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Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of al Qa'ida since 9/11: The Pursuit of al Qa'ida since 9/11
From one of our most trusted counterterrorism experts, a sweeping, insider's account of the decade-long chase for America's deadliest enemy.This comprehensive, landmark history chronicles our ongoing battle against al-Qa ida, the greatest threat the West has faced in the modern era. An internationally recognized authority on terrorism and counterinsurgency, Seth G. Jones presents a dramatic narrative of the on-the-ground police work; the elaborate, multiyear investigations led by the CIA, FBI, and Britain s MI5; and the shifting and deadly alliances between terrorist groups that have characterized the conflict. With gripping detail he recounts the against-the-clock hunt for the Times Square bomber and reveals startling information about Osama bin Laden s behavior during his final days. Drawing on recently declassified documents and court materials, transcripts of wiretapped conversations, and interviews with current and former government officials from the United States and key allies, Jones navigates the waves (al Qa ida attacks) and reverse waves (successful efforts to disrupt al Qa ida), explaining how we might analyze past patterns in order to successfully counter al Qa ida and its allies in the future.
448 pages, Kindle Edition
First published May 1, 2012
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
July 17, 2016
A solid, workmanlike, readable history of al Qaeda. This is a book I wanted to keep reading and one I remembered after putting it aside. The book was published in 2012 and with any history of a dynamic organization much has happened since that time.
Early on I thought the author gave too much credit to the CIA but he seemed to offer some criticism later on. (As a contrast I hated Tim Weiner's "Legacy of Ashes" where I thought he went out of his way to fault the CIA at every turn in his history of the agency.) Also, earlier on I felt the author was way too generous to Pakistan and it's efforts to combat al Qaeda but he did offer some criticism as the book went on. (Carlotta Gall takes Pakistan to task very well in her very good book "The Wrong Enemy.")
One odd and glaring error that had nothing to do with the history of al Qaeda came about in the opening of chapter 5 where the author said the Cubs hadn't won the World Series since 1945. (Correct answer is 1908. Although they did play in the 1945 World Series, losing to the Detroit Tigers 4 games to 3.) I have to say it made me wonder what else was inaccurate in the book. Particularly because the author indicated he got his PhD at the University of Chicago.
Early on I thought the author gave too much credit to the CIA but he seemed to offer some criticism later on. (As a contrast I hated Tim Weiner's "Legacy of Ashes" where I thought he went out of his way to fault the CIA at every turn in his history of the agency.) Also, earlier on I felt the author was way too generous to Pakistan and it's efforts to combat al Qaeda but he did offer some criticism as the book went on. (Carlotta Gall takes Pakistan to task very well in her very good book "The Wrong Enemy.")
One odd and glaring error that had nothing to do with the history of al Qaeda came about in the opening of chapter 5 where the author said the Cubs hadn't won the World Series since 1945. (Correct answer is 1908. Although they did play in the 1945 World Series, losing to the Detroit Tigers 4 games to 3.) I have to say it made me wonder what else was inaccurate in the book. Particularly because the author indicated he got his PhD at the University of Chicago.
August 31, 2014
As a Rand Corporation analyst and former advisor to the US Special Operations Command in Afghanistan, Seth Jones is well-equipped to offer expansive thoughts about counterterrorism strategy. His latest book, Hunting in the Shadows, is a survey of the struggle of the US and Europe against al Qa’ida and its affiliates from 1998-2011. Jones frames the West’s battle with terrorism as a series of three waves in which al Qa’ida’s effectiveness, popularity among Muslims, and organizational structure have varied considerably. This broad framework is somewhat useful for conceptualizing the conflict between al Qaida and the West, but his argument breaks down in several areas where he overlooks key details in favor of preserving his grander narratives and explanations.
The bulk of the book covers al Qa’ida plots and American efforts to counter them. Jones draws from declassified government documents and recently released court records from terrorism cases to create thrilling and detailed narratives that give the reader a vivid sense of the tactics and tools employed by both sides. He structures these episodes of terrorism into three waves. The first wave started with al Qa’ida’s attacks on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, reached its apex on 9/11, and declined when the US invaded Afghanistan, capturing and killing many al Qa’ida operatives and denying them a valuable sanctuary. The second wave began in 2003 as al Qa’ida used the unpopular US invasion of Iraq to rally Muslims to their banner, launch attacks against the US and its European allies, and carve out a new base of power in Iraq. By 2007, al Qa’ida’s fortunes declined again as Muslims in Iraq and elsewhere rejected its brutality and radicalism and Western counterterrorism units foiled a number of plots. The third wave grew from 2008-2011 as al Qaida’s morphed into a more decentralized, flexible network and launched a new wave of plots against the US and Europe. Jones contends that this wave crashed in 2011 with increased counterterrorism efforts and the killings of prominent terrorists such as Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki.
After rearranging these episodes of terrorism into a grand framework, Jones identifies three main factors that explain the ebbing and flowing of terrorism in this period and predict whether a “fourth wave” will erupt. The first factor is American counterterrorism strategy. Jones argues that the US has been most successful in rooting terrorist groups out of safe haven and disrupting their operations when it follows a “light footprint” approach that relies on “covert intelligence, law enforcement, and the use of special operations forces to conduct precision targeting of al Qa’ida and its financial and logistical support network.” He cites the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 as an example of this counterterrorism strategy. In contrast, when the US has used large numbers of conventional troops in places like Iraq, it has provoked a popular backlash that has aided al Qa’ida. The second factor in determining the rise or decline of al Qa’ida local governments establish basic security and governance in order to deny terrorists safe havens in unstable areas. Jones duly notes that most of al Qa’ida’s affiliates have formed in poorly governed states, such Yemen, Somalia, or Iraq during the US occupation. The third factor is whether or not al Qa’ida pursues a “punishment strategy” in which they frequently use violence against civilians, especially Muslim civilians. Jones charts al Qa’ida’s popularity in polls of ordinary Muslims and among leading clerics to show that when they has been too indiscriminately violent, their approval has plunged and their recruit base has dwindled. He cites the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the anti-al Qa’ida Sunni Awakening in Iraq as examples.
Jones’ book will make compelling reading for beginners in the study of terrorism, but experts will find problems with his somewhat simplistic model and his overlooking of key details. The most glaring problem relates to his claim that the light footprint strategy is the best approach to counterterrorism. This claim overlooks the fact that in major conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan, the US has fought hybrids wars, requiring elements of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency to be employed simultaneously. For example, Jones praises the US light footprint strategy in Afghanistan from 2001-2003 for effectively uprooting al Qa’ida while not provoking a popular backlash. The problem here is that the lack of American soldiers in Afghanistan in the early parts of the war required the US to rely on violent, self-interested warlords to hunt terrorists and provide security. As South Asian scholar Ahmed Rashid has documented, this policy may have worked to kill and capture terrorists, but it precluded the construction of a viable Afghan state and left many rural areas open to Taliban re-infiltration.
Moreover, the US has explicitly pursued light footprint strategies before in Iraq and Afghanistan, and security experts now largely deride both of these applications. In Iraq, the US light footprint strategy from roughly 2003-2005 did not challenge extremists like al Qa’ida in Iraq for control of the civilian population, allowing such groups to establish safe havens in civilian areas. Jones should not have presented the light footprint as a panacea for counterterrorism given how ineffective the light footprint has been in achieving American foreign policy goals beyond counterterrorism, such as nation building or counterinsurgency.
A further problem with the book is the lack of clarity surrounding the three waves of terrorism. In the introduction, Jones says that he will delineate the waves of al Qa’ida activity by the number of fatalities caused in their attacks. However, later in the book he claims that the third wave started to gain steam with the failed attacks of Najibullah Zazi and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and the successful attack of Nidal Malik Hussein, all in 2009. The inconsistency here is that Jones started out by demarcating the waves by the effectiveness of al Qa’ida attacks as measured by fatalities, but in this later section he claims that a new wave was starting around 2009 mostly on the basis of attempted attacks. Furthermore, to make the apex of the third wave look significant, Jones includes attacks by Lashkar e Taiba, a group with only loose connections to al Qa’ida core. Jones seems to be changing the basis of his waves and the definition of al Qa’ida to fit his argument that a third wave was rising by the end of the decade. The problem is that Jones has created an artificial pattern where no pattern may actually exist.
Despite these shortcomings, Jones offers much insight into the psychology of terrorists, how al Qa’ida has evolved, and what the US and Europe should or should not do in response. Overall, his most valuable suggestion is that the “War on Terror” is a poor way to conceive of this conflict. He demonstrates repeatedly that an overly militarized mindset has lead to military occupations of Muslim nations, which at least partially motivated most terrorist plots in Europe or America since 9/11. In contrast, Jones stresses the efficacy of patient interagency counterterrorism work and information campaigns that work with moderate Muslims to counter al Qa’ida’s ideology. Unfortunately, the conceptual frame of the book and its main explanations for al Qaida’s fluctuations are too simplistic to explain this multi-faceted conflict. Jones’ argument would stand on firmer ground if he spoke in terms of general trends and factors in modern terrorism rather than rigid waves and variables. 443 pages.
The bulk of the book covers al Qa’ida plots and American efforts to counter them. Jones draws from declassified government documents and recently released court records from terrorism cases to create thrilling and detailed narratives that give the reader a vivid sense of the tactics and tools employed by both sides. He structures these episodes of terrorism into three waves. The first wave started with al Qa’ida’s attacks on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, reached its apex on 9/11, and declined when the US invaded Afghanistan, capturing and killing many al Qa’ida operatives and denying them a valuable sanctuary. The second wave began in 2003 as al Qa’ida used the unpopular US invasion of Iraq to rally Muslims to their banner, launch attacks against the US and its European allies, and carve out a new base of power in Iraq. By 2007, al Qa’ida’s fortunes declined again as Muslims in Iraq and elsewhere rejected its brutality and radicalism and Western counterterrorism units foiled a number of plots. The third wave grew from 2008-2011 as al Qaida’s morphed into a more decentralized, flexible network and launched a new wave of plots against the US and Europe. Jones contends that this wave crashed in 2011 with increased counterterrorism efforts and the killings of prominent terrorists such as Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki.
After rearranging these episodes of terrorism into a grand framework, Jones identifies three main factors that explain the ebbing and flowing of terrorism in this period and predict whether a “fourth wave” will erupt. The first factor is American counterterrorism strategy. Jones argues that the US has been most successful in rooting terrorist groups out of safe haven and disrupting their operations when it follows a “light footprint” approach that relies on “covert intelligence, law enforcement, and the use of special operations forces to conduct precision targeting of al Qa’ida and its financial and logistical support network.” He cites the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 as an example of this counterterrorism strategy. In contrast, when the US has used large numbers of conventional troops in places like Iraq, it has provoked a popular backlash that has aided al Qa’ida. The second factor in determining the rise or decline of al Qa’ida local governments establish basic security and governance in order to deny terrorists safe havens in unstable areas. Jones duly notes that most of al Qa’ida’s affiliates have formed in poorly governed states, such Yemen, Somalia, or Iraq during the US occupation. The third factor is whether or not al Qa’ida pursues a “punishment strategy” in which they frequently use violence against civilians, especially Muslim civilians. Jones charts al Qa’ida’s popularity in polls of ordinary Muslims and among leading clerics to show that when they has been too indiscriminately violent, their approval has plunged and their recruit base has dwindled. He cites the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the anti-al Qa’ida Sunni Awakening in Iraq as examples.
Jones’ book will make compelling reading for beginners in the study of terrorism, but experts will find problems with his somewhat simplistic model and his overlooking of key details. The most glaring problem relates to his claim that the light footprint strategy is the best approach to counterterrorism. This claim overlooks the fact that in major conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan, the US has fought hybrids wars, requiring elements of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency to be employed simultaneously. For example, Jones praises the US light footprint strategy in Afghanistan from 2001-2003 for effectively uprooting al Qa’ida while not provoking a popular backlash. The problem here is that the lack of American soldiers in Afghanistan in the early parts of the war required the US to rely on violent, self-interested warlords to hunt terrorists and provide security. As South Asian scholar Ahmed Rashid has documented, this policy may have worked to kill and capture terrorists, but it precluded the construction of a viable Afghan state and left many rural areas open to Taliban re-infiltration.
Moreover, the US has explicitly pursued light footprint strategies before in Iraq and Afghanistan, and security experts now largely deride both of these applications. In Iraq, the US light footprint strategy from roughly 2003-2005 did not challenge extremists like al Qa’ida in Iraq for control of the civilian population, allowing such groups to establish safe havens in civilian areas. Jones should not have presented the light footprint as a panacea for counterterrorism given how ineffective the light footprint has been in achieving American foreign policy goals beyond counterterrorism, such as nation building or counterinsurgency.
A further problem with the book is the lack of clarity surrounding the three waves of terrorism. In the introduction, Jones says that he will delineate the waves of al Qa’ida activity by the number of fatalities caused in their attacks. However, later in the book he claims that the third wave started to gain steam with the failed attacks of Najibullah Zazi and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and the successful attack of Nidal Malik Hussein, all in 2009. The inconsistency here is that Jones started out by demarcating the waves by the effectiveness of al Qa’ida attacks as measured by fatalities, but in this later section he claims that a new wave was starting around 2009 mostly on the basis of attempted attacks. Furthermore, to make the apex of the third wave look significant, Jones includes attacks by Lashkar e Taiba, a group with only loose connections to al Qa’ida core. Jones seems to be changing the basis of his waves and the definition of al Qa’ida to fit his argument that a third wave was rising by the end of the decade. The problem is that Jones has created an artificial pattern where no pattern may actually exist.
Despite these shortcomings, Jones offers much insight into the psychology of terrorists, how al Qa’ida has evolved, and what the US and Europe should or should not do in response. Overall, his most valuable suggestion is that the “War on Terror” is a poor way to conceive of this conflict. He demonstrates repeatedly that an overly militarized mindset has lead to military occupations of Muslim nations, which at least partially motivated most terrorist plots in Europe or America since 9/11. In contrast, Jones stresses the efficacy of patient interagency counterterrorism work and information campaigns that work with moderate Muslims to counter al Qa’ida’s ideology. Unfortunately, the conceptual frame of the book and its main explanations for al Qaida’s fluctuations are too simplistic to explain this multi-faceted conflict. Jones’ argument would stand on firmer ground if he spoke in terms of general trends and factors in modern terrorism rather than rigid waves and variables. 443 pages.
January 25, 2019
Hunting in the Shadows is an accessible narrative that examines al Qa'ida's operations from the late 1990s though the Abbottabad raid. Jones's analysis combines organizational, leadership, political, and some ideological perspectives. His study is told through "waves" of activity that ebb and flow. This book does a fine job of describing how the waves of activity were carried out and what tactics were used by those seeking to strike against the enemies of al Qa'ida.
What is most prominent is the retelling of individual attacks of people directly reporting to, loosely affiliated with, or inspired by al Qa'ida. This works well as it illustrates the many ways in which people became radicalized and how they found certain messaging appealing. However, this approach does have a tendency to eclipse the actual pursuit and "hunting" aspects of the history, and at times leaves very general observations about the changing nature of the organization throughout the 2000s. I have a suspicion that this could be due to what is available in terms of documents and resources. Jones wants to be accurate and provide a well-researched account, and that is exactly what the reader gets.
It may be limited if you are looking for larger contexts, but this book works well with other studies relating to al Qa'ida and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Perhaps as more items become declassified and available, we will see other editions of this work.
What is most prominent is the retelling of individual attacks of people directly reporting to, loosely affiliated with, or inspired by al Qa'ida. This works well as it illustrates the many ways in which people became radicalized and how they found certain messaging appealing. However, this approach does have a tendency to eclipse the actual pursuit and "hunting" aspects of the history, and at times leaves very general observations about the changing nature of the organization throughout the 2000s. I have a suspicion that this could be due to what is available in terms of documents and resources. Jones wants to be accurate and provide a well-researched account, and that is exactly what the reader gets.
It may be limited if you are looking for larger contexts, but this book works well with other studies relating to al Qa'ida and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Perhaps as more items become declassified and available, we will see other editions of this work.
January 7, 2013
Hunting in the Shadows is a very interesting account of al Qaeda's operations and status since 9/11. This chronicles the various operations conducted or inspired by al Qaeda and the various individuals in carrying out the plots and the aftermath. What the author argues is that al Qaeda's operations come in waves in which operations are planned grow strength and attempted or carried out followed by a lull as those attempts are responded to. For example the first wave began with the US Embassy bombings in 1998 and crested wit the 9/11 attacks. The wave then ebbed as the US began operations to destroy al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan only to rise once again as the US invaded Iraq. As one reads it becomes clear how the US adapted to it's strategy fighting al Qaeda and likewise how al Qaeda attempted to cope with the changing battlefield and challenges of becoming gradually decentralized as leaders were systematically killed or captured.
One thing readers can appreciate is the lack of partisanism. Dr. Jones writes objectively; pointing out the various policy flaws and failures of Washington as well as the strengths of those pursuing al Qaeda. We are good at hunting and responding but it appears prevention and identifying plots and plotters is still weak. One thing is clear: we got lucky on several occasions that al Qaeda trained bombers such as the shoe bomber, Richard Reid, the Christmas day underwear bomber,and the NYC Times Square car bomb attempt were pretty amateurish.
Dr. Jones, a RAND employee, also offers suggestions that policy makers would be wise to heed. The reduction of conventional combat forces in Iraq is starting to pay off while the use of clandestine CIA and law enforcement assets and special operations to systematically pick off al Qaeda one by one, thus leaving a small foot print, is proving to be more successful.
The author believes, and I agree in hindsight, that the Iraq invention helped al Qaeda in the short run by giving excused to would be terrorist recruits to defend what they perceive as an infidel incursion into Muslim lands and diverting critical assets away from the central al Qaeda threat based in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the long run I believe the Iraq invasion will prove worthy despite the lack of prudence at the time of the invasion in March 2003.
Anybody interested in a concise look at where al Qaeda now stands and how we've done fighting against them would really enjoy and appreciate this book. Highly recommended.
One thing readers can appreciate is the lack of partisanism. Dr. Jones writes objectively; pointing out the various policy flaws and failures of Washington as well as the strengths of those pursuing al Qaeda. We are good at hunting and responding but it appears prevention and identifying plots and plotters is still weak. One thing is clear: we got lucky on several occasions that al Qaeda trained bombers such as the shoe bomber, Richard Reid, the Christmas day underwear bomber,and the NYC Times Square car bomb attempt were pretty amateurish.
Dr. Jones, a RAND employee, also offers suggestions that policy makers would be wise to heed. The reduction of conventional combat forces in Iraq is starting to pay off while the use of clandestine CIA and law enforcement assets and special operations to systematically pick off al Qaeda one by one, thus leaving a small foot print, is proving to be more successful.
The author believes, and I agree in hindsight, that the Iraq invention helped al Qaeda in the short run by giving excused to would be terrorist recruits to defend what they perceive as an infidel incursion into Muslim lands and diverting critical assets away from the central al Qaeda threat based in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the long run I believe the Iraq invasion will prove worthy despite the lack of prudence at the time of the invasion in March 2003.
Anybody interested in a concise look at where al Qaeda now stands and how we've done fighting against them would really enjoy and appreciate this book. Highly recommended.
September 4, 2015
A comprehensive, well-written, and riveting history of both al-Qaeda since 9/11 and the overt and covert war against it by the US and Britain. Jones has a good grasp of the subject matter, makes his work easy to read, and does a fine job portraying how al-Qaeda perceives its war against the West, which doesn’t always make sense from a Western perspective.
Jones writes that al-Qaeda activity comes in “waves,” and he also shows how the intensity of international counterterrorism efforts force the organization to adopt a more and more decentralized model.
Jones details the often bitter political, ideological, and personal divisions in the al-Qaeda and how these exacerbated following 9/11. Interestingly, many al-Qaeda operatives have abandoned mosques, preferring the teachings of extremists with no religious credentials. Americans tend to lump all Islamist militants together under the general label of "terrorist." Unfortunately, they fail to appreciate the complex tensions and conflicts resulting from their differing religious and political ideologies, which Jones explores in detail.
Jones also takes us deep inside pretty much every al-Qaeda plot since 9/11, from their planning to their execution. He also provides fascinating biographical portraits of the al-Qaeda members that carried out these attacks. An interesting nugget that Jones details is the strange diversity of these foot soldiers, from Middle Eastern youths like Mohammed Sidique Khan to the unlikely Adam Gadahn, editor of a death metal magazine. Some al-Qaeda members were shrewd tacticians, others incompetent nitwits.
Jones also details the evolution of al-Qaeda from a centralized, almost bureaucratic organization to a more far-flung, de-centralized "umbrella organization" with branches in North Africa, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Another angle that Jones explores is the increasing use of technology by al-Qaeda for propaganda purposes.
Well-researched and interesting, with sharp insight and an interesting attention to detail.
Jones writes that al-Qaeda activity comes in “waves,” and he also shows how the intensity of international counterterrorism efforts force the organization to adopt a more and more decentralized model.
Jones details the often bitter political, ideological, and personal divisions in the al-Qaeda and how these exacerbated following 9/11. Interestingly, many al-Qaeda operatives have abandoned mosques, preferring the teachings of extremists with no religious credentials. Americans tend to lump all Islamist militants together under the general label of "terrorist." Unfortunately, they fail to appreciate the complex tensions and conflicts resulting from their differing religious and political ideologies, which Jones explores in detail.
Jones also takes us deep inside pretty much every al-Qaeda plot since 9/11, from their planning to their execution. He also provides fascinating biographical portraits of the al-Qaeda members that carried out these attacks. An interesting nugget that Jones details is the strange diversity of these foot soldiers, from Middle Eastern youths like Mohammed Sidique Khan to the unlikely Adam Gadahn, editor of a death metal magazine. Some al-Qaeda members were shrewd tacticians, others incompetent nitwits.
Jones also details the evolution of al-Qaeda from a centralized, almost bureaucratic organization to a more far-flung, de-centralized "umbrella organization" with branches in North Africa, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Another angle that Jones explores is the increasing use of technology by al-Qaeda for propaganda purposes.
Well-researched and interesting, with sharp insight and an interesting attention to detail.
May 28, 2012
This was an excellent history of al-Qaida. The author bases his book on the hypothesis that there have been three major waves of the terrorist organization with the first wave beginning with the embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya and the third wave ending with the assassination of Osama bin Laden. The book draws on a variety of sources within the intelligence agencies of the United States and the UK and is very well written. The book is easy to read and also accessible to those who have limited knowledge of al-Qaida. It is an excellent companion to Steve Coll's "Ghost Wars".
January 3, 2015
Great chronicle of the recent "War on Terror". This book connected the dots between many news snippets I'd heard over the years and gave me a greater understanding of terrorist networks and the complex political structure of the Middle East.
June 21, 2016
Clear, detailed, poignant, accurate. There are dozens of words capable of describing this account. I'm looking forward to a new addition with some added detail of the past four years.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews