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The Savior Generals: How Five Great Commanders Saved Wars That Were Lost - From Ancient Greece to Iraq
Leading military historian Victor Davis Hanson returns to non-fiction in The Savior Generals, a set of brilliantly executed pocket biographies of five generals who single-handedly saved their nations from defeat in war. War is rarely a predictable enterprise--it is a mess of luck, chance, and incalculable variables. Today's sure winner can easily become tomorrow's doomed loser. Sudden, sharp changes in fortune can reverse the course of war.
These intractable circumstances are sometimes mastered by leaders of genius--asked at the eleventh hour to save a hopeless conflict, created by others, often unpopular with politics and the public. These savior generals often come from outside the established power structure, employ radical strategies, and flame out quickly. Their careers often end in controversy. But their dramatic feats of leadership are vital slices of history--not merely as stirring military narrative, but as lessons on the dynamic nature of consensus, leadership, and destiny.
These intractable circumstances are sometimes mastered by leaders of genius--asked at the eleventh hour to save a hopeless conflict, created by others, often unpopular with politics and the public. These savior generals often come from outside the established power structure, employ radical strategies, and flame out quickly. Their careers often end in controversy. But their dramatic feats of leadership are vital slices of history--not merely as stirring military narrative, but as lessons on the dynamic nature of consensus, leadership, and destiny.
320 pages, Hardcover
First published May 1, 2013
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About the author
Victor Davis Hanson
81 books1,162 followersVictor Davis Hanson was educated at the University of California, Santa Cruz (BA, Classics, 1975), the American School of Classical Studies (1978-79) and received his Ph.D. in Classics from Stanford University in 1980. He lives and works with his family on their forty-acre tree and vine farm near Selma, California, where he was born in 1953.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 115 reviews
February 4, 2017
This is not a review of Victor Davis Hanson’s “The Savior Generals,” but simply comments on the nature of some specifics it contains and the cast of Hanson’s argument. I have read and appreciated Mr. Hanson’s work on warfare in the classical era. He should stick to that. With “The Savior Generals” he has allowed his parallel career as a right-wing pundit to bleed over into his work as a historian. This book is history with an agenda. How so?
-Byzantium was handicapped by big government with a “vast public bureaucracy and the welfare state…” This resulted in an eroding military and “fewer Byzantines engaged in private enterprise.” (Page 52)
-President Truman rashly dismantled our defense establishment after World War II to facilitate “a redirection of federal spending to new comprehensive social entitlements.” Which entitlements? The GI Bill? (Page 151).
-Communism’s appeal in post-war East Asia was the result of “largesse” to the local populations. No recognition is allowed for the appeal of Marxist economics, land reform or the impact of anti-colonial sentiment. (Page 154)
-He castigates leading Democrats for supporting President Bush’s invasion of Iraq and then latter opposing the same without benefit of consideration that their initial support was based upon flawed, or outright phony, intelligence concerning Weapons of Mass Destruction. (Page 192)
-The October 11, 2002 congressional authorization for the use of force to remove Saddam Hussein was “in some sense…merely a restatement of a prior 1998 congressional authorization for ‘regime change’ in Iraq, supported and signed by Bill Clinton.” The Clinton resolution did not commit the U.S. to use military force against Iraq. The invasion of Iraq cannot be placed in Clinton’s lap. (Page 198)
-The U.N. Security Council declined to authorize the Iraq invasion and “there were loud NATO dissenters such as France and Russia.” France withdrew from the integrated command structure of NATO in 1966 and did not rejoin until 2009. Russia has never been part of NATO. (Page 198)
-Iraq was saved due to “The Surge” which was the brainchild of a Neo-Con pantheon from the American Enterprise Institute listed on Page 213. Now Iraq’s economy remains a shambles, sectarian violence is rife, and minority Christians and Sunnis remain endangered. Many thousands have died. Only Iran emerged a winner. How is this being saved? If General Petraeus saved anything it was a modicum of face for President Bush.
-I would refrain from writing a serious piece on General Petraeus using Paula Broadwell as a key source. How fair and unbiased is it? (See various footnotes and bibliography)
Of the five generals profiled, the section on Matthew Ridgway makes the best argument for him as a “savior” general. Ridgway could genuinely be portrayed as the savior of U.N. forces in Korea and of South Korea as an independent state. Without his impact on the battlefield, South Korean may not have grown into an economic powerhouse and democratic example for East Asia.
-Byzantium was handicapped by big government with a “vast public bureaucracy and the welfare state…” This resulted in an eroding military and “fewer Byzantines engaged in private enterprise.” (Page 52)
-President Truman rashly dismantled our defense establishment after World War II to facilitate “a redirection of federal spending to new comprehensive social entitlements.” Which entitlements? The GI Bill? (Page 151).
-Communism’s appeal in post-war East Asia was the result of “largesse” to the local populations. No recognition is allowed for the appeal of Marxist economics, land reform or the impact of anti-colonial sentiment. (Page 154)
-He castigates leading Democrats for supporting President Bush’s invasion of Iraq and then latter opposing the same without benefit of consideration that their initial support was based upon flawed, or outright phony, intelligence concerning Weapons of Mass Destruction. (Page 192)
-The October 11, 2002 congressional authorization for the use of force to remove Saddam Hussein was “in some sense…merely a restatement of a prior 1998 congressional authorization for ‘regime change’ in Iraq, supported and signed by Bill Clinton.” The Clinton resolution did not commit the U.S. to use military force against Iraq. The invasion of Iraq cannot be placed in Clinton’s lap. (Page 198)
-The U.N. Security Council declined to authorize the Iraq invasion and “there were loud NATO dissenters such as France and Russia.” France withdrew from the integrated command structure of NATO in 1966 and did not rejoin until 2009. Russia has never been part of NATO. (Page 198)
-Iraq was saved due to “The Surge” which was the brainchild of a Neo-Con pantheon from the American Enterprise Institute listed on Page 213. Now Iraq’s economy remains a shambles, sectarian violence is rife, and minority Christians and Sunnis remain endangered. Many thousands have died. Only Iran emerged a winner. How is this being saved? If General Petraeus saved anything it was a modicum of face for President Bush.
-I would refrain from writing a serious piece on General Petraeus using Paula Broadwell as a key source. How fair and unbiased is it? (See various footnotes and bibliography)
Of the five generals profiled, the section on Matthew Ridgway makes the best argument for him as a “savior” general. Ridgway could genuinely be portrayed as the savior of U.N. forces in Korea and of South Korea as an independent state. Without his impact on the battlefield, South Korean may not have grown into an economic powerhouse and democratic example for East Asia.
September 14, 2018
Excellent oversee to the pivotal role these Generals held. And the dire, dire politics and logistic situations surrounding them.
I wish the Sherman section could be read by all students of American History.
Lincoln was ultimately hated (more than Trump) and barely got his own party's nomination for his reelection bid of 1864. He was called every foul and despicable name often preceded by baboon (and to his face by his own cabinet and a general or two. McClellan tried to nab the Republican nomination for his reelection process and almost did, while his plan was ending the war with slavery allowed in the "west".) At the same exact time, Mary Lincoln Todd was embezzling government funds and both were near insane and erratic to massively depressed (depending on the day) from their sons' deaths. And the horrific splits in the politico makes that the "easy" part to explain about Lincoln in 1863-64! He was despised. All of you who see war as the ultimate evil would detest Lincoln, even today. He knew it was the only way to continue with the sword or a worse alternative/ evil would triumph. And Sherman was a quirky 100 different jobs and scruffy past/ way past his prime "man". But he saw a "way".
The sections on Sherman and Petraeus are a full 5 star. The other 3 are at least a 4. Ridgeway I barely remember, but the fact that there is a South Korea at all, it is due to him. When I read some of the other reviews for this book after I myself had read it? They have missed the entire point with Petraeus as they have swallowed whole the carefully, carefully taught anti-W propaganda. All the generals and FBI/CIA insisted there was "reason" and that the WMD existed. It was NOT all W.'s misinformation. It was not impossible to win either. It still is not.
Some of his wider material about the "after" life of generals was also a full 5 stars.
I wish the Sherman section could be read by all students of American History.
Lincoln was ultimately hated (more than Trump) and barely got his own party's nomination for his reelection bid of 1864. He was called every foul and despicable name often preceded by baboon (and to his face by his own cabinet and a general or two. McClellan tried to nab the Republican nomination for his reelection process and almost did, while his plan was ending the war with slavery allowed in the "west".) At the same exact time, Mary Lincoln Todd was embezzling government funds and both were near insane and erratic to massively depressed (depending on the day) from their sons' deaths. And the horrific splits in the politico makes that the "easy" part to explain about Lincoln in 1863-64! He was despised. All of you who see war as the ultimate evil would detest Lincoln, even today. He knew it was the only way to continue with the sword or a worse alternative/ evil would triumph. And Sherman was a quirky 100 different jobs and scruffy past/ way past his prime "man". But he saw a "way".
The sections on Sherman and Petraeus are a full 5 star. The other 3 are at least a 4. Ridgeway I barely remember, but the fact that there is a South Korea at all, it is due to him. When I read some of the other reviews for this book after I myself had read it? They have missed the entire point with Petraeus as they have swallowed whole the carefully, carefully taught anti-W propaganda. All the generals and FBI/CIA insisted there was "reason" and that the WMD existed. It was NOT all W.'s misinformation. It was not impossible to win either. It still is not.
Some of his wider material about the "after" life of generals was also a full 5 stars.
July 5, 2021
A “savior general” is one who rescues his country from a war that has turned disastrous. Victor Davis Hanson examines the careers of Themistocles, Belisarius, Sherman, Matthew Ridgway, and David Petraus. A savior general is one who can peel away the mask of invincibility from the enemy.
The Athenian Themistocles should be credited with the rise of the Athenian navy and empire. He knew that the heroic victory at Marathon did nothing to stop the Persians. He knew that only a highly mobile Athenian navy could counter superior Persian resources. That was only half the problem. He still needed to defeat the Persian navy. He could not fight them on the open sea. Therefore, he negated Persia’s numerical advantage by forcing them to fight in the narrow confines off Salamis.
The Byzantine general Belisarius adapted Roman tactics on the Persian front. He understood that losing a battle was preferable to losing an army. While he could never entirely defeat the Persians, his tactics secured the Eastern border and made the Persians look elsewhere.
He also saved Justinian. The various “sports” factions in Constantinople allied with themselves against the Emperor. The closest modern equivalent is how the mafia sometimes controls sports outcomes. Justinian lost his nerve in the Nika riots. Belisarius, however, charged the mob and butchered them (as should happen with all mobs).
General Sherman saved Lincoln’s presidency. Despite the North’s victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, Lincoln was disliked by 1864 and knew he would probably lose the election. Grant was unable to take Richmond and in every battle the Union body count was outrageous. Lee knew that if he kept Grant at bay (not win, just keep at bay), the 1864 election would be a referendum on Lincoln.
Sherman changed the calculus. He upgraded the supply lines in the South in such a way that would let him make a long march to Atlanta, all the while refusing to give battle to Joe Johnston. He forced Johnson back to Atlanta while denying him the psychological battle the South so needed.
Did Sherman really butcher the South? In terms of modern total war, Sherman was quite tame. In fact, Grant is responsible for far more loss of life than Sherman. Sherman, however, understood that the ruling class of the South needed to be responsible for the horrors of the war. This gave Lincoln the push in the polls.
The really exciting part of this book is how Matthew Ridgway won the battle for Asia. The temptation after Hiroshima was to scale down the military and respond to every threat with nukes. Ridgway knew, on the contrary, that nukes could not replace limited warfare.
While Douglas MacArthur understood the geopolitical reality fairly well, he blundered in Korea. To his credit, he did nearly annihilate the North Korean army and pushed ahead of the 38th parallel. The problem was the hoarder of Chinese communists who nearly cut him off and subsequently overran the peninsula. It was Ridgway’s steel nerves who saw this was actually China’s undoing. Previously, Russian-made MiGs were superior to the F-80s, which meant that our B-29s lacked any support. As China found itself stretched thin and away from its MiGs, along with a newly outfitted F-86 to provide support to the B-29s, Ridgway was now able to decimate the Chinese army. Hanson relates that some Chinese sources said the B-29s killed one million Chinese soldiers. If this is true, it explains why China was reluctant to invade North Vietnam.
The jury is still out on Petraeus. He is to be credited with perfecting American counterinsurgency tactics, but Iraq can hardly be called a success (although almost all of the blame can be placed on Bush’s Wilsonianism).
In conclusion, while one might quibble on some of Hanson’s analyses (e.g., I don’t think Iraq is a success story), the book is a challenging and engaging read.
The Athenian Themistocles should be credited with the rise of the Athenian navy and empire. He knew that the heroic victory at Marathon did nothing to stop the Persians. He knew that only a highly mobile Athenian navy could counter superior Persian resources. That was only half the problem. He still needed to defeat the Persian navy. He could not fight them on the open sea. Therefore, he negated Persia’s numerical advantage by forcing them to fight in the narrow confines off Salamis.
The Byzantine general Belisarius adapted Roman tactics on the Persian front. He understood that losing a battle was preferable to losing an army. While he could never entirely defeat the Persians, his tactics secured the Eastern border and made the Persians look elsewhere.
He also saved Justinian. The various “sports” factions in Constantinople allied with themselves against the Emperor. The closest modern equivalent is how the mafia sometimes controls sports outcomes. Justinian lost his nerve in the Nika riots. Belisarius, however, charged the mob and butchered them (as should happen with all mobs).
General Sherman saved Lincoln’s presidency. Despite the North’s victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, Lincoln was disliked by 1864 and knew he would probably lose the election. Grant was unable to take Richmond and in every battle the Union body count was outrageous. Lee knew that if he kept Grant at bay (not win, just keep at bay), the 1864 election would be a referendum on Lincoln.
Sherman changed the calculus. He upgraded the supply lines in the South in such a way that would let him make a long march to Atlanta, all the while refusing to give battle to Joe Johnston. He forced Johnson back to Atlanta while denying him the psychological battle the South so needed.
Did Sherman really butcher the South? In terms of modern total war, Sherman was quite tame. In fact, Grant is responsible for far more loss of life than Sherman. Sherman, however, understood that the ruling class of the South needed to be responsible for the horrors of the war. This gave Lincoln the push in the polls.
The really exciting part of this book is how Matthew Ridgway won the battle for Asia. The temptation after Hiroshima was to scale down the military and respond to every threat with nukes. Ridgway knew, on the contrary, that nukes could not replace limited warfare.
While Douglas MacArthur understood the geopolitical reality fairly well, he blundered in Korea. To his credit, he did nearly annihilate the North Korean army and pushed ahead of the 38th parallel. The problem was the hoarder of Chinese communists who nearly cut him off and subsequently overran the peninsula. It was Ridgway’s steel nerves who saw this was actually China’s undoing. Previously, Russian-made MiGs were superior to the F-80s, which meant that our B-29s lacked any support. As China found itself stretched thin and away from its MiGs, along with a newly outfitted F-86 to provide support to the B-29s, Ridgway was now able to decimate the Chinese army. Hanson relates that some Chinese sources said the B-29s killed one million Chinese soldiers. If this is true, it explains why China was reluctant to invade North Vietnam.
The jury is still out on Petraeus. He is to be credited with perfecting American counterinsurgency tactics, but Iraq can hardly be called a success (although almost all of the blame can be placed on Bush’s Wilsonianism).
In conclusion, while one might quibble on some of Hanson’s analyses (e.g., I don’t think Iraq is a success story), the book is a challenging and engaging read.
discredited
October 15, 2018I agree with Manray's Review on this one:
I have read and appreciated Mr. Hanson’s work on warfare in the classical era*. He should stick to that. With “The Savior Generals” he has allowed his parallel career as a right-wing pundit to bleed over into his work as a historian.
I have read and appreciated Mr. Hanson’s work on warfare in the classical era*. He should stick to that. With “The Savior Generals” he has allowed his parallel career as a right-wing pundit to bleed over into his work as a historian.
February 2, 2017
Most interesting to me are two chapters, the ones about Civil War Gen. Sherman and Korean War Gen. Ridgway. Though I was familiar with the story of Sherman’s capture of Atlanta and his “March to the Sea,” I hadn’t realized how these events played such a pivotal role in determining the war’s outcome. Sherman was a more effective war strategist than the more acclaimed Grant, whose preference for head-on slugfests almost destroyed his Army of the Potomac. Sherman brought about a public opinion turnaround toward victory with much less loss of life. The Ridgway chapter recounts how this general turned around Gen. MacArthur’s Korea botch into a sensible conclusion. Chapters about a Greek general-admiral (480 BC) and a Roman general (527-59 AD) recount their successful strategies against great odds. The final chapter, author’s assessment of Gen. Petraeus’s effort in Iraq, to me seems a bit pretentious.
June 6, 2016
This book is less about military operations and tactics, and more about politics and what goes behind the scene of an operation. Good to know for sure. But wasn't what I expected.
The writer omitted many great generals and a great many battles simply because he believed those generals weren't "savior generals" since they fought for a totalitarian government. If you ask me I'd say he should have changed the name of the book.
anyhow, a pretty good read.
The writer omitted many great generals and a great many battles simply because he believed those generals weren't "savior generals" since they fought for a totalitarian government. If you ask me I'd say he should have changed the name of the book.
anyhow, a pretty good read.
February 5, 2017
It's important not to let an important historical argument be overshadowed by an authors'/readers' political identity or sensitivity. Savior Generals examines the role of human agency in the context of consensual societies throughout human military history. I think Dr. Hanson generally succeeds in his efforts to illustrate and quantify the contributions of human leadership to an audience that often overlooks individual capacity and contribution. The section on William Tecumseh Sherman was particularly elucidating and interesting. He makes the connection between Sherman's march to Atlanta and then to the Sea; which boosted Northern morale and saved Lincoln politically. This in turn kept anti-war Northerners and Copperheads out of the White House and helped win the war. Having said this, some of his secondary assertions need additional evidence and discussion. A must read for military historians or any history buffs!!
December 23, 2019
There is one common thread, one that the author chooses not to recognize, in all of these various stories of savior generals who were able to salvage wars that were thought of as lost. In all of these cases, we are dealing with military situations that were lost or at least imperiled in a political sense and not necessarily in a military sense. As a result, four of these five generals end up being from republican regimes, and the fifth one was a general in the Byzantine Empire, which was notorious for seeking to act ambitiously with its military to an extent beyond most other empires of their time (or any time really). As a result, this particular book explores those leaders who were not themselves autocratic leaders of a regime who saved war efforts that looked lost (like, say, Frederick the Great of Prussia) but rather were generals who were accountable to leaders and not only had to win but win in a way that was politically acceptable. This is something that the author appears not to take into consideration, and he of course biases his account even more by looking at only Western generals, although some Chinese generals would have met the bill as well as his Western options did.
This book is about 250 pages long and is divided into five chapters that deal with five generals and their supposed role as savior. The author begins with a prologue and then ends with an epilogue, acknowledgements, notes, bibliography and index that help to frame the author's thinking about the qualities of a savior general, without thinking enough about the qualities of the situation that needed saving in the first place. The author first talks about Themistocles and talks about how he was able to persuade the Athenians to fight on sea despite having their city burned twice, and about what this meant for his future career as well as what future political leaders of Athens did to prevent that sort of event from happening again (1). After that the author talks about the wars of Belisarius in Persia and Italy in particular, and how it was that he never fully had the confidence of Justinian despite (or because of) his obvious military talent (2). After that the author discusses three American generals, William T. Sherman (3), Matthew Ridgeway (4), and David Patraeus (5), and how they managed to turn defeat into draws or victories in the Civil War, Korean War, and Iraq War, respectively.
In examining what made these various wars lost, and what the author considers turning these wars around, a few conclusions can be drawn. For one, some of these wars were a bit ill-advised from the start, and lacked a certain amount of legitimacy. That can certainly be said of the war in Iraq, but it can also be said of the invasion of Italy and certainly of the attempt to move beyond the 39th parallel in Korea in the face of China's express warnings that they would intervene as they did. In most of these cases the wars were almost lost because of considerable mistakes in how they were fought, not because the wars were entirely unwinnable from a conventional standpoint. The Civil War is a case in point, where winning the war with a minimum of casualties was certainly important because there was an election, not because the war was in fact lost. It was the election that was in peril, not the Union war effort by that time. The author seems not to be as sure in his grasp of political history as of military history, and in a book like this, that is a serious shortcoming.
This book is about 250 pages long and is divided into five chapters that deal with five generals and their supposed role as savior. The author begins with a prologue and then ends with an epilogue, acknowledgements, notes, bibliography and index that help to frame the author's thinking about the qualities of a savior general, without thinking enough about the qualities of the situation that needed saving in the first place. The author first talks about Themistocles and talks about how he was able to persuade the Athenians to fight on sea despite having their city burned twice, and about what this meant for his future career as well as what future political leaders of Athens did to prevent that sort of event from happening again (1). After that the author talks about the wars of Belisarius in Persia and Italy in particular, and how it was that he never fully had the confidence of Justinian despite (or because of) his obvious military talent (2). After that the author discusses three American generals, William T. Sherman (3), Matthew Ridgeway (4), and David Patraeus (5), and how they managed to turn defeat into draws or victories in the Civil War, Korean War, and Iraq War, respectively.
In examining what made these various wars lost, and what the author considers turning these wars around, a few conclusions can be drawn. For one, some of these wars were a bit ill-advised from the start, and lacked a certain amount of legitimacy. That can certainly be said of the war in Iraq, but it can also be said of the invasion of Italy and certainly of the attempt to move beyond the 39th parallel in Korea in the face of China's express warnings that they would intervene as they did. In most of these cases the wars were almost lost because of considerable mistakes in how they were fought, not because the wars were entirely unwinnable from a conventional standpoint. The Civil War is a case in point, where winning the war with a minimum of casualties was certainly important because there was an election, not because the war was in fact lost. It was the election that was in peril, not the Union war effort by that time. The author seems not to be as sure in his grasp of political history as of military history, and in a book like this, that is a serious shortcoming.
July 22, 2024
A historical survey with an interesting premise whose examples don't totally fit.
About 4/5 of the way through Hansons' 2013 "The Savior Generals" he admits that he didn't title it "The Victorious Generals" -- which seems odd given the book seels itself as being stories of commanders who "saved wars that were lost" -- which sounds a lot like....victory. But that aside, this relatively brief survey covers the following commanders:
Themistocles at Salamis (480 BC)
Belisarius of Byzantium (less a battle than a summary of Belisarius' career)
Sherman's March to the Sea (1864)
Ridgeway 8th Army Command during the Korean War (1950)
Petraeus during the Iraq surge (2007-2008)
Of these, only 3 reallyfit the premise of a commander whose efforts "saved" a war - Themistocles, Sherman, and Ridgeway. The chapter on Belisarius is more an overview of his entire career, which, while interesting, doesn't really fit the premise of a general who "saved" a war. The Petraeus chapter is simply too close in time to the book's publication to be valuable. Did Petraeus' efforts in Al-Anbar "save" the Iraq war? I don't know, but *ISIS has entrered the chat*
As with his 2024 "The End of Everything," there's an interesting premise here, but the examples selected don't effectively make that argument. Moreover, unlike some of Hanson's earlier works (Carnage and Culture, the Sould of Battle), there's not much of a takeaway/teaching point to be gleaned from these examples. It's just a loose (and brief) collection. Not "bad" - but also not terrible informative, novel, or rewarding.
About 4/5 of the way through Hansons' 2013 "The Savior Generals" he admits that he didn't title it "The Victorious Generals" -- which seems odd given the book seels itself as being stories of commanders who "saved wars that were lost" -- which sounds a lot like....victory. But that aside, this relatively brief survey covers the following commanders:
Themistocles at Salamis (480 BC)
Belisarius of Byzantium (less a battle than a summary of Belisarius' career)
Sherman's March to the Sea (1864)
Ridgeway 8th Army Command during the Korean War (1950)
Petraeus during the Iraq surge (2007-2008)
Of these, only 3 reallyfit the premise of a commander whose efforts "saved" a war - Themistocles, Sherman, and Ridgeway. The chapter on Belisarius is more an overview of his entire career, which, while interesting, doesn't really fit the premise of a general who "saved" a war. The Petraeus chapter is simply too close in time to the book's publication to be valuable. Did Petraeus' efforts in Al-Anbar "save" the Iraq war? I don't know, but *ISIS has entrered the chat*
As with his 2024 "The End of Everything," there's an interesting premise here, but the examples selected don't effectively make that argument. Moreover, unlike some of Hanson's earlier works (Carnage and Culture, the Sould of Battle), there's not much of a takeaway/teaching point to be gleaned from these examples. It's just a loose (and brief) collection. Not "bad" - but also not terrible informative, novel, or rewarding.
April 19, 2022
I got this book specifically to read about General Matthew Ridgway's turnaround of the Korean War.
The five generals:
1. Themistocles at Salamis
2. Favius Belisarius fighting for Byzantium
3. William Tecumseh Sherman in Georgia
4. Matthew Ridgway's 100 days in Korea
6. David Petraeus and the Surge in Iraq
Victor Davis Hanson ends with this:
The five generals:
1. Themistocles at Salamis
2. Favius Belisarius fighting for Byzantium
3. William Tecumseh Sherman in Georgia
4. Matthew Ridgway's 100 days in Korea
6. David Petraeus and the Surge in Iraq
Victor Davis Hanson ends with this:
Do not believe that high technology and globalized uniformity have made military leadership, especially eccentric leadership, outdated or even rare. Instead, in the future age of robotic soldiers, fleets of drones, and deadly computer consoles, there will always be commanders waiting in the shadows for their moment, different sorts of people who thrive on chaos and ignore criticism. Whether they will be listened to next time—and whether lost wars are to be saved—hinges on how well we have learned from the savior generals of the past.
May 15, 2018
Some good facts about the ancient world, but deadly dull writing. And it's a little creepy when VD compares American troops invading Iraq to Greeks fighting in their own homeland against a Persian invasion thousands of years ago. Opposites much?
February 18, 2021
The book gets four stars because it nails four out of the five profiles. The odd one out? David Petraeus.
Hanson tries his best to characterize him similarly to the others, and certainly from a political, military, and personality perspective, he matches them. He is empirical, pessimistic, and contrarian, just as the rest of them. Beyond that, Petraeus, similarly to his "savior" kin, as Hanson portrays him, has not ended up well in his career and life.
The book is centered on a premise that is worth exploring. We know all about great achievements from military leaders, and just as much about the great military failures of others. But we don't know as much about those underdog figures put into unenviable positions and succeeding beyond all expectations, thereby "saving" a cause for others to either win or lose later. Hanson narrows further the scope of this inquiry by selecting only from causes that he believes were actually worth saving and worth the effort, thereby giving normative and moral arguments to the wars that were fought. To write a book like this, this is absolutely the correct approach.
But at the time of publication, it had been only fifteen years since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the casualty count had been around 3k Americans. That is less than 10% of the next "smallest" conflict depicted in the book. We do not have the appropriate amount of time or distance to understand the Iraq War, evaluate it as correct vs. incorrect, worth the effort vs. not, etc. Moreover, it is simply not a conflict that is in any way comparable to the others in terms of scale. The Iraq War Hanson characterizes is almost a hypothetical alternate type of war where Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait and the war that begins in 1991 doesn't let up or have a stopping point.
I love Victor Davis Hanson, but this book makes me wonder if he wrote the whole thing just to justify the Iraq War and give Petraeus a heroic profile comparable to historical figures. This is something Hanson does often, sometimes with greater validity than other times. Worse, what he narrates about Petraeus undermines what may be the most unsung contribution of the book - its rehabilitation of the career and legacy of General Matthew Ridgway. If the book had ended with him and his heroic efforts in Korea, the book would be perfect. Please keep in mind, I am not writing this review from the perspective of someone who is absolutely sure that the Iraq War was a mistake, or is any kind of dove or isolationist. I am instead of a mind that it is too early. The last conflict that is described before Iraq was, at the time, over 65 years old. You need half a century, if not more, to give 20/20 hindsight to events and evaluate the wisdom thereof. Hanson has written a book that is valuable and about 4/5 of the way worth the read.
Hanson tries his best to characterize him similarly to the others, and certainly from a political, military, and personality perspective, he matches them. He is empirical, pessimistic, and contrarian, just as the rest of them. Beyond that, Petraeus, similarly to his "savior" kin, as Hanson portrays him, has not ended up well in his career and life.
The book is centered on a premise that is worth exploring. We know all about great achievements from military leaders, and just as much about the great military failures of others. But we don't know as much about those underdog figures put into unenviable positions and succeeding beyond all expectations, thereby "saving" a cause for others to either win or lose later. Hanson narrows further the scope of this inquiry by selecting only from causes that he believes were actually worth saving and worth the effort, thereby giving normative and moral arguments to the wars that were fought. To write a book like this, this is absolutely the correct approach.
But at the time of publication, it had been only fifteen years since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the casualty count had been around 3k Americans. That is less than 10% of the next "smallest" conflict depicted in the book. We do not have the appropriate amount of time or distance to understand the Iraq War, evaluate it as correct vs. incorrect, worth the effort vs. not, etc. Moreover, it is simply not a conflict that is in any way comparable to the others in terms of scale. The Iraq War Hanson characterizes is almost a hypothetical alternate type of war where Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait and the war that begins in 1991 doesn't let up or have a stopping point.
I love Victor Davis Hanson, but this book makes me wonder if he wrote the whole thing just to justify the Iraq War and give Petraeus a heroic profile comparable to historical figures. This is something Hanson does often, sometimes with greater validity than other times. Worse, what he narrates about Petraeus undermines what may be the most unsung contribution of the book - its rehabilitation of the career and legacy of General Matthew Ridgway. If the book had ended with him and his heroic efforts in Korea, the book would be perfect. Please keep in mind, I am not writing this review from the perspective of someone who is absolutely sure that the Iraq War was a mistake, or is any kind of dove or isolationist. I am instead of a mind that it is too early. The last conflict that is described before Iraq was, at the time, over 65 years old. You need half a century, if not more, to give 20/20 hindsight to events and evaluate the wisdom thereof. Hanson has written a book that is valuable and about 4/5 of the way worth the read.
July 19, 2024
"Winning against impossible odds—when most others cannot or would not try—is the only mark of a great general."
March 20, 2025
An outstanding work about how these five commanders' (Themistocles, Belisarius, Sherman, Ridgway, and Petraeus) political and strategic objectives and processes were successful and memorable. I do not agree with all of his conclusions, but they are fascinating, nonetheless. I will definitely be following up on some of the information he includes.
One well-known quote: “In some sense, winning against impossible odds—when most others cannot or would not try—is the only mark of a great general.”
Bob Souer's narration of the audiobook was a bit dry, but this ain't fiction. Highly recommended for those interested in military history.
One well-known quote: “In some sense, winning against impossible odds—when most others cannot or would not try—is the only mark of a great general.”
Bob Souer's narration of the audiobook was a bit dry, but this ain't fiction. Highly recommended for those interested in military history.
February 5, 2017
Victor Davis Hanson Delivers Another Quality Book
Victor Davis Hanson, best known for his works on Ancient Greece, looks at five different generals from five different time periods and discusses how these generals became what he calls "Savior Generals". This book is very similar in structure to his 2003 book Ripples of Battle .
Hanson picked five generals to discuss. All are from the West and he notes that this is not an all-inclusive list. They are not even particularly spread out well over history. One is from Ancient Greece, one from the early Byzantine Empire and three of them are American generals. In my opinion, not all of them fit the mold perfectly. In fact, I think only two of them do.
To be a Savior General you have to have been on the outs with the establishment and then, when everything has fallen apart and the situation is about as dire as possible, the establishment command structure looks to you to come in with your unorthodox ways and save the day. You also have to have an odd sense of how people work - a sense that makes you approach the crisis at hand in a different way than everyone else. Once the victory is won, the "Savior General" is removed in some way.
Themistocles (524-459 B.C.)
Hanson starts out with Themistocles, the general turned admiral who almost single-handedly created the Athenian navy in order to prepare for a repeat Persian invasion after the Athenians defeated the Persians at the Battle of Marathon. While most Athenians assumed that the Persians were not going to return after their defeat at Marathon, Themistocles understood the true size and scope of the Persian military and knew that the military losses at Marathon were a drop in the bucket compared to their true potential. When the Persians returned it was with "the largest amphibious invasion of Europe until the 1944 Normandy landing more than 2,400 years later." (p.23)
While the Sparta's famed 300 soldiers and their king slowed the Persian advance for a few days at Thermopylae, the Athenians fled their city state using the navy that Themistocles had pushed for so hard between invasions. Hanson goes into detail about how Themistocles argued, cajoled, harangued and demagogued this fleet into existence and then repeated his performance all over again with the Greek allied leaders as they tried to figure out if they should even engage the Persians or if they should simply surrender. Luck, skill, sleight of hand, superior knowledge of the waters around Athens all contributed to a victory when defeat seemed so sure.
No general in this book was so far behind...
Read more at: http://dwdsreviews.blogspot.com/2015/...
Read all of my reviews of books by Victor Davis Hanson here: http://dwdsreviews.blogspot.com/searc...
Victor Davis Hanson, best known for his works on Ancient Greece, looks at five different generals from five different time periods and discusses how these generals became what he calls "Savior Generals". This book is very similar in structure to his 2003 book Ripples of Battle .
Hanson picked five generals to discuss. All are from the West and he notes that this is not an all-inclusive list. They are not even particularly spread out well over history. One is from Ancient Greece, one from the early Byzantine Empire and three of them are American generals. In my opinion, not all of them fit the mold perfectly. In fact, I think only two of them do.
To be a Savior General you have to have been on the outs with the establishment and then, when everything has fallen apart and the situation is about as dire as possible, the establishment command structure looks to you to come in with your unorthodox ways and save the day. You also have to have an odd sense of how people work - a sense that makes you approach the crisis at hand in a different way than everyone else. Once the victory is won, the "Savior General" is removed in some way.
Themistocles (524-459 B.C.)
Hanson starts out with Themistocles, the general turned admiral who almost single-handedly created the Athenian navy in order to prepare for a repeat Persian invasion after the Athenians defeated the Persians at the Battle of Marathon. While most Athenians assumed that the Persians were not going to return after their defeat at Marathon, Themistocles understood the true size and scope of the Persian military and knew that the military losses at Marathon were a drop in the bucket compared to their true potential. When the Persians returned it was with "the largest amphibious invasion of Europe until the 1944 Normandy landing more than 2,400 years later." (p.23)
While the Sparta's famed 300 soldiers and their king slowed the Persian advance for a few days at Thermopylae, the Athenians fled their city state using the navy that Themistocles had pushed for so hard between invasions. Hanson goes into detail about how Themistocles argued, cajoled, harangued and demagogued this fleet into existence and then repeated his performance all over again with the Greek allied leaders as they tried to figure out if they should even engage the Persians or if they should simply surrender. Luck, skill, sleight of hand, superior knowledge of the waters around Athens all contributed to a victory when defeat seemed so sure.
No general in this book was so far behind...
Read more at: http://dwdsreviews.blogspot.com/2015/...
Read all of my reviews of books by Victor Davis Hanson here: http://dwdsreviews.blogspot.com/searc...
April 10, 2017
This is not as incredible a set of ideas as other books by Victor Davis Hanson that I’ve read. From the subtitle: How five great commanders saved wars that were lost—from Ancient Greece to Iraq I was expecting something on the order of Carnage and Culture or The Soul of Battle: From Ancient Times to the Present Day. But it is pretty much exactly what it says and no more: a description of five wars (or theaters of war) thought to be completely lost by most people at the time, which were turned around by a leader who didn’t buy into the general consensus.
What it doesn’t do is build an over-arching theory of how to recognize that wars aren’t really lost, nor how to recognize which leader will be able to turn the war around. The analysis is limited to a short epilogue that tersely outlines Hanson’s ideas of what these five commanders—Themistocles in Greece, Belisarius in Byzantium, Sherman during the Civil War in the United States, Ridgway in Korea, and Petraeus in Iraq—had in common that contributed to their success.
In some cases, their success came from recognizing different ways of waging war, and in others, their success came simply from recognizing that the war was being lost for superficial, rather than unchangeable, reasons.
The appearance of a leader uniquely positioned to turn a failing war around would appear to be somewhat random. Sherman held a wide variety of mediocre civilian jobs before the civil war, but these jobs prepared him to maintain and create supply lines in spotty areas, probably the biggest contributor to his success behind enemy lines in Georgia. Similarly,
Despite not being as interesting to me as other Hanson books, it may be more useful for those who wish to translate the ideas into their own lives, or businesses, outside of the military. Few business owners find themselves in armed conflict with slave-owning countries but many will find themselves in situations or locales that the general consensus treats as impossible to benefit from.
What it doesn’t do is build an over-arching theory of how to recognize that wars aren’t really lost, nor how to recognize which leader will be able to turn the war around. The analysis is limited to a short epilogue that tersely outlines Hanson’s ideas of what these five commanders—Themistocles in Greece, Belisarius in Byzantium, Sherman during the Civil War in the United States, Ridgway in Korea, and Petraeus in Iraq—had in common that contributed to their success.
In some cases, their success came from recognizing different ways of waging war, and in others, their success came simply from recognizing that the war was being lost for superficial, rather than unchangeable, reasons.
The appearance of a leader uniquely positioned to turn a failing war around would appear to be somewhat random. Sherman held a wide variety of mediocre civilian jobs before the civil war, but these jobs prepared him to maintain and create supply lines in spotty areas, probably the biggest contributor to his success behind enemy lines in Georgia. Similarly,
Whether consciously or not, David Petraeus for two decades had been preparing himself neither for conventional warfare nor for counterterrorism special operations—nor even for classic jungle or rural insurgency. Instead, he had prepped for large-scale postbellum occupation and reconstruction in highly urbanized, extremely hostile populations—exactly what Iraq would be like in 2003.
Despite not being as interesting to me as other Hanson books, it may be more useful for those who wish to translate the ideas into their own lives, or businesses, outside of the military. Few business owners find themselves in armed conflict with slave-owning countries but many will find themselves in situations or locales that the general consensus treats as impossible to benefit from.
September 21, 2013
You don't need to be a hawk and a Republican to appreciate this book, but it helps. I found the first two sections, on the ancient generals Themistocles and Belisarius, to be the most interesting (probably because I knew the least about them) and the easiest to appreciate regardless of your ideology.
The other three sections on George Sherman, Matthew Ridgway (Korea) and David Petraeus require you to buy into the concept of prophylactic war. That is, force and foreign intervention is justified if it will prevent worse or bloodier conflict down the road. In other words, the hypothetical end justifies the means. Hanson hails Sherman as the hero who saved the Union, which is probably true given that his decimation of Atlanta preserved Lincoln's presidency, but he neglects the thousands of Southern civilian bodies Sherman left in his wake. He similarly praises Matt Ridgway for resolving the Korean War without us needing to use nuclear weapons, yet suggests that wrestling China to a stalemate was worth sacrificing millions of lives. And in the last section on Petraeus and Iraq, Hanson lets his full hawk flag fly. Democrats voted for and supported the war and are therefore just as much to blame--although, of course, they backed the war because they were sold a false bill of goods by the administration. To Hanson, anyone who didn't back Petraeus' surge was flat out wrong, but is it wrong to pull out of a war that we entered under false pretenses?
Although the other sections of this book are interesting, they feel like mere pretext for the last chapter on Iraq. Hanson wants to include Petraeus in the pantheon of genius and misunderstood military heroes to rewrite history on a failed, muddled, decade long war. And even Petraeus' legacy has been subsequently tarnished by his bizarre adultery scandal, so he probably wasn't the best person for Hanson to canonize.
The other three sections on George Sherman, Matthew Ridgway (Korea) and David Petraeus require you to buy into the concept of prophylactic war. That is, force and foreign intervention is justified if it will prevent worse or bloodier conflict down the road. In other words, the hypothetical end justifies the means. Hanson hails Sherman as the hero who saved the Union, which is probably true given that his decimation of Atlanta preserved Lincoln's presidency, but he neglects the thousands of Southern civilian bodies Sherman left in his wake. He similarly praises Matt Ridgway for resolving the Korean War without us needing to use nuclear weapons, yet suggests that wrestling China to a stalemate was worth sacrificing millions of lives. And in the last section on Petraeus and Iraq, Hanson lets his full hawk flag fly. Democrats voted for and supported the war and are therefore just as much to blame--although, of course, they backed the war because they were sold a false bill of goods by the administration. To Hanson, anyone who didn't back Petraeus' surge was flat out wrong, but is it wrong to pull out of a war that we entered under false pretenses?
Although the other sections of this book are interesting, they feel like mere pretext for the last chapter on Iraq. Hanson wants to include Petraeus in the pantheon of genius and misunderstood military heroes to rewrite history on a failed, muddled, decade long war. And even Petraeus' legacy has been subsequently tarnished by his bizarre adultery scandal, so he probably wasn't the best person for Hanson to canonize.
August 3, 2013
I like that Dr. Hanson makes the point that a savior general will share the dangers of being on the front line with his men.
December 29, 2023
Though this topic might have been aced with a pistol shot, Victor Hansen Davis chose a cannon - and in the process delivered a narrative that was both confusing and over the top in general and in certain specifics.
The structure was the source of much of my confusion. He would cover something. Then he seemed to retrace the same situation again (and sometimes again). Maybe in his mind there were nuances that distinguished the seeming repetition. In mine, it was tedious. Indeed the whole book felt padded. I kept thinking a tighter approach (an essay, for instance) would have been more appropriate.
My larger concerns derive from the broad, and sometimes unfair, conclusions he draws at times. I don't dispute Sherman as a "savior" general. Atlanta and the march to the sea were critical in Union success. But Davis treats Sherman as if he constructed his strategy independent of Grant, which he didn't. Davis pretends that Sherman showed wisdom in avoiding battle while Grant was foolish for unrelenting combat with Lee. He wasn't.
This completely misunderstands the strategic picture. Grant's strategy was to engage Lee precisely so Sherman would have freedom to conduct his campaigns as he did. By bleeding the Army of Northern Virginia, Grant would assure that Sherman's opponents couldn't be reinforced. Thus, facing worn out armies and lesser generals, Sherman could wreck the interior of the Confederacy. (Union generals Canby, Banks and others were supposed to operate similar to Sherman, but they lacked the skill.)
Davis also seems to ignore (in error) it was Grant who showed Sherman how a march to the sea could succeed. At Vicksburg, Grant makes the most audacious move of the war, cutting loose from his supply lines to live off the land so he could attack the Confederate bastion from the south. Though initially appalled at Grant's untraditional strategy, Sherman sees that Grants succeeds and replicates that success in Georgia.
Beyond Sherman, Ridgeway seems to get credit for not being McArthur. Patraeus? Well, is it really history when you're writing with less than a decade's perspective? The many pages he devotes to the politics of the Iraq war (also repetitive) suggest maybe not.
At the start, I expected this book to exhilarate me. By the end, it was tedium. Doubt I will be reading any more of his.
The structure was the source of much of my confusion. He would cover something. Then he seemed to retrace the same situation again (and sometimes again). Maybe in his mind there were nuances that distinguished the seeming repetition. In mine, it was tedious. Indeed the whole book felt padded. I kept thinking a tighter approach (an essay, for instance) would have been more appropriate.
My larger concerns derive from the broad, and sometimes unfair, conclusions he draws at times. I don't dispute Sherman as a "savior" general. Atlanta and the march to the sea were critical in Union success. But Davis treats Sherman as if he constructed his strategy independent of Grant, which he didn't. Davis pretends that Sherman showed wisdom in avoiding battle while Grant was foolish for unrelenting combat with Lee. He wasn't.
This completely misunderstands the strategic picture. Grant's strategy was to engage Lee precisely so Sherman would have freedom to conduct his campaigns as he did. By bleeding the Army of Northern Virginia, Grant would assure that Sherman's opponents couldn't be reinforced. Thus, facing worn out armies and lesser generals, Sherman could wreck the interior of the Confederacy. (Union generals Canby, Banks and others were supposed to operate similar to Sherman, but they lacked the skill.)
Davis also seems to ignore (in error) it was Grant who showed Sherman how a march to the sea could succeed. At Vicksburg, Grant makes the most audacious move of the war, cutting loose from his supply lines to live off the land so he could attack the Confederate bastion from the south. Though initially appalled at Grant's untraditional strategy, Sherman sees that Grants succeeds and replicates that success in Georgia.
Beyond Sherman, Ridgeway seems to get credit for not being McArthur. Patraeus? Well, is it really history when you're writing with less than a decade's perspective? The many pages he devotes to the politics of the Iraq war (also repetitive) suggest maybe not.
At the start, I expected this book to exhilarate me. By the end, it was tedium. Doubt I will be reading any more of his.
September 18, 2022
Ancient historian and historian of war Prof Victor Davis Hansen reviews 5 “savior” generals. These are more than good generals. These generals turned the tide when all was likely lost, and something more. A great idea for a book.
Hansen chooses —
Themistocles as Salamis, saving the West from the Persians
Belasaurius, who at one point reunited the Eastern Roman Empire with the Western, and expanded the Rastern 45 pct, all while facing plague, treating locals well, and continually having tthe rug pulled out from under him by his “friend” and emperor Justinian. And persistently saving Byzantium right over decades, and in emergencies.
Gen. Sherman, Grant’s right hand, who saved the country, gave Lincoln a second term, and so ended slavery.
Gen Ridgeway, who restored moral in a retreating Korea, got out in the field with his men, knew every part of the country and battlefront, and asked his subordinates for their offensive rather than defensive plans. Who then integrated the services for good measure.
David Petraeus, who saved the Iraq campaign thru the “surge”, and basically ended the Iraq war on positive terms while he was there.
As Hansen points out, none of this means things go well for the general in the rest of life. In fact, like some anti-hero savior in a western, they are tossed out or asked to move on after the saving. They are contrarians. They are mostly unloved by the powers that they save. But save they do.
So much more could be written for each of these and their amazing momentum turnabouts. And Hansen does. Each one did things that others in the field could not. Working with the same men and materiale.
Hansen at the start tells how he chooses them, the many he could have chosen but leaves out. What he does not say but simply does, that I really appreciated, was use earlier examples for comparison, to build out the next and next story. So your knowledge of Salamis or many of the other events is integrated with the latter story, and both benefit from this building one on the other imo.
Hansen chooses —
Themistocles as Salamis, saving the West from the Persians
Belasaurius, who at one point reunited the Eastern Roman Empire with the Western, and expanded the Rastern 45 pct, all while facing plague, treating locals well, and continually having tthe rug pulled out from under him by his “friend” and emperor Justinian. And persistently saving Byzantium right over decades, and in emergencies.
Gen. Sherman, Grant’s right hand, who saved the country, gave Lincoln a second term, and so ended slavery.
Gen Ridgeway, who restored moral in a retreating Korea, got out in the field with his men, knew every part of the country and battlefront, and asked his subordinates for their offensive rather than defensive plans. Who then integrated the services for good measure.
David Petraeus, who saved the Iraq campaign thru the “surge”, and basically ended the Iraq war on positive terms while he was there.
As Hansen points out, none of this means things go well for the general in the rest of life. In fact, like some anti-hero savior in a western, they are tossed out or asked to move on after the saving. They are contrarians. They are mostly unloved by the powers that they save. But save they do.
So much more could be written for each of these and their amazing momentum turnabouts. And Hansen does. Each one did things that others in the field could not. Working with the same men and materiale.
Hansen at the start tells how he chooses them, the many he could have chosen but leaves out. What he does not say but simply does, that I really appreciated, was use earlier examples for comparison, to build out the next and next story. So your knowledge of Salamis or many of the other events is integrated with the latter story, and both benefit from this building one on the other imo.
January 8, 2020
I read a Wall Street book review of books to read about Generals and their many talents. This book was one that was highly recommended. I read briefly a few reviews that were not highly appraised of this book, but the author for previous books. Either way, I had this on my Amazon wishlist and Mrs. Santa dropped it off on Christmas.
The book highlights five Generals who were given leadership of a poor and failing situation. The five Generals were Themistocles, Belisarius, Willian T. Sherman, Matthew Ridgeway, and David Petraeus. I was especially intrigued by Belisarius and I've already added another book to my wishlist about his life, though the reviews were shoddy.
The book basically gives some historical significance around the situation of each General about how it got to this desperate point. These can get a little grainy and boring but once through, the good stuff starts. The General's acts to corrective abilities and the outcome. Finally, it gives a short biography of the General with a finish with their ending careers. Sadly, they all had similar endings that were not worthy of their feats.
The last chapter highlights attributes each General shared and really is the highlight of the book. They were very alike and that is the true reason for the book. I'm sure another few dozen General's could have been added to this group but wouldn't have had the same attributes.
It's good read and entertaining. I knew of each General and especially Petraeus which I knew deeply from other works and newspapers. I would say it's worth a read for anyone interested in military leadership.
The book highlights five Generals who were given leadership of a poor and failing situation. The five Generals were Themistocles, Belisarius, Willian T. Sherman, Matthew Ridgeway, and David Petraeus. I was especially intrigued by Belisarius and I've already added another book to my wishlist about his life, though the reviews were shoddy.
The book basically gives some historical significance around the situation of each General about how it got to this desperate point. These can get a little grainy and boring but once through, the good stuff starts. The General's acts to corrective abilities and the outcome. Finally, it gives a short biography of the General with a finish with their ending careers. Sadly, they all had similar endings that were not worthy of their feats.
The last chapter highlights attributes each General shared and really is the highlight of the book. They were very alike and that is the true reason for the book. I'm sure another few dozen General's could have been added to this group but wouldn't have had the same attributes.
It's good read and entertaining. I knew of each General and especially Petraeus which I knew deeply from other works and newspapers. I would say it's worth a read for anyone interested in military leadership.
June 6, 2021
I picked this up to read for a book club and had no prior knowledge of the author. I was very impressed with the opening three chapters on Themistocles, Belisarius, and Sherman. VDH does an excellent job of interweaving the campaign narrative with character backstory. The prose was clear and easy to follow, even for a theatre major like myself.
However, the writing clarity declined with the Ridgway chapter, and further declined with Petraeus. This may be in part due to the wider availability of sources on the Korean and Iraq Wars - leading to some of VDH’s observations being muddled by accounting for a variety of opinions. But his sentence structure also elongates in these chapters, straying from an initially clear, yet academic prose. I found it a slog to get through these chapters.
After reading some reviews, I’m not surprised to learn the author is a conservative commentator - but I do believe he does attempt to account for his bias. In the Petraeus chapter, he criticizes actions and comments by Rumsfeld and Powell on the Iraq War and Surge. But, he does spend more time outlining clearly how Obama and Biden criticized Petraeus in senate hearings and subsequent political actions. His writing is inherently biased, as is every piece of media we consume or make, but I didn’t find his bias irrational or obtuse. It was just his writing I found obtuse for chapters four and five.
If you’re a military history nut, I highly recommend this book for chapters 1-3, lightly recommend it for chapter 4, and you can slog through chapter five if you want.
However, the writing clarity declined with the Ridgway chapter, and further declined with Petraeus. This may be in part due to the wider availability of sources on the Korean and Iraq Wars - leading to some of VDH’s observations being muddled by accounting for a variety of opinions. But his sentence structure also elongates in these chapters, straying from an initially clear, yet academic prose. I found it a slog to get through these chapters.
After reading some reviews, I’m not surprised to learn the author is a conservative commentator - but I do believe he does attempt to account for his bias. In the Petraeus chapter, he criticizes actions and comments by Rumsfeld and Powell on the Iraq War and Surge. But, he does spend more time outlining clearly how Obama and Biden criticized Petraeus in senate hearings and subsequent political actions. His writing is inherently biased, as is every piece of media we consume or make, but I didn’t find his bias irrational or obtuse. It was just his writing I found obtuse for chapters four and five.
If you’re a military history nut, I highly recommend this book for chapters 1-3, lightly recommend it for chapter 4, and you can slog through chapter five if you want.
December 31, 2019
Hanson offers a biography of 5 generals who's training, attitude and attributes where exactly what was needed to rescue their countries wars. He profiles Themistocles, Belisarius, William Tecumseh Sherman, Matthew Ridgway, and David Petraeus.
Why I started this book: I'm eager for a new year and to cross more titles of my Professional List. And lets be honest one the best ways to accomplish more is to start early.
Why I finished it: Interesting idea, that there are generals that have prepared for certain scenarios and are ready to step in, in the time of need. But then I thought, is that an interesting idea? No, the U.S. Army has been training generals in all types of methods and circumstances for this exact reason, so that they have some one to step in. Gen. Marshall in WWII went out of his way to make it easier to fire generals without messing up their career, so that they could have the right man on the job. The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today is a great book on leadership. This would have been a far more fascinating book if Hanson showed how to recognize a "Savior General" before, so that you didn't have to wait and see if he was successful. The method is great for a historian but not a ruler, president or emperor.
Why I started this book: I'm eager for a new year and to cross more titles of my Professional List. And lets be honest one the best ways to accomplish more is to start early.
Why I finished it: Interesting idea, that there are generals that have prepared for certain scenarios and are ready to step in, in the time of need. But then I thought, is that an interesting idea? No, the U.S. Army has been training generals in all types of methods and circumstances for this exact reason, so that they have some one to step in. Gen. Marshall in WWII went out of his way to make it easier to fire generals without messing up their career, so that they could have the right man on the job. The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today is a great book on leadership. This would have been a far more fascinating book if Hanson showed how to recognize a "Savior General" before, so that you didn't have to wait and see if he was successful. The method is great for a historian but not a ruler, president or emperor.
February 10, 2023
Whatever this book wants to be, it fails at being for everyone but the very small portion of the population that still wholeheartedly believe in American superiority in the same way the author does. His choices seem odd, and honestly not great, and his inability to criticize anything to do with America again and again weakens his whole argument. While he charts out great military victories in somewhat dire situations, the word saviour rings patently false to me. Themistocles and perhaps all the subsequent generals in this book (jury’s out on Belisarius) are portrayed as paragons without personal ambition, which oh lord. The personal ambitions of these men, however blatant—Themistocles wasn’t looking to spread even the weak version of Athenian democracy around the Aegean with the fleet so much as he wanted an empire in the British mold, which is decidedly undemocratic—are ignored to serve a narrative that doesn’t hold water.
The commentary is at times good if you can fight through the ham handed summaries of evil communism, and the way that the author ignores real questions about American involvement in Iraq especially.
In the end, Hanson thinks his opinion—which is probably the opinion of so many grandfathers (especially the white ones)—is gospel. And honestly, fuck his adulation for LeMay when the man refuses the mention the hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties he incurred.
The commentary is at times good if you can fight through the ham handed summaries of evil communism, and the way that the author ignores real questions about American involvement in Iraq especially.
In the end, Hanson thinks his opinion—which is probably the opinion of so many grandfathers (especially the white ones)—is gospel. And honestly, fuck his adulation for LeMay when the man refuses the mention the hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties he incurred.
July 29, 2024
I really like the unique approach that Dr. Hanson brings to the table here, as it does not read as simply another chronicle of great battlefield generals and the decisions that define them. He narrows the scope here to specifically discuss why the 5 commanders that he chose were unique in saving what were previously seen as unwinnable situations by their contemporaries. This is a fantastic backdrop that affords discussions into a number of geopolitical issues broadly, not to mention the inevitable what-ifs that arise from the void of what could have been.
While this is a rather tight and interesting read, I will say that I believe that these case studies could have been better served with at least a cursory glance into some of the tactical and operational elements of their success stories to better amplify their stark contrast to their contemporary quagmire. That being said, this was a solid read that adds to the historical discussion around these 5 leaders.
(NOTE: I consumed this by way of Audible Audio, and I must say the narrator was pretty terrible. At times he sounded AI generated, and at others had odd, seemingly unnecessary pauses to take a drink or deep breath that felt in need of some simple editing. But while I typically appreciate my non-fiction by way of audio for the car ride, I feel this one would have been much better if I didn't spend a fair portion of the book struggling with the narrator.)
While this is a rather tight and interesting read, I will say that I believe that these case studies could have been better served with at least a cursory glance into some of the tactical and operational elements of their success stories to better amplify their stark contrast to their contemporary quagmire. That being said, this was a solid read that adds to the historical discussion around these 5 leaders.
(NOTE: I consumed this by way of Audible Audio, and I must say the narrator was pretty terrible. At times he sounded AI generated, and at others had odd, seemingly unnecessary pauses to take a drink or deep breath that felt in need of some simple editing. But while I typically appreciate my non-fiction by way of audio for the car ride, I feel this one would have been much better if I didn't spend a fair portion of the book struggling with the narrator.)
July 8, 2021
This book is about 5 generals, that had an impact on wars that may have otherwise been lost. Those were:
- Themistocles
- Flavius Belisarius
- William Sherman
- Matthew Ridgway
- David Petraeus
Whilst they were interesting people I can't say I drew too many new lessons from it. I liked the fact, that Hanson wrote how they interacted with the soldiers and led by example, never asking them to do something that they wouldn't do themselves. Furthermore, he does a good job of drawing parallels between the generals and trying to paint a good picture of what it means to lead men into combat.
A slightly aesthetic annoyance with this book is, that he starts with a general in ancient Greece, followed by one in Byzantium and then jumps over 1000 years to Sherman in the American Civil War. That time gap was very annoying for me, since it ignores so much that happened between Belisarius and Sherman. I don't think it would have hurt if he had included some general from e.g. the Hundred Years War or the British Civil War and also maybe one from the Napoleonic Wars such as maybe Admiral Horatio Nelson. But ehh that's just my personal preference. I understand that Hanson specialises in ancient and modern military history, not the middle ages and that's fine.
All in all, not a terrible book, but definitely not Hansons finest.
- Themistocles
- Flavius Belisarius
- William Sherman
- Matthew Ridgway
- David Petraeus
Whilst they were interesting people I can't say I drew too many new lessons from it. I liked the fact, that Hanson wrote how they interacted with the soldiers and led by example, never asking them to do something that they wouldn't do themselves. Furthermore, he does a good job of drawing parallels between the generals and trying to paint a good picture of what it means to lead men into combat.
A slightly aesthetic annoyance with this book is, that he starts with a general in ancient Greece, followed by one in Byzantium and then jumps over 1000 years to Sherman in the American Civil War. That time gap was very annoying for me, since it ignores so much that happened between Belisarius and Sherman. I don't think it would have hurt if he had included some general from e.g. the Hundred Years War or the British Civil War and also maybe one from the Napoleonic Wars such as maybe Admiral Horatio Nelson. But ehh that's just my personal preference. I understand that Hanson specialises in ancient and modern military history, not the middle ages and that's fine.
All in all, not a terrible book, but definitely not Hansons finest.
May 1, 2023
Hanson is able to draw insightful parallels across centuries of history; however, his brief snapshot of each 'savior' general tend to be overly simplistic. Characters like Ridgway, Petraeus, and Sherman are good representations of successful generals overcoming poor odds. Yet, I find that some of these generals were not always saviors. Petraeus merely staved off the inevitable in Iraq. Some may argue, and some do, that we should have pulled out of Iraq prior to the Surge based on what we know now. ISIS, extremism, and warring tribes are not solved in a span of a year. Petraeus did save American lives, but he by no means saved an expensive and brutal war.
Sherman was a different type of general. Hanson's argument that Sherman did not endorse or pursue 'total war' is absurd. Whether you agree with Sherman or not he did ravage Southern land in order to expediate the North's victory. This involved civilians.
Other generals were more believable. Ridgway definitely turned the Korean war and provided hope for millions of South Koreans. Themistocles definitely turned the Persians back at Salamis with expert skill.
Overall, I thought this book was an interesting set of mini-biographies on generals long-forgotten by American culture. However, I do not see each general fitting Hanson's thesis as beautifully as he would wish.
Sherman was a different type of general. Hanson's argument that Sherman did not endorse or pursue 'total war' is absurd. Whether you agree with Sherman or not he did ravage Southern land in order to expediate the North's victory. This involved civilians.
Other generals were more believable. Ridgway definitely turned the Korean war and provided hope for millions of South Koreans. Themistocles definitely turned the Persians back at Salamis with expert skill.
Overall, I thought this book was an interesting set of mini-biographies on generals long-forgotten by American culture. However, I do not see each general fitting Hanson's thesis as beautifully as he would wish.
January 28, 2022
This was a good selection of five generals which turned around wars or situations that seemed hopeless. Hanson has a deep background knowledge on all five wars which I lacked, especially the Korean and Iraq war. Each biography follows a similar narrative in that their background and upbringing begins a fair amount into the chapter. Comparing the biographies where I know more about the time period (subjects that have less primary source material to learn) like for Belisarius, to the Korean war where I know relatively little about the inter-commander politics, there was a distinct difference in personal enjoyment. I can see how someone who knows little about the time periods discussed would be confused and uninterested, as I only really enjoyed the sections where I had familiar footing.
I think this book is meant for people that know little about each war, yet a solid background knowledge of the topics almost feels required to fully grasp the situation each general faced. This was a combination of two of the authors areas of interest, ancient history and American history. If those topics interest you and you like Hanson, this book is worth a read.
I think this book is meant for people that know little about each war, yet a solid background knowledge of the topics almost feels required to fully grasp the situation each general faced. This was a combination of two of the authors areas of interest, ancient history and American history. If those topics interest you and you like Hanson, this book is worth a read.
August 31, 2024
Puiki analizė apie penkių generolų - Temistoklas, Belisarius, Sherman, Ridgway ir Petraeus - vadovavimą karams. Nepaisant didžiausio skepticizmo tuomet, kai kiekvienas iš jų pradėjo vadovauti kokrečioms karinėms pastangoms, jie buvo ypač sėkmingi iš pirmo žvilgsnio beveik jau beviltiškoje situacijoje. Neabejotinai dauguma skaitytojų prisimins paskutinį naujausią aprašomą atvejį apie generolą Petraeus. Paradoksalu, kad nepaisant didžiausių pasiekimų karo lauke šie karvedžiai vėliau negavo užtarnauto ir tinkamo pripažinimo ir pagarbos. Dar viena mintis. Ar tikrai kitąkart generolų gebėjimas puikiai vadovauti yra tai, ko reikėtų siekti? Ar nebūtų buvę geriau 1-ojo ar 2-ojo pasaulinių karų pabaigoje vokiečių generolai būtų buvę prastesni karvedžiai? Tikriausiai, jei jie būtų buvę prastesni, tada karai būtų baigęsi anskčiau ir būtų buvę galima išsaugoti nemažas skaičius žmonių gyvybių.
October 22, 2019
This book is a very happy surprise. Victor has a fluid writing style and it is just enjoyable to read.
"Prominent military historian Victor Davis Hanson explores the nature of leadership with his usual depth and vivid prose in The Savior Generals, a set of brilliantly executed pocket biographies of five generals (Themistocles, Belisarius, William Tecumseh Sherman, Matthew Ridgway, and David Petraeus) who single-handedly saved their nations from defeat in war. War is rarely a predictable enterprise-it is a mess of luck, chance, and incalculable variables. Today's sure winner can easily become tomorrow's doomed loser. Sudden, sharp changes in fortune can reverse the course of war."
I will read more books by him!
"Prominent military historian Victor Davis Hanson explores the nature of leadership with his usual depth and vivid prose in The Savior Generals, a set of brilliantly executed pocket biographies of five generals (Themistocles, Belisarius, William Tecumseh Sherman, Matthew Ridgway, and David Petraeus) who single-handedly saved their nations from defeat in war. War is rarely a predictable enterprise-it is a mess of luck, chance, and incalculable variables. Today's sure winner can easily become tomorrow's doomed loser. Sudden, sharp changes in fortune can reverse the course of war."
I will read more books by him!
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