Bilim düşmanı! Akıl düşmanı! Anarşist!.. Feyerabend, 1975 yılında yayımlanan Yönteme Karşı adlı yapıtıyla bu ve benzeri suçlamalara hedef olurken aynı zamanda geniş bir tartışmayı da başlatıyordu. Elinizdeki Özgür Bir Toplumda Bilim'de ise bir yandan Yönteme Karşı'nın başlatmış olduğu bu tartışmayı tekrar ele alarak daha da geliştirmekte, öte yandan da bilim alanındaki tezlerini toplum alanını da kapsayacak biçimde genişleterek özgür bir toplumda bilimin ve bilim adamının rolünün ne olması gerektiğini tartışmaktadır.
Paul Karl Feyerabend was an Austrian-born philosopher of science best known for his work as a professor of philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, where he worked for three decades (1958–1989).
His life was a peripatetic one, as he lived at various times in England, the United States, New Zealand, Italy, Germany, and finally Switzerland. His major works include Against Method (published in 1975), Science in a Free Society (published in 1978) and Farewell to Reason (a collection of papers published in 1987). Feyerabend became famous for his purportedly anarchistic view of science and his rejection of the existence of universal methodological rules. He is an influential figure in the philosophy of science, and also in the sociology of scientific knowledge.
I don’t know why I (re)read Feyerabend, except for the best of all reasons. I discovered the book in my library (having forgotten that I had bought it), flipped thru it, started to read and could not stop.
Feyerabend had the unique position of being a rebel in the Philosophy of Science. He started as a disciple of Popper but came to, let us say, disagree which much of what Popper stood for. In fact, he disagreed with almost everyone. He was brilliant and he knew it and so he was a bit more arrogant than was good for his purposes. He knew what he was talking about and he knew how to be polemical. He did not mind being an outsider. Probably enjoyed it.
But did he make a lasting contribution? If he is remembered at all then probably for being an "anarchist" and for the slogan "anything goes". That this is not entirely fair goes without saying. But it seems to be the only way to ensure fame, being reducible, if only mistakenly, to one slogan.
And it is not easy to say what he really stood for. He introduced 'anarchism' as a medicine he says and he "could envisage periods in which rationalism is preferable." (186)
This book is basically only an appendix to his mayor work "Against Method" with a few clarifications, maybe, and a lot of critique against his critics. This part he called "Conversations with Illiterates". Calling your opponents (among them Agassi and Gellner) illiterate probably did not help in winning their sympathies. But it is great reading. And the examples he gives are really shocking. How is it possible that a writer with wonderfully clear and concise prose as Feyerabend was able to use can be misunderstood like this? And not only by one reviewer but apparently by all? Is it really that "we have no longer incompetent professionals, we have professionalized incompetence"? (183)
I think the answer is very simple and it is also a kind of reductio ad absurdum (to use one of Feyerabend’s favorite expressions) of the goal to treat alternatives to science with respect (or rather science with less respect.) Because it is a (maybe sad) fact that we do think in paradigm. So even within one frame (in this case philosophical writings), it is impossible to understand a writer who departs from established views. And because you do not understand him you start constructing "inconsistencies" to convince yourself that he is out of his mind. And if this happens to philosophers who had more or less the same education how should one be able to understand (or take seriously) the arguments of witch-doctors or astrologers or of people thinking we could learn from the Hopi Genesis?
That Feyerabend found help from faith-healers and not from traditional medicine is anecdotal evidence. Can one take this seriously? Of course, it is important to know the history of science. We have to know that a lot of what we take for granted (even thinking that Galileo’s system is superior to Aristotle’s) is in some respect a consequence of historical coincidence. But we have no choice but to stick to one believe-system. Not because it happens to be the correct one but because everything else would be impossible, except maybe for rare individuals like Feyerabend.
I wonder how much of today’s relativism is a direct result of Feyerabend. I doubt that there is a connection. But one must admire a man who as a Professor in Berkeley was unhappy with the task of telling his Mexican and Indian and Black students "what a small group of white intellectuals had decided was knowledge". (118) I just happen to think there is no real alternative.
Quotes.
"Every piece of knowledge contains valuable ingredients side by side with ideas that prevent the discovery of new things."
"I thought that regarding all achievements as transitions, restricted and personal and every truth as created by our love for it and not as 'found' would prevent the deterioration of once promising fairy tales... I now realize that these considerations are just another example of intellectualist conceit and folly."
"Nestroy, George S. Kaufman, Aristophanes, on my scale of values range far above Kant, Einstein and their anemic imitators."
"A liberal is not a mealymouthed wishywashy nobody who understands anything and forgives everything, he is a man or a woman with occasionally quite strong beliefs... Thus, being a liberal, I do not have to admit that Puritans have a chance of finding truth."
"An argument is not a confession but an instrument designed to embarrass opponents."
“A ciência em uma sociedade livre” expande as ideias e responde às críticas de “Contra o método”, o primeiro (e mais famoso, ou infame) livro de Paul Feyerabend. É dividido em três partes: 1) Razão e prática, na qual aprofunda certos pontos que ficaram pendentes na obra anterior, 2) A ciência em uma sociedade livre, que empresta o título ao livro e que expande as ideias originais de “vale tudo” e de “anarquismo epistemológico”, e 3) Conversas com ignorantes, na qual responde a diversos críticos — e deixa claro (com capítulos como “Lógica, a capacidade de ler e escrever e o professor Gellner” ou “Do profissionalismo incompetente à incompetência profissionalizada — o surgimento de uma nova raça de intelectuais”) o espírito incendiário do autor que, futuramente, conferir-lhe-iam o epíteto de “o maior inimigo da ciência” em um artigo publicado na Nature, em 1987.
Imagino Feyerabend rindo para o artigo emoldurado em seu escritório.
Publicado em 1978, certas passagens parecem dirigidas ao Brasil de 2020: “[…] A maneira como problemas sociais, problemas de distribuição de energia, a Ecologia, a Educação, o cuidado de idosos e assim por diante são ‘solucionados’ em nossas sociedades pode ser mais ou menos descrita da seguinte forma. Surge um problema. Ninguém faz nada sobre ele. As pessoas começam a ficar preocupadas. Os políticos divulgam essa preocupação. Os especialistas são chamados. Estes desenvolvem um plano ou uma variedade de planos. Grupos de poder com especialistas próprios realizam várias modificações nos planos até que uma versão diluída seja aceita e concretizada. O papel dos especialistas nesse processo gradativamente aumentou. Os intelectuais desenvolveram teorias sobre a aplicação da Ciência aos problemas sociais. ‘Para ter ideias’ eles perguntam a outros intelectuais e políticos. Apenas raramente lhes ocorre que não é sua responsabilidade, e sim a responsabilidade daqueles diretamente envolvidos, decidir a questão. Eles simplesmente presumem que suas ideias e aquelas de seus colegas são as únicas que importam e que as pessoas têm de se adaptar a elas. Mas o que essa situação tem a ver comigo?”
A resposta a essa pergunta retórica traz elementos que muito recordam Frantz Fanon, Paulo Freire e, mais recentemente, a noção de “epistemicídio”, do pensador Boaventura de Sousa Santos (e retomada por Sueli Carneiro e Djamila Ribeiro): “Após 1964, estudantes mexicanos, negros e índios entraram para a universidade como resultado de novas políticas educacionais. Lá ficavam eles sentados, em parte curiosos, em parte desdenhosos, em parte simplesmente confusos na expectativa de obter uma ‘educação’. Que oportunidade para um profeta em busca de seguidores! Que oportunidade, meus amigos nacionalistas me diziam, de contribuir para a divulgação da Razão e a melhoria da humanidade! Que oportunidade para uma nova onda de Iluminismo! O que eu sentia era muito diferente. Pois descobri que os argumentos complicados e as histórias maravilhosas que eu até então tinha contado para meu público mais ou menos sofisticado poderiam ser apenas sonhos, reflexões da presunção de um pequeno grupo que tivera sucesso em escravizar todos os demais com suas ideias. Quem era eu para dizer a essas pessoas o quê e como pensar? […] Ora, falou-se muito de libertação, de igualdade racial — mas o que isso significava? Significava a igualdade dessas tradições e as tradições do homem branco? Não. A igualdade significava que os membros de raças e culturas diferentes agora tinham a chance maravilhosa de participar das manias do homem branco, tinham a chance de participar de sua Ciência, Tecnologia, Medicina, Política. Esses eram os pensamentos que me passavam pela mente enquanto eu olhava o meu público, e eles me fizeram recuar com revulsão e terror da tarefa que deveria estar desempenhando. Pois a tarefa ��� isso agora ficou claro para mim — era a de um capataz de escravos, muito requintado, muito sofisticado. E capataz de escravos não era o que eu queria ser.”
Se eu pudesse voltar no tempo e aconselhar a mim mesmo, diria para ler as partes 2) e 3) de “A ciência em uma sociedade livre” antes de ler “Contra o método”. Explico. Na parte que dá nome a este livro, vislumbramos aquilo que poderíamos chamar, de fato, de uma visão feyerabendiana da ciência ou, melhor, de epistemologia, de conhecimento. Ou seja: passamos a ter um ponto de partida para a leitura de “Contra o método”. A leitura da parte 3), por sua vez, serve para nos alertar sobre possíveis erros de leitura do texto de Feyerabend que, diferentemente de outros autores de filosofia e história da ciência, é muito mais carregado de sarcasmo, ironia, retórica e de argumentos indiretos (isto é, que não partem das convicções do autor, mas de um autor que se reveste, temporariamente, das convicções de seu interlocutor para poder abalar seu edifício desde as fundações).
Feyerabend diz com todas as letras: “A Ciência é uma ideologia entre muitas e deve ser separada do Estado exatamente como a religião hoje está”. Em uma época de pandemia, mas em que vemos a ascensão de movimentos anti-vacinas; em uma época de “home offices” e de “lives” dependentes das tecnologias de telecomunicações, mas em que vemos pipocarem cosmologias terraplanistas, essa ideia não apenas parece um enorme contrassenso mas, também, extremamente perigosa. E sim: é literalmente “contra-o-senso”, contra uma ideia monolítica de “razão”, que fundamentaria um “método”, que basearia a “ciência”, que justificaria, circularmente, a “razão”. Sim, a ascensão das ideias não-científicas (ou pseudocientíficas) é perigosa. Mas Feyerabend nos lembra de que a Ciência também pode ser terrível — como foi, em muitos momentos inclusive da história recente. Aliás, não será a Ciência a nos proteger do abismo da tecnocracia liberal do qual, vertiginosamente, estamos nos aproximando. A Ciência é bela, é poderosa, mas não é a antítese da ignorância — e a ignorância… a ignorância é o maior dos perigos.
Yazar kitapta bilime karşı şüphelerininin nedenlerini delillendiriyor ve özgür bir dünyada bilimin daha "aklıselim" olması için yapılabilecekler konusunda tavsiyeler veriyor. Şu sorulara cevap arıyor Paul Feyerabend:
A) Bilim nedir? Nasıl gelişmektedir, sonuçları nelerdir; standartlan, prosedürleri, sonuçlan diğer standartlardan, prosedürlerden ve sonuçlardan nasıl fark etmektedir?
(B) Bilimi böylesine yücelten nedir? Bilimi, diğer var olanlara üstün kılan, tercih edilir olmasını sağlayan nedir? Modern bilimin Aristo bilimine tercih edilmesinin gerekçeleri nelerdir?
Paradigma kavramından bahsettikten sonra bilimin aslında birtakım uzman grubunun kabulü olduğunu, bilimin halkın denetiminden geçmemesinin onu kiliseleştirdiğini söylüyor. Nasıl kilisenin söylemleri gerçek olmadığı halde gerçek gibi sunulduysa zamanında, bugün de bilimcilerin söylemleri gerçeğin bir yorumu olduğu halde bize gerçek gibi sunuluyor.
"Ailesinden hasta olan birine bir doktorun ameliyat tavsiye ettiğine, bir başkasının ameliyatı kesinlikle tavsiye etmediğine?, bir üçüncüsünün ise, bambaşka bir yol önerdiğine şahit olmamış olanımız pek azdır. Nükleer güvenlik, ekonominin durumu, ilaçların yan etkileri, aerosol spreylerin atmosfer üzerindeki olumsuz etkileri, eğitim yöntemlerinin etkinliği, ırkın zeka üzerindeki etkisi ve daha nice benzeri konularda bir uzmanın söylediğini bir başka uzmanın söylediğinin tuttuğunu hiç gördünüz mü?"
It sure isn't Feyerabend's best book, as this is in essence just his declaration of war against everyone who (mis)read his previous book - "Against Method", but his critics (and fans alike) should all read it in order to avoid parroting the same empty accusations and/or professing he defended something he didn't really support... something which has become all too common, as any review of tertiary literature shows.
In a sense, Feyerabend is to blame for the mess he got into: No matter how entertaining "Against Method" is, he was too creative and innovative for his style, and to this day people believe he actually supported the idea that in science anything goes. He went to great lengths to explain this is not what he meant, among other things, berating everyone who lambasted his work up to this point (strangely enough, he doesn't seem to mind his supporters, being hard to tell if he even had any).
It could have been a truly wonderful book, had he not written it with so much anger. As it is, the book is just a fun read with the occasional good insight, though it's hard to tell it managed to do the one thing Feyerabed hoped for: that Feyerabend knew science had its limitations (being a former scientist himself), and he wasn't the deranged post-modern relativist who believed science was rubbish.
Summary & Thoughts: This is a book that takes Paul Feyerabend's epistemological princilples from Against Method and extends them to a political theory about the role of science in a democratic society. It posits that science is just one of many traditions, and there is no objective way to judge one tradition against another. Therefore, it advocates for an essentially pluralistic society in which science itself is de-centred from the public sphere. It seems very of its moments (the 70s?) and in my mind too accepting of mysticism, hunter-gatherer epistemologies, ideas that might be psuedo-science. He thinks we have no objective grounds really to reject these schools of thought, and we instead have to work it out politically and democratically. The standards by which we adjudicate can not presuppose Rationalism, which makes it tricky to think-- how then do we decide? He says the conversation must not be 'guided,' and instead made up collaboratively as people go along. This part is the weakest, for me. But the strongest part, for me, is his insistence that democracy is in fact more important than Truth or science. He would rather have a free society where people make some mistakes than an unfree one run by technocratic experts.
I thought that Against Method was a work of genius. Before I got to Mr. Feyerabend, I was suspicious that other philosophers of science, notably Popper and Kuhn, were finding more defined structure and process in scientific advancement than really existed. Mr. Feyerabend showed how much chaos, social and political context, and guesswork underly the seemingly rational and logical process. In his world, science is not totally without method, but much of it is enlightened stumbling in which the scientist grabs onto an unpopular idea, often from some disrespected tradition, and then gnaws the bone until he finally gets to the marrow.
Mr. Feyerabend often goes too far, but he tells us, sometimes openly, sometimes between the lines, that he is doing so. It's often hard to tell what he really means, but that is the point. Part of what he really means is that there are no crisply defined boundaries. He's against the scientific establishment and the mainstream of the philosophy of science. He does a brilliant job of taking them down, but he repeatedly tells us that he isn't an anarchist but is only using anarchy as a tool to show the weaknesses in his rhetorical opponents.
So I have a pretty good idea of what he is against, but I'm still not entirely sure what he is for or whether it makes sense. He advocates for his idea of a free society in which groups of like thinking people can band together and work within traditions that the mainstream world rejects. He wants these groups to be entirely independent and self-contained so that they are not just nods to old traditions in the dominant mainstream world, but have their own individual existence. He wants more social control over science, because he sees mainstream science as a form of religion based on a false claim of having a unique access to truth. I'm sure he'd say that I am misreading him and that his point is more subtle. That's probably true, but still I wonder about whether his program is possible and whether it would produce a good result if it were implemented. I think that every tradition that exists within a society is inevitably impacted by the dominant forces. You can have a Black society or a Jewish society or a Yanomami society or witches operating within the mainstream society, but they can never be truly independent of it, nor is it desirable by my way of thinking that they should be. And we have found with the rise of the internet that when small groups of like-thinking individuals band together, the results are often horrendous, and do nothing to contribute to a productive proliferation of different forms of thinking. Give me mainstream science as flawed as it might be. Make room around the edges for people who think differently. Don't shout them down or make it impossible for them to have careers. Cherish the oddballs. They can be the breeding ground for new ideas that will sometimes be revolutionary and valuable, but more often than not will truly be the waste of time that the establishment will see them as being. And please let's not put them in charge of anything important beyond their own research.
In this hilariously bitchy book, Feyerabend can be taken to reveal how under-examined the tensions between the ideals of democracy as the ability to live self-directed lives and the organization of societies according to arcane science which no one really understands in any comprehensive way. By trying to so away with any notion of a uniform scientific method that applies across science, he does away with one of the planks of how this tension is typically hidden - through faith in some alleged rational methodology. By exposing the creativity that was a part of many seminal moments in science history (a theme that will be taken up as "finitism" by sociologists of scientific knowledge), he reveals that our understanding of how science works is deeply mystical and lacking in historical grounding.
Once this has been revealed, he carries a brief for yielding equal opportunities to other traditions apart from the specific Western scientific one, on the grounds of democratic equality for people to carry on as they wish instead of having to necessarily live as "secondary grafts on a basic structure that is an unholy alliance of science, rationalism, and capitalism". Since traditions can only judge traditions from their own perspective, a meta-methodological rule should entitle every tradition an equal chance to flourish, no matter how unscientific it may seem.
Feyerabend is hilarious, and it's not always entirely clear what he believes - he often claims that his arguments are just medicine for a sick tradition of thought about science. But he succeeds because he uses notions and arguments familiar to everyone to argue for positions that we've been taught to reject in a knee-jerk fashion (relativism! epistemic anarchy!), and for that (at least) he deserves credit.
"Bir zamanlar insana, kendisini zorba bir dinin yarattığı korkulardan ve önyargılardan kurtaracak fikirleri ve gücü vermiş olan aynı girişkenlik, şimdi insanı kendi çıkarlarının kölesi haline getiriyor...." modernliğin temel yapı taşlarından biri olan, yıllarca bağımsız ve güvenilir olduğu düşünülen bilim başlarda doğanın nasıl işlediğini anlamaya çalışmak için ortaya çıksa da sonrasında doğanın nasıl işlemesi gerektiğine kendisi karar verdi ve buna yönelik eylemlerini meşrulaştırma aracına dönüştü. aydınlanma dönemi cidden bir aydınlanma mı yoksa pozitivizm bize yeni bir din mi sundu, paul karl feyerabend tarafından harika bir şekilde ele alınmış ve bilimin otoritesi eleştirilmiş. bilim bağımsız değil, onun bu kısıtlanmış hali güvenirliğini de etkiliyor. sanayi devrimi sonrasında bilimin nasıl yozlaştığını birçok örnekten anlayabiliriz aslında. bilimin mevcut konumunu eleştiren hazine değerinde bir kitap
Might've even given this a 2-star rating if it hadn't clarified PKF's position a bit in certain areas. Doesn't really say anything that wasn't already said in AM, which is my main gripe with the book. The other issue is that half of it is responses to reviews of AM that I simply have not read. Ah well. Probably worth a revisit once I actually read the things this book is responding to.
Keşke kitabın yarısını eleştirilere cevap vermeye ayırmak yerine kendi fikirlerini daha çok açıklasaydı. Havada kalan birçok konu var, sürekli aynı şeyler söylenip duruyor. Yönteme Karşı kitabı bu bakımdan daha iyi olabilir. Eleştirilere verdiği cevaplarının saldırganlığı ne kadar kendi bu tavrı savunmuş olsa da okurken rahatsız ediyor.
In this sequel to Feyerabend's Against Method, the iconoclasm continues. The book is, more than anything else, a clarification of the views presented in the original, although that is not necessarily unwelcome. It is worth noting that, in this vein, the latter half of this book contains Feyerabend's criticism of several reviews of Against Method.
"Every piece of knowledge contains valuable ingredients side by side with ideas that prevent the discovery of new things."
Two years ago, I came across a book named Against Method (1975), basically this volume is a continuation of it, of its irreverent attack on widespread ideas about the nature of knowledge and the prestige of science in the west, with an added rebuttal to critics of Against Method. The main difference between Against Method and Science in a free Society is that the author extended his critique beyond the problem of scientific rules and methods, to the social function and direction of science today. If you would like to read about how Feyerabend took the epistemological principles from Against Method and extended them to a political theory about the role of science in a democratic society, this is your book.
In the first 1/3 of the book, the author again reminded us how science and their methods are not inherently objective. Science is a tradition, with its own method of conceptualizing problems and deriving conclusion, and of course, limitations. Thus, there is no perfect method, the concept that a single method contains firm, unchangeable and binding principles in all situations is perilous.
Throughout history, there is not a single rule, however plausible, however firmly grounded in logic and general philosophy that is not violated in some forms, at some time in the future. The invention of atomism in antiquity, the Copernican Revolution, the rise of modern atomism (Dalton; kinetic theory; dispersion theory; stereochemistry; quantum theory), the gradual emergence of the wave theory of light occurred only because some thinkers either decided not to be bound by certain ‘obvious’ rules, or because they unwittingly broke them.
The examples Feyerabend brought up are not to encourage randomly breaking rules and doing research arbitrarily and unguided. There are standards, but they come from the research process itself, not from abstract views of rationality. It needs ingenuity, tact, knowledge of details to come to an informed judgement of existing standards and to invent new ones. This leads to the next 1/3 of the book where the author illustrated how new rules or ideas can be given equal opportunities to be evaluated, even when it contradicts with prevailing theories or authority assumptions. The author’s proposed solution is a pluralistic society in which science itself is de-centralized from the public sphere.
I hate to say that, but he lost me in this part of the argument. To give all new rules equal opportunities to be evaluated is an ideal yet seems like any practice will fall short of this ideal. Imagine non-discriminatingly evaluate mysticism, hunger-gatherer epistemologies, witchcraft, astrology, cults, and ideas that may be pseudo-science… The questions I have boil down to a simple: ‘Who gets to evaluate everything and how?’
If the standards by which we adjudicate can not presuppose rationalism, how on earth do we decide on anything? Feyerabend explained that the lofty authority of the “expert” claimed by scientists is incompatible with any genuine democracy, and often merely serves to conceal entrenched prejudices and divided opinions with the scientific community itself. Therefore, he proposed that the society elect laymen, and the elected laymen can and must supervise science. Duly elected committees of laymen must examine whether the theory is well established as the scientists want us to want us to believe, whether being established in their sense settles the matter, and whether it should replace other views in schools. However, this argument is, in my point of view, his weakest point in the book. Nevertheless, his calling for far greater diversity in the content of education to facilitate democratic decisions over such issues is interesting.
You may wonder what is in the last 1/3 of the book? This last part contains Feyerabend's criticism of several reviews of his book Against Method, and whole lot consists of him sniping at his critics for misreadings and the inability to distinguish between straight argument and a reductio ad absurdum. You’d be surprised how long this part is. In a nutshell, great book, still very much worth reading.
If, after reading *Against Method*, and in particular its surprising final chapter, you wonder if Feyeraband may be against science, you should read *Science in a Free Society* (*Farewell to Reason* would also work fine for this purpose). Of course, Feyeraband's defenders will argue that he's not against science *per se*, but they will also tell you to ignore *Science in a Free Society* (I have literally read a paper on Feyeraband's "anything goes" that acknowledges that the opposite of one its central theses is said in *Science in a Free Society*, but appears contradictory to Feyeraband's other body of work (1)). In the anti-science's most appalling form, Feyeraband brags about telling people to ignore their doctor's medical advice in treating serious illnesses. For perhaps different reasons, Feyeraband's followers and myself agree, maybe not his best work.
(1) Shaw, Jamie. "Was Feyerabend an anarchist? The structure(s) of ‘anything goes’." _Studies in History and Philosophy of Science part A_ 64 (2017): 11-21.