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Challenger : A Major Malfunction : A True Story of Politics, Greed, and the Wrong Stuff by Malcolm McConnell (1986) Hardcover
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Hardcover
First published January 1, 1986
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
October 8, 2018
The Challenger accident is one of the most notorious technical malfunctions in history, and definitely the best-known space travel accident. Everyone remotely interested in space technology has a rudimentary knowledge of O-rings that caused the shuttle to explode,how a commission was started to analyze the accident, and how Richard Feynman displayed the fragility of the O-rings by freezing them in ice water. A fascinating talk by Stephen Carver on the history of the Challenger accident piqued my interest in this historic event, and I bought this book second-hand upon his recommendation. Malcolm McConnell, a veteran space reporter, was present at the Challenger launch that ended tragically, and published the book within the same year as the incident, with all the memories still intact. The atmosphere of astonishment and dismay at the possibility of such an accident is tangible on every page. The self-criticism of McDonnell on how the space journalists corps were not critical enough of the shuttle program before the accident, and how they were treated and behaved like actors in the media show organized around the shuttle reads very sincere, given the shock of the event. The immediacy comes with a price, however. The books is rather thin on the aftermath, for example, and a deeper analysis of the organizational problems at NASA is missing.
This is not to say that the book omits context. McConnell's journalistic and writing experience shines in his reports of the background of the accident, which is of course much more complicated than the simple O-ring issue. It is truly a 'major malfunction', in the sense that a whole organization actually malfunctions, making dubious decisions while organizing probably the most complicated engineering project in history. McConnell does a great job of laying out the tensions and dysfunctions within the organization that led to the string of (in retrospect) braindead decisions that caused the Challenger accident. There is the geologic separation and competition between the different project groups. The different centers are not communicating properly, and are in constant competition not to be the one to delay a launch. There is the dysfunctional culture in some teams, especially in the Marshall team responsible for the propulsion elements. Their manager is a tyrant that judges people solely based on loyalty and results. There are the external forces that pull NASA in all directions: Financial, military, political, and scientific. There is the constant pressure to deliver, so that the congress can be lobied for more money. Last but not least, there is the political and economic pressure from the contractors, who are doing everything in their power to get the lucrative shuttle project contracts.
The weird thing is that one gets a feeling of how this accident was pretty much unavoidable. As McConnell convincingly argues, after putting a man on the moon with the Apollo program, NASA was under pressure to create another exciting target to provoke the Americans'imagination. This was necessary to keep paying the 400 thousand or so people NASA was employing as the Apollo program ended. The new target NASA picked was Mars, but the bill on it proved too much for the politicians. A compromise was reached in which NASA was promised continuous funding if it built something that wasn't only for transporting humans reliably to orbit, so that a station could be built there to be used as a first base for further space travel. The vehicle had to also transport satellites to orbit, paying for itself,and opening the way for US-led "exploitation" of space. This constraint, coupled with others such as demands from the military, led to a construction with numerous technical compromises. Among these were the use of inherently more dangerous solid fuel, and the exlusion of air-breathing engines from the shuttle, allowing only gliding flight. McConnell does a great job of explaining the interweaving of these compromises with the aforementioned constant pressure to fly the shuttle. The shuttle that (maybe surprisingly) flew 24 successful missions before ending up in a fire ball was a technical Frankenstein that had to satisfy many masters, ending up too complicated and compromised for everybody's sake.
One serious shortcoming of the book is that the constant discussion of various technical aspects is not supported through visual aids. Considering that the shuttle program is the most publicized space program ever, it shouldn't have been hard to come find some diagrams in popular science magazines. The author keeps on using certain terms,some of which are explained in a list in the appendix, but the relationship of the different parts of the shuttle are occasionally too vague. It would have helped immensely, for example, if there were a few detailed images or diagrams of the shuttle itself with labels naming the various parts. I assume that the author has left such a diagram out because, as the book was being written, there was a state of over-publication regarding the shuttle.
"Challenger - A Major Malfunction" is a highly accessible book that has unfortunately suffered from the three decades that passed by. Nevertheless, it is still worth reading for the precise atmosphere it delivers, and as a guide to understanding what the shuttle program,and the Challenger accident meant to the US public at the time.
This is not to say that the book omits context. McConnell's journalistic and writing experience shines in his reports of the background of the accident, which is of course much more complicated than the simple O-ring issue. It is truly a 'major malfunction', in the sense that a whole organization actually malfunctions, making dubious decisions while organizing probably the most complicated engineering project in history. McConnell does a great job of laying out the tensions and dysfunctions within the organization that led to the string of (in retrospect) braindead decisions that caused the Challenger accident. There is the geologic separation and competition between the different project groups. The different centers are not communicating properly, and are in constant competition not to be the one to delay a launch. There is the dysfunctional culture in some teams, especially in the Marshall team responsible for the propulsion elements. Their manager is a tyrant that judges people solely based on loyalty and results. There are the external forces that pull NASA in all directions: Financial, military, political, and scientific. There is the constant pressure to deliver, so that the congress can be lobied for more money. Last but not least, there is the political and economic pressure from the contractors, who are doing everything in their power to get the lucrative shuttle project contracts.
The weird thing is that one gets a feeling of how this accident was pretty much unavoidable. As McConnell convincingly argues, after putting a man on the moon with the Apollo program, NASA was under pressure to create another exciting target to provoke the Americans'imagination. This was necessary to keep paying the 400 thousand or so people NASA was employing as the Apollo program ended. The new target NASA picked was Mars, but the bill on it proved too much for the politicians. A compromise was reached in which NASA was promised continuous funding if it built something that wasn't only for transporting humans reliably to orbit, so that a station could be built there to be used as a first base for further space travel. The vehicle had to also transport satellites to orbit, paying for itself,and opening the way for US-led "exploitation" of space. This constraint, coupled with others such as demands from the military, led to a construction with numerous technical compromises. Among these were the use of inherently more dangerous solid fuel, and the exlusion of air-breathing engines from the shuttle, allowing only gliding flight. McConnell does a great job of explaining the interweaving of these compromises with the aforementioned constant pressure to fly the shuttle. The shuttle that (maybe surprisingly) flew 24 successful missions before ending up in a fire ball was a technical Frankenstein that had to satisfy many masters, ending up too complicated and compromised for everybody's sake.
One serious shortcoming of the book is that the constant discussion of various technical aspects is not supported through visual aids. Considering that the shuttle program is the most publicized space program ever, it shouldn't have been hard to come find some diagrams in popular science magazines. The author keeps on using certain terms,some of which are explained in a list in the appendix, but the relationship of the different parts of the shuttle are occasionally too vague. It would have helped immensely, for example, if there were a few detailed images or diagrams of the shuttle itself with labels naming the various parts. I assume that the author has left such a diagram out because, as the book was being written, there was a state of over-publication regarding the shuttle.
"Challenger - A Major Malfunction" is a highly accessible book that has unfortunately suffered from the three decades that passed by. Nevertheless, it is still worth reading for the precise atmosphere it delivers, and as a guide to understanding what the shuttle program,and the Challenger accident meant to the US public at the time.
September 9, 2016
This book stirred two emotions in me - heartbreak, and pure anger. I felt so sorry for these astronauts who had no inkling of what was going to happen and were only excited to be broaching a frontier most of us only dream of. And I was so absolutely angered by the pure greed and the bloody politics which led to the Challenger exploding. I cannot fathom how some of these people slept at night - the NASA officials, the engineers, the technicians, the rocket manufacturers, everyone who KNEW something was not right but failed to speak up. And don't get me started on the associated politics. This is a blot and a shame on American space aviation which I hope (and I'd be reasonably sure) won't ever ever happen again. Apart from all that, it was a well-researched and good read.
January 26, 2022
Chilling. I went to college with the daughter of a NASA staffer....and heard from her that the 7 died when the crew compartment hit the water.... I graduated in 1998 with a BA in History Thesis Aerospace related subject. I looked on the date of the book 1986! The book sticks to the facts.... of Challenger ....sad
January 9, 2012
Challenger: A Major Malfunction: A true Story of Politics, Greed, and the Wrong Stuff is an interesting, thoughtful, and damning look at NASA in the post-Apollo era leading up to the Challenger accident.
The book focuses heavily on the political machinations which left NASA with the Space Shuttle and created a heavy launch schedule for 1986 that put tremendous strain on NASA personnel. It paints a picture of the startling decline of NASA and the intersection of politics, management, and engineering in leading to the accident.
The conclusions drawn by McConnell are certainly interesting, but should probably be taken with a grain of salt; the book was one of the first published after the Challenger accident, and the author admits in several places that the full story may never be known.
All in all, interesting, maddening, and worth a look if you're interested in the subject.
The book focuses heavily on the political machinations which left NASA with the Space Shuttle and created a heavy launch schedule for 1986 that put tremendous strain on NASA personnel. It paints a picture of the startling decline of NASA and the intersection of politics, management, and engineering in leading to the accident.
The conclusions drawn by McConnell are certainly interesting, but should probably be taken with a grain of salt; the book was one of the first published after the Challenger accident, and the author admits in several places that the full story may never be known.
All in all, interesting, maddening, and worth a look if you're interested in the subject.
June 7, 2012
Honestly, this book hurt to read. I was in 3rd grade when Challenger was lost, and I've learned something about the o-ring issue over the years. But the heartbreaking truth is that in the days leading up to launch, there were a number of questionable decisions made to "press on" with launch. O-ring failure was only one of several things that could have gone wrong on January 28, 1986 -- especially now, in light of the later loss of Columbia due to issues with the TPS tiles.
In the end, this book managed to kill any lingering desire to fly in space leftover from my inner elementary school kid. It spelled out how many things could go catastrophically wrong, not by "accident" but through political and corporate infighting.
In the end, this book managed to kill any lingering desire to fly in space leftover from my inner elementary school kid. It spelled out how many things could go catastrophically wrong, not by "accident" but through political and corporate infighting.
November 28, 2022
I remember the morning I drove to work and heard the news of the Challenger disaster. It was major news across America and Hawaii where Ellison Onizuka, a Challenger crewman, was a native.
Reading the book, and being a US Army helicopter mechanic, I was quickly swept up in the culture that caused the catastrophe, as I saw much of it in the Army culture.
This is a book everyone interested in space exploration, government (mis)management, and the clash of safety and mission cultures should read.
Reading the book, and being a US Army helicopter mechanic, I was quickly swept up in the culture that caused the catastrophe, as I saw much of it in the Army culture.
This is a book everyone interested in space exploration, government (mis)management, and the clash of safety and mission cultures should read.
October 13, 2012
A glimpse into NASA and the people, decisions, and events that led up to the Challenger disaster. The technical parts were harder to get through, but I really enjoyed finding out about the people that were involved in making decisions about the shuttle flights, and the political atmosphere that pushed the leaders into ignoring sound judgement so later flights wouldn't be put on hold.
January 12, 2016
A scathing critique of NASA mismanagement of the shuttle program.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews