squeal.
The book attempts to measure three principles as the solution to the differences between the politics of Europe and the US; use force, apply pre-emptive strike and be deceptive. This tactic feels like the strategy which Alice Cooper also applies in his lyrics;
Robert Kagan is a neo-conservative foreign-policy commentator. Although, he, prefers the term "liberal interventionist" to describe himself. Tony Blair (Former Prime Minister of Britain) read this book around the start of the second Iraq war and boasted that he was able to capture the real meaning of American interventionism while thinking of war and the yearning for political dominance. This is a move away from the establish post war political culture that had come to dictate the European collective outlook.
This piece of work sets out the political relationship between European powers and US hegemony. Much of the conversation hedges around the idea of defining the different principles the two entities pursue for dominance, co-operation, and control of nation states. It sets the scene of how Europe and the US have transacted politics in the way they now influence the political landscape across the world. Kagan offers in the opening page a succinct image of his daring, and contentious view:
“On the all-important question of power – the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power – American and European perspectives are diverging. Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and international negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Immanuel Kant's "perpetual peace." Meanwhile, the United States remains mired in history, exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable, and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might”.
The book is written with a wider perspective of political power in mind whilst comparing the relationship between the American perception of weak European states and the military might of the US. Niccolò Machiavelli (The Prince) wrote that when a ruler who wishes to maintain power should not always be good. This point adheres closely to the principle to which Kagan also subscribes, when he claims, it is the Americans who hold together the European agenda without whom the Europeans ‘would be nothing more than dishwashers in a place where the Americans do all the cooking’. The debate targets the illustration of military might rather than military cooperation between the two allies. It is in this respect that the Americans see military strength as a political hammer and all problems start to look like nails. Consequently, Europeans are being considered as a collection of nails at the disposal of the Americans. This neo-conservative approach is no different to the way the current US President Donald Trump sees the world through the lens of economic might and not just military strength.
James Nolt looks upon the principle of Kagan’s view differently when he points towards Realism (Kagan’s View of America) and liberalism (The European approach to political cooperation) share the idea of state and market as distinct realms, but they can also differ in their respective roles. The realists see the state as a strategic actor in international relations. This approach explains patterns of behaviour by the changes in political strategies and the balance of power among states. However, liberalism emphasises concessions to the neo-conservatives notion of state power. This philosophy argues that domestic politics influences state behaviour. The conversation which Kagan continues in his book dismisses any liberalist thought and concentrates on the realist concept of US influence in Europe, which is exactly the same principle the neo-conservatives believe under the George W. Bush doctrine. In the language of Aristotle, most realist’s political regimes (neo-cons) are considered as unethical or have a desire for self-interest. They seldom play-act consistently in the interest of a collective entity, or a nation-state. The debate stretches towards an attempt to justify why America is the stronger nation, and although military power maybe the pseudo description aimed to serve the purpose of the state. It is also said in ‘The Prince’, where Machiavelli underlines a leader’s main concern to be his national security by any means necessary. This view endorses Kagan's approach to go full-throttle on how the American interventionist model opens the way towards hawkish politics from its political leadership in Washington.
The book attempts to revive the realm of a fighting spirit where hawks firmly believe that whilst the Americans spend billions on protecting Europe, the Europeans themselves spend their billions on welfare programmes, vacations and short working weeks, they wish only to come along for the free ride. Kagan spends much of his time in the book deriding the post war European philosophy of compromise, cooperation and reconciliation. He believes this approach is wasted and compares neo-conservatism, by suggesting, while the Europeans spend their money on Arab Projects but in the end, it is the Arabs who always turn to the Americans for solutions to the Palestinian/Arab problem. The Americans forget that the conflict is not about who spends the most on Arab projects, the realpolitik aims to find collective resolutions to a decades old problem.
Kagan may have a point that realism is one way of resolving the dilemma of conflict where you have a ‘bully in the school yard making the rules’. But this tactic has always proven to fail until the crisis itself is not resolved. Real solutions can only happen when you have parallel and equal negotiators who are not attempting to make the other squeal.
The book attempts to measure three principles as the solution to the differences between the politics of Europe and the US; use force, apply pre-emptive strike and be deceptive. This tactic feels like the strategy which Alice Cooper also applies in his lyrics;
December 22, 2012
A book basically comparing the size of America's dong to Europe's by a neocon crusader steeped in the blood of the Iraqi people.
September 17, 2014
I think it's not too much to say that this book revolutionized my understanding of the meta level of foreign policy, especially as it concerns the EU, the USA and their partnership. It explains very well the thinking among an influential group of American policymakers. A must read!
December 2, 2014
Robert Kagan's brilliant and concise book analyze the differences between how the US and Europe have come to see international politics. He was writing during 2002 and 2003 in the midst of a transatlantic dispute over the Iraq War. Kagan contends that this dispute was not just about Iraq, but that it reflected deeper political and philosophical differences that mostly relate to power. He contends that the disparity of power and different views of power are at the heart of the increasing divergence in foreign policy between the US and Europe.
This book had many insightful points, so I'll just recount a few that stood out to me. The US and Europe clearly have had a vast military power gap since the end of WWII. Europe seemed more willing to tolerate threats like Iraq and to deal with them through persuasion, pressure, containment, and incentives. The US, however, had a much lower threat tolerance, which seems to make less sense on the surface because the US was so powerful. Kagan uses a cutting analogy to connect power to threat tolerance. Let's say you are in the woods armed only with a knife, and there's a bear prowling around. You will probably lie low because the alternative of hunting the bear and seeking confrontation is riskier than evasion and self-defense. Now let's say you have a rifle. If you have so much power, why should you tolerate a threat to your security? The logic here dictates that the person with more power will seek confrontation in order to eliminate threats it feels it would rather not tolerate? The first person is Europe, and the second is the US. As a much weaker power, Europe avoids conflict and focuses on self-defense. In contrast, the vastly more powerful US seeks to eliminate threats because its power has changed its psychology. Also, the fact that the US has become the global cop in so many regions means that the backlash of terrorism is pointed at America, so Europe has much less to be worried about.
Another crucial point is that the Europeans see themselves as building a Kantian liberal international order within Europe in which the use of force is strongly discouraged. Kogan says that the establishment of a rules-based, integrated, peaceful, and functional European system is possibly the greatest accomplishment ever in international politics. The French lamb has settled down with the German lion, and war between the powers of Europe seems highly unlikely. The Europeans tend to criticize the US for its unilateral streak and its willingness to use force and sometimes bend international law for security reasons. Kagan points out that the European criticism is highly ironic because one of the essential reasons the Europeans have created a Kantian system is that the Americans continue to live and act in a Hobbesian one. The US and the USSR vanquished Nazi Germany and made the postwar order possible. The US cast a security umbrella over Western Europe that guaranteed everyone's security, reducing fear between France and Germany to the point where they could integrate and become friends. The US continues to enforce international law and address threats inside and outside of Europe, but in order to make the liberal European order it has to, or at least thinks it has to, flex military muscles more often than Europeans find appropriate. He suggests that Americans and Europeans should get used to this double standard of American behavior. They will probably be able to be Kantian in the zone of paradise, but a mix of Kantian and Hobbesian in the anarchic zones of power. The US is the guardian of the gates of paradise, but cannot fully enter. The growing enmity between the US and Europe comes from the fact that the Europeans see the US use of force and unilateralism as a threat to their system, which is based more strictly on law, economic integration, and diplomacy. Thus in the lead to Iraq we saw Britain, France, and Germany all trying to reign in the US in different ways, which was hell-bent on erasing the Iraqi threat.
Even before I read this book, I have long puzzled over the Kagan line: "America did not change on September 11. It only became more itself." What exactly is this "self?" Kagan sees the American character as so fundamentally idealistic that we can't, or don't, separate ideology from interest. We have always been about expanding the circle of liberty and democracy, for better or worse. But mostly better, especially in the 20th century. We have consistently identified our interests with the freedom and prosperity of others in ways that make it seem worth fighting for democracy in far-flung places like Iraq and Vietnam. After 9/11, Kagan says we only accelerated our tendency to see the world in these terms and our willingness to use force to eliminate threats to liberty/democracy/capitalism and expand that circle. I am personally skeptical of this notion because of the peculiarities of the Bush administration, but I find it fascinating nonetheless. Kagan does not evaluate the wisdom or morality of this tendency, but he asserts that it is hard to deny. I found a lot of parallels here with Cayton and Anderon's "The Dominion of War" and Suri's "Liberty's Surest Guardian."
To some extent, there is a big question mark surrounding this book. After 9/11, in the period of immense sympathy for the US in Europe, could the US have built a broad and militarily potent coalition to address threats like terrorism, WMD, and rogue states? Supposedly pacifistic nations like France seemed willing to step up and help the US. However, we never really asked. The Bush administration eschewed foreign help in Afghanistan and killed any possibility of a broad coalition by breaking international law repeatedly and shifting the focus of the War on Terror to Iraq. So who knows? Maybe the structural and philosophical differences Kagan points out in this book really aren't that deep, and the more mundane answer relates to the mistakes of fallible and contextual human beings. Maybe a different president would have used the post 9/11 moment not to build a campaign against Iraq but to build a united coalition of nations to combat a common threat. Kagan's story fits well with the history that happened, but it sometimes feels a little too grand and deterministic to be the answer.
I hope the length of my review convinces you that this is worth a read. It will seriously take about 2 hours. I've honestly spent more time thinking about it than reading it. It is certainly a product of his age, and Kagan has been wrong about many claims in this book. He tends to paint in overly broad strokes, but there's something to his major claims. Btw I thought it was kind of funny that this book had basically the same message as Lt. Nathan Jessup's speech at the end of a Few Good Men. Check it out.
This book had many insightful points, so I'll just recount a few that stood out to me. The US and Europe clearly have had a vast military power gap since the end of WWII. Europe seemed more willing to tolerate threats like Iraq and to deal with them through persuasion, pressure, containment, and incentives. The US, however, had a much lower threat tolerance, which seems to make less sense on the surface because the US was so powerful. Kagan uses a cutting analogy to connect power to threat tolerance. Let's say you are in the woods armed only with a knife, and there's a bear prowling around. You will probably lie low because the alternative of hunting the bear and seeking confrontation is riskier than evasion and self-defense. Now let's say you have a rifle. If you have so much power, why should you tolerate a threat to your security? The logic here dictates that the person with more power will seek confrontation in order to eliminate threats it feels it would rather not tolerate? The first person is Europe, and the second is the US. As a much weaker power, Europe avoids conflict and focuses on self-defense. In contrast, the vastly more powerful US seeks to eliminate threats because its power has changed its psychology. Also, the fact that the US has become the global cop in so many regions means that the backlash of terrorism is pointed at America, so Europe has much less to be worried about.
Another crucial point is that the Europeans see themselves as building a Kantian liberal international order within Europe in which the use of force is strongly discouraged. Kogan says that the establishment of a rules-based, integrated, peaceful, and functional European system is possibly the greatest accomplishment ever in international politics. The French lamb has settled down with the German lion, and war between the powers of Europe seems highly unlikely. The Europeans tend to criticize the US for its unilateral streak and its willingness to use force and sometimes bend international law for security reasons. Kagan points out that the European criticism is highly ironic because one of the essential reasons the Europeans have created a Kantian system is that the Americans continue to live and act in a Hobbesian one. The US and the USSR vanquished Nazi Germany and made the postwar order possible. The US cast a security umbrella over Western Europe that guaranteed everyone's security, reducing fear between France and Germany to the point where they could integrate and become friends. The US continues to enforce international law and address threats inside and outside of Europe, but in order to make the liberal European order it has to, or at least thinks it has to, flex military muscles more often than Europeans find appropriate. He suggests that Americans and Europeans should get used to this double standard of American behavior. They will probably be able to be Kantian in the zone of paradise, but a mix of Kantian and Hobbesian in the anarchic zones of power. The US is the guardian of the gates of paradise, but cannot fully enter. The growing enmity between the US and Europe comes from the fact that the Europeans see the US use of force and unilateralism as a threat to their system, which is based more strictly on law, economic integration, and diplomacy. Thus in the lead to Iraq we saw Britain, France, and Germany all trying to reign in the US in different ways, which was hell-bent on erasing the Iraqi threat.
Even before I read this book, I have long puzzled over the Kagan line: "America did not change on September 11. It only became more itself." What exactly is this "self?" Kagan sees the American character as so fundamentally idealistic that we can't, or don't, separate ideology from interest. We have always been about expanding the circle of liberty and democracy, for better or worse. But mostly better, especially in the 20th century. We have consistently identified our interests with the freedom and prosperity of others in ways that make it seem worth fighting for democracy in far-flung places like Iraq and Vietnam. After 9/11, Kagan says we only accelerated our tendency to see the world in these terms and our willingness to use force to eliminate threats to liberty/democracy/capitalism and expand that circle. I am personally skeptical of this notion because of the peculiarities of the Bush administration, but I find it fascinating nonetheless. Kagan does not evaluate the wisdom or morality of this tendency, but he asserts that it is hard to deny. I found a lot of parallels here with Cayton and Anderon's "The Dominion of War" and Suri's "Liberty's Surest Guardian."
To some extent, there is a big question mark surrounding this book. After 9/11, in the period of immense sympathy for the US in Europe, could the US have built a broad and militarily potent coalition to address threats like terrorism, WMD, and rogue states? Supposedly pacifistic nations like France seemed willing to step up and help the US. However, we never really asked. The Bush administration eschewed foreign help in Afghanistan and killed any possibility of a broad coalition by breaking international law repeatedly and shifting the focus of the War on Terror to Iraq. So who knows? Maybe the structural and philosophical differences Kagan points out in this book really aren't that deep, and the more mundane answer relates to the mistakes of fallible and contextual human beings. Maybe a different president would have used the post 9/11 moment not to build a campaign against Iraq but to build a united coalition of nations to combat a common threat. Kagan's story fits well with the history that happened, but it sometimes feels a little too grand and deterministic to be the answer.
I hope the length of my review convinces you that this is worth a read. It will seriously take about 2 hours. I've honestly spent more time thinking about it than reading it. It is certainly a product of his age, and Kagan has been wrong about many claims in this book. He tends to paint in overly broad strokes, but there's something to his major claims. Btw I thought it was kind of funny that this book had basically the same message as Lt. Nathan Jessup's speech at the end of a Few Good Men. Check it out.
September 23, 2023
Kagan vo svojej knihe porovnáva strategickú kultúru USA a Európy. Jeho základnou „tézou“ je, že vo veci strategickej kultúry sú „Američania z Marsu a Európania z Venuše“.
Autor najprv rozoberá historickú perspektívu týchto rozdielov, z ktorej ale vyplýva, že tento rozdiel nie je nejako determinovaný, nakoľko Američania si s Európanmi, počas posledných dvoch storočiach, prakticky vymenili pozície. Zatiaľ čo v minulosti európske štáty neváhali siahnuť po zbrani, sledujúc svoj raison d'Etat či rozširujúc myšlienky slobody, rovnosti a bratstva, od druhej svetovej vojny sa Európa realizuje výhradne prostredníctvom ekonomiky či práva, zatiaľ čo ich výdaje na obranu sú skôr symbolické ako postačujúce. Spojené štáty sa v minulosti najviac odvolávali na právo, či už prirodzené alebo medzinárodné, zatiaľ čo na začiatku 21. storočia majú armádu, prostredníctvom ktorej môžu (a chcú) presadzovať záujmy Pax Americana kdekoľvek na svete, a to aj simultánne na viacerých miestach. O geografický či kultúrny determinizmus tu teda nejde.
Podľa Kagana za to môžu najmä dva faktory: mocenský a ideový. Američania vnímajú hrozby citlivejšie a častejšie intervenujú v zahraničí, lebo môžu. Európania hrozby mimo svojho kontinentu neriešia, pretože na to nemajú spôsobilosť: Pre toho kto má kladivo, sa zdajú byť všetky veci klincami. Ten kto kladivo nemá, tak nechce pripustiť, že nejaké klince existujú. Ideovým faktorom je, že Európania (najmä Nemci), sú poznačení hrôzami dvoch svetových vojen a ich snaha, aby sa podobná udalosť už neodohrala, vyvrcholila vytvorením Európskej únie, ktorá je všetkým, len nie základom pre vojenskú spoluprácu. Američania sú zas poznačený ich nezastupiteľnou úlohou ochrancu Západu počas Studenej vojny.
Zdá sa, že Európania si vybrali vznešenejšiu „mierovú“ cestu. Ale Kagan argumentuje, že Kantovský „večný mier“, ktorý si Európania žijú, by nebol možný bez Americkej dominancie v tom „Hobbesovskom“ svete.
Môžeme tvrdiť, že minimálne Európe je toto „rozdelenie úloh“ pohodlné. Avšak 30 rokov po skončení CW sa európske štáty nachádzajú v americkom bezpečnostnom „mama hoteli“ a 30 rokov je najvyšší čas, aby sa Európa aspoň minimálne osamostatnila. USA to očakáva, viac či menej to európskym štátom pripomína, avšak zrejme to do istej miery to vyhovuje aj im.
Európska špecifická percepcia hrozieb však môže mať aj hlbšie dôvody ako predpokladá Robert Kagan. Európania sú už viacero storočí prosto zvyknutí na vlastnú zraniteľnosť, nakoľko sa tam pravidelne odohrávali vojny. Na rozdiel od Američanov sú Európania zvyknutí žiť bok po boku so silnými štátmi, ktoré nemuseli byť vždy práve spojencami. To čo štát robilo nebezpečným nebola jeho moc, ale nepriateľské úmysly. Jediná skúsenosť USA pochádza z jeho hegemonického postavenia, a Američania si vlastne ani nevedia predstaviť nič iné. Preto ako hrozbu vnímajú kohokoľvek, kto by mohol mať nejakú kapacitu narušiť ich bezpečnosť. Takto napríklad argumentoval Colin Gray pri téme americko-európskej debaty o protivzdušnej obrane.
Nedostatkom, ktorý ale priznáva sám autor, je samotné rozdelenie na Ameriku a Európu, ktoré je trochu zavádzajúce, pretože na rozdiel od USA, Európa nemá jednotnú strategickú kultúru, čo sa ukazuje napr. aj na nezlučiteľných percepciách Ruska v očiach európskych štátov (napr. Poľsko x Nemecko).
Autor najprv rozoberá historickú perspektívu týchto rozdielov, z ktorej ale vyplýva, že tento rozdiel nie je nejako determinovaný, nakoľko Američania si s Európanmi, počas posledných dvoch storočiach, prakticky vymenili pozície. Zatiaľ čo v minulosti európske štáty neváhali siahnuť po zbrani, sledujúc svoj raison d'Etat či rozširujúc myšlienky slobody, rovnosti a bratstva, od druhej svetovej vojny sa Európa realizuje výhradne prostredníctvom ekonomiky či práva, zatiaľ čo ich výdaje na obranu sú skôr symbolické ako postačujúce. Spojené štáty sa v minulosti najviac odvolávali na právo, či už prirodzené alebo medzinárodné, zatiaľ čo na začiatku 21. storočia majú armádu, prostredníctvom ktorej môžu (a chcú) presadzovať záujmy Pax Americana kdekoľvek na svete, a to aj simultánne na viacerých miestach. O geografický či kultúrny determinizmus tu teda nejde.
Podľa Kagana za to môžu najmä dva faktory: mocenský a ideový. Američania vnímajú hrozby citlivejšie a častejšie intervenujú v zahraničí, lebo môžu. Európania hrozby mimo svojho kontinentu neriešia, pretože na to nemajú spôsobilosť: Pre toho kto má kladivo, sa zdajú byť všetky veci klincami. Ten kto kladivo nemá, tak nechce pripustiť, že nejaké klince existujú. Ideovým faktorom je, že Európania (najmä Nemci), sú poznačení hrôzami dvoch svetových vojen a ich snaha, aby sa podobná udalosť už neodohrala, vyvrcholila vytvorením Európskej únie, ktorá je všetkým, len nie základom pre vojenskú spoluprácu. Američania sú zas poznačený ich nezastupiteľnou úlohou ochrancu Západu počas Studenej vojny.
Zdá sa, že Európania si vybrali vznešenejšiu „mierovú“ cestu. Ale Kagan argumentuje, že Kantovský „večný mier“, ktorý si Európania žijú, by nebol možný bez Americkej dominancie v tom „Hobbesovskom“ svete.
Môžeme tvrdiť, že minimálne Európe je toto „rozdelenie úloh“ pohodlné. Avšak 30 rokov po skončení CW sa európske štáty nachádzajú v americkom bezpečnostnom „mama hoteli“ a 30 rokov je najvyšší čas, aby sa Európa aspoň minimálne osamostatnila. USA to očakáva, viac či menej to európskym štátom pripomína, avšak zrejme to do istej miery to vyhovuje aj im.
Európska špecifická percepcia hrozieb však môže mať aj hlbšie dôvody ako predpokladá Robert Kagan. Európania sú už viacero storočí prosto zvyknutí na vlastnú zraniteľnosť, nakoľko sa tam pravidelne odohrávali vojny. Na rozdiel od Američanov sú Európania zvyknutí žiť bok po boku so silnými štátmi, ktoré nemuseli byť vždy práve spojencami. To čo štát robilo nebezpečným nebola jeho moc, ale nepriateľské úmysly. Jediná skúsenosť USA pochádza z jeho hegemonického postavenia, a Američania si vlastne ani nevedia predstaviť nič iné. Preto ako hrozbu vnímajú kohokoľvek, kto by mohol mať nejakú kapacitu narušiť ich bezpečnosť. Takto napríklad argumentoval Colin Gray pri téme americko-európskej debaty o protivzdušnej obrane.
Nedostatkom, ktorý ale priznáva sám autor, je samotné rozdelenie na Ameriku a Európu, ktoré je trochu zavádzajúce, pretože na rozdiel od USA, Európa nemá jednotnú strategickú kultúru, čo sa ukazuje napr. aj na nezlučiteľných percepciách Ruska v očiach európskych štátov (napr. Poľsko x Nemecko).
April 24, 2014
Robert Kagan's famous essay is a thoughtful, thorough and, at times, incendiary exploration of the strains currently existing among the countries that compose the West. The author brings these tensions to light by drawing out the distinct philosophical disparities between Europe's steadfast aim toward a negotiated "paradise" of perpetual peace and America's conviction of the continuing necessity for (and use of) military "power." How can these perspectives coalesce into a unified approach to foreign policy? The first step would have to be to air those differences in an attempt to understand them.
There are those who resist such discussions. In fact, it might be time to draw attention to the bewildering number of people who appear to believe that if we cannot have a perfect conversation we should have no conversation at all. The perfect conversation would be, of course, one in which you are: a) absolutely correct in everything you say, b) persuasive enough to change everyone's mind, c) powerful enough to effect immediate change and d) assured that whenever anyone references this conversation in the future he/she will be compelled to admit how astonishingly brilliant you are. Well, that's conversational nirvana and about as rarely sighted as a wild white elephant in the modern-day Hindu Kush. Most of us are stuck in the standard communicative muddle, attempting to make the best of ill-chosen words, thorny facts and a point that's clearly been cobbled together on the instinctive fly. That muddle is what we have to work with. That muddle is what we have to try.
One may not agree with all of Mr. Kagan's rhetoric, or anyone's rhetoric for that matter - confronting the issue at this juncture is, I believe, important enough. And he's certainly done that.
There are those who resist such discussions. In fact, it might be time to draw attention to the bewildering number of people who appear to believe that if we cannot have a perfect conversation we should have no conversation at all. The perfect conversation would be, of course, one in which you are: a) absolutely correct in everything you say, b) persuasive enough to change everyone's mind, c) powerful enough to effect immediate change and d) assured that whenever anyone references this conversation in the future he/she will be compelled to admit how astonishingly brilliant you are. Well, that's conversational nirvana and about as rarely sighted as a wild white elephant in the modern-day Hindu Kush. Most of us are stuck in the standard communicative muddle, attempting to make the best of ill-chosen words, thorny facts and a point that's clearly been cobbled together on the instinctive fly. That muddle is what we have to work with. That muddle is what we have to try.
One may not agree with all of Mr. Kagan's rhetoric, or anyone's rhetoric for that matter - confronting the issue at this juncture is, I believe, important enough. And he's certainly done that.
November 30, 2012
Very Realistic, worth reading & Discussion.
الكتاب يطرح شكل العلاقة بين أمريكا و أوروبا، و أوروبا و ذاتها و تعريف "الغرب" الليبرالي إجمالا.. إن وجد.
و يطرح جدليات صادمة في معظم الأحيان نحو نزعة امريكا نحو القوة، و مرحلة ما بعد الحضارة التي تعيشها أوروبا.
يتطرق سريعا لجذور بدايات الصراع في الغرب. من العدوان الثلاثي على مصر بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية، ثم فرض هيمنة امريكا على الغرب، ثم الهيمنة الكالمة بعد الحرب الباردة أوئال التسعينات، ثم مرحلة تصرف امريكا بأحادية بغض النظر عن الأمم المتحدة و حفاؤها الغربيين في العراق. و يذكر الكاتب حرب كوسوفو على انها مثل آخر وافقت فيه اوروبا امريكا، و مع وجود كوسوفو بالقرب من أوروبا فإن قوات اوروبا العجوز لم تتواكب مع القدرة الأمريكية على ادارة الحرب كلها في أوروبا نفسها.
التفكير الاستراتيجي في اوروبا اميل لسلام مابعد الحضارة و بدون أعداء، بينما تتكفل واقعيا امريكا بكل الأعداء. أوروبا تتصرف بمنطق الضعيف، بينما امريكا تعمل بمنطق القوي. أوروبا تفضل العملية على النتيجة، على عكس أمريكا.
في الأخير يطرح الكاتب جدليات استمرار فكرة الغرب، أوروبا الجديدة و القديمة، حالة النزاع الفكري الليبرالي و النظام العالمي الجديد و كيف للعلاقة الأمريكية الأوروبية ان تتطور سلبا أو إيجابا. مع تعريض مدى امكانية تطبيق القانون فعلا في وسط الغاب... يقصد هنا كل البلاد الغير ليبرالية بالدرجة الأولى.
الكتاب واجب المرور على الأقل لمنتصفه، لفهم طريقة تفكير الكاتب، وأنصح معه بالتبعية بكتاب آخر
Beyond Paradise and Power
وفي ردود على بعض الجدليات المطروحة في الكتاب.
الكتاب يطرح شكل العلاقة بين أمريكا و أوروبا، و أوروبا و ذاتها و تعريف "الغرب" الليبرالي إجمالا.. إن وجد.
و يطرح جدليات صادمة في معظم الأحيان نحو نزعة امريكا نحو القوة، و مرحلة ما بعد الحضارة التي تعيشها أوروبا.
يتطرق سريعا لجذور بدايات الصراع في الغرب. من العدوان الثلاثي على مصر بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية، ثم فرض هيمنة امريكا على الغرب، ثم الهيمنة الكالمة بعد الحرب الباردة أوئال التسعينات، ثم مرحلة تصرف امريكا بأحادية بغض النظر عن الأمم المتحدة و حفاؤها الغربيين في العراق. و يذكر الكاتب حرب كوسوفو على انها مثل آخر وافقت فيه اوروبا امريكا، و مع وجود كوسوفو بالقرب من أوروبا فإن قوات اوروبا العجوز لم تتواكب مع القدرة الأمريكية على ادارة الحرب كلها في أوروبا نفسها.
التفكير الاستراتيجي في اوروبا اميل لسلام مابعد الحضارة و بدون أعداء، بينما تتكفل واقعيا امريكا بكل الأعداء. أوروبا تتصرف بمنطق الضعيف، بينما امريكا تعمل بمنطق القوي. أوروبا تفضل العملية على النتيجة، على عكس أمريكا.
في الأخير يطرح الكاتب جدليات استمرار فكرة الغرب، أوروبا الجديدة و القديمة، حالة النزاع الفكري الليبرالي و النظام العالمي الجديد و كيف للعلاقة الأمريكية الأوروبية ان تتطور سلبا أو إيجابا. مع تعريض مدى امكانية تطبيق القانون فعلا في وسط الغاب... يقصد هنا كل البلاد الغير ليبرالية بالدرجة الأولى.
الكتاب واجب المرور على الأقل لمنتصفه، لفهم طريقة تفكير الكاتب، وأنصح معه بالتبعية بكتاب آخر
Beyond Paradise and Power
وفي ردود على بعض الجدليات المطروحة في الكتاب.
April 11, 2012
Another sacred text of modern neoconservatism, this one merits the derision it has attracted. It's not terrible or completely off-base, and it's short, but it's the type of book that interested social scientists, in addition to Europeans and left-of-center folks, will hate, because it leverages history, politics and culture to render a cottage psychoanalysis of Europeans that is by equal terms sweeping and unsupported by data.
November 13, 2018
This book is a review of the differences between American and European views of international power politics, which derive from their different histories and their relative power. I am only roughly familiar with world politics -- a news listener but not an expert or a political junkie. For me the book is a 5 for interest and usefulness, because it is thought-provoking, readable, informative, and relevant to important matters, about like a stimulating magazine article or TED talk. But this book is also a 3 for presentation, because it is repetitious, several points could have used more explanation, and the footnoting for quotes or details seems haphazard. It emerged from a journal article and seems to have been expanded too far too fast; a book-length treatment should have been more thorough. So I give it a 4: worth the frustrations.
August 26, 2022
The book explains the relationship between the US and the European Union in regards to foreign policy. It really helped me understand how are actions taken from these two blocks and why they need to remain allies.
However, when reading the book I have noticed that the writer is quite bias, criticizing most of the times just the EU action and not as well as the US.
However, when reading the book I have noticed that the writer is quite bias, criticizing most of the times just the EU action and not as well as the US.
October 24, 2022
1.5
Read this for class debate
Basically a neoconservative apology of American interventionism
Does make a few good points on us - europe foreign policy and relations but simplifies the us as justified and strong and europe as hypocritical and weak
equating the intervention in kosovo to that in iraq is tasteless imo
Read this for class debate
Basically a neoconservative apology of American interventionism
Does make a few good points on us - europe foreign policy and relations but simplifies the us as justified and strong and europe as hypocritical and weak
equating the intervention in kosovo to that in iraq is tasteless imo
February 22, 2025
Kagens essay is a frustrating read, but not for the reasons you might think. The frustrating part is that he predicts the split between the USA and Europe that now is an undisputed truth. This has, of course, been going on for a long time and has been preached by a lot of intelligent men and women, but Kagen presents it in a uniquely simple way.
Some key words are:
Power vs. Paradise.
Unilateralism vs. Multilateralism.
Hegemony.
And a lack of understanding the "other part".
In a way, the essay also somewhat explains why the current US President wants to seek out friendship with Putin at the cost of European relations.
Some key words are:
Power vs. Paradise.
Unilateralism vs. Multilateralism.
Hegemony.
And a lack of understanding the "other part".
In a way, the essay also somewhat explains why the current US President wants to seek out friendship with Putin at the cost of European relations.
September 14, 2018
Let me save you some time. The theme of the book is thus:
“America is confident and strong. Europe is fearful and weak. America has by far the biggest stick. Consequently, by might and therefore by right, America can be, and is, the biggest dick.”
His biggest gripe against all these other weaklings is their question of “How will the sole superpower be controlled?”
Perhaps he should watch Batman vs Superman? (Which coped out by (a) posting Superman is inherently good, and (b) posing an even bigger threat in the form of Doomsday.)
While Kagan did not say so outright, his answer is that the USA need not, and ought not, be controlled. See theme above.
One telling example is Kagan’s depiction of the International Criminal Court. From his telling of it, he considered the ICC a hindrance to American ability to act (i.e. American unilateralism, which somehow everyone must implicitly accept as being right), and that the iCC’s proclaimed goal of enforcing international law merely being a manifestation of a weak Europe, prompted n by their misguided reliance on rules and order.
Another example is Kagan’s casual declaration of the death of the Westphalian system, i.e. the death of national sovereignty (and somewhat legitimizing the misplaced concept of “sub-sovereignty”), in support of the pre-emptive strike doctrine (which he correctly calls “preventive”). It reads less like an actual belief than an attempt to justify what can only be called an American hegemony. He did not, and did not care to, work through the implications of that declaration, which contradict his assumptions about America’s place in the world (e.g. as a sovereign nation, as being inherently “good”, etc.).
Fifteen years after publication, this book has, ironically, aged well. It reads at once like a Trumpian foreign policy bible and, despite Kagan’s assertion of a unipolar world, a somewhat accurate description of today’s multipolar world. Not because Kagan got his facts right. Far from it. It has aged well because of things he barely mentioned: the rise of a China who is more than willing to throw its weight (both economic and military) around, the spectre of a Cold War USSR that refuses to die, America’s (specifically, Trump’s) eagerness to tear down any and all international institutions. With so many other nations willing to flout the “international order” (which has been, as many Asian countries are fond to point out, established by “the West”), sole reliance on rules and institution is no longer sufficient.
But that is giving him too much credit. After all, if a scholar happened upon the correct conclusion by way of a misguided argument and being borne out by subsequent, unpredicted events, it merely speak to his luck, not his scholarship.
“America is confident and strong. Europe is fearful and weak. America has by far the biggest stick. Consequently, by might and therefore by right, America can be, and is, the biggest dick.”
His biggest gripe against all these other weaklings is their question of “How will the sole superpower be controlled?”
Perhaps he should watch Batman vs Superman? (Which coped out by (a) posting Superman is inherently good, and (b) posing an even bigger threat in the form of Doomsday.)
While Kagan did not say so outright, his answer is that the USA need not, and ought not, be controlled. See theme above.
One telling example is Kagan’s depiction of the International Criminal Court. From his telling of it, he considered the ICC a hindrance to American ability to act (i.e. American unilateralism, which somehow everyone must implicitly accept as being right), and that the iCC’s proclaimed goal of enforcing international law merely being a manifestation of a weak Europe, prompted n by their misguided reliance on rules and order.
Another example is Kagan’s casual declaration of the death of the Westphalian system, i.e. the death of national sovereignty (and somewhat legitimizing the misplaced concept of “sub-sovereignty”), in support of the pre-emptive strike doctrine (which he correctly calls “preventive”). It reads less like an actual belief than an attempt to justify what can only be called an American hegemony. He did not, and did not care to, work through the implications of that declaration, which contradict his assumptions about America’s place in the world (e.g. as a sovereign nation, as being inherently “good”, etc.).
Fifteen years after publication, this book has, ironically, aged well. It reads at once like a Trumpian foreign policy bible and, despite Kagan’s assertion of a unipolar world, a somewhat accurate description of today’s multipolar world. Not because Kagan got his facts right. Far from it. It has aged well because of things he barely mentioned: the rise of a China who is more than willing to throw its weight (both economic and military) around, the spectre of a Cold War USSR that refuses to die, America’s (specifically, Trump’s) eagerness to tear down any and all international institutions. With so many other nations willing to flout the “international order” (which has been, as many Asian countries are fond to point out, established by “the West”), sole reliance on rules and institution is no longer sufficient.
But that is giving him too much credit. After all, if a scholar happened upon the correct conclusion by way of a misguided argument and being borne out by subsequent, unpredicted events, it merely speak to his luck, not his scholarship.
January 13, 2019
This slightly dated analysis of geopolitics in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and Gulf War II still rings true. Kagan has amplified the themes expounded in this book in subsequent writings - The World America Made and the Jungle Grows Back.
After digesting three of his books, Kagan strikes me as a writer who tends to rant; however, this is not to deny the plausibility and merits of his theses. You won't find a wealth of footnotes. His writings seem loosely organized, almost like articles written in instalments for Foreign Affairs and Atlantic that were translated into books without much editing. None of the books exceeded 200 pages but the writing is tight and focused.
Kagan may be open to the charge that he divides the world into neat categories. In this book, he applies the old John Locke - Thomas Hobbes dichotomy on the state of Nature to modern geopolitics. Europe is driven by principles, laws, social compacts and agreements. The US is driven by raw power, competition and domination. Kagan offers a fairly convincing argument. Unlike many current political writers, Kagan forgoes extended, well-documented explanations that substantiate his conclusions. He tosses off opinions and insights and lets the reader react.
Kagan is dismissed by some rival pundits as a narrow-minded, doctrinaire neo-conservative; but his message warrants a close reading. His opinions belong in the current debate. And much written in Of Paradise and Power has come to pass and remains relevant.
Disclaimer: the author's father Donald is a distinguished Classics scholar at Yale whose MOOC on Ancient Greece is one of my favorites. Admittedly, it may have favorably affected my review of Kagan fils.
After digesting three of his books, Kagan strikes me as a writer who tends to rant; however, this is not to deny the plausibility and merits of his theses. You won't find a wealth of footnotes. His writings seem loosely organized, almost like articles written in instalments for Foreign Affairs and Atlantic that were translated into books without much editing. None of the books exceeded 200 pages but the writing is tight and focused.
Kagan may be open to the charge that he divides the world into neat categories. In this book, he applies the old John Locke - Thomas Hobbes dichotomy on the state of Nature to modern geopolitics. Europe is driven by principles, laws, social compacts and agreements. The US is driven by raw power, competition and domination. Kagan offers a fairly convincing argument. Unlike many current political writers, Kagan forgoes extended, well-documented explanations that substantiate his conclusions. He tosses off opinions and insights and lets the reader react.
Kagan is dismissed by some rival pundits as a narrow-minded, doctrinaire neo-conservative; but his message warrants a close reading. His opinions belong in the current debate. And much written in Of Paradise and Power has come to pass and remains relevant.
Disclaimer: the author's father Donald is a distinguished Classics scholar at Yale whose MOOC on Ancient Greece is one of my favorites. Admittedly, it may have favorably affected my review of Kagan fils.
August 13, 2022
Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order by Robert Kagan reads a bit like an extra long chapter of a book that was being written on American or Western approaches to international relations. The book carries with it the presupposition that you are familiar with the history of the international order and of the current policy debates that are ongoing about the role of the US and Europe on the world stage. This book is thus an answer to a debate that a number of people may stumble into unwittingly. That said, the answer is a good one. Europe, as a protected continent, has pursued a very different form of power on the world stage - particularly through its lack of power. This chaffs with the American use of power. Europe desires to make America a firmly multilateral actor, while America desires the freedom to move when necessary. The "West" is close to each other, but they must not be conflated with each other. Kagan wonders if the aftermath of the Cold War had resulted in the great project that made the world system will fall into disunion and disrepair. It comments on the different attitudes and politics of both nations, and there's a weirdly Nietzschean vibe you can grab from the text, if Kagan himself limits himself to less controversial characters, like Hobbes.
Its a fairly persuasive essay, and it won't take too long read. Go for it when you get the chance, particularly if you have neoconservative leanings.
86/100
Its a fairly persuasive essay, and it won't take too long read. Go for it when you get the chance, particularly if you have neoconservative leanings.
86/100
February 26, 2014
This book gets two stars over one because it was easy to read, quick, and it does a good job of explaining the view points of a certain group of people. Unfortunately, that group of people often include key decision makers in the USG.
Kagan’s argument, in Of Paradise and Power, can be summarized in saying that the interests and inclinations of America and Europe have diverged. Europe prefers to avoid the use of force, due to their inherent weakness, while the United States is inclined to use force, because it must. The argument is not convincing and his supporting data is often inaccurate and biased. There is an element of truth to the main themes of what he argues, however the subjective approach and disregard of any data that does not support his argument is unhelpful.
I agree with Kagan’s main point that the interests and inclinations of the United States and Europe have diverged. He makes a good case for describing how Europe prefers to avoid the use of force, while it is an increasingly American tendency. I disagree with the analysis that he makes to explain these conclusions. In fairness, the book was written before the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were able to fully play out, and the failures of U.S. intelligence and application of force, with the neglect of soft power advocated by the Europeans, was not yet evident.
Kagan’s argument, in Of Paradise and Power, can be summarized in saying that the interests and inclinations of America and Europe have diverged. Europe prefers to avoid the use of force, due to their inherent weakness, while the United States is inclined to use force, because it must. The argument is not convincing and his supporting data is often inaccurate and biased. There is an element of truth to the main themes of what he argues, however the subjective approach and disregard of any data that does not support his argument is unhelpful.
I agree with Kagan’s main point that the interests and inclinations of the United States and Europe have diverged. He makes a good case for describing how Europe prefers to avoid the use of force, while it is an increasingly American tendency. I disagree with the analysis that he makes to explain these conclusions. In fairness, the book was written before the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were able to fully play out, and the failures of U.S. intelligence and application of force, with the neglect of soft power advocated by the Europeans, was not yet evident.
December 17, 2018
One of the most vacuous and inane readings I have ever had the displeasure to lay my eyes on. Before even starting to discuss any merits of what Kagan is positing, one has has to recall the ludicrous and self-aggrandizing trend, popular among Washington insiders, to write books about topics that could be much better organized into succint papers. But why write a concise, on-the-point article if you can write an entire book rife with bloviating and vapid sentences that add nothing to your argument? I wanted to cry reading every sentence after sentence; the only reason I persevered is my pet peeve of not letting books go only partially read. When it comes to the actual argument, do not expect more than a sophomoric analysis and superficial knowledge of facts and figures discussed. I refuse to believe Kagan is that stupid as to pen this, so I naturally assume this book is just a propaganda piece written for high school students and not for anyone who understands the basic phenomena of human history. Be safe and stay clear of this drivel!
February 29, 2008
A hought-provoking quick read.
I thought this was a really interesting book at the time that I read it; it speculates that the reason that Europe is so much less warlike and more socialist than the USA is that they don't spend ANY money on defense any more (knowing that the USA is spending a fortune). They know the USA will protect them if the shit really hits the fan, so they have been able to spend their entire budgets on other things since WWII; Kagan's implication is that Europe is a little naive about their ability to function sans military.
I need to go back and re-read this, because I suspect that it oversimplifies a lot, and I am no longer as conservative politically as I was in 2003.
I thought this was a really interesting book at the time that I read it; it speculates that the reason that Europe is so much less warlike and more socialist than the USA is that they don't spend ANY money on defense any more (knowing that the USA is spending a fortune). They know the USA will protect them if the shit really hits the fan, so they have been able to spend their entire budgets on other things since WWII; Kagan's implication is that Europe is a little naive about their ability to function sans military.
I need to go back and re-read this, because I suspect that it oversimplifies a lot, and I am no longer as conservative politically as I was in 2003.
January 16, 2010
This book does a good job explaining some of the tensions between the United States and Europe, and seems especially relevant after the American invasion of Iraq. Kagan explains that the current split between the US and Europe stems from America's role as the sole superpower (along with the ability to act unilaterally for its own interests when necessary) and the European desire to exercise some control over that power. I would highly recommend it for anyone interested in understanding transatlantic relations. Don't be turned off by Kagan's political views - I am a liberal, but appreciate Kagan's analysis of the American-European relations and his clear explanation of how the current state came about.
April 25, 2018
Before I get into the actual review, I've seen a few other reviews of this essay, and I must say, the amount of insecurity and demagoguery present in the majority of negative reviews is enormous. The essay gives an excellent argument, and defends it clearly. None of the holier-than-thou reviews shown here have served to debunk it in any fashion, instead branding it as "neoconservative propaganda" and waving it away in disgust. The book in no way shows any bias for or against America or Europe, instead attempting (quite successfully, in my view) a neutral analysis of the place of each political bloc in the new world order. Any claim that this is a nationalistic piece of propaganda clearly did not read the parts claiming European superiority in social policy and moral standing, or the entire beginning tearing into American amorality in international affairs. It is an overall neutral piece with a hopefully written ending, and any claims otherwise are born from incredible insecurity over meaningless politicking.
Robert Kagan's perception of where the world would be politically today was clearly, deeply flawed in retrospect. However, despite these flaws, the overall sentiment of his essay here was powerful in message and concise in telling. In "Of Paradise and Power", Kagan describes a world in which the European Miracle has created a microcosm of social paradise in Europe, where peace springs eternal and the social outdoes the military. However, this miracle cannot survive without being granted an incubated space. The guard for this space, it turns out, is the United States. The claims of the United States being some barbaric nation as compared to those of Europe is not entirely inaccurate, Kagan claims, but rather an incomplete picture - instead, the United States is required to remain in its barbaric position in order to protect the European Miracle from an equally barbaric world. This argument is well thought out and defended, despite some inaccurate predictions of current day. This book serves to provide a look into the evolving view of American hegemony with the turn of the century, and despite clear flaws, is still powerful in its message to this day.
Robert Kagan's perception of where the world would be politically today was clearly, deeply flawed in retrospect. However, despite these flaws, the overall sentiment of his essay here was powerful in message and concise in telling. In "Of Paradise and Power", Kagan describes a world in which the European Miracle has created a microcosm of social paradise in Europe, where peace springs eternal and the social outdoes the military. However, this miracle cannot survive without being granted an incubated space. The guard for this space, it turns out, is the United States. The claims of the United States being some barbaric nation as compared to those of Europe is not entirely inaccurate, Kagan claims, but rather an incomplete picture - instead, the United States is required to remain in its barbaric position in order to protect the European Miracle from an equally barbaric world. This argument is well thought out and defended, despite some inaccurate predictions of current day. This book serves to provide a look into the evolving view of American hegemony with the turn of the century, and despite clear flaws, is still powerful in its message to this day.
February 12, 2019
A short and precise description of why the US and Europe have diverged in recent decades. He explains why the USA are more likely to use military force than europeans (because they can) and why Europe are more inclined to seek solutions based on dialogue (because they can't use military force). Kagan rightly points to the different world perspectives as a problem; but, I do not think he fully understands what must be done to reverse this trend. His neoconservative approach to geopolitics makes him vulnerable; relative power and security measurements overshadows the importance of differences in cultural and national perspectives and motives.
The book does a fine job in describing why the US has acted the way it has since Bush I.
The book does a fine job in describing why the US has acted the way it has since Bush I.
April 20, 2021
It is interesting to read the perspectives of 2004 and compare them to what is going on in 2021. The book is primarily about the US relationship with the EU, but of course the UK has since departed the EU. The US may still be the world’s only superpower, but hardly any mention of the rise of China. The book is idealistic in the sense that Europeans seem to accept that the US doesn’t have an “imperial” focus, and doesn’t want to control and dominate the world, at least militarily. Therefore, it will act in the best interests of not only itself but the rest of the world. Also, while this isn’t the subject of the book, the internal struggles of the US culturally in 2021....will it strengthen or weaken it? If weaken, what becomes of the world them?
April 3, 2022
I'll definitely have to revisit and attempt a better understanding on this one. I doubt it will change much though. Just another propaganda puff piece written by an establishment shill (Carnegie Endowment) trying to justify US imperialism and hegemony while downplaying English complicity in world events by lumping them in and referring to the entire continent they lay within rather than calling them out for what they are. All the while attempting to craft an alleged policy of peace, prosperity, and transcendence rather than global domination. They've only transcended tactics, not involvement. But Kagan wouldn't want you to know that so he focuses on propaganda talking points to maintain and cement that indoctrination they've worked so hard on for the last 100+ years.
April 6, 2021
Very well argued. I already sate his point for years and that as such Europe should get away from the US influence and protection before it's too late and start up their own military. Though the arguments given by Kagan against this and why Europe is not doing this are spot on too.
And then how serious this problem is becomes now more and more visible each day as both Russia and China are both stars in exactly undermining the the protective role that the US has. As such, especially putting someone in office like Trump was a masterstroke.
Highly recommended if you want to understand geo-politics on a bigger scale.
And then how serious this problem is becomes now more and more visible each day as both Russia and China are both stars in exactly undermining the the protective role that the US has. As such, especially putting someone in office like Trump was a masterstroke.
Highly recommended if you want to understand geo-politics on a bigger scale.
October 30, 2017
This short book was written in early 2003 before the Iraq War started, and this edition includes a long afterword by the author that was added a year later. Makes good points about the differences between Europe and the United States, including the psychological principle that we see the challenges and threats to which we are able and willing to respond while tending to ignore or deny unactionable information. Thus Europe focuses more on the sorts of problems that are best solved through diplomacy while the US is more likely to perceive threats that can be addressed through military response.
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July 15, 2023I hesitate to rate this one. Not out of agreement or disagreement but because this book presupposes observations he fleshed out in a previous book . This one just sounds like a complete apologia for American power politics. I think (and I might be wrong) that it is better to read his previous book, "A Dangerous Nation" before reading this one. It might not change your rating, but it will give you a better understanding of his position on American foreign policy.
November 25, 2020
Kagan is a neocon who pushed for Iraq invasion, and continues to justify it to this day.
Believes in American liberal interventionism and unilateralism. Argues that we should be able to do it alone, and that we can and should do so when it is in our interests. Justifies intervention both as self-interest and as spreading liberal democratic values.
Believes in American liberal interventionism and unilateralism. Argues that we should be able to do it alone, and that we can and should do so when it is in our interests. Justifies intervention both as self-interest and as spreading liberal democratic values.
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April 14, 2021One of the most frightening books I have ever come across. Europe should be happy, because they can spend their national wealth on their quality of life, because America is paying for the world's defense. Of course that means Americans don't spend their money - to improve the quality of their life.
When I get a chance I'll write something more signification about this.
When I get a chance I'll write something more signification about this.
April 8, 2023
Picking it up two decades after it was written has no bearing on the subject matter. These thoughts are as relevant today as they were twenty years ago. The divide has grown and new challenges have yet again proven to be sometimes on the edge of insurmountable for both parties to this trans-Atlantic game.
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