"Modern man seeks to explain away suffering, to rationalize and mitigate it. The tragic sensibility, however, accepts suffering as intrinsic and irredeemable."
In The Death of Tragedy, George Steiner does not merely offer a scholarly analysis of tragic literature; he composes a requiem for an entire mode of human expression, and in so doing, crafts a meditation on the nature of civilization itself. His thesis, at its core, is that tragedy—true tragedy, the kind that grips the soul with a sense of unalterable doom—has ceased to be possible in the modern age. With a breadth of erudition that ranges from Aeschylus to Beckett, from Shakespeare to Racine, Steiner charts the evolution of tragedy and, ultimately, its demise. It is a book that demands to be wrestled with, one that insists on the reader’s intellectual engagement and refuses the simple comforts of resolution.
Steiner’s argument is deceptively simple but, like the best of tragic literature, contains multitudes. His assertion is that tragedy, as it was conceived by the Greeks and perfected in the Renaissance, is fundamentally incompatible with the spirit of modernity. This is not simply because the structures of belief that underpinned tragic art—fate, divine justice, cosmic retribution—have collapsed in the wake of Enlightenment rationality, though that is part of it. Rather, Steiner argues that modern man, in his quest for mastery over nature and self, has forfeited the capacity to confront the tragic sensibility that defined ancient and early modern consciousness.
It is in this loss of metaphysical depth that Steiner locates the "death" of tragedy. The Greeks, he argues, understood that tragedy was not merely the result of individual flaws or societal injustice but an inevitable clash between human will and an indifferent, often hostile cosmos. Figures like Oedipus, Prometheus, and Agamemnon suffer not because they are morally inferior or because their societies are corrupt but because they are bound by forces—whether the gods, fate, or their own inescapable natures—that they can neither control nor fully comprehend. Theirs is a world where suffering is written into the very fabric of existence, where human striving is, by definition, futile.
This, Steiner posits, is what has been lost. In the modern world, our tragedies are not cosmic but political, not existential but psychological. We look for explanations, for causes that can be identified and rectified—whether in class struggle, in economics, in psychology—believing that suffering, with enough knowledge or the right policies, can be mitigated, perhaps even eliminated. The modern sensibility, imbued with a belief in progress and individual autonomy, cannot reconcile itself to the notion that suffering is purposeless, that it cannot be redeemed or rationalized. For Steiner, this shift marks the fatal rupture between the tragic consciousness of the past and the world we now inhabit.
Yet, Steiner is not content to leave his argument in abstraction. One of the great pleasures of The Death of Tragedy is its insistence on grounding theory in close readings of texts. His analyses of Sophocles, Shakespeare, Corneille, and others are rich, nuanced, and deeply informed by his encyclopedic knowledge of Western literature and philosophy. Steiner moves effortlessly between the linguistic and the metaphysical, the historical and the aesthetic, drawing connections that illuminate not just the texts in question but the broader cultural shifts they reflect.
In discussing King Lear, for example, Steiner explores the tension between human agency and cosmic indifference, arguing that the play represents a culmination of tragic art because it refuses to offer even the cold comfort of divine justice. Lear, like Oedipus, suffers because he is human, because the universe is such that suffering is inevitable. Yet unlike Oedipus, Lear’s suffering has no higher purpose, no final resolution. It is, in the purest sense, gratuitous—a reflection of the ultimate meaninglessness of human striving in a world without gods or fate to anchor it.
By contrast, Steiner is far less charitable in his treatment of modern dramatists. He sees in figures like Ibsen, Shaw, and Brecht a domestication of the tragic, a reduction of grand metaphysical dilemmas to mere social or psychological conflicts. For Steiner, these writers, however accomplished, are fundamentally incapable of capturing the tragic spirit because they cannot bring themselves to confront the abyss—the radical unknowability of the forces that shape human existence. Instead, they seek to explain, to diagnose, to offer solutions. But tragedy, Steiner insists, is not about solutions; it is about the irreconcilable. It is about the recognition that some aspects of existence cannot be mastered, cannot be made whole, and must be borne.
This is not to say that Steiner dismisses modern drama entirely. On the contrary, he is deeply engaged with the work of twentieth-century playwrights, particularly those of the absurdist tradition, like Samuel Beckett. For Steiner, Beckett represents the closest modern approximation to true tragedy, precisely because he strips human existence of its illusions and confronts the audience with the stark reality of nothingness. Waiting for Godot, in its bleak circularity, captures the essence of tragedy in a world where the gods are silent and history offers no redemption. Beckett, Steiner argues, understands what so many of his contemporaries do not: that the human condition is, at its core, tragic not because we lack solutions but because the universe itself is indifferent to our striving.
At the heart of Steiner’s critique is a profound lament for the loss of the tragic sensibility, which he views as not merely an artistic or literary concern but a philosophical and existential one. The death of tragedy, for Steiner, is synonymous with the death of a certain understanding of what it means to be human. To live in a tragic world is to acknowledge that suffering is not merely accidental or avoidable but woven into the fabric of existence. It is to recognize that human greatness is defined not by mastery or triumph but by the capacity to endure, to persist in the face of an unfeeling cosmos.
And so, The Death of Tragedy resonates as both a critical study and a philosophical elegy. Steiner’s erudition is formidable, his prose densely packed with insights that reward careful, repeated reading. But beyond the scholarly apparatus lies a more profound meditation on the fragility of human life and the limits of our ability to understand and control the world around us. In mourning the death of tragedy, Steiner mourns the loss of a way of thinking, a way of being, that recognized the inevitability of suffering and yet, paradoxically, found in that recognition the possibility of human dignity.
For those of us who believe in the power of literature to illuminate the darkest corners of the human condition, Steiner’s The Death of Tragedy stands as a testament to the enduring relevance of the tragic mode. It reminds us that, in a world obsessed with solutions and progress, there remains something deeply valuable in the recognition that some truths cannot be reconciled, that some suffering cannot be explained away. In tragedy’s death, Steiner finds not despair but the possibility of confronting life’s deepest mysteries with a kind of resolute, if sorrowful, grace.