I couldn't get into this book. Not interesting. From some areas I do know something about, I think she hops on the bandwagon with some popular topics and gives mathematics (and scientific authorities) unwarranted credit for solving this and that problem.
She says some Nobel prize winner proved mathematically that "no democratic voting system could ever be completely fair." Not sure why that's a revelatory accomplishment. Quoting a researcher, Cole writes that unfair "'inevitably means different things to different people. When my kids say something's unfair,..what they really mean is, they didn't get what they want."' Disagreement on outcomes goes with Democracy, where people have different points of view. But of course, fairness on outcomes is different than voting systems that are set up to determine policy outcomes. If we disagree on policy outcomes, we still might regard the voting process by which we get those outcomes as being fair. That's the way it used to be in the pre-Trump era, but that's not where Cole is at when she writes that "The one thing that most parties do agree on is that the current system is the worst."
Before that conclusion though, she writes that "In the end, deciding which voting system is the fairest of them all comes down to, well, voting." So....the current system is the worst, but it's also the fairest? And isn't this the way Democracy works? Voters make the decision about how to conduct elections?
Cole gets into the rational "social choice theory" that applies mathematics to allocate societal benefits fairly ("Fair Division"). Not sure here why mathematics gets the credit which is built into our biological being, as Darwin observed in 1870's and as others with common sense have known all along. Group life is essential to survival and well being. We are bred to merge with the group, and to do that we must walk the line between our own self-interest and the interests of others within the group. That means we are disposed to, and impelled by, a wide array of social instincts to give up some of our own self-interest on behalf of the good of the group (a collection of self interests).
In a separate chapter, Cole gives mathematics credit for the golden rule. That rule, in all its variant forms, appears in a wide variety of cultures for a reason. It, and reciprocity, is necessary for group life to cohere. She touts the Axelrod book on the evolution of cooperation as if that feature of group life is a mathematical creation when it, with reciprocity and the golden rule, is built into our biology. It's necessary for our self-interest.
In her discussion of game theory, Cole notes that mathematical models prove that self-interested behavior doesn't work - because predators run out of prey - relative to cooperation. Pull in Darwin though, and you get a different picture. Within any group are those that seek the benefits of group life without any of the responsibilities that go with it. In other words, they go through the motions to hide self-interested imperatives. They manipulate and lie; they smile and screw people over. They dominate when they can get away with it. And, regarding game theory, it's the same. Cole writes that "Clearly, if one party cooperates while the other cheats, the cooperator is a sucker. But if both cheat, no one gets anything." She is setting aside common sense here. Other-regarding people who intend to get to yes in any dispute resolution process will be suckers if the others are not playing by the same rues.
Cole touts Lynn Margulis's excellent book that shows our bodies are made by cooperators. But, then, Cole doesn't note that our bodies have to fend off self-interested viruses and bacteria that have only their own interests in "mind." That sleight-of-hand business extends to her comments that, while the connection between smoking and cancer is proven statistically, "smoking caused by any particular case of cancer is near impossible to demonstrate." Really?
Cole's big thing here is that causality, taking from the quantum world, is in the end probabilistic: it applies generally, but not to individual cases. She notes that Einstein refused to go there - and we're familiar with the debates he had with the quantum theorists in this regard, but then she writes this: "Unpredictably, argued Born, does not mean that subatomic behavior does not have causes; it only means that it has causes too subtle and complex for us to untangle." While she calls Einstein's debate with Born "delicious," I am not sure what to make of this Born quote as it seems to substantiate Einstein's perspective, though I think she's making a point about causality in a probabilistic sense. Just because we cannot (inherently, because the act of observing via light influences what we see) know what's going on at the subatomic level, this doesn't mean that causality does not exist at an individual particle level.