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Θεωρία της ελευθερίας: Από την ψυχολογία στην πολιτική της δράσης
Το πολιτικό ιδεώδες της ελευθερίας -το ιδεώδες της ελευθερίας που θα πρέπει να προάγει το κράτος- είναι το ιδεώδες της μη κυριαρχίας. Ωστόσο, κάθε κράτος που έχει αναλάβει το έργο της διαφύλαξης της μη κυριαρχίας αποτελεί το ίδιο μια δύναμη που απειλεί να κυριαρχήσει πάνω στους πολίτες του. Δεν υπάρχει καμία εγγύηση εδώ ότι το κράτος δεν θα λειτουργήσει αυθαίρετα και αυταρχικά: καμία εγγύηση ότι θα σεβαστεί τα κοινά αναγνωρίσιμα συμφέροντα των μελών του. Πώς μπορούμε, λοιπόν, να προφυλαχθούμε από αυτόν τον κίνδυνο; Υποστηρίζουμε ότι, για να λειτουργήσει η δημοκρατία, θα πρέπει να αναγκάσει το κράτος να χαράξει την πολιτική του με άξονα τα κοινά αναγνωρίσιμα συμφέροντα του λαού και μόνον αυτά. Μια εκλογική δημοκρατία θα μπορούσε να εξασφαλίσει την εξέταση και την πιθανή υιοθέτηση των πιο εύλογων προτάσεων σχετικά με το τι αποτελεί κοινό αναγνωρίσιμο συμφέρον. Είναι απαραίτητο, όμως, να συμπληρώσουμε την εκλογική δημοκρατία με μια αμφισβητησιακή μορφή δημοκρατίας, η οποία θα επιτρέψει στον λαό, σε άτομα και σε ομάδες, να υψώσει αποτελεσματικά τη φωνή του εναντίον πολιτικών και πρακτικών που δεν αντανακλούν κοινά αναγνωρίσιμα συμφέροντα, σύμφωνα με τα δικά του κριτήρια.
Η υπαρκτή δημοκρατία έχει ατέλειες. Η ανάλυση μας υποδεικνύει διάφορους τρόπους με τους οποίους θα μπορούσαμε να βελτιώσουμε τις υπαρκτές δημοκρατίες. Το δημοκρατικό κράτος, αν κατανοηθεί σωστά, δικαιούται περισσότερο από οποιοδήποτε άλλο καθεστώς να χαρακτηριστεί ελεύθερο κράτος. Είναι το μόνο κράτος το οποίο μπορούμε να φανταστούμε ότι είναι σε θέση να προστατεύσει τον λαό από την κυριαρχία, χωρίς να γίνει το ίδιο ένα όργανο κυριαρχίας.
Η υπαρκτή δημοκρατία έχει ατέλειες. Η ανάλυση μας υποδεικνύει διάφορους τρόπους με τους οποίους θα μπορούσαμε να βελτιώσουμε τις υπαρκτές δημοκρατίες. Το δημοκρατικό κράτος, αν κατανοηθεί σωστά, δικαιούται περισσότερο από οποιοδήποτε άλλο καθεστώς να χαρακτηριστεί ελεύθερο κράτος. Είναι το μόνο κράτος το οποίο μπορούμε να φανταστούμε ότι είναι σε θέση να προστατεύσει τον λαό από την κυριαρχία, χωρίς να γίνει το ίδιο ένα όργανο κυριαρχίας.
352 pages, Paperback
First published July 1, 2001
3 people are currently reading
81 people want to read
About the author
Philip Pettit
56 books56 followersPhilip Noel Pettit (born 1945) is an Irish philosopher and political theorist. He is Laurence Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Human Values at Princeton University and also Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy at the Australian National University. He was a Guggenheim Fellow.
He was educated at Garbally College, the National University of Ireland, Maynooth (BA, LPh, MA) and Queen's University, Belfast (PhD). He was a lecturer at University College, Dublin, a Research Fellow at Trinity Hall, Cambridge, and professor at the University of Bradford. He was for many years Professorial Fellow in Social and Political Theory at the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. He is the recipient of numerous honours, including an honorary doctorate from the National University of Ireland. He was keynote speaker at Graduate Conference, University of Toronto.
Pettit defends a version of civic republicanism in political philosophy. His book Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government provided the underlying justification for political reforms in Spain under José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Pettit detailed his relationship with Zapatero in his A Political Philosophy in Public Life: Civic Republicanism in Zapatero's Spain, co-authored with José Luis Martí.
Pettit holds that the lessons learned when thinking about problems in one area of philosophy often constitute ready-made solutions to problems faced in completely different areas. Views he defends in philosophy of mind give rise to the solutions he offers to problems in metaphysics about the nature of free will, and to problems in the philosophy of the social sciences, and these in turn give rise to the solutions he provides to problems in moral philosophy and political philosophy. His corpus as a whole was the subject of a series of critical essays published in Common Minds: Themes from the Philosophy of Philip Pettit (Oxford University Press, 2007).
He was educated at Garbally College, the National University of Ireland, Maynooth (BA, LPh, MA) and Queen's University, Belfast (PhD). He was a lecturer at University College, Dublin, a Research Fellow at Trinity Hall, Cambridge, and professor at the University of Bradford. He was for many years Professorial Fellow in Social and Political Theory at the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. He is the recipient of numerous honours, including an honorary doctorate from the National University of Ireland. He was keynote speaker at Graduate Conference, University of Toronto.
Pettit defends a version of civic republicanism in political philosophy. His book Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government provided the underlying justification for political reforms in Spain under José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Pettit detailed his relationship with Zapatero in his A Political Philosophy in Public Life: Civic Republicanism in Zapatero's Spain, co-authored with José Luis Martí.
Pettit holds that the lessons learned when thinking about problems in one area of philosophy often constitute ready-made solutions to problems faced in completely different areas. Views he defends in philosophy of mind give rise to the solutions he offers to problems in metaphysics about the nature of free will, and to problems in the philosophy of the social sciences, and these in turn give rise to the solutions he provides to problems in moral philosophy and political philosophy. His corpus as a whole was the subject of a series of critical essays published in Common Minds: Themes from the Philosophy of Philip Pettit (Oxford University Press, 2007).
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
March 7, 2008
I sympathize strongly with connecting up free will/-action/-self/-what-have-you debates with freedom as a political concept. The book contains a helpful review of some of the dominant themes in debates about freedom within analytical philosophy. I think Pettit heads in the right direction when he points to something inherently social and human about the nature of freedom, but where he advocates a return to the republican ideals advocated as ideological justification for the American Revolution, things begin to go awry.
Among other problems, it's hard to see what force in society today exists to push through the ideals of 1776. The bourgeoisie which was progressive at the time and carried through the French and American Revolutions now exists only as a reactionary class force. There is precious little evidence that the bourgeoisie is any less loathe to "inflame expectations" or "disturb the public content with complaints" than it was in 1825, the year in which William Paley issued the warnings against construing freedom as non-domination that Pettit quotes to support his argument that the best thinkers of the time were all for freedom as non-domination--unless it started to give people funny ideas about substantial equality. (These quotes, far from making the case that Paley was really for the right kind of freedom although he endorsed the wrong one, show a kind of naked cynicism in his refusal to endorse philosophical positions which would lend ideological support to the struggles of the oppressed.)
Pettit calls this a paradox, and it is true that there is something contradictory here. The contradiction, however, is not a mere accident of unexplained bigotries and resentments, but arises from the friction between the republican ideals of the day that guided the bourgeoisie in overthrowing feudalism (which we are all quite happy about!) and the real material interests of that class once its revolution had been carried through and the task remained to contain the liberatory aspirations of the classes below it.
The way Pettit tells the story, it appears a mere unfortunate accident that the bourgeois class did not fully live up to its republican ideals. Things are different now, we're told, because now the bourgeoisie can stomach the idea of treating women and servants fully as persons. But things remain mysterious: why do they have better ideas now than they did then? What's the evidence that they do?
In fact, that the ideals of republicanism were eventually betrayed is no accident of the vicissitudes of ruling class opinion, but in fact the necessary side effect of the pursuit of the bourgeoisie's material interests and the need for new ideological justifications to match these interests (a process that the quotes from Paley's letters clearly illustrate). As the bourgeoisie has even less interest now in substantial human freedom than it did in 1825, there's little reason to hope that all we need to do is remind it of the good ideas it's simply managed to have "forgotten" by the wayside of history. Instead, we should look to the struggles that have won concessions from the bourgeoisie such as the struggle for women's reproductive freedom, for the eight-hour day, and for the abolition of slavery as examples of the kinds of class struggle that can move the pursuit of human freedom forward, and understand human freedom in connection with the sort of political freedom you would find in a society where everyone's needs as human beings were fully met.
Among other problems, it's hard to see what force in society today exists to push through the ideals of 1776. The bourgeoisie which was progressive at the time and carried through the French and American Revolutions now exists only as a reactionary class force. There is precious little evidence that the bourgeoisie is any less loathe to "inflame expectations" or "disturb the public content with complaints" than it was in 1825, the year in which William Paley issued the warnings against construing freedom as non-domination that Pettit quotes to support his argument that the best thinkers of the time were all for freedom as non-domination--unless it started to give people funny ideas about substantial equality. (These quotes, far from making the case that Paley was really for the right kind of freedom although he endorsed the wrong one, show a kind of naked cynicism in his refusal to endorse philosophical positions which would lend ideological support to the struggles of the oppressed.)
Pettit calls this a paradox, and it is true that there is something contradictory here. The contradiction, however, is not a mere accident of unexplained bigotries and resentments, but arises from the friction between the republican ideals of the day that guided the bourgeoisie in overthrowing feudalism (which we are all quite happy about!) and the real material interests of that class once its revolution had been carried through and the task remained to contain the liberatory aspirations of the classes below it.
The way Pettit tells the story, it appears a mere unfortunate accident that the bourgeois class did not fully live up to its republican ideals. Things are different now, we're told, because now the bourgeoisie can stomach the idea of treating women and servants fully as persons. But things remain mysterious: why do they have better ideas now than they did then? What's the evidence that they do?
In fact, that the ideals of republicanism were eventually betrayed is no accident of the vicissitudes of ruling class opinion, but in fact the necessary side effect of the pursuit of the bourgeoisie's material interests and the need for new ideological justifications to match these interests (a process that the quotes from Paley's letters clearly illustrate). As the bourgeoisie has even less interest now in substantial human freedom than it did in 1825, there's little reason to hope that all we need to do is remind it of the good ideas it's simply managed to have "forgotten" by the wayside of history. Instead, we should look to the struggles that have won concessions from the bourgeoisie such as the struggle for women's reproductive freedom, for the eight-hour day, and for the abolition of slavery as examples of the kinds of class struggle that can move the pursuit of human freedom forward, and understand human freedom in connection with the sort of political freedom you would find in a society where everyone's needs as human beings were fully met.
February 16, 2018
Hardest book ever.
to-read-in-part
August 18, 2017Filosofía Política Contemporánea. Unidad 4.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews