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In The Midst Of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia
Edward Geary Lansdale (1908-1987) truly became a legend in his own time. His mission to the Philippines in the early 1950s as an Air Force officer and CIA agent resulted in the defeat of the communist-led Hukbalahap movement and the subsequent election of Ramon Magsayay, arguably the most popular president that the people of the Philippines have known.
385 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1972
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October 21, 2021
Colonel Edward Lansdale arrived in Saigon in 1954 after his triumph in the Philippines, where he worked as an adviser to Ramón Magsaysay, helping the Filipino patriot quench a rebellion then flaming throughout much of the land, headed by a Marxist insurgency known briefly as Huk. Lansdale devised tactics, implemented by Magsaysay, that ensured the first (and almost last) popular election there. The outcome of the vote prompted some in Manila to refer to him as “Colonel Landslide.” He successfully promoted policies that helped the government destroy the Huks as a threat to Filipino society. It was in those years, from 1950 to 1954, that Lansdale formed his views on how to fight insurgent movements.
Lansdale's alleged job in Vietnam was to serve as Air Force attaché at the American embassy. An ordinary-looking, unstylish man, he hardly looked like the legendary clandestine operative of the Central Intelligence Agency he in fact was. At the time of his arrival, the American government was tentatively, but openly, extending its influence into Vietnam to replace the French, who had been thoroughly whipped at Dien Bien Phu. The new American hope in Saigon was Ngo Dinh Diem, a Catholic mandarin who was facing more challenges than he could cope with: rival politicians, pro-French dissidents in the South Vietnamese Army, two angry religious sects, and a brotherhood of organized criminals.
Lansdale had never heard of Diem and was curious to learn about the man who had been named South Vietnam's Prime Minister at such a critical moment. On his way to attend Diem's welcoming ceremony, the CIA agent noticed that the road was lined by citizens hoping to catch a glimpse of the Vietnamese leader as he rode past. Lansdale decided to stop and wait with the crowd to observe their response to Diem. But Diem’s car hurtled past at high speed with the windows closed. “The ‘let down’ feeling [among the crowd] was something tangible, obvious.” Lansdale writes. His story about the speeding limousine would become part of the "American lore" about Diem. And the experience persuaded him that Diem and his advisers were making “errors of judgment” and that the new premier “had no instincts at all of politics and the people he was going to lead.”
That conclusion of Lansdale's is the problem I have with his whole book. After agent shouldered the task of providing the political counsel that he believed Diem needed, by his own account, related excitingly and compellingly, he quickly won Diem’s trust and became one of his closest American friends and advisers. Whether his friendship and advice did more harm or more good to the Prime Minister and his country is still a subject of debate. However, it seems most historians and critics agree with Lansdale's representation of Diem as politically naive and unfortunate.
Was Diem really as hapless and unaware of his surroundings as his CIA friend suggests, though? Several authorities on the subject whose books I have read challenge this idea.
First of all, Diem's welcoming ceremony was more carefully organized than Lansdale claims. The Prime Minister's brother Nhu was not oblivious to the importance of mustering public support. His committee proposed to hold a public reception on the street in front of Gia Long Palace, the prime minister’s official residence. It was there that Diem would address the public and appeal for support. That is why the ceremony at the airport was not expected to be a public spectacle. The reception at the palace came off according to Nhu’s plans. The crowd was several times larger than the one at the airport, and Diem's speech was a success.
Therefore, although the Ngo brothers were by far not infallible, they were not naive or helpless. They were prepared. Diem achieved more during his first year in power than even his most ardent supporters had dared to hope.
Lansdale’s relationship with Diem figures prominently in almost all accounts of Diem’s first year in office. In his memoirs, Lansdale suggests that he had not only advised Diem but also contributed greatly to the unexpected success the Premier enjoyed in his efforts to establish his power in South Vietnam. One reporter who covered the war and knew Lansdale well expressed the predominant view: “South Vietnam, it can truly be said, was the creation of Edward Lansdale.” But the Colonel, deliberately or not, was not telling the whole story.
American officials were, in fact, divided and unsure about what to do in South Vietnam. Meanwhile, Diem and his closest supporters were not. By the time Lansdale saw the Premier’s limousine on the streets of Saigon, Diem and his brothers had already devised a strategy to establish their authority in South Vietnam by pitting their various rivals against one another – divide-and-conquer strategy. Diem was, of course, happy to accept Lansdale's assistance, but he was careful to do so only on his own terms, in ways that helped his goals. Far from being politically lost during his first year in power, Diem was a man with a plan, which turned out to be remarkably successful in the short term. He knew that his reputation as a Catholic and a nationalist would help him win over large segments of the Vietnamese population. The only thing he needed was American support. To ensure it for himself, he promised reforms, modernization, democracy – everything his tradionalist, Confucianist worldview shied away from. He did not intend to actually carry out these reforms, but he was politically smart enough to promise them and get the American government's support. His actions hardly portray him as the naive, lost leader that Lansdale depicts in his memoir.
IN THE MIDST OF WARS is undoubtedly a compelling book. But Colonel Edward Lansdale is, I am afraid, not the most honest and precise of authors. I do not blame him: it was his job. He had taken an oath of secrecy, so he always told less than he knew. However, I have to warn that his narrative is more exciting spy fiction and less a straightforward account of what transpired in Vietnam. I recommend it to anyone who would like a realistic page-turner. If interested in the history of American-Vietnamese relations, though, please, buy the books I listed below, not Lansdale's memoir.
Note: Do not be fooled by William Colby's introduction. Bill Colby was a CIA agent and later Director of the CIA. Naturally, he is praising his colleague.
Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam
Vietnam's Lost Revolution: Ngô Đình Diệm's Failure to Build an Independent Nation, 1955-1963
Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam
Our Vietnam Nightmare
Lansdale's alleged job in Vietnam was to serve as Air Force attaché at the American embassy. An ordinary-looking, unstylish man, he hardly looked like the legendary clandestine operative of the Central Intelligence Agency he in fact was. At the time of his arrival, the American government was tentatively, but openly, extending its influence into Vietnam to replace the French, who had been thoroughly whipped at Dien Bien Phu. The new American hope in Saigon was Ngo Dinh Diem, a Catholic mandarin who was facing more challenges than he could cope with: rival politicians, pro-French dissidents in the South Vietnamese Army, two angry religious sects, and a brotherhood of organized criminals.
Lansdale had never heard of Diem and was curious to learn about the man who had been named South Vietnam's Prime Minister at such a critical moment. On his way to attend Diem's welcoming ceremony, the CIA agent noticed that the road was lined by citizens hoping to catch a glimpse of the Vietnamese leader as he rode past. Lansdale decided to stop and wait with the crowd to observe their response to Diem. But Diem’s car hurtled past at high speed with the windows closed. “The ‘let down’ feeling [among the crowd] was something tangible, obvious.” Lansdale writes. His story about the speeding limousine would become part of the "American lore" about Diem. And the experience persuaded him that Diem and his advisers were making “errors of judgment” and that the new premier “had no instincts at all of politics and the people he was going to lead.”
That conclusion of Lansdale's is the problem I have with his whole book. After agent shouldered the task of providing the political counsel that he believed Diem needed, by his own account, related excitingly and compellingly, he quickly won Diem’s trust and became one of his closest American friends and advisers. Whether his friendship and advice did more harm or more good to the Prime Minister and his country is still a subject of debate. However, it seems most historians and critics agree with Lansdale's representation of Diem as politically naive and unfortunate.
Was Diem really as hapless and unaware of his surroundings as his CIA friend suggests, though? Several authorities on the subject whose books I have read challenge this idea.
First of all, Diem's welcoming ceremony was more carefully organized than Lansdale claims. The Prime Minister's brother Nhu was not oblivious to the importance of mustering public support. His committee proposed to hold a public reception on the street in front of Gia Long Palace, the prime minister’s official residence. It was there that Diem would address the public and appeal for support. That is why the ceremony at the airport was not expected to be a public spectacle. The reception at the palace came off according to Nhu’s plans. The crowd was several times larger than the one at the airport, and Diem's speech was a success.
Therefore, although the Ngo brothers were by far not infallible, they were not naive or helpless. They were prepared. Diem achieved more during his first year in power than even his most ardent supporters had dared to hope.
Lansdale’s relationship with Diem figures prominently in almost all accounts of Diem’s first year in office. In his memoirs, Lansdale suggests that he had not only advised Diem but also contributed greatly to the unexpected success the Premier enjoyed in his efforts to establish his power in South Vietnam. One reporter who covered the war and knew Lansdale well expressed the predominant view: “South Vietnam, it can truly be said, was the creation of Edward Lansdale.” But the Colonel, deliberately or not, was not telling the whole story.
American officials were, in fact, divided and unsure about what to do in South Vietnam. Meanwhile, Diem and his closest supporters were not. By the time Lansdale saw the Premier’s limousine on the streets of Saigon, Diem and his brothers had already devised a strategy to establish their authority in South Vietnam by pitting their various rivals against one another – divide-and-conquer strategy. Diem was, of course, happy to accept Lansdale's assistance, but he was careful to do so only on his own terms, in ways that helped his goals. Far from being politically lost during his first year in power, Diem was a man with a plan, which turned out to be remarkably successful in the short term. He knew that his reputation as a Catholic and a nationalist would help him win over large segments of the Vietnamese population. The only thing he needed was American support. To ensure it for himself, he promised reforms, modernization, democracy – everything his tradionalist, Confucianist worldview shied away from. He did not intend to actually carry out these reforms, but he was politically smart enough to promise them and get the American government's support. His actions hardly portray him as the naive, lost leader that Lansdale depicts in his memoir.
IN THE MIDST OF WARS is undoubtedly a compelling book. But Colonel Edward Lansdale is, I am afraid, not the most honest and precise of authors. I do not blame him: it was his job. He had taken an oath of secrecy, so he always told less than he knew. However, I have to warn that his narrative is more exciting spy fiction and less a straightforward account of what transpired in Vietnam. I recommend it to anyone who would like a realistic page-turner. If interested in the history of American-Vietnamese relations, though, please, buy the books I listed below, not Lansdale's memoir.
Note: Do not be fooled by William Colby's introduction. Bill Colby was a CIA agent and later Director of the CIA. Naturally, he is praising his colleague.
Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam
Vietnam's Lost Revolution: Ngô Đình Diệm's Failure to Build an Independent Nation, 1955-1963
Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam
Our Vietnam Nightmare
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May 21, 2019The short version first . . .
March 1, 2013
I read this book when I was doing research for the Ensign Locker. I was looking for something else and stumbled across it this afternoon. Great history of the Philippines march to independence, and more than a little hint of what we should have done in Vietnam.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews