Ο πολιτικός φιλελευθερισμός

by John Rawls, Αλέξανδρος Κιουπκιολής (Translator), Σπύρος Μαρκέτος (Translator / Editor)

Ένα από τα σημαντικότερα έργα αναφοράς στον χώρο της πολιτικής φιλοσοφίας για τη σύγχρονη δημοκρατική κοινωνία στην οποία ποικίλα ασυμβίβαστα δόγματα -θρησκευτικά, φιλοσοφικά και ηθικά- συνυπάρχουν στο πλαίσιο των δημοκρατικών θεσμών.

Στο βιβλίο αυτό ο John Rawls προεκτείνει και αναθεωρεί την ιδέα της δικαιοσύνης όπως την παρουσίασε στο βιβλίο του Θεωρία της δικαιοσύνης· παράλληλα, αναθεμελιώνει τη φιλοσοφική της ερμηνεία. Στη Θεωρία της δικαιοσύνης ο συγγραφέας θεωρούσε δεδομένη την «εύτακτη κοινωνία», όπως την ονόμασε ο ίδιος, δηλαδή μια κοινωνία σταθερή, σχετικά ομοιογενή στις βασικές ηθικές της πεποιθήσεις, η οποία χαρακτηρίζεται από ευρεία συναίνεση για το τι συνιστά την καλή ζωή. Ωστόσο, στη σύγχρονη δημοκρατική κοινωνία βλέπουμε ότι συνυπάρχει μια πολλαπλότητα ασύμβατων μεταξύ τους δογμάτων – θρησκευτικών, φιλοσοφικών και ηθικών.

Αναγνωρίζοντας πως αυτή είναι μια πάγια κατάσταση της δημοκρατίας, ο Rawls θέτει το ζήτημα του πολιτικού φιλελευθερισμού ως εξής:
Πώς μπορεί μια σταθερή και δίκαιη κοινωνία ελεύθερων και ίσων πολιτών να ζει σε ομόνοια, όταν διαιρείται βαθιά από όλα αυτά τα εύλογα αλλά και ασύμβατα μεταξύ τους δόγματα;
Η απάντηση που μας δίνει στον Πολιτικό φιλελευθερισμό στηρίζεται σε έναν νέο ορισμό της εύτακτης κοινωνίας. Εύτακτη δεν είναι πλέον η κοινωνία που ενώνεται από τις βασικές ηθικές της αντιλήψεις, αλλά εκείνη που ενώνεται από την πολιτική της αντίληψη περί δικαιοσύνης, και στην οποία επιπλέον υπάρχει μια επάλληλη συναίνεση των εύλογων περιεκτικών δογμάτων που εστιάζεται σε τούτη την αντίληψη.

Η παρούσα εμπλουτισμένη μορφή του έργου συγκεντρώνει σε μία οριστική έκδοση το σύνολο της σκέψης του κορυφαίου πολιτικού φιλοσόφου για τον πολιτικό φιλελευθερισμό, προσθέτοντας τα εξής νέα κεφάλαια: Απάντηση στον Χάμπερμας, Η ιδέα του δημόσιου λόγου αναθεωρημένη, καθώς και την εισαγωγή του John Rawls στη χαρτόδετη έκδοση του Πολιτικού φιλελευθερισμού .

Genres: Philosophy, Politics, Nonfiction, Political Science, Economics, Society, Sociology

632 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1993

About the author

John Bordley Rawls was an American philosopher and a leading figure in moral and political philosophy. He held the James Bryant Conant University Professorship at Harvard. His magnum opus A Theory of Justice (1971) is now regarded as "one of the primary texts in political philosophy." His work in political philosophy, dubbed Rawlsianism, takes as its starting point the argument that "most reasonable principles of justice are those everyone would accept and agree to from a fair position." Rawls employs a number of thought experiments—including the famous veil of ignorance—to determine what constitutes a fair agreement in which "everyone is impartially situated as equals," in order to determine principles of social justice.

Rawls received both the Schock Prize for Logic and Philosophy and the National Humanities Medal in 1999, the latter presented by President Bill Clinton, in recognition of how Rawls's thought "helped a whole generation of learned Americans revive their faith in democracy itself."

Reviews

[محمد شکری · Rating 5 out of 5]

متن زیر خیلی طولانی است. اگر حوصله خواندن همه آن را ندارید فقط بخش سوم، «درباره محتوای کتاب»، را بخوانید

کمی درباره اهمیت نویسنده
جان رالز (۱۹۲۱-۲۰۰۲) فیلسوف ناشناخته‌ای نیست، به‌خصوص برای اهالی اینجا. ولی می‌خواهم کمی درباره پس‌زمینه و اهمیت او توضیح دهم. زندگی حرفه‌ای رالز گستره بسیار متنوعی از فلسفه‌های هنجاری را پوشش می‌دهد. ابتدا و در دوره کارشناسی (۱۹۳۹) تزی در حیطه فلسفه دین درباره معنای گناه و ایمان می‌نویسد. سپس، طبق برخی زندگی‌نامه‌ها، شرکت در جنگ جهانی و از سر گذراندن تجربه‌های بسیار سخت او را به دوری از ایمان (یا دست‌کم ایمان پیشینش) سوق می‌دهد. پس در دوره دکترا (۱۹۵۲) به فلسفه اخلاق روی آورده و تزی در زمینه مبانی شناخت اخلاقی (با توجه به ارزش اخلاقی شخصیت) می‌نگارد (و احتمالا به همین دلیل برخی شارحین نه تنها کانت بلکه ارسطو را نیز در آثار او می‌بینند).
اما چیزی که رالز را رالز کرد، کتاب‌های او در حوزه فلسفه سیاسی بود. ابتدا و در سال ۱۹۷۱ نظریه‌ای درباره عدالت را منتشر کرد. سال ۱۹۹۳ لیبرالیسم سیاسی (نسخه اولیه همین کتاب که بعدها دو مقاله مهم به آن افزوده شد) را با تجدید نظر جدی در کتاب قبلی‌اش نظریه عدالت به چاپ رساند. بعدتر برای پوشش برخی کاستی‌های نظریه‌اش قانون ملت‌ها (که برخی مترجمین متاسفانه قانون مردمان ترجمه کرده‌اند) را در ۱۹۹۹ روانه بازار کرد و نهایتا در ۲۰۰۱ کتاب عدالت به مثابه انصاف را که تقریبا صورت‌بندی مجدد و تلخیص لیبرالیسم سیاسی بود انتشار داد. در اهمیت کتاب‌های رالز می‌توان به گزارشی اشاره کرد که وبلاگ معتبر Leiter Reports ‌سال ۲۰۱۷ ارائه کرد و در آن عدالت به مثابه انصاف بعد از ساختار انقلاب‌های علمی تامس کون دومین کتاب پرارجاع فلسفه پس از جنگ جهانی دوم شناخته شد. همچنین لیبرالیسم سیاسی بعد از افعال گفتاری سرل و در پی فضیلت مک‌اینتایر پنجمین کتاب این لیست بود. قانون مردمان و عدالت به‌مثابه انصاف هم به ترتیب ۳۴ و ۳۵مین کتاب بودند. نکته آنکه در این لیستِ پنجاه‌تایی، رالز تنها فیلسوفی است که ۴ کتاب (و همه در فلسفه سیاسی) به نام خود ثبت کرده و مجموع ارجاعات به این چهار کتاب هم نشان می‌دهد که کتاب‌های او بیش از هر فیلسوف دیگری پس از جنگ جهانی محل رجوع بوده‌است. (البته این لیست حرفی از مقالات نزده و می‌دانیم در عالم فلسفه دانشگاهی مقالات اهمیت کمتری از کتاب ندارند) ر

درباره جایگاه کتاب
کتاب حاضر مرجع اصلی من در شش ماه گذشته بوده‌است. بخش‌هایی از آن را بارها خوانده‌ام، بخش‌هایی را با نظریه و یا عدالت به‌مثابه انصاف تطبیق داده‌ام و نقدهای زیادی هم از جماعت‌گرایان (سندل و تیلور)، اخلاق گفتمانی‌ها (هابرماس و هونت) و فمینیست‌ها (کیتی و نوسبام) بر آن دیده‌ام. با بسیاری از این نقدها نیز همدل بوده‌ام. ولی چارچوبی که رالز در این کتاب پذیرفته را هم شخصا قبول دارم و هم ندیده‌ام که هیچ‌کدام از این فلاسفه رد کنند. حتی نوسباوم که مستقیما به نظریه «قرارداد اجتماعی» که بنیان «لیبرالیسم سیاسی» است حمله می‌کند خود را ذیل چارچوب «لیبرالیسم سیاسی» تعریف می‌کند
درست است که لیبرالیسم سیاسی پس از نظریه نوشته شده‌است و در دل نظریه هم ایده «عدالت به مثابه انصاف» طرح شده‌است. اما از نظرساختاری باید ایده «لیبرالیسم سیاسی» را پایه‌ای‌ترین ایده رالز درنظر گرفت که کلا جای نظریه را گرفته است و سپس روی این پایه ایده «عدالت به مثابه انصاف» به عنوان یک «پیشنهاد» ارائه می‌شود. چرا اینگونه است را در بخش بعد توضیح می‌دهم

درباره محتوای کتاب
محتوای کتاب را نه بر اساسی که خود رالز توضیح داده، بلکه بر مبنایی که کل نظام رالز را آشکار کند توضیح می‌دهم
مهم‌ترین مسئله رالز در این کتاب این است: اعمال قانون الزار‌آور چگونه مشروع می‌شود؟ یا به سادگی حکومت چگونه مشروع است؟
رالز در جایی از تاریخ فلسفه ایستاده که دو پاسخ مهم به این پرسش در اختیار اوست: از دوران افلاطون و ارسطو تا دوران هابز و لاک یک پاسخ واضح و پذیرفته شده به این پرسش وجود دارد: تطابق عقلانی با طبیعت انسان-جهان. جان کلام افلاطون در جمهوری (و گرگیاس) و جان کلام ارسطو در سیاست (و اخلاق نیکوماخوسی)‌ همین است که هر قانونی که چنین تطابقی دارد مشروع است و اگر ندارد نامشروع. اگر تطابق داشته باشد به مصلحت و نفع و فضیلت شهروندان می‌انجامد و اگر نداشته باشد تنها به نفع پادشاه جبار (استبداد) و نزدیکان او (الیگارشی) است یا به نفع هیچ‌کس نیست (آنارشی) ر
حال سوال این است: این تطابق را چگونه می‌توان یافت؟ اینجاست که مونارکی (فیلسوف-پادشاه) آریستوکراسی (فیلسوف-وزیر یا فیلسوف-مشاور) از یک سو و تئوکراسی (نبی-پادشاه یا فقیه-پادشاه) سر بر می‌آورند. تمام نسخه‌های حکومت شایستگان، چه شایستگان عقلی، چه نژادی و چه دینی زیر همین بیرق قرار دارند و تنها اختلافشان بر سر این است که کدام یک (فیلسوف، نژاده یا فقیه) بهتر می‌تواند آن قانون مطابق با طبیعت انسان-جهان را کشف کند
ولی از دوران هابز و لاک یک مفهوم بسیار متفاوت بجای طبیعت یا حقیقت سر برآورد: «رضایت»- قانون الزام‌آور تنها زمانی مشروع است که مردم با رضایت به آن تن داده باشند. این بصیرت که امروزه همچون امری بدیهی می‌نماید، در روزگاری موجب خشم و خنده حکما و عقلای قوم بوده‌است
سپردن مشروعیت قانون به رضایت به اصول و پیش‌فرض‌های بسیار جدیدی نیاز داشت که برخی از آنها حتی از زبان طراحان اولیه‌اش هم بیرون نیامد: (۱) آزادی افراد برای تعیین سرنوشت خویش [سویه هنجاری فردگرایی]؛ (۲)‌ برابری تمام انسان‌ها، نه در پیشگاه قانون، بلکه فی‌نفسه و پیش از وضع قانون [سویه هنجاری انسان‌گرایی] و (۳) اینکه علم غایی در دسترس هیچ بشری نیست و برای رسیدن به قانون مشروع هیچ فردی مرجعیت بیرونی و نهایی ندارد [سویه توصیفی تکثرگرایی]. بسیاری از فلاسفه لیبرال کلاسیک (چه لاک و چه میل) اصل (۱) را وارد اندیشه خود کردند. نظریه قرارداد اجتماعی، به خصوص در نسخه روسو و کانت اصل (۲)‌ را نیز مورد تصریح قرار داد. نتیجه اینکه تنها راه مشروعیت قانون این است که افراد آزاد و برابر همگی آن را به عنوان قرارداد عقلایی خویش پذیرفته باشند. اما این اصل (۳) بود که تا زمان رالز چندان جدی گرفته نشده بود
ایده «لیبرالیسم سیاسی» تلاشی برای توجیه مشروعیت قانون/حکومت به صورتی بود که تمام پیش‌فرض‌های مذکور را بپذیرد، از نظر عقلی قابل دفاع باشد (یعنی فقط مبتنی بر رضایت نباشد) و هیچ شهروند معقولی با نظام اخلاقی، فلسفی یا دینی خود در آن احساس خفقان نکند و بتواند سعادت فردی خود را (طبق آموزه جامع فلسفی یا دینی خود) دنبال کند. به عبارت دیگر، تلاش رالز در این کتاب جمع هر دو ایده قبلی بود که هم عقل در آن جایی داشت و هم رضایت: «عقل عمومی». مفهوم عقل عمومی مرکزی‌ترین مفهوم لیبرالیسم سیاسی است که طبق آن بناست تنها قانونی مشروع باشد که هیچ شهروند معقولی (با هر دین و مسلکی) آن را رد نکند. در ابتدا این ایده ناشدنی به نظر می‌رسد، اما نکته اساسی در مفهوم «معقول» نهفته است
معقولیت از نظر رالز یک مفهومی معرفتی صرف نیست، بلکه مفهومی معرفتی-سیاسی است و اساسا لیبرالیسم او از همین‌جا تبدیل به لیبرالیسم سیاسی می‌شود. این مفهوم معرفتی است به این خاطر که قانون پیشنهادی، همچون دلیل، باید ویژگی عمومیت، فهم‌پذیری و دسترس‌پذیری داشته باشد؛ سیاسی است به این معنا که نه تنها باور، بلکه فرد هم می‌تواند متصف به آن شود. فردی معقول است که اصل (۱) و (۲) را می‌پذیرد و هرکه آنها را نپذیرد نامعقول است. به این ترتیب اگر شما بگویید ما باید فلان قانون را داشته باشیم چون به من وحی شده یا اگر بگویید قانون من مزیت خاصی برای جنس، نژاد یا دین خاصی قائل است چون این فی‌نفسه مطابق طبیعت یا حقیقت است شما به ترتیب معقولیت معرفتی یا سیاسی را احراز نکرده‌اید و از دایره عقل عمومی خارجید. نکته این است که نه تنها پیشنهاد قانون، بلکه رد قانون پیشنهادی هم باید بر همین اساس باشد و شما نمی‌توانید بدون دلیل هر قانونی را رد کنید
نکته دیگر این است که سه اصل مذکور پیش‌فرض‌های نظریه‌اند و به این ترتیب تعبیری عام از لیبرالیسم و قرارداد اجتماعی را از پیش پذیرفته‌اند. به عبارت دقیق‌تر، هر قانونی که آزادی و برابری شهروندان را زیر سؤال ببرد از پیش قابلیت عرضه شدن به عقل عمومی را ندارد

قاعدتا نمی‌توان ۵۰۰ صفحه کتاب فلسفی را در ۵۰۰ کلمه طوری خلاصه کرد که نکته مهمی جا نیفتد. اما من صرفا می‌خواهم دو نکته به این توضیح کلی اضافه کنم و تمام (اگر نقد یا پرسشی دارید خوشحال می‌شوم آن را منتقل کنید) ر
نکته اول اینکه بسیاری رالز را با آن دو اصل کلی (اصل برابری و اصل تفاوت)‌ می‌شناسند و شاید بگویید پس آن چه شد. باید بگویم که آن دو اصل درواقع نه ایده «لیبرالیسم سیاسی» بلکه ایده «عدالت به مثابه انصاف» هستند که در مرور آن کتاب روی آن تمرکز خواهم کرد. اما توضیح بسیار مهمی لازم است که گاه حتی فلاسفه مهمی در توضیح رالز آن را اشتباه می‌گیرند: لیبرالیسم سیاسی یعنی دست کشیدن از هر ایده جامعی که از پیش دنبال رسیدن به یک نقطه خاص به عنوان نقطه مطلوب عدالت است. به این ترتیب لیبرالیسم سیاسی نه تنها دربرابر حکومت‌های دینی و ایدئولوژیک، بلکه حتی دربرابر حکومت‌هایی است که سکولاریسم یا لیبرالیسم را به عنوان آموزه جامع فلسفی پذیرفته اند و معتقدند مثلا نوع خاصی از عقیده یا عمل (که حتی می‌تواند سه اصل مذکور را پاس کند) باید از جامعه حذف شود. اما ما تنها یک عقل عمومی یا پلورالیسم سیاسی نداریم و در هر جامعه‌ای با پس‌زمینه فرهنگی عام لیبرال و دموکراتیک می‌توان عقل عمومی همان جامعه را به دست داد. کار عمده عقل عمومی این است که (۱) حقوق، آزادی‌ها و فرصت‌های پایه‌ای که همه شهروندان باید از آن برخوردار باشند تعیین کند؛ (۲) ترتیب آنها را معین کند (چون در عمل گاهی بعضی باید فدای مابقی شوند؛ (۳) راه دسترسی به آنها را مشخص کند. آن دو اصل معروف رالز پیشنهادی درون چارچوب پلورالیسم سیاسی است که این سه را تعیین می‌کند. به همین دلیل پیش‌تر گفتم که «عدالت به مثابه انصاف» ایده‌ای درون «لیبرالیسم سیاسی» است و می‌توان آن را رد کرد اما لیبرالیسم سیاسی را رد نکرد
نکته دوم اینکه عقل عمومی برای همه‌جا قانون وضع نمی‌کند بلکه فقط برای عرصه‌هایی این کار را می‌کند که تلاقی عرصه حضور بلاواسطه شهروندان در مقابل دولت است. رالز تمایزی بین جامعه و انجمن‌هایی مثل کلیسا، دانشگاه و باشگاه‌های ورزشی می‌گذارد که در آن شما می‌توانید قوانین داخلی خود را داش��ه باشید: مثلا یک کلیسا می‌تواند زن‌ها را از کشیش شدن یا همجنس‌گرایان را از ورود به کلیسا منع کند (همان‌چیزی که لیبرالیسم غیرسیاسی به کلیسا اجازه نخواهد داد) اما اگر نزاعی بین یک شهروند و یک شماس کلیسا ��ربگیرد دادگاه به عنوان عرصه عمومی جامعه آن را براساس عقل عمومی حل و فصل خواهد کرد. این مسئله درمورد خانواده هم پابرجاست و مشخصا که یکی از نکاتی است که برخی از فمینیست‌ها مورد نقد قرار داده‌اند. دلیل این تمایز از نظر رالز این است که جامعه جایی است که بسته و کامل است: یعنی شما به درخواست خود عضو آن نشدید و تمام نیاز‌های شما هم به آن وابسته است اما انجمن یا جماعت این‌گونه نیست: شما به درخواست خود عضو آن شده‌اید و تسلط کاملی هم بر زندگی شما ندارد. این برداشت از نسبت فرد و جماعت یا انجمن‌ها هم چیزی است که مورد نقد جماعت‌گرایان بوده‌است

بار دیگر:‌ در مجموع لیبرالیسم سیاسی می‌کوشد دو اصل مهم را با هم جمع کند:‌(۱) هم مبتنی بر مدلی پیشرفته از قرارداد اجتماعی باشد که حقوق اقلیت را نادیده نمی‌گیرد و (۲) هم به هیچ آموزه جامعی اعم از دینی، فلسفی یا اخلاقی برای توجیه مشروعیت قانون نیاز نداشته باشد اما با آموزه‌های معقول موجود در جامعه در تضاد هم نباشد. اصل (۱) یعنی «لیبرالیسم» و اصل (۲)‌ یعنی «سیاسی» ر

[Andy Masley · Rating 5 out of 5]

A really magic book.

The best introduction that's been written (that I know of) to the general political ideology currently governing the Earth.

People complain that Rawls's language is often so theological and otherworldly that his beliefs can't really be applied well in the everyday world, but to me it reads more like he's discovered and is articulated real facts about our social lives together and how we learn to mediate radical difference.

I might be biased because I was primed by other authors I've loved since college to expect great things from this, but it really exceeded my expectations and became one of my favorite books.

[Sarah Myers · Rating 4 out of 5]

Political Liberalism was my first foray into the work of John Rawls, the American philosopher at the back of much of contemporary liberalism, and it may have been better to read his other work, A Theory of Justice, first, since much of what he wrote in this book appears to be a development upon that other book and a response to the criticisms that were leveled against it. This made some parts of PL confusing, and I hope that I do not badly misrepresent Rawls in this review.


At the very beginning (Introduction to the Paperback Edition), Rawls makes a crucial distinction between what he calls "comprehensive liberalism" and "political liberalism." The distinction appears to be a response to criticism that he claimed to be fair to all concepts of the good and actually substituting a liberal concept of good.

Comprehensive liberalism may be identified with a broad scheme of ideas derived from the Enlightenment, intended to serve as the modern substitute for the older religious ideas. Clearly this kind of liberalism contains within itself its own values and ideas of the good. Political liberalism, on the other hand, is not entirely without an idea of the good, but its good is specifically limited. "[It] takes for granted the fact of reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines, where some of those doctrines are taken to be nonliberal and religious," and therefore its "good" is to provide a just public space where all these views can meet on equal ground and work together in a stable political order.

So in Political Liberalism, Rawls's project is to avoid comprehensive liberalism and show that political liberalism is able to provide a concept of justice that can rightly be endorsed by a variety of competing comprehensive views, not merely because the current balance of power more or less forces that upon them, but because an "overlapping consensus" can actually recognize it as just. We find a starting point for this overlapping consensus in the values that are already broadly shared in a democratic society: things such as equal liberties and freedom of thought and belief. The rest of the book develops this theme in a series of chapters originally given as lectures (but still very well tied together).


At one point, Rawls does admit that although there is nothing inherent to the concept of political liberalism that is antagonistic to specific religious views or other comprehensive views of the good, the cultural climate of a politically liberal society may simply prove inhospitable to such views and it may be inevitable that some of them will die out. It could be that the passing of some of these comprehensive is to be regretted, but "no society can include within itself all forms of life." The recognition that not even political liberalism can produce a kind of utopian society where all views will live in peace is very honest (and shows the difficult challenges in front of those attempting to harmonize Christianity and democratic liberalism), but it is unclear to me why those holding specific religious or philosophical views should endorse the "overlapping consensus" if it is forseeable to them that doing so will ultimately spell the end of their way of life. If the space provided by Rawls's political liberalism does not ultimately provide for at least the majority of the major comprehensive views, then it seems to fail in what it set out to do. Also, I would have liked to see more practical examples of how Rawls's concepts would work out in American society as it actually is--though perhaps that is unrealistic to expect in a book that was already over 400 pages.


In spite of my misgivings that Rawls's political ideas are not rooted in a realistic view of human persons, I was deeply impressed by the book, and I would venture to say that the real force and attraction of such a liberalism as Rawls's is not adequately dealt with by most conservatives. In spite of the book's heavily academic tone, I think it would contribute to anyone's ability to engage in the conversation regarding liberalism, democracy, and just government in a pluralist society. I highly recommend it.

[Ali · Rating 5 out of 5]

مساله مورد بررسی رالز در لیبرالیسم سیاسی دو پرسش بنیادین زیر است:

نخستین پرسش: برای تعیین شروط منصفانه همکاری اجتماعی میان شهروندانی که آزاد و برابر تلقی می شوند درخورترین برداشت از عدالت چیست؟ دومین پرسش: با توجه به واقعیت تکثرگرایی معقول چونان نتیجه گریزناپذیر توان های عقل انسان، که در درون نهادهای آزاد دیرپا عمل می کنند، دلایل رواداری به معنای عام کدامند؟ با در هم آمیختن این دو پرسش به این یک پرسش می رسیم: چگونه ممکن است که یک جامعه عادلانه و پایدار متشکل از شهروندان آزاد و برابری که بر پایه آموزه های معقول دینی، فلسفی و اخلاقی همچنان در گروه های بسیار متفاوت می مانند، در گذر زمان بپاید؟

قید "تکثرگرایی معقول" در بررسی رالز از اهمیت اساسی برخوردار است. رالز در توصیف اشخاص معقول می نویسد:

اشخاص از یک جنبه اساسی معقول اند هر گاه آماده باشند اصول و استانده هایی را چونان شروط منصفانه همکاری پیشنهاد کنند و به دلخواه خویش بدان ها وفادار بمانند، با فرض اطمینان از این که دیگران نیز چنان خواهند کرد. آنان پذیرش آن هنجارها برای هر کس را معقول، و بدین سان توجیه پذیر می دانند؛ و آماده اند به بررسی شروط منصفانه پیشنهادی دیگران بپردازند.

از توضیحات فوق پیداست که نظریه رالز به کار جوامعی که در آن اکثریت به برداشت سنتی از ادیان توحیدی یا هر آموزه فراگیر نامعقول/نارورادار دیگر معتقدند، نمی آید. رالز در شرح فرآیند شکل گیری اجماع بر سر قانون اساسی، نحوه تبدیل نگرش های فراگیر شهروندان به نگرش های معقول را توضیح می دهد:

در نخستین مرحله اجماع بر سر قانون اساسی، اصول لیبرال عدالت، که در آغاز با اکراه بسان یک «سازش موقت» پذیرفته شده و به درون قانون اساسی راه یافته اند، می خواهند آموزه های فراگیر شهروندان را دگرگون کنند به گونه ای که آنان دست کم اصول یک قانون اساسی لیبرال را بپذیرند. این اصول حقوق و آزادی های اساسی ویژه ای را تضمین می کنند، و روندهای دموکراتیکی را برای پدیدآوری تعدیل در رقابت سیاسی، و برای تعیین موضوعات سیاسی اجتماعی پدید می آورند. تا این اندازه نگرش های فراگیر شهروندان را در چنین گستره ای می توان معقول دانست؛ تکثرگرایی صرف به سوی تکثرگرایی معقول پیش می رود و اجماع بر سر قانون اساسی به دست می آید

رالز آزادی های تضمین شده در یک قانون اساسی لیبرال را فراتر از آزادی های صوری محض نمی انگارد. مرحله بعدی در طرح رالز حرکت از اجماع قانون اساسی به اجماع همپوش (جامعه استوار بر قانون اساسی عادلانه) است. با توجه به واقعیت تکثرگرایی معقول، اجماع همپوش بایستی بر یک برداشت سیاسی از عدالت که خودبنیاد است (به هیچ آموزه فراگیری وابسته نیست) پی ریزی شود. برداشت سیاسی پیشنهادی رالز "نظریه عدالت به مثابه انصاف" است. استدلال رالز با بررسی معقولیت و پایایی طرح پیشنهادی اش پایان می پذیرد.

رالز در طول کتاب، آشنایی با نظریه عدالت به مثابه انصاف را فرض می گیرد؛ فقط بخش هایی از نظریه که به زعم رالز در ویرایش اول کتاب "نظریه ای در باب عدالت" کاستی هایی دارد بازبینی شده است. البته این تغییرات اکثرا در ویرایش نهایی کتاب نظریه ای در باب عدالت هم اعمال شده است. شاید بخش هایی از کتاب (به ویژه فصل پایانی) حاوی نکات جدیدی برای خوانندگان ویرایش نهایی نظریه نباشد، هر چند با توجه به خلاصه تر بیان شدن مطالب مطالعه آن خالی از لطف هم نیست.

[Gabriel · Rating 4 out of 5]

“Political Liberalism” es el segundo libro más importante de Rawls después de “A Theory of Justice”.

Es el tercer libro que leo de él (los anteriores fueron la teoría y “Justice as Fairness: A Restatement”).

El libro lidia con el conflicto propio de la modernidad: muchas doctrinas razonables y, sin embargo, incompatibles. Todavía peor, son inconmensurables. No pueden ni siquiera dialogar. ¿Cómo lo hace la democracia constitucional para sobrevivir, entonces? Haciendo uso de la razón pública, lo que implica, de alguna manera, renunciar a parcialmente a las pretensiones de cada doctrina.

Algunos critican este libro por anular, de hecho, la verdadera discusión entre las doctrinas comprehensivas. Puede ser. Kuhn, en “The Structure of the Scientific Revolutions”, sostiene que los paradigmas científicos son inconmensurables. Si los paradigmas científicos son inconmensurables, con mayor razón lo pueden ser las doctrinas morales, filosóficas y religiosas. Sin embargo, el mismo Kuhn reconoció en su libro que esa inconmensurabilidad no es absoluta, sino parcial. Esto quiere decir que hay posibilidad de traducir y dialogar entre paradigmas. Quizás también haya esperanza en el campo político.

Quizás sea Habermas quien, a través de la teoría de la acción comunicativa, haya dado mejores pistas de cómo desanudar el persistente problema moderno.

Quién sabe.

[Soha Bayoumi]

This book attempts to answer the question of how can a stable and just society of free and equal citizens live in a concord when deeply divided by reasonable but incompatible doctrines? Rawls's answer to the question puts forward his Political Liberalism, with the central idea of public reason. A must-read in my opinion.

[Tom Willis · Rating 1 out of 5]

"Rawls hated our God. Catholics ought to know that before they read him." - Andrew M. Greenwell, Esq.

The great awfulness of this tome is that not only is it eminently boring (a "smokescreen of technicalities," Ralph Hancock calls it), but its thesis is swiftly refuted by Christopher Eberle in his book Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics. Don't waste your time trudging through Rawls. Instead read the pertinent chapter(s) of Eberle's book.

Rawls' concern is noble enough: lay a groundwork for a just and stable (democratic) society in the midst of religious and philosophical pluralism. We all have a stake in this. His groundwork, "Political Liberalism", is ostensibly a module in which a variety of what he calls "comprehensive doctrines" (that is, worldviews) can coexist, but it is really based on a sort of relativism, mixed with a grossly intolerant lust for toleration.

"Central to the idea of public reason is that it neither criticizes nor attacks any comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, except insofar as that doctrine is incompatible with the essentials of public reason and a democratic polity" (p.441). At first glance this may sound equitable. But even a surface evaluation of this statement reveals how tautological it is. Public reason criticizes nothing ... except for those doctrines with which it is incompatible. The same can be said of any ideology - Catholicism criticizes no doctrine, except insofar as that doctrine is incompatible with Catholicism's essentials. That is not an argument in any way for basing coercive laws on Catholic beliefs.

"How is it possible - or is it - for those of faith, as well as the nonreligious (secular), to endorse a constitutional regime even when their comprehensive doctrines may not prosper under it, and indeed may decline?" (p.459) This is what Rawls demands of citizens - that they support a constitutional regime - his constitutional regime - over and above their own comprehensive doctrines. This is an unreasonable request, and demonstrates an astonishing misconception of the human person, which Eberle addresses in his book.

Rawls' answer to the above question "lies in the religious or nonreligious doctrine's understanding and accepting that, except by endorsing a reasonable constitutional democracy, there is no other way fairly to ensure the liberty of its adherents consistent with the equal liberties of other reasonable free and equal citizens" (p.460). This is an incredibly ignorant sentence. Rawls seems totally unaware that adherents to comprehensive doctrines are incredibly likely to value the prosperity of their particular CDs far more than their own prosperity and liberty. The systems Rawls sets up is "just" by his own definition of the word, and yet by his own admission also distinguishes (that is, discriminates,) between comprehensive doctrines, holding them up to its own standard as either "reasonable" or "unreasonable." Rawls' pluralist society is in fact not true pluralism, but only limited pluralism, and survives by telling a certain group of people that they cannot continue to operate within society as they are now. This is no different from the Inquisitions and proverbial witch-hunts Rawls castigates at the beginning of his book. For his tolerant society to flourish, some belief systems cannot be tolerated.

Rawls' doesn't "get" people. This is a fatal flaw of Political Liberalism. But he himself admits that he is unconcerned with people. "In political liberalism we try to avoid natural or psychological views ... accounts of human nature we put aside and rely on a political conception of persons as citizens instead" (p.482). Uhh, you can't do that buddy. You cannot discuss the human person without claiming some view of his nature.

In the end Rawls is a relativist, and like other modern political philosophers, skirts dealing with the fact of pluralism by ignoring the Good and focusing instead on rights. "Justice as fairness" is his mantra, but it is inherently flawed, because the Truth is not "fair." It is necessarily discriminatory.

[Audrius Slanina · Rating 4 out of 5]

Knygą pasiėmiau paskaityti po to, kai gavau prašymą iš vienos kolegės padėti parengti vieną skyrių jos bakalauro darbo teorinei daliai, tai atlikus darbus nusprendžiau knygą perskaityti iki galo. Skaičiau lietuvišką versiją (kurios goodreads neradau), tai nežinau ar knyga jau praradusi dalį aktualumo, ar tam tikrose vietose naudojama per daug "wishful thinking", tai autoriaus siūlomos idėjos arba neišsprendžia visų problemų arba pernelyg utopinis. Tačiau dalis autoriaus idėjų yra aktualios iki šiol ir pasistengus ir atsisakius tam tikro "savanaudiškumo", jas galima įgyvendinti. Tebūnie 4 (nors pilnai iki to knyga netraukia). Gražių Šv. Velykų visiems !!!

[Jacob Williams · Rating 3 out of 5]

What this book offers: intriguing thoughts on living in a society characterized by deep disagreements
What not to expect: enjoyment; actionable takeaways

The only way you could have made this more boring would have been to interleave it with a phone book. And at least then there might've been a few funny ads to liven things up.

Rawls’ style is to break down his worldview into a highly hierarchical outline and translate that unceremoniously into paragraph form. So you’re constantly reading about stuff like the “three ways in which the social aspect of human relationships is reflected in the content of the [two] principles of justice,” or the “four main kinds of variations in citizens’ capacities," or the “five essential elements of a conception of objectivity” (admittedly, I was pretty excited about that one). The degree of organization is admirable, but I would’ve liked more time spent upfront explaining why we should care; why his framework is a good way to view the world. The book feels heavy on exposition and comparatively light on argumentation.

But it’s given me some concepts and ways of thinking that I really appreciate.

One is the notion of reflective equilibrium. When you’re confronted with a question - let’s say, is it OK to steal to feed my baby? - do you try to answer it on the basis of fundamental abstract principles, like always obey Scripture or promote the greatest good for the greatest number? Or do you see what your intuition tells you about the specific case, and then judge the abstract principle on whether it agrees (hmm, if my holy book says it’s better to let my kid starve, maybe I should overlook its advice in this case… or at least reevaluate how I’m interpreting it)?

To some extent we do both, and that’s a good thing. If our beliefs about concrete situations don’t seem to be compatible with our more general beliefs, that’s a warning sign that some of our beliefs are mistaken. But the correct change might be in one of multiple places. Maybe one of the more general beliefs is wrong, or maybe we need to bite the bullet and ignore our intuition about the concrete case (ideally, then, we’d have an explanation for why we have an incorrect intuition about that case), or maybe they actually are compatible and we just haven’t identified how to reconcile them yet.

Updating our beliefs at all levels of abstraction is a never-ending process. When you encounter a compelling argument against a particular belief you hold, but changing it would be incompatible with some of your other beliefs, you have to consider whether you may be wrong about those others, even if they are what you consider more fundamental beliefs. You need to check whether the reasons for believing them are strong enough to outweigh the new argument you’ve come across, or whether there’s a different set of beliefs you could hold that makes better sense of all the available evidence and arguments. Rawls refers to this as a process of seeking “reflective equilibrium,” a state where you hold a coherent set of beliefs that account for your firmest convictions at all levels.

I think discussions of some controversial issues would go a bit more smoothly if more people saw things this way. I’ve had too many conversations where we’re trying to discuss something like should the state allow same-sex marriage or should we have single-payer healthcare, and one participant won’t allow the conversation to proceed unless we can all come to agreement on what is the metaphysical basis of right and wrong and where does the government’s right to tax originate. But such foundational questions are extremely difficult to resolve, in part because one of the ways we judge foundational beliefs is whether their implications seem plausible. So it’s important to be able to discuss more down-to-earth issues individually and directly; doing so may eventually lead us to revise our opinions about more foundational issues.

Or it may not. Another Rawlsian assumption that I’d love to see more widely accepted throughout our society is what he calls “the fact of reasonable pluralism.” This means simply that reasonable people will hold conflicting worldviews. You cannot expect that everyone will reach the same conclusion as you on important questions, and you should not assume that disagreement stems from stupidity or evil. Rawls has a nice partial list of explanations for why serious disagreements persist among reasonable people:

a. The evidence—empirical and scientific—bearing on the case is conflicting and complex, and thus hard to assess and evaluate.
b. Even where we agree fully about the kinds of considerations that are relevant, we may disagree about their weight, and so arrive at different judgments.
c. To some extent all our concepts, and not only moral and political concepts, are vague and subject to hard cases; and this indeterminacy means that we must rely on judgment and interpretation (and on judgments about interpretations) within some range (not sharply specifiable) where reasonable persons may differ.
d. To some extent (how great we cannot tell) the way we assess evidence and weigh moral and political values is shaped by our total experience, our whole course of life up to now; and our total experiences must always differ. …
e. Often there are different kinds of normative considerations of different force on both sides of an issue and it is difficult to make an overall assessment.
...

Given this reality of widespread, unresolvable, deep disagreement, how exactly are we supposed to have a society? That’s basically the question Political Liberalism is trying to address. Rawls thinks it’s possible to formulate a set of political principles that all reasonable worldviews (“comprehensive doctrines” in his terminology) could endorse, forming what he calls an “overlapping consensus”. Government officials are then expected to justify their actions and legislation purely in terms of those broadly-acceptable principles, relying only on so-called “public reason” instead of appealing directly to their own religious/philosophical doctrines.

That sounds a bit like just try to find some common ground everyone can agree to, which wouldn’t exactly be earth-shattering advice, but the very disciplined and principled way Rawls approaches it is instructive. The reason he has to construct so many lists and categorizations - of, e.g., the powers that a person must have in order to function as a free and equal citizen in society - is so that he can then use them to constrain what kinds of arguments should be considered valid in public reasoning. This leads to interesting discussions of, for example, the freedom of political speech. In his view it’s not enough to show that a particular restriction on this freedom would have some kind of net benefit for society, since reasonable people may disagree on how to evaluate that supposed benefit. Rather, any restrictions must be justified on the grounds that they are necessary to create the conditions that enable people to exercise the powers of a citizen, which (if his theory succeeds) are grounds all reasonable people should recognize.

Proverbially, “a good compromise is when both parties are dissatisfied”… I think Rawls demonstrates how you might go about building more stable, satisfying compromises, with their own internal logic that people can come to support enthusiastically (just as, for example most Americans enthusiastically support the freedom of speech enshrined in our bill of rights, even if such freedom is at best tolerated by their own religions). To what extent we could apply his way of thinking immediately to public life is not clear.

[Chris · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ok, sorry I am biased. Rawls is by far my most favorite philosopher. So realistically this book would be a 2 in my rating system but I cannot bring myself to rate it that way.

For a philosophy book it's straight, to the point and not pretentious. By any other standard it's unreadable. Basically here is the gist, if you are into political philosophy, there is no way around Rawls. Read this! If you are not into political philosophy, you should read at least a summary. His theory is brilliant, only his writing isn't.

[Valentina Salvatierra · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book gives a compelling account of how it is possible, in today's pluralistic societies, to create an overlapping consensus on fundamental political issues. Highly recommended for anyone looking for a solid ideological foundation for a politically liberal worldview.

[Jason Burke Murphy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Everyone should wrestle with this book as it is one of the best efforts to lay a foundation for a fair politics. This book provides a vocabulary that makes political discussion more fruitful.

[Rachel · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book, framed as a series of lectures, feels at times purposefully obfuscating. Rawls seems to have an allergy to using real-world examples, clarifying his real-world position, or summarising in real-world speech. I gather he’s proposing an ideal political justice system that neither currently exists or ever did exist, but if we could go back to the start and implement it would be great. This system is called justice as fairness, is based on eagerly-participating free and equal citizens, and contains primary goods. Justice as fairness evokes an overlapping consensus from all the religions and belief systems and dumps whatever doesn’t make it into the middle of the Venn diagram as irrelevant to day-to-day working. How this system is decided is with the veil of ignorance method, where you design a system not knowing what part you would play in it.

Notes on citizenship:

Everyone has equal basic rights
Inequality serves the least advantaged in society
A citizen is someone who can play a role, exercise and respect rights and duties, has a capacity for justice, a conception of the good, and powers of reason
Moral power to change your definition of ‘the good’ without sacrificing public identity as a free person
Free citizens: moral power to conceive of the good, take responsibility, rational autonomy, rational deliberation to decide principles of cooperation, higher order interests that require primary goods
Propose fair terms of cooperation, recognise burden of judgement, cooperate fully, reasonable moral psychology

Notes on social cooperation:

Cooperation is guided by recognised rules that can be reasonably accepted: reciprocity
Between impartial altruism and mutual advantage
Society is structured such that we cannot enter or leave it voluntarily
Social cooperation is mutual benefit from a shared notion of fair terms
There is no alternative aside from resentful compliance or civil war
Equal persons cooperating in good faith with mutual respect
Rational: agree to terms they believe to be best
Reasonable: capacity to honour fair terms of cooperation

Notes on justice as fairness:

Limited to political domain; don’t have to affirm the same doctrine, just the same conception of justice
Diversity can only be overcome by oppressive state power
Reasonable people know it is unreasonable to repress other reasonable but different views
Can’t use power to impose your beliefs because they are ‘true’
Schopenhauer says the categorical imperative is the principle of reciprocity in disguise
Disagreement can be consistent with objectivity
Another’s comprehensive views are reasonable even if you think they’re mistaken

Notes on overlapping consensus:

Political power is always coercive
It is proper when in accordance with a constitution where citizens are free and equal
You can’t use political power to enforce a belief but this doesn’t mean the belief is false
Overlapping consensus is not reasonable unless it can win support by addressing each citizen’s reason
Consensus may only apply to certain procedural issues rather than whole structure
Accept that some questions can’t be satisfactorily answered, frame society so intractable conflicts are unlikely, focus on constitutional essentials
Reasonable pluralism puts certain issues beyond the calculus of social interests
Overlapping consensus: liberty of conscience, freedom of thought, fair and equal opportunity
Problems of extension, duty to future generations, international law, normal health care, and animals

Notes on primary goods:

Below a certain level of material wellbeing people can’t participate as equal citizens
Primary goods: rights and liberties, freedom of movement and occupation, income, self respect
Justice as fairness as neutrality of aim so can be endorsed by citizens generally; it is not neutral in effect

Notes on free speech:

Kant: moral philosophy is not how to be happy but how to be worthy of happiness
If seditious libel is a crime, the society is not free
Deepest question: when revolution is justified
Subversive advocacy is always part of a comprehensive political view
Restricting free speech requires a partial suspension of democracy
A well designed constitution includes democratic procedures for dealing with emergencies
Habermas: civil disobedience is a dynamic understanding of the constitution as an unfinished project
Legitimacy is a weaker idea than justice; something can be unjust but legitimate
Citizens are responsible for what political authority does in their name
Political principles don’t apply directly to families but do impose constraints upon them, in the same way as religion
Unreasonable doctrines aren’t a failure of public reason but do indicate limits to what it can accomplish

[Kyle van Oosterum · Rating 4 out of 5]

In this classic work of political philosophy Rawls sets himself the task of understanding how society can remain stable despite the fact of a reasonable plurality of viewpoints about the good life, human nature and ultimate questions of value. Needless to say, it's quite a task and requires assuming that we are in a relatively well-ordered society such as a constitutional democratic society, but a lot of what the book boils down to (in my very amateurish opinion) is understanding what makes political power and liberal political societies legitimate.

A lot of this builds on – but is different – 'Theory of Justice' but the one idea that seems to tie them together is the fascinating ideal of public reason, which is a view about the kinds of reasons (taken as considerations that count in favour of doing/believing something) citizens can rest their political cases on when making justifications to one another when they support laws and policies that invoke the coercive power of the state on fundamental political matters. The idea of public reason that so much of the book is spent on defending is a fascinating one and just for that, I would recommend reading the book although I must admit it is a long and treacherous read.

[Vineet Jain · Rating 5 out of 5]

Should I read it whole?
maybe!

But Rawls does give a strong sense of his point of view in first chapter about fundamentals. He anticipates conflicts and tries to give answers how to implement liberty in a society with different inclinations due to associations with different institutions. The concept of reasonable pluralism is a wonderful tool to not be restricted for your own Liberty while not restricting anybody else’s. A good extension to Mill’s view of liberty. Elegantly and beautifully done.

People who feel perplexed to not be fair if they exercise their Liberty need to understand Rawlsian philosophy. It’s liberating to employ tools shared by Rawls as it empowers liberty for this set of people. My kind of guy…a phenomenal work!

[Nathan · Rating 4 out of 5]

*Pre-ramble* [This is how I view Rawls at this time. Like many other texts (e.g. my review of Difference and Repetition by Deleuze) my stance is not static. It changes and evolves with time, study, and experience.]

[Review] I took an entire seminar course on Political Liberalism, where we read this one text. I was deeply ambivalent about Rawls for a number of reason. On the one hand, I agreed on a theoretical level with his conclusions. It's a work of political philosophy formulated through formal moral reasoning. A kind of reasoning where morality is framed in logical terms, much in the spirit of Kant. Next, he begins with the notion of a 'well-ordered society' - which is an abstract concept of what, I guess, is the ideal form of society where all needs are met and different parties are willing to come to terms with each other. His principles of rational (what is right and good for the individual) and the reasonable (what is right and good for the community) and the idea of placing the Right before the good are all principles I agree with. I also agree with the fact of reasonable pluralism, which is already integral to numerous constitutions.

Where I have trouble with Rawls is how this formally constructed conception of a society moves to concrete actuality. Kant's conception of reason was transcendental and so was a priori - before experience. Meaning, experience itself was made possible by these transcendental a priori concepts. For Rawls -insofar as I understand - it's the other way around. We ought to construct our society on the basis of his idea of a well-ordered society, not based on imposition, but because it's the rational thing to do. Call me a naive realist, because I have trouble seeing how this ideal could be implemented. Unlike Hegel, who takes the concept of Right and allows it to unfold dialectically to its logical conclusion through tension and sublation, Rawls' ideal is pre-configured. My prof said that Rawls' was more concerned with constitutional matters rather than individual problems (I guess that even means municipal policy?). Some of Rawls' ideas can apply to constitutional matters (like the fact of reasonable pluralism), BUT the idea of an overlapping consensus requires hope for it to be actualized. I don't disagree with the idea, and it seems critical now more than ever (since we are in such a polarized epoch); it requires hope, faith (in making the model a reality), and effort on behalf of all parties.

So, I suggest everyone read this book because while it might seem 'out there' if we apply Rawls' ideas, maybe, just maybe, an overlapping consensus could happen.

[Michael · Rating 3 out of 5]

What can I say? I was bored to tears, remembering most of the material from my college lectures. Also, it reminds me of how easy it is in academia to be disconnected from reality. Lots of idealism, but the world functions far too pragmatically and messily.

[Dave Peticolas · Rating 4 out of 5]

Rawl's account of the possibility of a stable and just society in the presence of 'reasonable pluralism' -- the existence of mutually incompatible but reasonable compresensive doctrines.

[Renato Garín · Rating 4 out of 5]

Después de la publicación de "Una Teoría de la Justicia" en 1971, John Rawls continuó desarrollando sus ideas y reflexionando sobre las críticas y debates que había suscitado su obra. Esta evolución conceptual culminó en la publicación de "Liberalismo Político" en 1993. En este trabajo, Rawls se centra en la estabilidad y legitimidad de una sociedad democrática y cómo alcanzar un consenso solapado en sociedades pluralistas.

1. Consenso Solapado:
En "Liberalismo Político", Rawls introduce el concepto de "consenso solapado". Reconoce que en sociedades democráticas modernas existen múltiples y a menudo incompatibles concepciones del bien, derivadas de tradiciones filosóficas, religiosas y morales diversas. En lugar de buscar un consenso completo en torno a una única concepción del bien, Rawls propone que se puede alcanzar un consenso en torno a principios políticos de justicia que sean razonables y que funcionen como base para las estructuras básicas de la sociedad.

2. Concepción Política de la Justicia:
Rawls recalca que su teoría es una "concepción política" y no una "concepción comprehensiva" del bien o de la moralidad. Esto significa que los principios de justicia están diseñados exclusivamente para la estructura básica de la sociedad y no pretenden responder a todas las cuestiones morales o filosóficas que puedan surgir en la vida.

3. Las Doctrinas Razonables:
Rawls acepta que habrá muchas "doctrinas razonables" en una sociedad democrática, que son concepciones del bien que, aunque diferentes, son compatibles con una democracia justa. Aunque estas doctrinas pueden ser incompatibles entre sí, todas pueden aceptar y apoyar una concepción política de la justicia.

4. El Punto de Vista Público:
Rawls destaca la importancia del "punto de vista público", es decir, el espacio de discusión y deliberación donde los ciudadanos justifican sus decisiones políticas a otros en términos que los demás puedan aceptar, basándose en razones públicas.

5. La revisión de los dos principios de justicia:
Aunque los principios de justicia presentados en "Una Teoría de la Justicia" siguen siendo centrales en "Liberalismo Político", Rawls los presenta en un contexto donde se subraya más su carácter político y menos su fundamentación metafísica o moral. Es decir, se entienden como principios que ciudadanos libres y racionales pueden aceptar sin necesidad de compartir una concepción moral o filosófica comprehensiva.

En resumen, en "Liberalismo Político", John Rawls refina y aclara su teoría inicial, subrayando el carácter político y no metafísico de su propuesta. Además, pone énfasis en la necesidad de encontrar un terreno común en sociedades democráticas pluralistas, buscando una coexistencia armoniosa entre diferentes concepciones del bien

[Erin Blaire · Rating 3 out of 5]

Too much influenced by Rorty. Not that that is a problem in it of itself, but just exactly will the liberal principle of toleration be applied alongside the withholding of comprehensive doctrines for the sake of public reasonableness??? That I cannot bear in mind. The two moral powers (for justice and sense i the good) and the public sphere’s “fair terms of cooperation” deserves more than a quasi-hegelian approach to reconcile the universal and the particular...which is not fully sketched out here (at least not in the way that properly acknowledges a reconciliation of comprehensive doctrines and public reasonableness). I am sympathetic towards his approach to find reasonable consensus and some sense of agreement, giving this much weight in the public, political sphere rather than comprehensive doctrines. The call for reasonable pluralism is perhaps exactly what this democratic society needs right now in so far as incommensurability has led to withstanding conflict. Yet I am trying to wrap my head around such a language, even methods of inquiry, of rational and reasonable powers, to appeal to some type of comprehensive doctrines to facilitate this process. I personally enjoyed the theory of justice more and perhaps will need to think more about the implications of stability as well.

[Charlie Huenemann · Rating 3 out of 5]

Rawls' Political Liberalism has a wider scope than his earlier Theory of Justice. In ToJ, Rawls presents a comprehensive theoretical view of political justice. In PL, he considers how to manage a pluralistic society in which the citizens have different comprehensive theoretical views. His basic answer is that the citizens should have enough overlap in their interests to agree upon a constitution that gives rules for getting things done, without giving any particular view an advantage. This means that when we argue in public about laws and policy, we should only employ values all citizens can endorse. It's a good idea, though it runs into hard problems as you try to apply it (what to teach in public schools, transgender bathrooms, etc.), and Rawls doesn't have much to say that isn't at a very high altitude of theory. It's amazing that both books take 500 pages to say what they say while offering only minimal bits of concrete advice.

[Micah · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an excellent work in which John Rawls defends both the principles of justice—which include basic rights and liberties for all and equal opportunity to succeed—and the principles of public reason—which include being reasonable and refusing to impose ideology on politics.

Unfortunately, I can't give the book five stars, because these are not the virtues practiced by so-called "liberals" , as Rawls claims, but only by CONSERVATIVES.

1) liberals HATE basic rights like religious freedom; only conservatives defend the religoius rights of bakers

2) liberals HATE equal opportunity to succeed and want no whites or men to ever have succes

3) liberals are always trying to impose their IDEOLOGY of """intersectionality""" on politics; conservatives are not ideological and just want people to love GOD more

4) there is NO SUCH things as a reasonable liberals, because they are all communists

[Joe · Rating 2 out of 5]

While I'm sure his philosophical argument has some value, and it's always good to know the foundational thought behind some arguments, I found very little use for this book. I'm not entirely certain that there are any real example for the hypothetical argument that he makes, and his dismissal of certain key aspects of culture (i.e. religion and anything non-Western) makes this book an interesting thought exercise, but very little beyond that.

[hazel · Rating 4 out of 5]

I add one of my required readings just to finish my “reading challenge”.A really good way to cheat;)
I must finish the book in several days and come up with an essay in twelve days, so I guess I will become really tired of this book and be so conversant to its content at that time, stay tuned…

[Thy Duong · Rating 2 out of 5]

I am gonna be among a few not fashioning this book much. It’s not tedious, I am just not convinced by some of his viewpoints.
Still, worth reading since it is thought- provoking in many aspects. I have drawn some comparisons with other philosophers meanwhile.

[Jonathan Choe · Rating 4 out of 5]

A thoughtful expansion on Theory of Justice, especially regarding public reason. Rawls still seems to cling to a certain idealism in Political Liberalism but is unapologetic about holding these ideals in a just society.

[Madeleine · Rating 5 out of 5]

People trust the system when the system treats them well. When the floor of society is solid and no one is left to drown, pluralism becomes a generator of invention and progress rather than a competition for scarce resources.

[Ian Miller · Rating 4 out of 5]

Doing due diligence

[Grace]

Read introduction for Political Philosophy class

[Kimberly Te · Rating 2 out of 5]

Not as riveting as A Theory of Justice. Going to be harsher with this one because John Rawls is dead so he will never see this two star review.