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Rising Sun, Falling Skies: The Disastrous Java Sea Campaign of World War II
A fresh look at the disastrous Java Sea Campaign of 1941–42 which heralded a wave of Japanese naval victories in the Pacific but which eventually sowed the seeds of their eventual change in fortunes.
In the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, the Japanese juggernaut quickly racked up victory after victory. Desperate to secure resource-rich regions in the Pacific and ensure their continued dominance of South East Asia, Japanese forces were determined in their efforts to conquer Malaya, Singapore and the oil-rich islands around Java Sea - Borneo, Sumatra and Java itself. In the face of this seemingly unstoppable tide stood a small Allied force - American, Australian, British and Dutch. Thrown together by circumstance; cut off from reinforcements or in many cases retreat; operating with old, obsolete equipment and dwindling supplies, there was little hope of victory. Indeed, the month-long Java Sea Campaign, as it subsequently became known, quickly evolved from a traditional test of arms into a test of character. In the face of a relentless enemy and outnumbered, outgunned and alone, they defiantly held on, attempting to buy weeks, days, even hours until a better line of defense - and offense - could be established. These were the men of the US Asiatic Feet, the British Far Eastern Fleet, the Royal Netherlands Navy's East Indies Squadron and the Royal Australian Navy. And their supporting units like Patrol Wing Ten, the Royal Netherlands Naval Air Service, the US Army Air Force's 17th Pursuit Squadron and submarines of all these fine nations. A campaign that has been too often either ignored by historians or criticised for poor command decisions, this is the story of the sailors and the airmen at the sharp end, and how they fought and endured the first months of the War in the Pacific.
In the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, the Japanese juggernaut quickly racked up victory after victory. Desperate to secure resource-rich regions in the Pacific and ensure their continued dominance of South East Asia, Japanese forces were determined in their efforts to conquer Malaya, Singapore and the oil-rich islands around Java Sea - Borneo, Sumatra and Java itself. In the face of this seemingly unstoppable tide stood a small Allied force - American, Australian, British and Dutch. Thrown together by circumstance; cut off from reinforcements or in many cases retreat; operating with old, obsolete equipment and dwindling supplies, there was little hope of victory. Indeed, the month-long Java Sea Campaign, as it subsequently became known, quickly evolved from a traditional test of arms into a test of character. In the face of a relentless enemy and outnumbered, outgunned and alone, they defiantly held on, attempting to buy weeks, days, even hours until a better line of defense - and offense - could be established. These were the men of the US Asiatic Feet, the British Far Eastern Fleet, the Royal Netherlands Navy's East Indies Squadron and the Royal Australian Navy. And their supporting units like Patrol Wing Ten, the Royal Netherlands Naval Air Service, the US Army Air Force's 17th Pursuit Squadron and submarines of all these fine nations. A campaign that has been too often either ignored by historians or criticised for poor command decisions, this is the story of the sailors and the airmen at the sharp end, and how they fought and endured the first months of the War in the Pacific.
487 pages, Hardcover
First published July 23, 2013
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 56 reviews
September 16, 2015
This book picks up after the attack on Pearl Harbor, and how the Japanese Navy and Army, continued their dominance across the Pacific and really anywhere they wanted to go. The beginning speaks of how MacArthur, dis obey orders and allowed the entire Army air corps to be destroyed. This would have a profound effect for many months. Even after he left the Philippines he would deflect responsibility to another person who actually was doing their job and making the best they could for his mistakes. The author also goes into the Dutch, and the British, and how they at first were also caught by surprised. Because these two countries had been fighting the Germans in the Atlantic the ships they had along with Ares at first were old and very out dated especially when it came to weapons. There was also a power struggle between the three and the Dutch won out and Washington let an Admiral Hart out and reassigned him. He actually was a man with a plan instead the new man to me had a disregard for human life because he sent his ships in or ordered them to attack against must stronger force and put all of his ships out there. Nothing wrong with the men serving just they were on much older ships going against the Japanese. Lost a lot of good men because of him and MacArthur, just not thinking that at the beginning of the war that they were going up against a much more powerful foe until our war machine was up and running. An interesting book with battles that I had not read about before. Really a forgotten part of the beginnings of the war. Overall a good book. Igot this book from net galley.
December 6, 2022
An intriguing book about an oft forgotten phase in the Pacific War, when Japan invaded the Dutch East Indies and the Japanese still ruled supreme. With a mix of old and obsolete destroyers and cruisers the ABDA command tried to halt the Japanese advance. The author provides a fresh narrative on the way the Dutch with their obselete ships fought the Japanese and how they succeeded with just a handful old submarines to sink more ships than the British and US combined. Karel Doorman, the Dutch admiral who went down with his ship, is reinstated as the man who tried his best, although not enough but at least he tried.
Unfortunately, although extensive and meticulously researched, the narrating style is rather dull and not engaging. Therefore 'just' 3 stars.
Unfortunately, although extensive and meticulously researched, the narrating style is rather dull and not engaging. Therefore 'just' 3 stars.
October 28, 2020
Well written, the author makes you part of the story by his narrative skills. Never a dull moment, Cox makes bold statements about the multiple errors made by the Allies during this period, a period of defeat which could bring learning opportunities from a strategic, tactical and operational standpoint. This period has not been covered in depth unfortunately as it brings to the fore some of the factors that will influence the rest of the war. Some of these factors include: the management of military units from multiple nations, integration of communication between air and naval units, dissemination of intelligence at the operational level and above all ensuring there is a common purpose and clear realistic objectives to guide the actions of military leaders in the field. Many men and ships were sacrificed for political reasons, leaders being guided by pride and emotions at the expense of a more rational approach that would have led to better conservation of limited assets. The Allies had yet to understand the advantage that the Japanese had in night fighting and the usage of superior torpedoes. It seems that it is difficult to acknowlege that the enemy can be superior with its tactics and technology.
December 16, 2014
Wow, where to begin? This book was a monster. As per my Kindle app, it was going to take me about 20 hours to finish. I think I may have gotten it down to 15 or so, but this was a mammoth book. When the forward tells you that the author decided a book needed to be written about ALL of the Allies failed efforts in the Pacific War, as all of the other books were just about a few of the battles, you know you're going to be in for a LOOOONG read.
But. NONE of the book was boring. The author described everything so well, that you felt the "thrill" and terror of battle. It wasn't dramatized or romanticized. It was real. Gritty, raw and ultimately frustrating as hell.
War is hell, but politics is WAAAY worse. Much of the Allies failures were the result of political backstabbing by those in charge who wanted more power, but when they got it at the expense of wiser leaders, they dropped the ball to the great detriment of those fighting under them.
After speaking briefly to my father who is a bit of a WWII buff, asking him how the heck the Allies managed to turn it around, the answer was basically, America's military production of ships and planes finally caught up to and surpassed the Japanese. As this book is only from 1941-1942, I need to do much more research to be able to wrap my head around the Allies eventually succeeding.
I am a Pacific War nube. So this book may not be as great as I think it is as I have nothing to compare it to, but when a book has 30% of it being the notes and bibliography to the first 70%, I'm impressed. Being an English major, I know the importance of citation and I tend to look at poorly cited works as being lesser and suspect. This book blew me away with the notes. I NEVER read notes to books, never. Yet I read these notes, because they were just as interesting as the book itself.
It is SO IMPORTANT to read history and to LEARN from it. My lessons learned from this are 1) NEVER surrender, fight until you die if you are backed into a corner, because surviving may not be so great at the hands of the enemy, 2) don't let yourself be backed into a corner, always leave an out. If that's not possible, refer to lesson 1, 3) If you want to destroy something so the enemy doesn't get it, do it yourself and do a good job of it, 4) be willing to NOT follow incompetent leaders who are ok with sending you on a suicide mission while they stay nice and cozy and safe back at the office. Yes, on occasion a suicide mission is necessary to try to save others who are unable to help themselves, but know the difference between a worthy sacrifice and a moron-leader decision.
I honestly cannot say enough good things about this book. I completely loved it, even when my blood was boiling at the asinine decisions the "leaders" made and when I was tearing up at the unnecessary loss of life. To me, a good book makes you feel, and non-fiction is no exception.
Fantastic book, amazingly written, a solid five stars. Get it, read it. It's huge, but don't let the size of it intimidate you. It is incredibly worth it, even the notes.
My thanks to NetGalley and Osprey Publishing for an eARC of this book to read and review.
But. NONE of the book was boring. The author described everything so well, that you felt the "thrill" and terror of battle. It wasn't dramatized or romanticized. It was real. Gritty, raw and ultimately frustrating as hell.
War is hell, but politics is WAAAY worse. Much of the Allies failures were the result of political backstabbing by those in charge who wanted more power, but when they got it at the expense of wiser leaders, they dropped the ball to the great detriment of those fighting under them.
After speaking briefly to my father who is a bit of a WWII buff, asking him how the heck the Allies managed to turn it around, the answer was basically, America's military production of ships and planes finally caught up to and surpassed the Japanese. As this book is only from 1941-1942, I need to do much more research to be able to wrap my head around the Allies eventually succeeding.
I am a Pacific War nube. So this book may not be as great as I think it is as I have nothing to compare it to, but when a book has 30% of it being the notes and bibliography to the first 70%, I'm impressed. Being an English major, I know the importance of citation and I tend to look at poorly cited works as being lesser and suspect. This book blew me away with the notes. I NEVER read notes to books, never. Yet I read these notes, because they were just as interesting as the book itself.
It is SO IMPORTANT to read history and to LEARN from it. My lessons learned from this are 1) NEVER surrender, fight until you die if you are backed into a corner, because surviving may not be so great at the hands of the enemy, 2) don't let yourself be backed into a corner, always leave an out. If that's not possible, refer to lesson 1, 3) If you want to destroy something so the enemy doesn't get it, do it yourself and do a good job of it, 4) be willing to NOT follow incompetent leaders who are ok with sending you on a suicide mission while they stay nice and cozy and safe back at the office. Yes, on occasion a suicide mission is necessary to try to save others who are unable to help themselves, but know the difference between a worthy sacrifice and a moron-leader decision.
I honestly cannot say enough good things about this book. I completely loved it, even when my blood was boiling at the asinine decisions the "leaders" made and when I was tearing up at the unnecessary loss of life. To me, a good book makes you feel, and non-fiction is no exception.
Fantastic book, amazingly written, a solid five stars. Get it, read it. It's huge, but don't let the size of it intimidate you. It is incredibly worth it, even the notes.
My thanks to NetGalley and Osprey Publishing for an eARC of this book to read and review.
January 5, 2020
Cox offers a readable account of the doomed effort to defend the Dutch, American, and British possessions in the Java Sea area, focusing wholly on the naval-air war. He is at his best in balancing clear accounts of battle with dramatic anecdotes. His analysis is good in terms of the psychology of certain commanders and is fair to most players. His explanations of the controversial strategic actors, such as MacArthur, Churchill, and Helfrich, explain why each acted so irrationally, with MacArthur receiving the harshest criticism. His actions and reactions are aptly explained as shock. Cox's take on Doorman is particularly well thought out.
My squabbles are with the shallow research, numerous minor factual errors (Sakai was not Japan's leading ace), and the lack of Japanese perspective. Some of it is due to a lack of anecdotes. The Japanese suffered horrendous personnel losses and after the war few, particularly among the officers, were willing to talk. Other sources are still in Japanese. Yet, a discussion of even their operational plans and considerations is absent. This can be chalked up to the shallow research, but also Cox's temperament. He seems genuinely, and certainly not without reason, disgusted by the Japanese, but it goes further than that. He rarely misses a chance to criticize them, making their naval victories more a matter of overwhelming force than any real skill. Indeed, he even repeats words with the Japanese, showing a lack of attention to prose as if he cannot wait to get to the Allied side of things. It became a little tiresome hearing how "luxurious" the heavy cruiser Chokai was time and again.
All that said, Cox runs a clinic on how to describe the flow of battle. His description of the sinking of Prince and Wales and Repulse is peerless, and even the confusing gunnery actions made sense, bolstered by superb maps. All in all, its a book worth reading for what it does well.
My squabbles are with the shallow research, numerous minor factual errors (Sakai was not Japan's leading ace), and the lack of Japanese perspective. Some of it is due to a lack of anecdotes. The Japanese suffered horrendous personnel losses and after the war few, particularly among the officers, were willing to talk. Other sources are still in Japanese. Yet, a discussion of even their operational plans and considerations is absent. This can be chalked up to the shallow research, but also Cox's temperament. He seems genuinely, and certainly not without reason, disgusted by the Japanese, but it goes further than that. He rarely misses a chance to criticize them, making their naval victories more a matter of overwhelming force than any real skill. Indeed, he even repeats words with the Japanese, showing a lack of attention to prose as if he cannot wait to get to the Allied side of things. It became a little tiresome hearing how "luxurious" the heavy cruiser Chokai was time and again.
All that said, Cox runs a clinic on how to describe the flow of battle. His description of the sinking of Prince and Wales and Repulse is peerless, and even the confusing gunnery actions made sense, bolstered by superb maps. All in all, its a book worth reading for what it does well.
October 12, 2014
An intruiging book on the naval - air campaign (mostly the naval air side of the campaign) in the Pacific in the first couple of months after Pearl Harbor.
Cox paints a convincing picture of commanders and commands not yet used to serious full scale warfare. Strangely enough the British and Dutch should learned a lot in the two years since september 1939, surprised as they had been by the German lightning attack on Westerm Europe and in the Western Desert. Their underestimation of the Japanese capabilities would cost them dearly in december 1941 - march 1942. They should have learned never to underestimate a potential enemy and be as prepared as possible. The reactions of the US commanders in the Phillines are more in line with senior commanders suddenly in a major warsituation. Still, the indesicion by MacArthur and his reaction to the Japanese attacks should have resulted in a court martial upon his arrival in Australia.
The book describes the operational history of those months, sometimes delving into tactical warfare and technical details of ships, torpedoes and planes.
It is not a dry list of actions, losses and progress of the campaign. In sometimes heartrending prose, Cox succeeds in placing you as reader on the Deck of the USS Langly as the crew knows the Jap bombers to come and sink her, or on the bridge of the Hr Ms de Ruyter with Admiral Doorman and his "dammed if he does, dammed if he don't" descisions. Almost Japanese in his fight to the end is Commander William Rankin of the RAN in his little sloop Yarra as he charged three heavy Japanese cruisers and two destroyers to defend his convoy.
All these stories are placed in a frame of operational dilemma's by the Allied generals and admirals.
The conclusion Cox has reached is that although it looks as if all the men lost, ships sunk and aircraft shot down had been in vain, in his eyes they had bought time for the US and UK to rest, rearm and regroup. It didn't cost the Japs extra time or losses, but learned the Allies valuable lessons and kept the Japanese occupied in the East Indies area for a couple of months. Withdrawal to Australia or India after the fall of Singapore in february (even if the Dutch had agreed to such policy) would have left the Indies to swift and unopposed occupation by Japan, moving their timetable forward. Would Australia and Burma/India have been more ready for them then?
For the Dutch there was no other option with a cruel enemy like Japan, they had to fight and die for the Indies.
Cox paints a convincing picture of commanders and commands not yet used to serious full scale warfare. Strangely enough the British and Dutch should learned a lot in the two years since september 1939, surprised as they had been by the German lightning attack on Westerm Europe and in the Western Desert. Their underestimation of the Japanese capabilities would cost them dearly in december 1941 - march 1942. They should have learned never to underestimate a potential enemy and be as prepared as possible. The reactions of the US commanders in the Phillines are more in line with senior commanders suddenly in a major warsituation. Still, the indesicion by MacArthur and his reaction to the Japanese attacks should have resulted in a court martial upon his arrival in Australia.
The book describes the operational history of those months, sometimes delving into tactical warfare and technical details of ships, torpedoes and planes.
It is not a dry list of actions, losses and progress of the campaign. In sometimes heartrending prose, Cox succeeds in placing you as reader on the Deck of the USS Langly as the crew knows the Jap bombers to come and sink her, or on the bridge of the Hr Ms de Ruyter with Admiral Doorman and his "dammed if he does, dammed if he don't" descisions. Almost Japanese in his fight to the end is Commander William Rankin of the RAN in his little sloop Yarra as he charged three heavy Japanese cruisers and two destroyers to defend his convoy.
All these stories are placed in a frame of operational dilemma's by the Allied generals and admirals.
The conclusion Cox has reached is that although it looks as if all the men lost, ships sunk and aircraft shot down had been in vain, in his eyes they had bought time for the US and UK to rest, rearm and regroup. It didn't cost the Japs extra time or losses, but learned the Allies valuable lessons and kept the Japanese occupied in the East Indies area for a couple of months. Withdrawal to Australia or India after the fall of Singapore in february (even if the Dutch had agreed to such policy) would have left the Indies to swift and unopposed occupation by Japan, moving their timetable forward. Would Australia and Burma/India have been more ready for them then?
For the Dutch there was no other option with a cruel enemy like Japan, they had to fight and die for the Indies.
August 5, 2016
4.8 stars! A great story told with a wealth of detail and sound analysis. Two points demerit for stilted writing in spots, and an over-emphasis on using the Spartans at Thermopylae as a simile for the doomed American, British, Dutch, and Australians who tried to slow down the Japanese juggernaut when it attacked Indonesia in 1941. The whole tale is captured in vignette ably told in this book, wherein the survivors of a sunken Dutch destroyer cheer the 4 antiquated cruisers of the allied fleet as it steamed by on midnight raid. Two of the four ships would also be sunk that night.
I would welcome a book that looks at the Japanese occupation of Indonesia. The capture of the oil fields was the primary reason Japan started the war.
I would welcome a book that looks at the Japanese occupation of Indonesia. The capture of the oil fields was the primary reason Japan started the war.
March 24, 2019
This is a great granular description of a lesser known (to me) battle in the Pacific. Set in the beginning stages of the Pacific theater in 1941-1942, it gives a great background of how the ABDA forces came to be set up, their strengths and (mostly) weaknesses, the Japanese strength and weaknesses, and play-by-play of the actual battles. I've read mostly broad descriptions of the Pacific war in the past and this gives a lot more details. The book is written well and engaging enough that non-historians should be able to follow along. There are also a lot of details of the ships, the commanders, and the locations, with lots of footnotes and lengthy bibliography for further reading. Highly recommended to get a good idea of this particular battle.
July 21, 2025
This is an exceptionally well-researched and well-written book. As someone who considers himself a decent student of history, particularly Naval history, having served on active duty as a Naval Officer and studied the subject before commissioning, I was struck by how rarely this specific chapter of U.S. Navy history is covered.
There is no shortage of literature on Guadalcanal, the Battle of Midway, or the island-hopping campaign that ultimately led to victory in the Pacific. But in-depth narratives about the chaotic and grim opening months of World War II in the Pacific are relatively scarce. After reading Cox’s book, it’s clear why: the early Allied response in the Pacific was, as the title suggests, an unmitigated disaster.
One of the most compelling revelations was the strategic focus of the Japanese. Their primary objective wasn’t Pearl Harbor, but rather the resource-rich Netherlands East Indies (NEI). The attack on Pearl Harbor was designed to neutralize the U.S. Pacific Fleet, the most significant obstacle to Japanese expansion. In reality, there was likely little risk or interest on the part of the Japanese in invading the mainland United States. All they really cared about was getting the oil they needed in the NEI.
While the geopolitical backdrop is fascinating, what truly stood out were the series of strategic and tactical blunders made by both sides. The Allied naval coordination among the British, Dutch, and Americans was clumsy at best. And yet, despite Japan’s early dominance, their own mistakes, such as a surprising number of ships lost to their own torpedoes, revealed cracks in their war fighting effectiveness as well. This book vividly illustrates the challenges faced by even the most formidable naval force of the time, the vaunted Kido Butai that had struck Pearl Harbor, when it struggled to sink a single fleet oiler and a lone destroyer attempting to escape Java.
As I read, I found myself constantly asking: What would I have done if I were in command of this undermanned and under gunned Allied force? With only a handful of ships and limited coordination, resources and ammunition, what real chance did they have against the overwhelming might of the Japanese fleet? The author draws a comparison to the 300 Spartans at Thermopylae, which is apt, but in my view, the most compelling answer comes on the last page of the book.
There, Cox argues that, despite all logic pointing toward an organized withdrawal, the British, Dutch, and Americans chose to stay and fight, not because they thought they could win, but because, as one British officer put it, “I don’t think there was a man among us who would have opted for the sensible way out, which would, of course, have entailed our abandonment of Java. We knew we couldn’t win, not in the ultimate. But at least we could fight, and fulfil our obligations. We knew that we couldn’t stop an invasion, but we were still pretty confident that we’d take our toll of the invaders. We knew that Japan was formidable, but we were sick of being chivvied around by them… British, Australian, American, Dutch, we were all in it together.” It really was that simple.
There is no shortage of literature on Guadalcanal, the Battle of Midway, or the island-hopping campaign that ultimately led to victory in the Pacific. But in-depth narratives about the chaotic and grim opening months of World War II in the Pacific are relatively scarce. After reading Cox’s book, it’s clear why: the early Allied response in the Pacific was, as the title suggests, an unmitigated disaster.
One of the most compelling revelations was the strategic focus of the Japanese. Their primary objective wasn’t Pearl Harbor, but rather the resource-rich Netherlands East Indies (NEI). The attack on Pearl Harbor was designed to neutralize the U.S. Pacific Fleet, the most significant obstacle to Japanese expansion. In reality, there was likely little risk or interest on the part of the Japanese in invading the mainland United States. All they really cared about was getting the oil they needed in the NEI.
While the geopolitical backdrop is fascinating, what truly stood out were the series of strategic and tactical blunders made by both sides. The Allied naval coordination among the British, Dutch, and Americans was clumsy at best. And yet, despite Japan’s early dominance, their own mistakes, such as a surprising number of ships lost to their own torpedoes, revealed cracks in their war fighting effectiveness as well. This book vividly illustrates the challenges faced by even the most formidable naval force of the time, the vaunted Kido Butai that had struck Pearl Harbor, when it struggled to sink a single fleet oiler and a lone destroyer attempting to escape Java.
As I read, I found myself constantly asking: What would I have done if I were in command of this undermanned and under gunned Allied force? With only a handful of ships and limited coordination, resources and ammunition, what real chance did they have against the overwhelming might of the Japanese fleet? The author draws a comparison to the 300 Spartans at Thermopylae, which is apt, but in my view, the most compelling answer comes on the last page of the book.
There, Cox argues that, despite all logic pointing toward an organized withdrawal, the British, Dutch, and Americans chose to stay and fight, not because they thought they could win, but because, as one British officer put it, “I don’t think there was a man among us who would have opted for the sensible way out, which would, of course, have entailed our abandonment of Java. We knew we couldn’t win, not in the ultimate. But at least we could fight, and fulfil our obligations. We knew that we couldn’t stop an invasion, but we were still pretty confident that we’d take our toll of the invaders. We knew that Japan was formidable, but we were sick of being chivvied around by them… British, Australian, American, Dutch, we were all in it together.” It really was that simple.
November 5, 2017
This is a remarkable, absorbing and well written history of the Java Sea campaigns of the early months in the war in the Pacific, covering those months immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor and the invasion of the Philippines. The Japanese relentless conquest of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies was contested by a hurriedly organized amalgamation of American, British, Dutch and Australian forces (ABDA) that had no chance, indeed little hope, of even slowing down the Japanese advances. Hampered by poor communications, conflicting strategies and protocols, obsolete equipment and ships, incompetent leadership, poor planning, lack of adequate logistics, repair and refitting capabilities, ineffective air power and resources, unreliable torpedoes and outdated weapons... the courage, gallantry and tenacity of the ABDA forces fighting their losing battles against a ruthless, relentless and superior enemy is both stirring and tragic. Cox writes in a conversational manner that makes it even harder to put his book down. This is a superb work, superbly written - comprehensive, objective, perceptive and incisive. Cox offers details events and offers excellent analyses of the actions, decisions, results that are well explained. He makes well reasoned judgments, assessing the factors in play, the men and personalities acting on those factors, and the consequences of actions and decisions previously made that redounded through the campaign. His is a voice of clear, analytical reason that draws on prior histories, new research and documentation, and a wonderful ability to explain and describe what happened, why and who did what and what the consequences were.
The Java campaigns early in the war were essentially over by February 1942. It did not take long for the Japanese to expand their conquests. It would not be until the Battle of the Coral Sea in May of 1942 that the Japanese expansion was finally rebuffed and began to recede. The woebegone Java Campaign is largely overlooked - ignored both for its brevity and its ineffectiveness. That is a shame because the men who fought it did so in the finest traditions of other hopeless last stands in the interests of a greater cause such as Thermopylae, the Alamo and the Charge of the Light of the Light Brigade in the Crimean War. Cox argues that as ineffective and hopeless as it appears to have been, it did in fact affect the course of the war... and our war effort was better for it. Even more importantly, Cox gives those men their just historical accord. He establishes that their record of achievement, sacrifice, dedication and bravery are worthy of acclaim, respect, honor despite the unavoidable sadness and tragedy of their efforts. This is simply a wonderful historical work that is must reading for anyone with an interest in the War in the Pacific.
The Java campaigns early in the war were essentially over by February 1942. It did not take long for the Japanese to expand their conquests. It would not be until the Battle of the Coral Sea in May of 1942 that the Japanese expansion was finally rebuffed and began to recede. The woebegone Java Campaign is largely overlooked - ignored both for its brevity and its ineffectiveness. That is a shame because the men who fought it did so in the finest traditions of other hopeless last stands in the interests of a greater cause such as Thermopylae, the Alamo and the Charge of the Light of the Light Brigade in the Crimean War. Cox argues that as ineffective and hopeless as it appears to have been, it did in fact affect the course of the war... and our war effort was better for it. Even more importantly, Cox gives those men their just historical accord. He establishes that their record of achievement, sacrifice, dedication and bravery are worthy of acclaim, respect, honor despite the unavoidable sadness and tragedy of their efforts. This is simply a wonderful historical work that is must reading for anyone with an interest in the War in the Pacific.
January 18, 2024
This was a good book on a subject that there hasn't been much written about. Mr. Cox does an excellent job here by first setting the stage for the narrative, then telling the narrative in great detail, and then closing with a pretty in depth analysis. Most histories on this subject matter gloss over this battle and include it as a prelude to bigger battles in the future. Here, Mr. Cox goes to great effort to detail this battle as its own. Even if the Allied loss in this battle is known to the reader, there will be elements in the text that are not readily apparent. There will be revelations of great naval skill, poor judgement, and outright incompetence in regards to the planning and execution in this campaign on behalf of both sides. Even the unusual element of just plain bad luck. It was superbly written and I enjoyed turning these pages. There were a couple of items that left this reader wanting. First, and this is no reflection on Mr. Cox, but applies to the editing. There were a couple of lines that were in need of editing and lacked some clarity, and had to be read a couple of times to really understand the point. I attribute this more to the publisher (Osprey Books) than the author. Editing seems to be an issue with Osprey. What this book does not have, is a table or summary of the Order of Battle and the losses incurred. Still an enjoyable read.
December 5, 2022
A phenomenal account of the first stages of world war II in the Pacific. The author goes into great detail about the different naval actions that took place, so I would only recommend this to naval nerds. I also like that the author offers a critical view of the decisions that were made, specially by the allies, and it's not afraid to call out what in his opinion where mistaken decisions.
June 4, 2014
_Rising Sun, Falling Skies_ is a vivid narrative account of the naval and air side of the Allied loss of British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. Cox gives a devastating account of Douglas MacArthur's hesitation and failure to accept reality on Monday, December 8 (in the Philippines) and thus lay his air component open to devastating attack. In the process Cox examines and refutes using existing evidence the various arguments MacArthur's apologists have advanced over the years to explain (or explain away) his role in the debacle. In Cox's view the loss of American aircraft on that first day was the turning point for the entire campaign. The Allies were already outnumbered in the air, but the loss of so many American aircraft versus minimal Japanese losses so skewed the air imbalance that only one result was likely if not inevitable---that the Japanese would overrun Allied defenses in the area.
One of the great strengths of the book is that the author attempts to show how the campaign looked from the U.S., British, Dutch, and Japanese perspectives. In the process he goes a long way to rehabilitate the reputation of Admiral Karel W. F. M. Doorman, who in Cox's view has unfairly been made a scapegoat at least in the English-language literature for the failure of the Allied defense of the Dutch East Indies. Cox makes a very convincing case. The real failure was the inability of the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Netherlands to work out a combined command and exercise their forces together.
Every book has weaknesses as well as strengths. _Rising Sun, Falling Skies_ weaknesses are two-fold. Cox has not mastered the literature on the land campaigns, particularly the all-important Malayan Campaign. He neglected to read Stanley L. Falk's _Seventy Days To Singapore_ (1975), the first book to integrate Japanese sources into the campaign narrative, and Brian P. Farrell's _The Defence and Fall of Singapore, 1940-1942_ (2005), the first to use records generated during the campaign by U.K. forces. The second weakness is a failure to fully explain the political circumstances in the U.K., the U.S., and Australia that limited the kind of campaign the Allies could mount. His account of Japanese politics relies heavily on one source, David Bergamini's _Japan's Imperial Conspiracy_. He does provide a good analysis of the political circumstances influencing the Dutch East Indies government.
Despite these reservations, this is an exceptionally fine book. In many ways it is a memorial to those Allied airmen and sailors who fought and died to buy time for the U.S. to mobilize.
Osprey should be ashamed of some of the copy editing errors.
One of the great strengths of the book is that the author attempts to show how the campaign looked from the U.S., British, Dutch, and Japanese perspectives. In the process he goes a long way to rehabilitate the reputation of Admiral Karel W. F. M. Doorman, who in Cox's view has unfairly been made a scapegoat at least in the English-language literature for the failure of the Allied defense of the Dutch East Indies. Cox makes a very convincing case. The real failure was the inability of the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Netherlands to work out a combined command and exercise their forces together.
Every book has weaknesses as well as strengths. _Rising Sun, Falling Skies_ weaknesses are two-fold. Cox has not mastered the literature on the land campaigns, particularly the all-important Malayan Campaign. He neglected to read Stanley L. Falk's _Seventy Days To Singapore_ (1975), the first book to integrate Japanese sources into the campaign narrative, and Brian P. Farrell's _The Defence and Fall of Singapore, 1940-1942_ (2005), the first to use records generated during the campaign by U.K. forces. The second weakness is a failure to fully explain the political circumstances in the U.K., the U.S., and Australia that limited the kind of campaign the Allies could mount. His account of Japanese politics relies heavily on one source, David Bergamini's _Japan's Imperial Conspiracy_. He does provide a good analysis of the political circumstances influencing the Dutch East Indies government.
Despite these reservations, this is an exceptionally fine book. In many ways it is a memorial to those Allied airmen and sailors who fought and died to buy time for the U.S. to mobilize.
Osprey should be ashamed of some of the copy editing errors.
June 5, 2017
What a tough book to rate! It may seem unfair, but I think this book suffers from my own lack of interest in history books as a genre; what many history/war/navy buffs love about this book really caused it to drag for me. If I were rating solely on my reading experience, it's much more of a 2-star book.
Then again, I can imagine how this would be a 4- or 5-star book for almost anyone who loves this type of stuff. Cox covers an incredible amount of ground in an admittedly gargantuan book (seriously, this is a LONG read), with more information than I could have imagined existed about a naval battle so many years ago in a time when technology was nowhere near what we have today.
As a thrilling story, the Java Sea Campaign has all the requisite factors; unfortunately, Cox made sure to tell us everything in-between. If the focus had been on the politics, the battles, and the heroics, I think the book could have been 50% shorter and 100% more readable.
My two major takeaways: the members of the combined armed forces were incredibly heroic and brave, even when often let down by their organizations; and the wretched rate of failure for allied torpedoes.
I was honestly flabbergasted by the number of misses Cox describes during the battles. WWII movies make every shot seem on target and devastating -- the reality was the opposite. You can only wonder what history would have been like had the torpedoes worked as planned.
This is a detailed look at an entire sea campaign during WWII that deserves notice. If you are a reader who loves ships, history, details, and the most complete picture possible, this is the book for you.
Then again, I can imagine how this would be a 4- or 5-star book for almost anyone who loves this type of stuff. Cox covers an incredible amount of ground in an admittedly gargantuan book (seriously, this is a LONG read), with more information than I could have imagined existed about a naval battle so many years ago in a time when technology was nowhere near what we have today.
As a thrilling story, the Java Sea Campaign has all the requisite factors; unfortunately, Cox made sure to tell us everything in-between. If the focus had been on the politics, the battles, and the heroics, I think the book could have been 50% shorter and 100% more readable.
My two major takeaways: the members of the combined armed forces were incredibly heroic and brave, even when often let down by their organizations; and the wretched rate of failure for allied torpedoes.
I was honestly flabbergasted by the number of misses Cox describes during the battles. WWII movies make every shot seem on target and devastating -- the reality was the opposite. You can only wonder what history would have been like had the torpedoes worked as planned.
This is a detailed look at an entire sea campaign during WWII that deserves notice. If you are a reader who loves ships, history, details, and the most complete picture possible, this is the book for you.
December 1, 2019
This history book takes up the story of the Pacific war waged by the Allies against the Japanese shortly after Pearl Harbor until the fall of Indonesia in March of 1942. The Allies include the countries of America, Britain, Dutch Indonesia and Australia. The focus is on the Japanese conquests of the Philippines, Malaysia, Borneo and Indonesia in the South Pacific. It is an interesting story that sets up the case about Democracies letting their armed forces atrophy after the first world war while the Japanese violated Naval Treaties and international norms (if such norms exist in war) to strengthen their military and prepare for and execute a war of conquest. The Allies were woefully unprepared for a war they all seemed to know and acknowledge was coming. This lack of preparation led to the deaths of many brave men who tried to do their duty as laid out by their superiors, even when faced with almost certain death. The Allies were out gunned on the seas and lost most of their air power before the calendar turned to 1942. The Allies tried to resist Japan’s sweep into the South Pacific, but it truly was an irresistible force against an overmatched foe with equipment deficiencies, poor leadership and very poor communications. Since the South Pacific area isn’t well know geographically speaking, the book would have benefited by more maps and more details in those maps. Locations and distances between locations were difficult for me to grasp due to the lack of effective maps.
September 24, 2018
Cox brings to life what may be a long-overlooked campaign. Essentially, it is a tale of management: the Allies were far away from most of their homes, speaking different languages, perhaps inflated with hubris concerning the Japanese (@GeneralDouglasMacArthur). The Japanese, on the other hand, though imperfect were concentrated, focused, and, most of all, enjoyed advantages in technology with the Zero Aircraft and "Long-Lance" torpedoes. The result, in modern sports terms, resulted in the courageous allies being "taken behind the woodshed."
Cox delves deep into the details of the campaign. While a strength, it's also an issue I had with it. One almost loses the narrative learning about the particular leaks and bomb strikes on particular ships. The maps are too few, and, frankly tiny (on a Kindle) at least. As is the case with numerous history books, timelines and chapter summaries would have helped me considerably.
However, let's not throw out the baby with the bathwater. As I was reading the book, it occurred to me that Cox has laid the foundation of what would be a fantastic historical documentary (even a series).
Cox delves deep into the details of the campaign. While a strength, it's also an issue I had with it. One almost loses the narrative learning about the particular leaks and bomb strikes on particular ships. The maps are too few, and, frankly tiny (on a Kindle) at least. As is the case with numerous history books, timelines and chapter summaries would have helped me considerably.
However, let's not throw out the baby with the bathwater. As I was reading the book, it occurred to me that Cox has laid the foundation of what would be a fantastic historical documentary (even a series).
December 4, 2019
This is an exhaustively researched history of the little-known period in the months after Pearl Harbor when the combined navies of America, Holland, Britain and Australia met the Japanese at sea and splattered like bugs on a windshield.
US Gen. Douglas McArthur allowed American air power to be destroyed on the ground and the combined fleets were put under the command of a Dutch admiral who sent some of the greatest ships of the world's navies to their demise. The allies didn't appreciate the value of air escort over their ships and didn't know the range of Japanese aircraft. They didn't know that Japan had torpedoes that could travel 20 miles. They were looking for submarines when torpedoes were coming from surface ships over the horizon.
This book is a great study of mistakes in military planning and the arrogance of command that can cripple armed forces.
One stunning reveal; honorable captains otherwise unhurt actually went down with their ships.
US Gen. Douglas McArthur allowed American air power to be destroyed on the ground and the combined fleets were put under the command of a Dutch admiral who sent some of the greatest ships of the world's navies to their demise. The allies didn't appreciate the value of air escort over their ships and didn't know the range of Japanese aircraft. They didn't know that Japan had torpedoes that could travel 20 miles. They were looking for submarines when torpedoes were coming from surface ships over the horizon.
This book is a great study of mistakes in military planning and the arrogance of command that can cripple armed forces.
One stunning reveal; honorable captains otherwise unhurt actually went down with their ships.
March 2, 2024
I found this book during an Amazon search. After some thought, I bought this book and read it. It's not a cheerful story if you're following the ABDA (American-British-Dutch-Australia) forces fighting Japan early in the Pacific War of World War II. Cox's tale of the Japanese campaign in southeast Asia and the Netherlands East Indies is one of spectacular Japanese successes (though not without a few issues in some of their operations) and ABDA heroic setbacks. It does a good job shedding light on the operations, strategies, tactics, and commanders on both sides. After reading this book, I have a new appreciation for the heroic sacrifices the ABDA troops made against overwhelming odds. Recommended reading for those wishing a fuller understanding of the Pacific War.
November 11, 2024
The history and storytelling is very strong. Perhaps I would have appreciated this more if I had not gone for the audio format (my preferred medium).
Not that the narration is that bad.. it is just the careless/thoughtless approach to pronunciation of proper nouns from Japan and SE Asia. After the umpteenth mis-pronunciation (Cavite, Kure, Johor, Tone, Kidōbutai...), it starts to come across as quite arrogant that one can "just figure it out" from the letters on the page. All these words have clear pronunciation guides on wikipedia etc if one would care to look (let alone ask someone who may know).
Not that the narration is that bad.. it is just the careless/thoughtless approach to pronunciation of proper nouns from Japan and SE Asia. After the umpteenth mis-pronunciation (Cavite, Kure, Johor, Tone, Kidōbutai...), it starts to come across as quite arrogant that one can "just figure it out" from the letters on the page. All these words have clear pronunciation guides on wikipedia etc if one would care to look (let alone ask someone who may know).
May 9, 2021
Well researched book on the earliest parts of WW2 naval operations in the Pacific Theater
The author presents a well researched and written book. Very well footnoted with respect to references. Author provides well supported and well thought out conclusions and insights in to the whys of the various operations undertaken during this phase of World War II. I plan on reading the rest of his books in the series.
The author presents a well researched and written book. Very well footnoted with respect to references. Author provides well supported and well thought out conclusions and insights in to the whys of the various operations undertaken during this phase of World War II. I plan on reading the rest of his books in the series.
October 5, 2021
Very interesting and hard to put down book about the usually brushed over in 10 pages or less, early Pacific War Java campaign. Mr. Cox tells this story with a mix of anecdotes, dashes of obscure but important technical detail, proper placement of the story in a larger historical context, and humanity that makes this and his other books entertaining and illuminating. Definitely recommend this book if this era and topic is of any interest.
June 2, 2023
I knew part of the story due to other WW2 studying, but the zoom-in to this theater was interesting. The author took shots at some of the players where necessary (MacArthur) but was also more forgiving than some historians, especially toward the Dutch leadership. I wish there had been more maps, but that's usual for me. Also, a place name translation would have been nice since many changed when the Europeans left. Still, solid work about a set of battles that rarely get any focus.
April 2, 2018
Good history of the disastrous Java Sea campaign. Paints Karl Doorman in a far more sympathetic light as well. Start it for the confusion, finished with the heroics of the HMAS Perth and USS Houston.
May 25, 2024
I have previously read and enjoyed Cox's WW2 books and was not disappointed with this one. A detailed and balanced look at Japan's victories and Allied defeats in the opening stages of the Pacific war after Pearl Harbor.
June 12, 2025
An excellent work on the topic; the only real drawback is the inadequacy of the single theater map which does not have the level of detail to show the location of significant places such as Endau or Tanjoeng Priok.
May 14, 2017
A good, detailed account of the East Indies Campaign, especially the naval part.
September 1, 2020
Excellent coverage of the details for the Java Sea Campaign.
November 6, 2021
Not as good as his other books, but they were really good.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
October 18, 2025
Engrossing and evenhanded.
November 15, 2025
locked in
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