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The Eden Memoirs #2
The Reckoning
Second of three volume of memoirs of Anthony Eden (Earl of Avon). This volume covers the years of World War 2 when he had two roles - Lead the House of Commons and was also Foreign Minister of Great Britain.
623 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1965
About the author
Anthony Eden
49 books12 followersInstrumental British politician Sir Robert Anthony Eden, first earl of Avon, as foreign minister from 1935 to 1938, from 1940 to 1945, and from 1951 to 1955 founded the United Nations in 1945 and as prime minister from 1955 to 1957 supported the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in 1956.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthony...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthony...
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
November 27, 2019
This memoir is in three parts. The first is short, from the days of Munich to the outbreak of the Second World War when Anthony Eden held no cabinet post. The second part is when he was appointed at war’s outbreak as Dominions Secretary in Neville Chamberlain’s government. The main purpose of this position was to coordinate with Britain’s dominions (Canada, Australia, New Zealand) their role in the war effort.
The longest section is Anthony Eden as Foreign Secretary under Churchill. He previously had this position under Chamberlain in the 1930’s which he resigned because of differences with Chamberlain’s now discredited policy of appeasement. Eden and Churchill, as described many times in this book, clashed frequently and sometimes loudly. Both were strong-minded and unwilling to give in. However, to the credit of both – they would have their words but then go on with their friendship which endured for the rest of their lives. And to the credit of Churchill, it also shows that he had no desire to be surrounded by sycophants.
The book has many of the varied personalities that Anthony Eden encountered during the war years and his far-flung journeys to meet them. Stalin, he saw as both ruthless but a shrewd negotiator who knew his agenda. Eden saw Roosevelt as almost flippant and difficult to pin down. De Gaulle was exasperating but Eden whole-heartedly supported in the quest for a powerful France at the of the war.
We are provided with Eden’s travels to the Soviet Union, the Big Three conferences at Teheran and Yalta. I felt he missed the important point of the Yalta conference where Roosevelt succeeded in getting a commitment on important administrative issues for the United Nations and getting Soviet support for the upcoming invasion of Japan. The atom bomb at the time of Yalta was very much in the development phase and the U.S. was looking at the military landings in Japan with a very gloomy outcome and needed Soviet participation.
There were times I felt that Anthony Eden was not fully cognizant of the shift in global power to the United States and the Soviet Union. England’s role in world affairs was diminishing and despite England’s resolute stand to Nazi Germany from the very beginning of the war, the two newcomers were apt to ignore their third ally.
The saddest part of Anthony Eden’s struggles during the war was the eventual Soviet domination of Poland. Eden, like Churchill and Roosevelt, hoped for an independent and free Poland. With millions of Soviet troops in Poland this was not to be as Stalin carefully prepared his own Polish quislings to take over and be obsequious to Moscow. Countless verbal protestations from Eden and the Anglo-Americans were simply fruitless attempts.
In relation to this what astounded me was Anthony Eden’s first trip to Moscow in December, 1941. Even though Moscow had been under German attack a few weeks before and Leningrad was encircled and cut-off, Stalin asserted his post-war demands to Eden in regards to the Polish border wanting it pushed inside Germany and the Soviets were to gobble up portions of Eastern Poland. Eden was made constantly aware of these Soviet-Stalinist imperialistic demands throughout the war.
I did find the discussions on the war in Greece and the innumerable futile attempts to edge Turkey onto the side of the allies to be outside my interest range. This paled beside the conferences and meetings with Roosevelt and Stalin across North America, Africa and Europe.
The book ends with Churchill’s Conservative Party being defeated in the summer elections of 1945. So, Eden and Churchill, who had both been so involved in the turmoil for almost six long years, saw their positions in world affairs radically altered. One can imagine the silence they experienced at their removal from the very hub of world affairs.
The longest section is Anthony Eden as Foreign Secretary under Churchill. He previously had this position under Chamberlain in the 1930’s which he resigned because of differences with Chamberlain’s now discredited policy of appeasement. Eden and Churchill, as described many times in this book, clashed frequently and sometimes loudly. Both were strong-minded and unwilling to give in. However, to the credit of both – they would have their words but then go on with their friendship which endured for the rest of their lives. And to the credit of Churchill, it also shows that he had no desire to be surrounded by sycophants.
The book has many of the varied personalities that Anthony Eden encountered during the war years and his far-flung journeys to meet them. Stalin, he saw as both ruthless but a shrewd negotiator who knew his agenda. Eden saw Roosevelt as almost flippant and difficult to pin down. De Gaulle was exasperating but Eden whole-heartedly supported in the quest for a powerful France at the of the war.
We are provided with Eden’s travels to the Soviet Union, the Big Three conferences at Teheran and Yalta. I felt he missed the important point of the Yalta conference where Roosevelt succeeded in getting a commitment on important administrative issues for the United Nations and getting Soviet support for the upcoming invasion of Japan. The atom bomb at the time of Yalta was very much in the development phase and the U.S. was looking at the military landings in Japan with a very gloomy outcome and needed Soviet participation.
There were times I felt that Anthony Eden was not fully cognizant of the shift in global power to the United States and the Soviet Union. England’s role in world affairs was diminishing and despite England’s resolute stand to Nazi Germany from the very beginning of the war, the two newcomers were apt to ignore their third ally.
The saddest part of Anthony Eden’s struggles during the war was the eventual Soviet domination of Poland. Eden, like Churchill and Roosevelt, hoped for an independent and free Poland. With millions of Soviet troops in Poland this was not to be as Stalin carefully prepared his own Polish quislings to take over and be obsequious to Moscow. Countless verbal protestations from Eden and the Anglo-Americans were simply fruitless attempts.
In relation to this what astounded me was Anthony Eden’s first trip to Moscow in December, 1941. Even though Moscow had been under German attack a few weeks before and Leningrad was encircled and cut-off, Stalin asserted his post-war demands to Eden in regards to the Polish border wanting it pushed inside Germany and the Soviets were to gobble up portions of Eastern Poland. Eden was made constantly aware of these Soviet-Stalinist imperialistic demands throughout the war.
I did find the discussions on the war in Greece and the innumerable futile attempts to edge Turkey onto the side of the allies to be outside my interest range. This paled beside the conferences and meetings with Roosevelt and Stalin across North America, Africa and Europe.
The book ends with Churchill’s Conservative Party being defeated in the summer elections of 1945. So, Eden and Churchill, who had both been so involved in the turmoil for almost six long years, saw their positions in world affairs radically altered. One can imagine the silence they experienced at their removal from the very hub of world affairs.
December 9, 2018
It is almost a cliché to note that many books have been written about the Second World War, including diaries, autobiographies and biographies of some of the many people who played a role, be it political or military, in this tumultuous period of history. The Reckoning, a volume in the memoirs of Anthony Eden (later Earl of Avon) published in 1965, in three parts covers Eden’s time as Britain’s Foreign Secretary under Chamberlain, his subsequent resignation and appointment as Dominions Secretary (The Fatal Slope), his elevation to Secretary of State for War under Churchill in May 1940, and his return as Foreign Secretary from 1941 (Endurance) and his activities to the end of the war (Alliance).
The reflections of those intimately involved in decision making in this tumultuous period make fascinating reading to those with an interest in history. As Eden notes, “in wartime, diplomacy is strategy’s twin”. Those who have read some of the many books written about the war, would also be able to bring a discerning eye to Eden’s memoirs.
When reading a history such as Eden’s memoirs, the events which occurred have been selectively set out in a structured narrative. It is easy to forget that at the time it was difficult to discern fact from fiction, challenging to discern the important from the noise, and easy to overlook the multitude of simultaneous events and decisions. A thoughtful reader will appreciate some of this in Eden’s Reckoning.
Eden recalls his stirring words in September 1939 that “There can be no lasting peace until Nazism and all it stands for in oppression, cruelty and broken faith, is banished from the earth.” But provides no comment on how this differed from the oppression, cruelty and broken faith of Britain’s subsequent ally, the Soviet Union.
After the fall of Poland, both Britain and France sought ways to engage with Germany far from home, turning their focus to Scandinavia and Finland. Eden underplays how close Britain and France came to declaring war on the Soviet Union after its invasion of Finland in November 1939. And provides no critique of Churchill’s role when discussing the Norwegian fiasco of early 1940.
Eden captures the feeling of despair in Britain in May 1940, quoting the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Ironside, as lamenting that “This is the end of the British Empire” resigned to the fact that Britain could not hold out for more than a few months.
Following the fall of France in June 1940, and despite the imminent threat of invasion to Britain, Eden championed the Middle East as the only theatre in which Britain could deploy troops against the Axis. Eden recalls that he had “much in mind the dangers in the Middle East, where our forces were thin enough on the ground in any event. If French resistance were to collapse, our position would at once become precarious if Mussolini entered the war against us, as seemed daily more probable.”
Eden takes the time to recall individuals from all ranks whose courage or thoughtfulness stood out, bringing humanity to his history. He also reminds us of how random events can shape the course of war and history. A time in September 1940 when the US urgently telegraphed Churchill to advise ‘zero hour’ for the invasion of Britain, despite the rough weather, only to find out later it have been a coding error. Or the time his flight to Gibraltar nearly ended in disaster as the plane struggled against a head wind and rough weather, with instruments failing, fuel running out and engines failing, only narrowly escaping crashing or internment in Spain. Or when the plane flew too far south of Malta and was on a heading towards Italian controlled Libya before finally being reached by radio and redirected back to Malta.
The most controversial of the decisions during Eden’s second period as Foreign Secretary was the decision to send Allied troops, mainly from Australia and New Zealand, to Greece. Still debated to this day, this decision was either the prequel to the turning point of WW2 by delaying the German invasion of the Soviet Union by a crucial four weeks, or an always futile expedition which served only to squander Australia and New Zealand lives.
Eden’s recollection of these events is self-serving and uncritical.
He does not discuss why the Allies failed to consider the vulnerability of the Aliakmon position to a flanking attack by the Germans through Yugoslavia’s Monastir Gap; or the primitive state of the Greek transport system which made logistics impossible; or the fact that the Greek army was battle weary after its long winter campaign; or the lack of equipment in the Yugoslav armed forces, including anti-tank guns, tanks or aircraft; or the ethnic rivalries that made Yugoslavian troops unwilling to fight outside their province even if they had equipment. Although acknowledging in October 1940 the “accumulating evidence of German assistance to Italians in Libya” which “may just turn the scales in Egypt”, in Eden’s Reckoning he feigns surprise at the speed of the German counter-attack in Libya after the Allies had begun transporting troops to Greece.
All these factors were known in advance and ought to have been at least discussed and considered before troops were sent. But they were not. None of these factors were shared with the Australasian governments whose troops were to do the majority of the fighting (and dying). Eden also inexplicably fails to explore the important role that Australia’s prime minister Menzies played when he was in the UK and being considered as an alternate candidate to replace Churchill. Menzies doesn’t even rate a mention in the Index!
Eden also fails to shed light on the factors contributing to the volte face by Wavell, the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East, from outright opposition to seemingly uncritical support for the expedition to Greece. . Both Eden and Wavell “were apprehensive” in November 1940” lest the cries from Greece should result in our being asked to divert part of our very small resources” from Egypt, seeing the diversion of Allied troops to Greece as “strategic folly”. Both Eden and Wavell recognised that “We cannot from Middle East resources, send sufficient air or land reinforcement to have any decisive influence upon course of fighting in Greece.” Eden prophetically noted in his diary: “I feel absolutely confident that this telegram gives the line we should follow. I am less certain unhappily that we shall stick to it.’ This was to prove true, but with Eden as the chief instigator of the change in viewpoint.
Even in February 1941 Eden acknowledged that “it is, of course, a gamble to send forces to the mainland of Europe to fight Germans at this time.” However within a few weeks, both Eden and Wavell overcame their apprehension and passionately supported troops being sent to Greece in just a few short months. Eden is unable to explain what shaped his change of heart, or more likely, unwilling to acknowledge the role that Churchill had in this. It is left to other authors to explain the ambiguity introduced by Eden’s poor use of French, overuse of generalisations and lack of use of confirmation in a meeting with the Greeks to plan the Allied defence.
Eden also ignores the disingenuous role that Churchill played in almost insisting troops should be sent, but then subsequently attempting to pass the buck to Wavell when the prospects looked less promising.
Through the slow build up to the fateful and catastrophic decision to send Allied troops to Greece, Eden was pre-occupied with Turkey, Yugoslavia and the potential for building a Balkan alliance. In January 1941, Eden noted that “Turkey is the key and we must intensify our efforts there” as Turkey “loomed larger in my mind than Greece.” Churchill’s influence is again evident here, but not explored by Eden, with Churchill enigmatically instructing Eden that “the interest of Turkey were no less important to us than those of Greece”.
By March 1941, Eden was noting that the Commanders-in-Chief, while anxious that Yugoslavia should fight with us, despite acknowledging its “deficiencies in equipment”, “are of the opinion that Turkey’s entry into the war at this stage would constitute a military liability which they did not wish to incur.” Eden does not attempt to explain this when a key part of the rationale for supporting Greece in the first place was to get Turkey to enter the war.
Eden acknowledges the strengths of Wavell, Longmore and Dill, all of whom Churchill subsequently replaced, noting “Fortunate are those British commanders to whom chief responsibility falls in the later years of a way, when there is enough equipment to go round.”
In Alliance, Eden sheds insights to the evolving relationship of Britain with the United States and the Soviet Union: “Soviet policy is amoral: United States policy is exaggeratedly moral, at least where non-American interests are concerned.” After Roosevelt refused to go to the UK, Eden confides that he was “most anxious for good relations with U.S. but I don’t like subservience to them and I am sure that this only lays up trouble for us in the future.”
He also sees the US repeating in relation to the Soviet Union that pattern of appeasement that led to Britain’s war with Germany:: ‘[Mr Joseph Davis, former US Ambassador to Russia] is the born appeaser, and would gladly give Russia all Europe , except perhaps for us, so that America might not be embroiled. All the errors and illusions of Neville C., substituting Russia for Germany.”
Eden had an extraordinary life. On being voted out of office in 1945, he noted “I cannot believe I can ever know anything like it again.’
Eden was left with the impression, wonderfully conveyed to the reader of the Reckoning “of work and yet more work...made bearable or even welcome by a heightened sense of purpose.”
And in a reflection that is as true today as it was then Eden notes ‘those in power, as their tenure of office continues, find themselves less and less able to contemplate relinquishing it.’
A rewarding read for those willing to immerse themselves.
The reflections of those intimately involved in decision making in this tumultuous period make fascinating reading to those with an interest in history. As Eden notes, “in wartime, diplomacy is strategy’s twin”. Those who have read some of the many books written about the war, would also be able to bring a discerning eye to Eden’s memoirs.
When reading a history such as Eden’s memoirs, the events which occurred have been selectively set out in a structured narrative. It is easy to forget that at the time it was difficult to discern fact from fiction, challenging to discern the important from the noise, and easy to overlook the multitude of simultaneous events and decisions. A thoughtful reader will appreciate some of this in Eden’s Reckoning.
Eden recalls his stirring words in September 1939 that “There can be no lasting peace until Nazism and all it stands for in oppression, cruelty and broken faith, is banished from the earth.” But provides no comment on how this differed from the oppression, cruelty and broken faith of Britain’s subsequent ally, the Soviet Union.
After the fall of Poland, both Britain and France sought ways to engage with Germany far from home, turning their focus to Scandinavia and Finland. Eden underplays how close Britain and France came to declaring war on the Soviet Union after its invasion of Finland in November 1939. And provides no critique of Churchill’s role when discussing the Norwegian fiasco of early 1940.
Eden captures the feeling of despair in Britain in May 1940, quoting the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Ironside, as lamenting that “This is the end of the British Empire” resigned to the fact that Britain could not hold out for more than a few months.
Following the fall of France in June 1940, and despite the imminent threat of invasion to Britain, Eden championed the Middle East as the only theatre in which Britain could deploy troops against the Axis. Eden recalls that he had “much in mind the dangers in the Middle East, where our forces were thin enough on the ground in any event. If French resistance were to collapse, our position would at once become precarious if Mussolini entered the war against us, as seemed daily more probable.”
Eden takes the time to recall individuals from all ranks whose courage or thoughtfulness stood out, bringing humanity to his history. He also reminds us of how random events can shape the course of war and history. A time in September 1940 when the US urgently telegraphed Churchill to advise ‘zero hour’ for the invasion of Britain, despite the rough weather, only to find out later it have been a coding error. Or the time his flight to Gibraltar nearly ended in disaster as the plane struggled against a head wind and rough weather, with instruments failing, fuel running out and engines failing, only narrowly escaping crashing or internment in Spain. Or when the plane flew too far south of Malta and was on a heading towards Italian controlled Libya before finally being reached by radio and redirected back to Malta.
The most controversial of the decisions during Eden’s second period as Foreign Secretary was the decision to send Allied troops, mainly from Australia and New Zealand, to Greece. Still debated to this day, this decision was either the prequel to the turning point of WW2 by delaying the German invasion of the Soviet Union by a crucial four weeks, or an always futile expedition which served only to squander Australia and New Zealand lives.
Eden’s recollection of these events is self-serving and uncritical.
He does not discuss why the Allies failed to consider the vulnerability of the Aliakmon position to a flanking attack by the Germans through Yugoslavia’s Monastir Gap; or the primitive state of the Greek transport system which made logistics impossible; or the fact that the Greek army was battle weary after its long winter campaign; or the lack of equipment in the Yugoslav armed forces, including anti-tank guns, tanks or aircraft; or the ethnic rivalries that made Yugoslavian troops unwilling to fight outside their province even if they had equipment. Although acknowledging in October 1940 the “accumulating evidence of German assistance to Italians in Libya” which “may just turn the scales in Egypt”, in Eden’s Reckoning he feigns surprise at the speed of the German counter-attack in Libya after the Allies had begun transporting troops to Greece.
All these factors were known in advance and ought to have been at least discussed and considered before troops were sent. But they were not. None of these factors were shared with the Australasian governments whose troops were to do the majority of the fighting (and dying). Eden also inexplicably fails to explore the important role that Australia’s prime minister Menzies played when he was in the UK and being considered as an alternate candidate to replace Churchill. Menzies doesn’t even rate a mention in the Index!
Eden also fails to shed light on the factors contributing to the volte face by Wavell, the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East, from outright opposition to seemingly uncritical support for the expedition to Greece. . Both Eden and Wavell “were apprehensive” in November 1940” lest the cries from Greece should result in our being asked to divert part of our very small resources” from Egypt, seeing the diversion of Allied troops to Greece as “strategic folly”. Both Eden and Wavell recognised that “We cannot from Middle East resources, send sufficient air or land reinforcement to have any decisive influence upon course of fighting in Greece.” Eden prophetically noted in his diary: “I feel absolutely confident that this telegram gives the line we should follow. I am less certain unhappily that we shall stick to it.’ This was to prove true, but with Eden as the chief instigator of the change in viewpoint.
Even in February 1941 Eden acknowledged that “it is, of course, a gamble to send forces to the mainland of Europe to fight Germans at this time.” However within a few weeks, both Eden and Wavell overcame their apprehension and passionately supported troops being sent to Greece in just a few short months. Eden is unable to explain what shaped his change of heart, or more likely, unwilling to acknowledge the role that Churchill had in this. It is left to other authors to explain the ambiguity introduced by Eden’s poor use of French, overuse of generalisations and lack of use of confirmation in a meeting with the Greeks to plan the Allied defence.
Eden also ignores the disingenuous role that Churchill played in almost insisting troops should be sent, but then subsequently attempting to pass the buck to Wavell when the prospects looked less promising.
Through the slow build up to the fateful and catastrophic decision to send Allied troops to Greece, Eden was pre-occupied with Turkey, Yugoslavia and the potential for building a Balkan alliance. In January 1941, Eden noted that “Turkey is the key and we must intensify our efforts there” as Turkey “loomed larger in my mind than Greece.” Churchill’s influence is again evident here, but not explored by Eden, with Churchill enigmatically instructing Eden that “the interest of Turkey were no less important to us than those of Greece”.
By March 1941, Eden was noting that the Commanders-in-Chief, while anxious that Yugoslavia should fight with us, despite acknowledging its “deficiencies in equipment”, “are of the opinion that Turkey’s entry into the war at this stage would constitute a military liability which they did not wish to incur.” Eden does not attempt to explain this when a key part of the rationale for supporting Greece in the first place was to get Turkey to enter the war.
Eden acknowledges the strengths of Wavell, Longmore and Dill, all of whom Churchill subsequently replaced, noting “Fortunate are those British commanders to whom chief responsibility falls in the later years of a way, when there is enough equipment to go round.”
In Alliance, Eden sheds insights to the evolving relationship of Britain with the United States and the Soviet Union: “Soviet policy is amoral: United States policy is exaggeratedly moral, at least where non-American interests are concerned.” After Roosevelt refused to go to the UK, Eden confides that he was “most anxious for good relations with U.S. but I don’t like subservience to them and I am sure that this only lays up trouble for us in the future.”
He also sees the US repeating in relation to the Soviet Union that pattern of appeasement that led to Britain’s war with Germany:: ‘[Mr Joseph Davis, former US Ambassador to Russia] is the born appeaser, and would gladly give Russia all Europe , except perhaps for us, so that America might not be embroiled. All the errors and illusions of Neville C., substituting Russia for Germany.”
Eden had an extraordinary life. On being voted out of office in 1945, he noted “I cannot believe I can ever know anything like it again.’
Eden was left with the impression, wonderfully conveyed to the reader of the Reckoning “of work and yet more work...made bearable or even welcome by a heightened sense of purpose.”
And in a reflection that is as true today as it was then Eden notes ‘those in power, as their tenure of office continues, find themselves less and less able to contemplate relinquishing it.’
A rewarding read for those willing to immerse themselves.
November 12, 2012
This is an intriguing book as it tells the story of Anthony Eden's meetings and exchanges with famous people during WW2. He rocounts conversations with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. Although there are many books about Churchill and Roosevelt, there are not many first hand accounts of conversations and negociations with people like Stalin and his ministers. The book also tells the story how the big 3 divided up the post war world including Poland, Greece, Yoguslavia, etc.
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