First published in 1970. Taber was a CBS correspondent with many years covering revolutions in Asia, Latin America, elsewhere.
His analysis holds up well against, considering all of the rabid revisionism that gets recycled over and over. To understand the history of late-20th Century revolutions, it's not enough to pretend it was all about a failure of will and domestic conflicts, though those are certainly part of what happened, and in fact part of the guerrillas' expectations of what would happen during the later phases of the war, should their strategy succeed.
By the time Taber wrote this, guerrilla movements had succeed on multiple continents -- Cuba, China (Mao), Algeria, making it seem inevitable that the U.S. would lose Vietnam.
Taber draws some conclusions while describing in general the unique differences of each. He also explains why some guerrillas who lacked the same essential ingredients (e.g. Huks) failed.
"The guerrilla fights the war of the flea, and his military enemy suffers the dog's disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with. If the war continues long enough - this is the theory - the dog succumbs to exhaustion and anemia without ever having found anything on which to close his jaws or to rake with his claws."
"Given their inferiority of resources, they can survive only by avoiding direct confrontation with a superior enemy; that is, battle on the enemy's terms."
The guerrilla's advantage is time -- the "imperialists" and "occupiers" have only so much political time before the costs of maintaining the occupation and sending waves of weaponry and other hardware become a drag on the economy, or cast a shadow on the next election. OTOH, for the guerrilla, especially early on, time is required to educate a base of support, build strength, strike strategically to build a cache of weapons. Until it eventually starts crippling the economy (and turning mass opinion against the regime), incite insurrection, make foreign investors withdraw and make the political, police and military bureaucracies necessary to prop up the regime too corrupt and unsustainable.
Every revolution is different. And not every resistance movement is a revolution.
I'd be surprised if The War of the Flea is not still required reading at the War Colleges. If so, I wonder what -- if any -- lessons are drawn for, say, the ongoing war in Afghanistan. It's not so much that there are striking parallels, but reading this book made me think how little public discourse there is today about the longest war in American history. We've blotted it out of our daily awareness, despite the enduring failure to make much progress. Each horrific market bombing might needle us here in the U.S. like an annoying flea-bite. But do we think about how it might come back to haunt us (again)?
I once talked with a guy who advised top generals for CENTCOM a few years ago. He says they could approach the occupation differently, but that it's currently a failure. It costs us $5 - 8 billion in AID and another $20 billion or so in military costs. He told me the problem is we funnel the money through corrupt central government, and little of it is distributed through the regional governments where it would be easier to distribute to farmers who we want to stop growing poppies for heroin.
The military (and US AID) is too focused on burning poppy fields, but hey only extinguish about 20% each year, which means the rest is sold at a higher prices, and all it does is turn those angry farmers into recruits for the Taliban and others, like drone strikes.
They aren't trying to build an alternative economic model. They could. Afghanistan is a rich country with emeralds, diamonds that could be extracted, sold and put into a Federal Reserve account to cover the expense, too. (Why do you think Taliban also trade in gems.) Is there an example of a place where this worked in the past. The War Colleges have to dust off the strategy for post WW II Germany and Japan, That would likely be the most successful way to transition from occupation to a successful, functioning government. I don't know enough about either to believe if that would work.
You can say that Cuba, China, other guerrilla movements are different, because they had an ideological agenda (although Castro and his movement were not Communists, he reminds us).
But with a common enemy, disparate groups of malcontents that otherwise would otherwise lack popular support and common cause...
Taber:
"If revolution is to be understood as a historical, social process, rather than an accident or a plot, then it will not do to consider guerrillas, terrorists, political assassins as deviants or agents somehow apart from the social fabric, irrelevant or only fortuitously relevant to the historical process. Guerrillas are OF the people, or they cannot survive, cannot even come into being. ... It may be argued that terrorist movements attract criminals and psychopaths. So they do. But criminality itself is a form of unconscious social protest, reflecting the distortions of an imperfect society..."
Empires don't last that don't learn.