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Verdun: The Lost History of the Most Important Battle of World War I, 1914-1918
Alongside Waterloo and Gettysburg, the Battle of Verdun during the First World War stands as one of history’s greatest clashes. Yet it is also one of the most complex and misunderstood, in a war only imperfectly grasped.
Conventional wisdom holds that the battle began in February 1916 and lasted until December, when the victorious French wrested all the territory they had lost back from the Germans. In fact, says historian John Mosier, from the very beginning of the war until the armistice in 1918, no fewer than eight distinct battles were waged for the possession of Verdun. These conflicts are largely unknown, even in France, owing to the obsessive secrecy of the French high command and its energetic propaganda campaign to fool the world into thinking that the war on the Western Front was a steady series of German checks and defeats.
Although British historians have always seen Verdun as a one-year battle designed by the German chief of staff to bleed France white, Mosier’s careful analysis of the German plans reveals a much more abstract and theoretical approach.
Our understanding of Verdun has long been mired in myths, false assumptions, propaganda, and distortions. Now, using numerous accounts of military analysts, serving officers, and eyewitnesses, including French sources that have never been translated, Mosier offers a compelling reassessment of the Great War’s most important battle.
Conventional wisdom holds that the battle began in February 1916 and lasted until December, when the victorious French wrested all the territory they had lost back from the Germans. In fact, says historian John Mosier, from the very beginning of the war until the armistice in 1918, no fewer than eight distinct battles were waged for the possession of Verdun. These conflicts are largely unknown, even in France, owing to the obsessive secrecy of the French high command and its energetic propaganda campaign to fool the world into thinking that the war on the Western Front was a steady series of German checks and defeats.
Although British historians have always seen Verdun as a one-year battle designed by the German chief of staff to bleed France white, Mosier’s careful analysis of the German plans reveals a much more abstract and theoretical approach.
Our understanding of Verdun has long been mired in myths, false assumptions, propaganda, and distortions. Now, using numerous accounts of military analysts, serving officers, and eyewitnesses, including French sources that have never been translated, Mosier offers a compelling reassessment of the Great War’s most important battle.
400 pages, Hardcover
First published October 1, 2013
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 46 reviews
October 14, 2017
In this book, Mosier attempts to debunk some perceived myths of the Battle of Verdun. Of course, Verdun was more than just a single battle and actually a series of engagements, and Mosier stresses this particular point. Mosier often brings up Horne’s classic history and tries to make the history of the battle more broad and explain more of its complexities. He does, however, do a fine job bringing to life the area’s geography and how it affected the battle. Mosier’s style is readable (if a little obnoxious) and he has a good command of the subject matter and the various sources, even if his writing isn’t particularly eloquent. He does, however, have a captivating style. He mainly approaches the battle from a higher-up view and avoids bogging down in minor details.
However, Mosier’s book is a bit unfocused. He assumes a good deal of prior knowledge about the wider war. Mosier is critical of Joffre and Haig, but his critique seems too emotional and seems to consist mostly of potshots. He also has a tendency to quote novelists, which annoyingly does little to support any of his points. And at one point he writes that a French general (Frederick Herr) received an American Medal of Honor (he did?). There are also little quibbles like Mosier constantly writing “up” or “down” instead of north or south.
A fine, readable history, although some more maps would have helped and the format may not please everyone.
However, Mosier’s book is a bit unfocused. He assumes a good deal of prior knowledge about the wider war. Mosier is critical of Joffre and Haig, but his critique seems too emotional and seems to consist mostly of potshots. He also has a tendency to quote novelists, which annoyingly does little to support any of his points. And at one point he writes that a French general (Frederick Herr) received an American Medal of Honor (he did?). There are also little quibbles like Mosier constantly writing “up” or “down” instead of north or south.
A fine, readable history, although some more maps would have helped and the format may not please everyone.
September 24, 2016
There were times while reading this book that kept me wondering, if the Allies made so many mistakes, what was that rail car at Compiegne all about? Oh, that's right the Americans won the war because of St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne or at least according to Mosier.
No one questions that the French and British made mistakes, but is there anyone who truly believes that the U.S. could have taken on Germany all by itself in 1918 without the four years of blood-letting that preceeded it?
Mosier has some good points which make his book readable such as his assertions about the casualty figures, France's politicians who were desperate to keep their jobs so they went along with the falsehoods told by the Army, and of course, the fact that Falkenhayn didn't really want to "bleed France white". The trouble is I'm still not sure what he did want. The German High Command obviously wasn't sure either since he was pushed out after Verdun 5.
Verdun 5 is the one most most of us think of when we talk about Verdun. Starting on February 21, 1916, this battle is only one phase of the 4-year confrontation in the area. Mosier makes a great point of this. I found his presentation convincing on this topic. Unfortunately, Mosier's prejudices about German superiority and Von Falkenhayn were apparent and that made his book less appealing than it might have been.
No one questions that the French and British made mistakes, but is there anyone who truly believes that the U.S. could have taken on Germany all by itself in 1918 without the four years of blood-letting that preceeded it?
Mosier has some good points which make his book readable such as his assertions about the casualty figures, France's politicians who were desperate to keep their jobs so they went along with the falsehoods told by the Army, and of course, the fact that Falkenhayn didn't really want to "bleed France white". The trouble is I'm still not sure what he did want. The German High Command obviously wasn't sure either since he was pushed out after Verdun 5.
Verdun 5 is the one most most of us think of when we talk about Verdun. Starting on February 21, 1916, this battle is only one phase of the 4-year confrontation in the area. Mosier makes a great point of this. I found his presentation convincing on this topic. Unfortunately, Mosier's prejudices about German superiority and Von Falkenhayn were apparent and that made his book less appealing than it might have been.
November 24, 2013
The tone of this book is set by the following quotation regarding the French version(s) of the battle(s) of Verdun at the close of chapter one (page 32): "Mistakes, Misrepresentations, and Myths." A substitle in the first chapter is "True Lies," signalling how French sources misrepresented what was happening on the ground at Verdun over the course of the war. Much work on Verdun focuses on the battle fought in 1916. However, as Mosier points out, the battle actually stretched from 1914-1918, with American troops closing out this extended struggle at Saint-Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne.
Indeed, the author notes that there were nine separate battles at Verdun, with the 5th (in 1916) the one most mentioned and understood as "the" battle. Mosier notes that his thesis is not original, but he does observe that standard versions take battle # 5 out of context.
There is considerable discussion of the politics of the military (the French and Germans were especially political) and of the civil-military relationships among the major combatants. This is pretty well done.
Quibbles: the maps are very poor, in both quality and in terms of the quality of information transmitted to the reader. The author's disdain for various actors at the time is a bit overdone and becomes obtrusive at times (especially the critical analysis of the French and the rather benign view of Germans).
Overall, though, this is a fine book on a complex subject.
Indeed, the author notes that there were nine separate battles at Verdun, with the 5th (in 1916) the one most mentioned and understood as "the" battle. Mosier notes that his thesis is not original, but he does observe that standard versions take battle # 5 out of context.
There is considerable discussion of the politics of the military (the French and Germans were especially political) and of the civil-military relationships among the major combatants. This is pretty well done.
Quibbles: the maps are very poor, in both quality and in terms of the quality of information transmitted to the reader. The author's disdain for various actors at the time is a bit overdone and becomes obtrusive at times (especially the critical analysis of the French and the rather benign view of Germans).
Overall, though, this is a fine book on a complex subject.
March 28, 2021
Unfocused in places, and a bit strawman-y, but made up for by the fact that Mosier despises the French general staff more than anyone now living, and most long dead. The spite he has for Foch is admirable in a get off my lawn you damn kids sort of way.
Not your first book on the war, or your second, but worth considering for a deeper dive. Mosier is well informed with respect to materiel, tactics, strategy, and historiography.
Not your first book on the war, or your second, but worth considering for a deeper dive. Mosier is well informed with respect to materiel, tactics, strategy, and historiography.
August 25, 2015
The author is unfortunately obsessed with the lies and falsehoods that ran through the history of Verdun - in particular the French versions of events. He has such a grand view of the German military that it colors everything in the book. Certainly these arguments are valid but he can't be unbiased and results in a lot of snarky comments that removes one from really assessing what he is saying. However he is making solid points that should be considered when reading about the events in WWI as with any war. I think we have all been shaded by the amount of misinformation given us during Vietnam or Iraq that one looks to the past as being perhaps more truthful. The reality is that all wars are in part political or part of some moral issues that encourages or even creates the level of hidden or inaccessible information. I certainly give points to Mr. Mosier on the events of Verdun but it would have been better if he could be less emotional about it. His writing is not involving and with all the information he is supplying, that counters a lot of standard events, it would have helped to have more maps sandwiched in the events to follow his information. The author assumes one has read up on Verdun and WWI and is intimate with the history - so do that before reading this work.
July 3, 2020
I like learning about World War I a lot, A LOT, so I got a lot out of this book. Frankly, that's the only people I'd recommend this book to - hardcore ACKSHUYALLY World War I buffs, because the voice of the author is so annoying. This book captures the experience of listening to an old, opinionated, meandering professor very well - doesn't talk much about Verdun itself, when he does, says everyone involved was an idiot and the historians don't understand what was important, who was competent, and even where the battle took place. I'll try and read his other books, too, but I definitely wouldn't recommend these to even a casual enthusiast of World War I.
May 2, 2024
Artillery nerds (not me), look no further because this is the book for you!
July 25, 2014
It is becoming clearer to me that it is possible to read too many books on WWI. I do feel some sympathy for historians, who must increasingly struggle to say something new or distinctive on topics that have been so written about for such a long time. Even so, I have grown skeptical of histories that have some modifier, such as "lost", "critical", "what-if?", or something else. They promise to bring the reader some perspective that has been neglected until now and is thus more worthy of attention than other histories competing for attention. Pulling such an effort off successfully is must harder than it appears.
Mosier's book is about the series of battles fought around Verdun during WW1 from 1914 until 1918. His initial contention is that called separate episodes of this nearly continuous combat "battles" with winners and losers is not very informative, does little justice to the facts, and perpetuates a varieties of myths about the war. This is a worthwhile point and the author makes his case effectively about it.
Mosier has other arguments to make as well and these vary in their degrees of interest and their contentiousness. Some of the points are fairly technical while others link that military and the political in some curious ways.
Perhaps the most contentious and intriguing line of argument has to do with the linkage of allied control over battlefield information, allied propaganda, and military strategy. The claim is that the Allies were basing their strategy ultimately on there assumption that they were winning the casualty exchange with the Germans -- that German progress on the Western Front was coming at a proportionately higher body count than the Allies were suffering in defending against the Germans. As a result, the intuition was that the Allies would win the war by exhausting German manpower. However, the actual exchange rate of dead and wounded appears to have greatly favored the Germans over the Allies. However, given Allied controls over battlefield statistics and propaganda, Mosier claims that the Allies actually believed that they were winning the war of attrition when in fact they were losing the exchange badly. Allied political control over information, news, and propaganda was actually contributing to the senseless slaughter of infantry in the first three years of the war. This claim is plausible and at the same time is highly contention and speaks to nearly criminal leadership by the Allied military leaders and nearly criminal irresponsibility and incompetence by political leaders. ... the trouble is that making such a claim is one thing while proving it -- especially the strong negative normative implications -- is another. But it sure makes for good reading.
Another really interesting line of argument in Mosier's book concerns the differences in Allied versus German artillery capabilities. It is a very knowledgeable discussion and clarifies many questions I had about why the Germans did so well when their forces were not that different in number from the allies. The point is that, after accounting for effective firepower, the forces were quite different.
The details of particular battles in this massive war are hard to follow and remember, but the general trends are clear enough. Mosier makes some interesting claims about the geography of the Verdun region and its importance to military strategy. Readers should keep a map handy.
The book is highly polemical. The author is very negative towards the Allies and more positive towards the Germans. It is OK to have a point of view, but Mosier's comes across as a distraction. The book is also highly repetitive in its arguments, some of which crop up in multiple points throughout the narrative, whether or not it is necessary.
Overall, I learned something from the book and grant the author the benefit of the doubt. Verdun is an important campaign to know about. The incremental value of this book, relative to other histories, is not as great as the author claims. That is unfortunate and probably could have been addressed with some better editing.
Mosier's book is about the series of battles fought around Verdun during WW1 from 1914 until 1918. His initial contention is that called separate episodes of this nearly continuous combat "battles" with winners and losers is not very informative, does little justice to the facts, and perpetuates a varieties of myths about the war. This is a worthwhile point and the author makes his case effectively about it.
Mosier has other arguments to make as well and these vary in their degrees of interest and their contentiousness. Some of the points are fairly technical while others link that military and the political in some curious ways.
Perhaps the most contentious and intriguing line of argument has to do with the linkage of allied control over battlefield information, allied propaganda, and military strategy. The claim is that the Allies were basing their strategy ultimately on there assumption that they were winning the casualty exchange with the Germans -- that German progress on the Western Front was coming at a proportionately higher body count than the Allies were suffering in defending against the Germans. As a result, the intuition was that the Allies would win the war by exhausting German manpower. However, the actual exchange rate of dead and wounded appears to have greatly favored the Germans over the Allies. However, given Allied controls over battlefield statistics and propaganda, Mosier claims that the Allies actually believed that they were winning the war of attrition when in fact they were losing the exchange badly. Allied political control over information, news, and propaganda was actually contributing to the senseless slaughter of infantry in the first three years of the war. This claim is plausible and at the same time is highly contention and speaks to nearly criminal leadership by the Allied military leaders and nearly criminal irresponsibility and incompetence by political leaders. ... the trouble is that making such a claim is one thing while proving it -- especially the strong negative normative implications -- is another. But it sure makes for good reading.
Another really interesting line of argument in Mosier's book concerns the differences in Allied versus German artillery capabilities. It is a very knowledgeable discussion and clarifies many questions I had about why the Germans did so well when their forces were not that different in number from the allies. The point is that, after accounting for effective firepower, the forces were quite different.
The details of particular battles in this massive war are hard to follow and remember, but the general trends are clear enough. Mosier makes some interesting claims about the geography of the Verdun region and its importance to military strategy. Readers should keep a map handy.
The book is highly polemical. The author is very negative towards the Allies and more positive towards the Germans. It is OK to have a point of view, but Mosier's comes across as a distraction. The book is also highly repetitive in its arguments, some of which crop up in multiple points throughout the narrative, whether or not it is necessary.
Overall, I learned something from the book and grant the author the benefit of the doubt. Verdun is an important campaign to know about. The incremental value of this book, relative to other histories, is not as great as the author claims. That is unfortunate and probably could have been addressed with some better editing.
March 25, 2021
(Audiobook) This work may as well have been titled “How to slaughter some sacred French Cows”, because that is the raison d’etre for this work. While the focus is on the real story of events at Verdun, that it was more than what official histories indicate of the massive 1916 engagement, the bigger issues that this book focuses on are the shortcomings of the French military, from a detailed analysis of the French artillery, which was a significant weakness of the war, to its ability to alter the narrative as accepted by the French nation and historians.
Some of the issues, primarily with the French command, are not so alien, especially with the failing of Joffre, who was not much of a battlefield commander, but perhaps the best political general in the French military. However, the analysis of German and French actions can, especially in the strategy of the war, are of some interest and debate. Mosier is a bit more charitable to the German plans, especially in how they did take advantage of French mistakes. The author is good to note that there were multiple engagements at Verdun, not just the 1916 mega-battle.
Yet, for all of his attack of the sacred cows, he doesn’t really dispel all that much of the history of the 1916 battle. The Voie Sacree is still the Voie Sacree, and perhaps a big failing is that this book assumes that the reader will already have a detailed understanding of the war. However, there is a great chance that a reader, especially in America, who checks this book out, may view this book as the first real exposure to the battle. He tries to take a few shots at Alastair Horne’s work on Verdun, but doesn’t really dispel it, and to be honest, while there could be some flaws with Horne’s work, that one is better written and does offer a better sense of the 1916 battle. This book is at best a companion for those with knowledge of the battle and World War I. Not recommended for the outside reader.
Some of the issues, primarily with the French command, are not so alien, especially with the failing of Joffre, who was not much of a battlefield commander, but perhaps the best political general in the French military. However, the analysis of German and French actions can, especially in the strategy of the war, are of some interest and debate. Mosier is a bit more charitable to the German plans, especially in how they did take advantage of French mistakes. The author is good to note that there were multiple engagements at Verdun, not just the 1916 mega-battle.
Yet, for all of his attack of the sacred cows, he doesn’t really dispel all that much of the history of the 1916 battle. The Voie Sacree is still the Voie Sacree, and perhaps a big failing is that this book assumes that the reader will already have a detailed understanding of the war. However, there is a great chance that a reader, especially in America, who checks this book out, may view this book as the first real exposure to the battle. He tries to take a few shots at Alastair Horne’s work on Verdun, but doesn’t really dispel it, and to be honest, while there could be some flaws with Horne’s work, that one is better written and does offer a better sense of the 1916 battle. This book is at best a companion for those with knowledge of the battle and World War I. Not recommended for the outside reader.
July 22, 2014
This book might be a good preparatory reading for World War One. Dr. Mosier covers a number of topics, geography of France, German and French history prior to WWI, railroads and their usefulness and limitations as well as military preparedness. He explains in pain-staking detail why the French artillery was terribly inaccurate and inadequate. French politics are reviewed along with their divisive role in military preparedness.
The author claims the lost history is actually buried history. The French army controlled all information or disinformation of the war. The author delved into this mass of suppressed information finding that each layer of command lied to the one above it as to the results of the latest offensive effort. One of the main points the author makes is that Verdun was not one battle but a series of battles fought from late 1914 to 1918. One need to carefully review the source of the information provided in the index and keep a skeptical viewpoint to decide for yourself, is the book a fresh viewpoint and a struggle with official “truth” or a powerful revisionist account. Mosier also points out that WWI had no hero General to catch the public attention. Whereas, WWII had many Hero Generals that has kept the public interested in WWII for years. For those interested in World War One history the book is well worth the read. I read this as an audio book downloaded from Audible. The book was narrated by Wes Talbot.
The author claims the lost history is actually buried history. The French army controlled all information or disinformation of the war. The author delved into this mass of suppressed information finding that each layer of command lied to the one above it as to the results of the latest offensive effort. One of the main points the author makes is that Verdun was not one battle but a series of battles fought from late 1914 to 1918. One need to carefully review the source of the information provided in the index and keep a skeptical viewpoint to decide for yourself, is the book a fresh viewpoint and a struggle with official “truth” or a powerful revisionist account. Mosier also points out that WWI had no hero General to catch the public attention. Whereas, WWII had many Hero Generals that has kept the public interested in WWII for years. For those interested in World War One history the book is well worth the read. I read this as an audio book downloaded from Audible. The book was narrated by Wes Talbot.
June 7, 2015
Both entertaining and thought provoking. Mosier takes an alternative look at this epic, four year long bloody exercise in siege tactics, and draws all sorts of conclusions that I hadn't really considered before. I haven't previously focused much on WWI, so I'm coming from a mostly general overview perspective, but his sidebar conversations into the distorting power of myths, and the debate about the value of strategies like "war of attrition" or "strategic bombing" can apply to so many intn'l conflicts in any age. The more complex and ambiguous a problem is, the more prone a leader is to try to oversimplify it, and in the process misjudge it completely. He mostly focuses on the impacts from the French perspective, for whom it was a major battle. He doesn't exactly overlook it from the German perspective, but I got the impression it wasn't as important to them as it was to the French. One of his conclusions, tieing this into the collapse of the French gov't in 1940, wasn't very well supported, anc perhaps could have justified an entire add'l chapter.
September 8, 2021
I purchased this book in the gift shop at the National World War 1 Museum in Kansas City, MO during a visit there with my Dad in June 2016. I started to read this book shortly after returning home from that trip but soon set it aside as I wasn't enamored with the author's writing style. I recently pulled it back off the shelf for another try. I have not read any of Mosier's other books, but in this one he has more axes to grind than Paul Bunyan, mainly with other historians who he characterizes as misrepresenting the true scope and significance of the battles known as "Verdun". I would preferred a more straightforward telling of his version of the facts without the polemic. That being said, there are quite a number of interesting things in the book, especially about the development and use of artillery in WW1. Three out of five stars.
October 30, 2019
An interesting idea - the Battle of Verdun was actually 9 different battles throughout the course of WWI. What I found more intriguing was the psychology of the Allies in lying to the folks back home and lying so convincingly that some historians (and school textbooks) still buy into the lies!
Mosier sets out the case for which side was better prepared and equipped for the conflict. He also details the deception practiced by leaders to hide the devastation to the citizens, and, in some cases, their own governments. This turns several histories on their heads. Worth the arduous read
Mosier sets out the case for which side was better prepared and equipped for the conflict. He also details the deception practiced by leaders to hide the devastation to the citizens, and, in some cases, their own governments. This turns several histories on their heads. Worth the arduous read
November 4, 2025
With the return of trench warfare and restricted maneuver in Ukraine, I thought it would be interesting to read up on the history of the First World War. Verdun is a battle that I thought I understood fairly well, though not on the level of other battles I've researched like Gettysburg or the Battle of the Bulge. After reading this book, I came away with a better understanding of the murkiness of the First World War. I would have liked to see more tactical analysis, though the records from this war make it much harder to analyze than others like the Second World War. What I learned most from this book is the following: 1) Organization and equipment made the initial German offensives more successful than the French. 2) The mentality of the two sides on how to win the war differed more than I previously thought. 3) The "Battle of Verdun" was not an isolated event, it was a campaign throughout the war that only truly ended with American involvement.
First, the idea that this battle resulted from the Germans blindly sending waves upon waves of troops to the slaughter for little ground is a misconception. The misconception comes from the fact that the French and British were doing this and could not fathom that their enemy was doing anything different. In fact, the Germans were practicing early combined arms warfare, where infantry moved with machine guns, engineers, and artillery support to puncture holes in the French line that could then be exploited. This was not the hours of artillery bombardment followed by an "Over the Top!" call, it was decentralized command with greater concentrations of firepower. The French in this sector were late to understanding this and they did not have the weaponry to support this type of maneuver warfare, which showed in their failed counterattacks.
Second, this battle was not intended to purely be a battle of attrition as it may be thought. The German chief of staff, von Falkenhayn understood that time would not be in Germany's favor forever, yet he was not rushing. His plan for the offensive at Verdun in 1916, the most famous battle within the series of engagements, was to reach 1 of 2 outcomes. Option 1: Taking the terrain at Verdun would convince the French that they could not be victorious and they would accept peace, like Vicksburg in the American Civil War. Option 2: The French would respond by attempting to retake the ground lost and would destroy their ability to fight in the process, again resulting in a peace. The intention was not to simply kill as many Frenchmen as possible, it was to convince the army, government, and people that victory was out of reach. It may have worked, if Petain had not been installed and resolved to preserve his men rather than waste their lives for meters of ground that themselves were not valuable.
Third, the battle in 1916 was not the beginning and end at Verdun, the French did not win victory there and beat back the Germans that same year, though they proclaimed to have. The fighting in the area dated back to 1914 and it was not over until the American Expeditionary Force moved in during the Saint Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne Offensives. In this way, the area is more comparable to the battles north of Richmond that occurred over and over again until Grant finally cleared through during the Wilderness Campaign. Yet to the French government and people, the battle to reclaim Verdun had been over months ago. The lies from the army were seen as necessary to keep morale high, yet those lies themselves perpetuated the incompetence that had gotten them into the situation they were in. I don't want to be blindly jingoistic as an American, but even von Hindenburg himself credited the Americans influx of troops and campaigns as deciding the war.
To me, Verdun is a cautionary tale. It is viewed as a French triumph, the wall that broke the German tide and would eventually decide the war, all due to misinformation. To fail to scrutinize the facts and now history, is to set ourselves up for failure that we may not be able to recover from.
First, the idea that this battle resulted from the Germans blindly sending waves upon waves of troops to the slaughter for little ground is a misconception. The misconception comes from the fact that the French and British were doing this and could not fathom that their enemy was doing anything different. In fact, the Germans were practicing early combined arms warfare, where infantry moved with machine guns, engineers, and artillery support to puncture holes in the French line that could then be exploited. This was not the hours of artillery bombardment followed by an "Over the Top!" call, it was decentralized command with greater concentrations of firepower. The French in this sector were late to understanding this and they did not have the weaponry to support this type of maneuver warfare, which showed in their failed counterattacks.
Second, this battle was not intended to purely be a battle of attrition as it may be thought. The German chief of staff, von Falkenhayn understood that time would not be in Germany's favor forever, yet he was not rushing. His plan for the offensive at Verdun in 1916, the most famous battle within the series of engagements, was to reach 1 of 2 outcomes. Option 1: Taking the terrain at Verdun would convince the French that they could not be victorious and they would accept peace, like Vicksburg in the American Civil War. Option 2: The French would respond by attempting to retake the ground lost and would destroy their ability to fight in the process, again resulting in a peace. The intention was not to simply kill as many Frenchmen as possible, it was to convince the army, government, and people that victory was out of reach. It may have worked, if Petain had not been installed and resolved to preserve his men rather than waste their lives for meters of ground that themselves were not valuable.
Third, the battle in 1916 was not the beginning and end at Verdun, the French did not win victory there and beat back the Germans that same year, though they proclaimed to have. The fighting in the area dated back to 1914 and it was not over until the American Expeditionary Force moved in during the Saint Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne Offensives. In this way, the area is more comparable to the battles north of Richmond that occurred over and over again until Grant finally cleared through during the Wilderness Campaign. Yet to the French government and people, the battle to reclaim Verdun had been over months ago. The lies from the army were seen as necessary to keep morale high, yet those lies themselves perpetuated the incompetence that had gotten them into the situation they were in. I don't want to be blindly jingoistic as an American, but even von Hindenburg himself credited the Americans influx of troops and campaigns as deciding the war.
To me, Verdun is a cautionary tale. It is viewed as a French triumph, the wall that broke the German tide and would eventually decide the war, all due to misinformation. To fail to scrutinize the facts and now history, is to set ourselves up for failure that we may not be able to recover from.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
October 14, 2020
This is the third book I've read by Mosier. Like the other 2, I find this one hard to grade. There is much to like, and much to scratch one's head at.
Let's start with the good. Mosier provides a useful tonic to the historical groupthink that surrounds many of the battles of the first word war (the focus here is on the many battles for Verdun, but he talks about other battles too). He tries, with some success, to pierce the more or less accepted narrative of these battles, which is very Allies focused. Often portrayed as a static line where offensive action was impossible, Mosier notes that the Western front was in fact the site of numerous successful offensives by the Germans. He has a very firm grip on the weapons and tactics that made these offensives possible, even where the Germans were outnumbered (put simply - much better firepower through mortars, and a refusal to order suicidal frontal en masse attacks). He also does a good job of showing the deceitful manner in which the French (and British) high command reported the war to the politicians (who were supposedly in charge). I also like his conclusion that there are really no good lessons to be drawn from Verdun (even the sound military tactics used by the Germans were no different than what they did in other areas).
But as is often the case with Mosier, the individual pieces seem to lead to something less that a whole. His focus on the deception employed by the Allied command and press is convincing, yet I find it hard to believe that this wasn't also happening in Germany. He gives some credit to Petain, but the French victories at Verdun are brushed over in a couple of paragraphs. He is very convinced that only the Americans saved the Allies, which... actually sounds about right.
Mosier's prose is workmanlike, but he certainly isn't going to win any prizes for writing. To his credit, he is generally clear and the writing is easy to follow. He needs a better editor (I found numerous cases where exactly the same point, in more or less the same words, was made in successive paragraphs). He also used the phrase "Denial is not just a river in Egypt". But overall the book is fairly readable.
Let's start with the good. Mosier provides a useful tonic to the historical groupthink that surrounds many of the battles of the first word war (the focus here is on the many battles for Verdun, but he talks about other battles too). He tries, with some success, to pierce the more or less accepted narrative of these battles, which is very Allies focused. Often portrayed as a static line where offensive action was impossible, Mosier notes that the Western front was in fact the site of numerous successful offensives by the Germans. He has a very firm grip on the weapons and tactics that made these offensives possible, even where the Germans were outnumbered (put simply - much better firepower through mortars, and a refusal to order suicidal frontal en masse attacks). He also does a good job of showing the deceitful manner in which the French (and British) high command reported the war to the politicians (who were supposedly in charge). I also like his conclusion that there are really no good lessons to be drawn from Verdun (even the sound military tactics used by the Germans were no different than what they did in other areas).
But as is often the case with Mosier, the individual pieces seem to lead to something less that a whole. His focus on the deception employed by the Allied command and press is convincing, yet I find it hard to believe that this wasn't also happening in Germany. He gives some credit to Petain, but the French victories at Verdun are brushed over in a couple of paragraphs. He is very convinced that only the Americans saved the Allies, which... actually sounds about right.
Mosier's prose is workmanlike, but he certainly isn't going to win any prizes for writing. To his credit, he is generally clear and the writing is easy to follow. He needs a better editor (I found numerous cases where exactly the same point, in more or less the same words, was made in successive paragraphs). He also used the phrase "Denial is not just a river in Egypt". But overall the book is fairly readable.
February 5, 2026
Mosier has a preceding reputation as a revisionist historian, and if the title of the book doesn't clue you in, he's seeking to review the popular interpretation of the Battle of Verdun. In short, much of what we know and believe today is from Allied propaganda (hence "the lost history"), the Battle of Verdun is actually just a part of a series of battles over the entire region, and Falkenhayn was a wise man while Hindenburg was average. This was my first attempt to get into Mosier, and unfortunately the overall experience was disappointing.
Part of the problem is that very little of this book actually focuses on what is known as the Battle of Verdun. Now don't misunderstand me, I get what Mosier was trying to do: he says right at the beginning that you have to understand things in a broader context, and he tries to look at the all the engagements around Verdun leading up to the titular battle. The problem is that he spends so much time talking about this fight and that fight, and this internal struggle in the French military and that internal struggle, only for an underwhelming conclusion. When we finally get to THE Battle of Verdun, it's barely looked into with detail. I would dare estimate, for a book named after the Battle of Verdun, discussions on the actual battle amount to barely 20% of the book itself. (Maybe even less!) Imagine a book on the Tet Offensive that spent three quarters of its pages talking about the Vietnam War was going on, the various political machinations of South Vietnam, then perhaps within one chapter or so talked about the actual Tet Offensive and called it a day. It didn't help that everything seemed only weakly connected to the final event; I didn't really see how everything Mosier had discussed before had led up to this one moment, and how all the puzzle pieces fit together. In short, Mosier tells us he's going to bombard us with detail so we can finally "see the big picture", but when all is said and done, you're still left scratching your head as to what exactly that "big picture" was that differs from any other book about World War I.
Part of the problem is an unnecessarily large portion of this book is Mosier either taking potshots at other historians or potshots at historical figures. It's not that I don't think historians can criticize trends among other historians, but at some point it just felt like Mosier was puffing his chest out a bit. This is especially true when he gives a weak case that Falkenhayn wasn't actually trying to drain the French army, and does so right out of a page of fellow revisionist David Irving's playbook: honing in on a single German word and basically having this attitude of, "Y'all don't really know German like I know German! It actually means THIS!" Also, I'm not against criticizing historical figures, but when you start going into ad hominems, it can get sophomoric at worst and tiring to the reader at best. Near the end of the book, when Mosier started making fat jokes about Hindenburg, I had to roll my eyes and say enough was enough. It was right there that I ended my read, though I'm frankly amazed I lasted as long as I did.
It's a pity, because there's potential here. For example, Mosier talks about how the Allies perceived that the Germans were getting drained of manpower, when that was far from the truth. As other reviewers have said, the discussion of the French layout of towns and regions, and how they all correlate, was interesting, as was discussing how Verdun was set up as a staging point early on in the war. There were lots of potential routes the book could have taken that unfortunately weren't.
Really, there are two types of "revisionist" history books out there. There are the ones that try to examine the broader view of the updated facts now available to historians, and attempt from this to present a fuller picture over and against the "everybody knows" mentality. (Keith Nolan's work on Fire Support Base Mary Ann is one positive example of this, though he would never be labeled a "revisionist".) Then there are the ones that mainly lambaste everybody who isn't them with a kind of "wake up sheeple" mentality. Unfortunately, this book ultimately falls into the latter category.
Part of the problem is that very little of this book actually focuses on what is known as the Battle of Verdun. Now don't misunderstand me, I get what Mosier was trying to do: he says right at the beginning that you have to understand things in a broader context, and he tries to look at the all the engagements around Verdun leading up to the titular battle. The problem is that he spends so much time talking about this fight and that fight, and this internal struggle in the French military and that internal struggle, only for an underwhelming conclusion. When we finally get to THE Battle of Verdun, it's barely looked into with detail. I would dare estimate, for a book named after the Battle of Verdun, discussions on the actual battle amount to barely 20% of the book itself. (Maybe even less!) Imagine a book on the Tet Offensive that spent three quarters of its pages talking about the Vietnam War was going on, the various political machinations of South Vietnam, then perhaps within one chapter or so talked about the actual Tet Offensive and called it a day. It didn't help that everything seemed only weakly connected to the final event; I didn't really see how everything Mosier had discussed before had led up to this one moment, and how all the puzzle pieces fit together. In short, Mosier tells us he's going to bombard us with detail so we can finally "see the big picture", but when all is said and done, you're still left scratching your head as to what exactly that "big picture" was that differs from any other book about World War I.
Part of the problem is an unnecessarily large portion of this book is Mosier either taking potshots at other historians or potshots at historical figures. It's not that I don't think historians can criticize trends among other historians, but at some point it just felt like Mosier was puffing his chest out a bit. This is especially true when he gives a weak case that Falkenhayn wasn't actually trying to drain the French army, and does so right out of a page of fellow revisionist David Irving's playbook: honing in on a single German word and basically having this attitude of, "Y'all don't really know German like I know German! It actually means THIS!" Also, I'm not against criticizing historical figures, but when you start going into ad hominems, it can get sophomoric at worst and tiring to the reader at best. Near the end of the book, when Mosier started making fat jokes about Hindenburg, I had to roll my eyes and say enough was enough. It was right there that I ended my read, though I'm frankly amazed I lasted as long as I did.
It's a pity, because there's potential here. For example, Mosier talks about how the Allies perceived that the Germans were getting drained of manpower, when that was far from the truth. As other reviewers have said, the discussion of the French layout of towns and regions, and how they all correlate, was interesting, as was discussing how Verdun was set up as a staging point early on in the war. There were lots of potential routes the book could have taken that unfortunately weren't.
Really, there are two types of "revisionist" history books out there. There are the ones that try to examine the broader view of the updated facts now available to historians, and attempt from this to present a fuller picture over and against the "everybody knows" mentality. (Keith Nolan's work on Fire Support Base Mary Ann is one positive example of this, though he would never be labeled a "revisionist".) Then there are the ones that mainly lambaste everybody who isn't them with a kind of "wake up sheeple" mentality. Unfortunately, this book ultimately falls into the latter category.
January 21, 2026
The first World War makes for an interesting study in my mind for the amount of mind-numbing stupidity on the Allied side of battle. To state that the Allies' unintentional plan to turn every battle into a charnel house of horrors is not an overstatement. Seeing the fruitlessness of doing the same thing over and over again...the mind reels. Well, this book gives us a good look into why.
Verdun is - like the Somme - one of those protracted battles that incurred high casualties for relatively little territorial gain. To boil the book down to its essence - the French GQG in Paris operated in a different world that the one the world was fought in. Some of this was intentional, such as keeping any reporters who got to the front, or showing it only to sympathetic allies (something Disney thinks they pioneered, no doubt). They also used naming conventions for battles that were intentionally obuscative in order to make it easier to proclaim success. The reality is for as much as the "12th Battle of the Isonzo" sounds ridiculous, the author maintains that there were no less than nine distinct battles of Verdun.
The detail spelled out about the extent that the GQG would lie to their own government would appall a 21st century civilian authority. This does not include the purge of Roman Catholic generals in the early part of the century and the French reliance on equipment from the Franco-Prussian War, the latter issue hampering the French until the very end of the war.
What is illustrated is the need for direct civilian control and oversight of a nation's military. The military hierarchy needs another set of eyes to prevent operational blindness and lack of thinking in terms of new strategy and tactics. The painful lesson almost cost France its sovereignty.
BOTTOM LINE: How not to conduct war for dummies.
Verdun is - like the Somme - one of those protracted battles that incurred high casualties for relatively little territorial gain. To boil the book down to its essence - the French GQG in Paris operated in a different world that the one the world was fought in. Some of this was intentional, such as keeping any reporters who got to the front, or showing it only to sympathetic allies (something Disney thinks they pioneered, no doubt). They also used naming conventions for battles that were intentionally obuscative in order to make it easier to proclaim success. The reality is for as much as the "12th Battle of the Isonzo" sounds ridiculous, the author maintains that there were no less than nine distinct battles of Verdun.
The detail spelled out about the extent that the GQG would lie to their own government would appall a 21st century civilian authority. This does not include the purge of Roman Catholic generals in the early part of the century and the French reliance on equipment from the Franco-Prussian War, the latter issue hampering the French until the very end of the war.
What is illustrated is the need for direct civilian control and oversight of a nation's military. The military hierarchy needs another set of eyes to prevent operational blindness and lack of thinking in terms of new strategy and tactics. The painful lesson almost cost France its sovereignty.
BOTTOM LINE: How not to conduct war for dummies.
January 4, 2021
Other than most accounts of Verdun, the authors considers all the battles between 1914 and 1918 on both flanks of Verdun as battles fought for the city. For an approach like this the book is too thin in my opinion, especially the fighting from 1917 to the end of the war is hardly covered. That said there are many positive things to say about the book; mostly the analysis of the myths created about the battles by the French side in regards to causalities and terrain conquered during the various offenses between 1915 - 1917.The interpretation of Falkenhayn’ s letter to the emperor and the author's spin on it was very interesting to me as well. He argues a convincing point that the goal was less to bleed the French Army white than to convince the people of France that the war was futile and could not be won. His analysis of the person of Falkenhayn is very different from everything I read in the past about him. If you are going to read a single book about Verdun I wouldn’t pick this one, if you plan on reading several books about the topic this is definitely one to consider.
February 28, 2020
A history worth reading after you've read two other histories on the Battle of Verdun. Without any background knowledge the author sounds smug in his observations and theories regarding the battle, his comments on French leadership and tactics childish to the point that they overshadow some very interesting ideas on how the Western Front was fought. Being a quasi-nerd about World War I allowed me to really enjoy this book as I got to mentally argue points and revel in the technical details about such a bloody period in our world history.
June 13, 2018
Mosier does a brilliant job of doing what nobody else has done yet: get the real story of the SEVERAL battles for Verdun documented correctly. Highly recommend, great research, yes Mosier repeats a lot of information, but out of necessity due to the amount of information. Best work I have read on the subject to date, and at the very least will challenge the seasoned First World War historian/enthusiast on the "official" history, and how wrong and inaccurate it is.
December 28, 2021
Makes a convincing case that the narrative about this battle is wrong. Mosier seems to have a good command of German and French, which many Anglo WW 1 historians lack. So, definitely worth reading. My only critique is that I suspect most people will still leave confused about what actually happened. Needs better and more frequent maps
April 5, 2023
Revisionist pushback to myths I never got (German attackers were dynamic stormtroopers, not human wave robots; forts were completely useless, the defense always inflicted high casualty ratios) but still fascinating. Echoes of Bakhmut - politicians switching generals, misinfo everywhere, assumptions turning into myths, a target selected for political reasons in a giant front.
August 27, 2017
Very well foot noted, this book provides a good history of the war around the Verdun sector from start to finish.
December 21, 2017
The title may say Verdun but it covers most of the war with details not found in other books. I recommend reading one or two others if you aren't familiar with the war and then read this one.
January 22, 2018
An interesting look at world war 1 combat in relation to the many battles that took place in and around Verdun
April 17, 2018
One expression comes to mind: If you can’t dazzle them with brilliance, baffle them with...
December 20, 2018
a tough read
January 29, 2019
Kinds beats the head horse. The book could be half the length if he wasnt so redundant.
October 5, 2022
Hard to finish, had to read it for Dr. King class
December 31, 2024
An interesting analysis of one of the most terrible battles in history, the Battle of Verdun in France in the First World War.
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