What do you think?
Rate this book
The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Strategies, February to June 1942 by H. P. Willmott
The second part of H. P. Willmott's three-volume history of the war in the Pacific, this work tells how Japan arrived at a situation in which war with the United States was the only means of ensuring long-term security and resolving her immediate problems of access to raw materials and of an unwinnable war in China. Totally balanced in presentation, the book also explains the basis of Allied miscalculations and provides explanations of the defeats that overwhelmed American, British, and Dutch forces throughout Southeast Asia in a little more than three months. Willmott argues that it was Japan's concentration and economy of force that contributed to its success in that early campaign. It was a later decision to disperse forces over a large area, he says, that resulted in Japan's loss of the Coral Sea and Midway battles and ultimately the entire war. The book's stunning assessment of those battles offers insights and interpretations that continue to be discussed, twenty-five years after it was first published.
Paperback
First published October 15, 1983
1 person is currently reading
89 people want to read
About the author
H.P. Willmott
38 books17 followersHedley Paul Willmott (H.P. Willmott) was a widely published military historian, author, former Senior Lecturer at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, and a fellow of the Royal Historical Society. He has written extensively on modern naval and military history.
He had retired and lived till his death in Surrey, England.
(source: http://www.goodreads.com/author/edit/... & http://www.potomacbooksinc.com/Books/...)
He had retired and lived till his death in Surrey, England.
(source: http://www.goodreads.com/author/edit/... & http://www.potomacbooksinc.com/Books/...)
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews
June 8, 2020
This book dabbles its toes in brilliance, but his insights are often lost in the course of Willmott's narrative.
It is in many ways a spiritual predecessor to later revisionist works on this period. While Willmott takes a wide-ranging and critical look at Pacific operations in the first 6 months of 1942, his work is rife with typos and a meandering structure that makes the prose itself difficult to follow. That said, the struggle is worth it.
Perhaps because he's not an American, Willmott was able to critique the US side (most notably at Midway). He gets to the core issue of the battle when he notes: "By prewar standards the lack of concentration and coordination would guarantee failure, but on the other hand the sheer number of attacks coming one on top of the other might bring success. There was no way of knowing which would prove the case, the Americans losing because of their failure to concentrate their efforts or winning in spite of it."
He notes several mistakes by the Japanese, laying most of the fault with Yamamoto's plan, which dispersed Japanese strength over too far a battlespace. Even the force at the tip of the spear had a critical problem: they had to attack two American forces. The Americans were able to use Midway as a shield, while their carriers operated separately. The problem for Nagumo was not about getting caught in his launch cycle during the planned second attack on Midway; the real problem was that he had to attack Midway to begin with. He had to defeat both Midway and the US carriers at the same, when they had planned to defeat them in detail.
For all of its tactical sloppiness on the American side, it's worth noting in an age when American intelligence agencies are doubted by their own commander in chief, that it was American intelligence that gave the Americans the edge at Midway. Too, while the battle has entered American mythology as a parallel to the Revolutionary days -- small, ragtag force beating a stronger, more professional and more practiced one -- the truth is that Midway offers a good example of what John Ellis argued in Brute Force.
One is left with the impression that the Americans threw their planes at the Japanese, overwhelming the Japanese defenses more by numbers than any particular plan. Surely, the American pilots were brave (as were Japanese pilots), and there is little to be gainsaid there. However, while poor Japanese reconnaissance is often cited (or remembered) as a key Japanese failing during the battle, it's also worth noting that planes didn't even find Kido Butai and many had to ditch. If anything, Midway proves that in war as in many areas of life, it's better to be lucky than to be good. And, it seems, victory does indeed go to the side that makes the fewest mistakes.
For all of military history's fascination with "pivotal battles" and "turning points," Willmott takes a contrarian view of Midway. He points out that Midway can't be decisive while American victory in the Pacific inevitable; both can't be true despite many believing otherwise. An inevitable victory doesn't need decisive battles; it's inevitable in spite of the outcomes of this or that action.
Indeed, it's probable that the Americans would have won in the Pacific eventually, but that victories like Midway probably also hastened defeat for Japan. As the American war machine got into full gear, the US Navy waged a successful economy of force operation in the Pacific, blunting Japanese efforts at expansion. The Imperial Navy's days of easy victories were over; the long, bloody retreat had begun.
It is in many ways a spiritual predecessor to later revisionist works on this period. While Willmott takes a wide-ranging and critical look at Pacific operations in the first 6 months of 1942, his work is rife with typos and a meandering structure that makes the prose itself difficult to follow. That said, the struggle is worth it.
Perhaps because he's not an American, Willmott was able to critique the US side (most notably at Midway). He gets to the core issue of the battle when he notes: "By prewar standards the lack of concentration and coordination would guarantee failure, but on the other hand the sheer number of attacks coming one on top of the other might bring success. There was no way of knowing which would prove the case, the Americans losing because of their failure to concentrate their efforts or winning in spite of it."
He notes several mistakes by the Japanese, laying most of the fault with Yamamoto's plan, which dispersed Japanese strength over too far a battlespace. Even the force at the tip of the spear had a critical problem: they had to attack two American forces. The Americans were able to use Midway as a shield, while their carriers operated separately. The problem for Nagumo was not about getting caught in his launch cycle during the planned second attack on Midway; the real problem was that he had to attack Midway to begin with. He had to defeat both Midway and the US carriers at the same, when they had planned to defeat them in detail.
For all of its tactical sloppiness on the American side, it's worth noting in an age when American intelligence agencies are doubted by their own commander in chief, that it was American intelligence that gave the Americans the edge at Midway. Too, while the battle has entered American mythology as a parallel to the Revolutionary days -- small, ragtag force beating a stronger, more professional and more practiced one -- the truth is that Midway offers a good example of what John Ellis argued in Brute Force.
One is left with the impression that the Americans threw their planes at the Japanese, overwhelming the Japanese defenses more by numbers than any particular plan. Surely, the American pilots were brave (as were Japanese pilots), and there is little to be gainsaid there. However, while poor Japanese reconnaissance is often cited (or remembered) as a key Japanese failing during the battle, it's also worth noting that planes didn't even find Kido Butai and many had to ditch. If anything, Midway proves that in war as in many areas of life, it's better to be lucky than to be good. And, it seems, victory does indeed go to the side that makes the fewest mistakes.
For all of military history's fascination with "pivotal battles" and "turning points," Willmott takes a contrarian view of Midway. He points out that Midway can't be decisive while American victory in the Pacific inevitable; both can't be true despite many believing otherwise. An inevitable victory doesn't need decisive battles; it's inevitable in spite of the outcomes of this or that action.
Indeed, it's probable that the Americans would have won in the Pacific eventually, but that victories like Midway probably also hastened defeat for Japan. As the American war machine got into full gear, the US Navy waged a successful economy of force operation in the Pacific, blunting Japanese efforts at expansion. The Imperial Navy's days of easy victories were over; the long, bloody retreat had begun.
September 14, 2017
Fantastic work on the months between Pearl Harbor and Midway. What were the Japanese planners' goals? What were the Americans' goals? Events proved to exceed the Japanese understanding of the tactical and industrial situation. Also exceedingly interesting are the author's research into the number of planes available to either side. Great read!
February 2, 2021
Interesting analysis of strategies and possibilities of first months of the war in the Pacific. Unfortunately because of the old first publication date it doesn't take in account later discoveries (mostly about battle of Midway) - for that see e.g. Parschall & Tully: Shattered Sword.
July 12, 2019
Helpful for my EE
July 31, 2017
Lengthy, sometimes dreary, without the drama of many other books on the subject.
But insightful on strategy and tactics, for both sides, but especially for the Japanese and especially with regard to the Coral Sea as impactful not just on Midway but on the whole of the war.
pp. 8-9 give "the root of Japan's problems..."The passage of the Two-Ocean Naal expansion Act" in June 1940 meant that Japan would keep sliding to a lesser and lesser percentage of American naval strength, from 70 to75% in 1940-41 to 30% in 1944.
pp. 78-79 lashes Imperial Navy policy in developing Operations MO (Port Moresby) and the Indian Ocean without realizing they needed to put their power where it might do real long-range good, Operation MI (Midway). The Shokaku and Zuikaku were wasted in the SW Pacific whereas they would have been the margin of victory at Midway.
pp. 165-66 blasts MacArthur who was photogenic but whose failures in the Philippines were swept aside.
186 summarizes the arguments over Pacific versus Germany first. Eisenhower shifted his position about the worth of Australia. King and MacArthur fought to protect Australia, each of their own tactical reasons.
198 suggests that "The Nimitz-Fletcher plan in many ways bears an ucannysimilarity to that of the Japanese plan for Midway." We too were wasting resources in the SW Pacific, suggests the author. I do not know enough to judge.
But insightful on strategy and tactics, for both sides, but especially for the Japanese and especially with regard to the Coral Sea as impactful not just on Midway but on the whole of the war.
pp. 8-9 give "the root of Japan's problems..."The passage of the Two-Ocean Naal expansion Act" in June 1940 meant that Japan would keep sliding to a lesser and lesser percentage of American naval strength, from 70 to75% in 1940-41 to 30% in 1944.
pp. 78-79 lashes Imperial Navy policy in developing Operations MO (Port Moresby) and the Indian Ocean without realizing they needed to put their power where it might do real long-range good, Operation MI (Midway). The Shokaku and Zuikaku were wasted in the SW Pacific whereas they would have been the margin of victory at Midway.
pp. 165-66 blasts MacArthur who was photogenic but whose failures in the Philippines were swept aside.
186 summarizes the arguments over Pacific versus Germany first. Eisenhower shifted his position about the worth of Australia. King and MacArthur fought to protect Australia, each of their own tactical reasons.
198 suggests that "The Nimitz-Fletcher plan in many ways bears an ucannysimilarity to that of the Japanese plan for Midway." We too were wasting resources in the SW Pacific, suggests the author. I do not know enough to judge.
October 21, 2025
Willmott does an excellent job explaining the strategic options that were available to both the Japanese and the Allies during the pivotal early months of the Pacific war. He makes it clear as to why Midway was ultimately the target of the Japanese offensive in 1942 and also why their operational plan was, ultimately, doomed to failure. He brings up a lot of interesting points of discussion and contests the idea that Midway was the "decisive battle" of the Pacific War. American victory is often considered inevitable by historians. If it's true that the US was always going to win due to the sheer disparity in economic/industrial capabilities between it and Japan, then the battle of Midway can't be considered a decisive battle, simply because, regardless of its outcome, the US would win the war.
This book really needs to be read as a sequel to Empires in the Balance, which deals with Japan's opening campaign. Together, they analyze the war's first 6 months and the strategy behind the major Allied and Axis decisions during this pivotal time of the conflict. They are among the best books written on the Pacific War and invaluable for understanding a strategic top-level view of the war.
This book really needs to be read as a sequel to Empires in the Balance, which deals with Japan's opening campaign. Together, they analyze the war's first 6 months and the strategy behind the major Allied and Axis decisions during this pivotal time of the conflict. They are among the best books written on the Pacific War and invaluable for understanding a strategic top-level view of the war.
November 29, 2017
This book is not as interesting as his previous work, Empires In The Balance. Both books were to be part of a trilogy, but this book only focuses on just 2 battles; Coral Sea and Midway. Midway was in early June 1942 so at the pace he's writing there is no way this will be a trilogy. In fact, the first book came out in 1982, this one in 1983 and there have been no further releases in this series. The book contains a few minor grammatical errors. Additionally, the events at Midway have recently been shown to have transpired differently than what Mr. Willmott and many other authors have represented. Among these is the notion that the Japanese were anywhere from 5-10 minutes from launching their own large strike at the Americans when 3 of 4 of them were destroyed. According to Shattered Sword, they were more like 30-45 minutes away. Nevertheless, this is a thorough examination of these important battles although it is a bit on the dry side.
May 13, 2013
Willmott's second volume on the early campaigns of the Second World War in the Pacific is an outstanding narrative and analysis of the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. As he gleefully points out, either Midway might have been a "decisive battle" or the American victory in the war was inevitable, but not both. His steady eye spares neither side from criticism, but he justifiably castigates Japanese decision making and especially the role of Yamamato in these critical defeats. Very few stones are left unturned and the quality of the writing is first-rate. A few more maps might have helped. If you have an interest in this titanic struggle, Willmott's works are must-reads.
March 27, 2009
This is considered a classic, and it's now back in print. However, I was actually a little disappointed in it. I thought Willmott's previous book, Empires in the Balance, provided a much better picture of the situation leading into World War 2. As a book about Coral Sea and Midway, I believe it has been surpassed in recent years by Shattered Sword and Black Shoe Carrier Admiral.
March 23, 2022
Read & liked it some years ago, gave it a 2nd shot. Still good. The first third is a great analysis of Japanese strategic options after the first 3 months of the war, and where they might have fallen down on their thinking.
September 17, 2012
Excellent analysis of the pivotal period of balance in the Pacific war, culminating with the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. As always, Wilmott pulls no punches in his assessment of the commanders involved nor decision made.
Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews