Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy) 1st edition by Driver, Julia (2001) Hardcover

by Julia Driver

"The predominant view of moral virtue can be traced back to Aristotle. He believed that moral virtue must involve intellectual excellence. To have moral virtue, one must have practical wisdom - the ability to deliberate well and to see what is morally relevant in a given context. Julia Driver challenges this classical theory of virtue, arguing that it fails to take into account virtues that do seem to involve ignorance or epistemic defect. Some "virtues of ignorance" are counterexamples to accounts of virtue that told that moral virtue must involve practical wisdom. Modesty, for example, is centrally considered to be a virtue even though the modest person may be making an inaccurate assessment of his or her accomplishments." "Driver argues that we should abandon the highly intellectualist view of virtue and instead adopt a consequenialist perspective that holds that virtue is simply a character trait that systematically produces good consequences. In this approach, what counts as human excellence will be determined by conditions external to agency, such as consequences. Uneasy Virtue presents a stimulating and accessible defense of the idea that the importance of the virtues and the ideas of virtue ethicists are best understood within a consequentialist framework."--BOOK JACKET.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction

Hardcover

First published January 1, 2001

Reviews

[Norah Bradley · Rating 4 out of 5]

"What leads people to act is a combination of knowledge and ignorance. Ignorance can be enabling and knowledge inhibiting."

In Uneasy Virtue, Julia Driver describes and defends a consequentialist approach to virtue ethics which defines a virtue as "a character trait that leads to good consequences systematically." (I'm reminded of G.E. Moore's definition of a virtue as "an habitual disposition to perform certain actions, which generally produce the best possible results.")

Driver contrasts her approach with the more intellectualist and internalist traditional Aristotelian approach, which she argues has a number of serious flaws. She devotes a chapter to exploring what she calls the "virtues of ignorance"—virtues like modesty and impulsive courage—which she thinks complicate the Aristotelian account, since they seem to involve some sort of lack of knowledge.

The chapter on the virtues of ignorance introduced me to a number of interesting and useful distinctions: for example, between ocurrent knowledge ("knowledge that is actually being manifested in some way by the agent") and dispositional knowledge ("knowledge that the agent has that is not being exercised at a particular time"), and between propositional ignorance ("ignorance of the facts") and inferential ignorance ("ignorance of how the facts fit together").

I'm not sure I'm convinced that the "virtues of ignorance" she lists really are virtues or really involve ignorance. However, I like the way that she integrates consequentialist concerns and ends into the framework virtue ethics, and her consequentialist definition of virtue is one that I would use as well.

Driver's writing style is readable without sacrificing rigor or substance, and her book is an excellent contribution to the growing body of literature on contemporary virtue ethics.

[Isaac Tan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Driver presents a unique position of combining virtue ethics and consequentialism. To her, virtues are character traits that systematically produce good consequences. Clear, direct and mostly well argued. While I'm not totally convinced that virtue consequentialism is the way to go, Driver certainly provides the best account for it.