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Free: Why Science Hasn't Disproved Free Will by Alfred R. Mele
Does free will exist? The question has fueled heated debates spanning from philosophy to psychology and religion. The answer has major implications, and the stakes are high. To put it in the simple terms that have come to dominate these debates, if we are free to make our own decisions, we are accountable for what we do, and if we aren't free, we're off the hook. There are neuroscientists who claim that our decisions are made unconsciously and are therefore outside of our control and social psychologists who argue that myriad imperceptible factors influence even our minor decisions to the extent that there is no room for free will. According to philosopher Alfred R. Mele, what they point to as hard and fast evidence that free will cannot exist actually leaves much room for doubt. If we look more closely at the major experiments that free will deniers cite, we can see large gaps where the light of possibility shines through. In Why Science Hasn't Disproved Free Will, Mele lays out his opponents' experiments simply and clearly, and proceeds to debunk their supposed findings, one by one, explaining how the experiments don't provide the solid evidence for which they have been touted. There is powerful evidence that conscious decisions play an important role in our lives, and knowledge about situational influences can allow people to respond to those influences rationally rather than with blind obedience. Mele also explores the meaning and ramifications of free will. What, exactly, does it mean to have free will -- is it a state of our soul, or an undefinable openness to alternative decisions? Is it something natural and practical that is closely tied to moral responsibility? Since evidence suggests that denying the existence of free will actually encourages bad behavior, we have a duty to give it a fair chance.
Unknown Binding
First published September 2, 2014
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About the author
Alfred R. Mele
26 books35 followersAlfred Remen Mele is an American philosopher. He has been the William H. and Lucyle T. Werkmeister Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University since 2000. He specializes in irrationality, akrasia, intentionality and philosophy of action.
Born in Detroit, Michigan, Mele attended Wayne State University, and received his doctorate in philosophy from the University of Michigan in 1979. He took a position at Davidson College in 1979 as a visiting professor, which led to a tenured position at Davidson, where he remained for 21 years until accepting his position with Florida State.
Mele explores the concepts of autonomy or self-rule and the concept of self-control. as they relate to terms like "free will."
Without committing himself to the idea that human autonomy is compatible with determinism or incompatible (a position held by both libertarians and incompatibilists), Mele provides arguments in support of autonomous agents for both positions. He is, as he says, "officially agnostic about the truth of compatibilism" and describes his position as "agnostic autonomism."
Mele proposed a two-stage model of "Modest Libertarianism" that follows Daniel Dennett's 1978 "Valerian" model for decision making. Like Dennett, Mele requires that the indeterminism should come early in the overall process. He describes the latter - decision - part of the process as compatibilist (effectively determinist).
Born in Detroit, Michigan, Mele attended Wayne State University, and received his doctorate in philosophy from the University of Michigan in 1979. He took a position at Davidson College in 1979 as a visiting professor, which led to a tenured position at Davidson, where he remained for 21 years until accepting his position with Florida State.
Mele explores the concepts of autonomy or self-rule and the concept of self-control. as they relate to terms like "free will."
Without committing himself to the idea that human autonomy is compatible with determinism or incompatible (a position held by both libertarians and incompatibilists), Mele provides arguments in support of autonomous agents for both positions. He is, as he says, "officially agnostic about the truth of compatibilism" and describes his position as "agnostic autonomism."
Mele proposed a two-stage model of "Modest Libertarianism" that follows Daniel Dennett's 1978 "Valerian" model for decision making. Like Dennett, Mele requires that the indeterminism should come early in the overall process. He describes the latter - decision - part of the process as compatibilist (effectively determinist).
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 36 reviews
April 24, 2019
Meh. A nice, general, response to academics (psychologists, neuroscientists, etc) who claim free will doesn’t exist. It was interesting, but I chose to not like it. Nothing was pre-arranged. It could have gone either way. Certainly, what I’ve experienced and read before influenced how I felt about this book. Perhaps, if I had been educated as a psychologist I might feel differently. I’ll expand on this later. I have to. It was determined the moment I ordered the book. That too was pre-set.
October 6, 2014
Anyone who has read this book is wondering why this is five stars rather than, say, four stars or even three.
I am giving this a five star rating with a caveat. This is a very short, small book. I take it for granted that this is most likely meant to be a non-technical and mostly entry level to the controversy.
With that in mind, I believe Dr. Mele was quite successful in his endeavors. He lays out numerous studies that people like to cite and explains why the interpretation of the results are false. Something he mentions at the end of the book is true in many cases. He says that many people set the bar of free will to be outrageously high that nobody is really arguing for. This is true, especially, in epistemology and metaethics.
One more thing to note is that Dr. Mele doesn't take a religious or secular stance. He stays objective in that sense and limits himself strictly to the task at hand: explaining how scientists have failed to disprove free will.
Anyway, this is a great book for people interested in the subject. I personally take it to be a more entry level part of the discussion, but I will definitely be reading more from Alfred Mele from here on out.
I absolutely recommend it to anyone interested in the subject, but especially for those who truly think that scientists have ended the debate.
I am giving this a five star rating with a caveat. This is a very short, small book. I take it for granted that this is most likely meant to be a non-technical and mostly entry level to the controversy.
With that in mind, I believe Dr. Mele was quite successful in his endeavors. He lays out numerous studies that people like to cite and explains why the interpretation of the results are false. Something he mentions at the end of the book is true in many cases. He says that many people set the bar of free will to be outrageously high that nobody is really arguing for. This is true, especially, in epistemology and metaethics.
One more thing to note is that Dr. Mele doesn't take a religious or secular stance. He stays objective in that sense and limits himself strictly to the task at hand: explaining how scientists have failed to disprove free will.
Anyway, this is a great book for people interested in the subject. I personally take it to be a more entry level part of the discussion, but I will definitely be reading more from Alfred Mele from here on out.
I absolutely recommend it to anyone interested in the subject, but especially for those who truly think that scientists have ended the debate.
April 24, 2018
Pretty short, mostly casual level exploration of the most prominent scientific challenges to free will. If you want detailed rigorous philosophy, you would do well to look at Mele's other books. This one is by comparison an easy-to-read version of the topic, not that that is a bad thing. Still, the ideas are good and the points made clear and compelling. Highly recommended as an intro to the subject.
September 16, 2025
Every couple of years, a scientist announces that science has proved that we don’t have free will. Philosophers chuckle, but many people take the scientists seriously.
This is an excellent book for showing not only that science has not disproved our free will, but why it’s conceptually difficult to imagine that they even ever could.
This is an excellent book for showing not only that science has not disproved our free will, but why it’s conceptually difficult to imagine that they even ever could.
February 13, 2015
Tiny book with a very limited subject: "Have recent scientific experiments proven that free will does not exist?" But his answer is well done. "No, unless your definition of free will is absurd." Note that he isn't arguing that free will must exist (although he believes it does) -- he's just denying that recent experiments have proven any such thing.
September 7, 2022
Mi vien da dire che il sottotitolo del libro potrebbe essere più preciso: "Perché la scienza non ha confutato il libero arbitrio... per ora!". Quante cose che nei secoli passati si ritenevano sottratte al metodo empirico sperimentale sono poi state da esso affrontate e spiegate con successo? A fine '700 diceva Kant nella Critica del giudizio che non sarebbe mai esistito un "Newton del filo d'erba", ma poi sono arrivate la botanica, la chimica, la biologica, la genetica, ecc. E il filo d'erba è stato spiegato. Nulla esclude che un giorno, magari più presto di quanto si creda, possa succedere la stessa cosa anche per la mente umana e per quella cosa sfuggente chiamata libero arbitrio.
Del resto da questo punto di vista il libro è anche onesto, perché afferma che il suo intento non è discutere se il libero arbitrio sia possibile o addirittura reale, o portare prove filosofiche o scientifiche a suo favore, ma unicamente tentare di smentire una serie di esperimenti scientifici che, nei tempi recenti, sembrerebbero aver negato il libero arbitrio. Ovviamente, anche se l'autore non lo dice con la chiarezza che secondo me sarebbe necessaria, anche se che questi esperimenti non fossero davvero così decisivi come credono alcuni (e come contesta l'autore) questo non esclude che in un futuro prossimo o remoto ci siano altri esperimenti coronati da successo. Insomma, la porta resta aperta.
Inoltre, da quel che son riuscito a capire leggendo il libro con le mie ridotte facoltà mentali, a me sembra che anche le confutazioni mosse dall'autore del libro agli esperimenti che cita non siano sufficientemente decisive. Parte dal celebre esperimento di Libet, che avrebbe riscontrato come il cervello si attivi per eseguire determinate azioni prima che la coscienza che ne sia al corrente. In pratica la centrale decisionale della mente umana si troverebbe al di fuori dell'autocoscienza, che si limiterebbe a illudersi solo in seconda battuta di aver preso lei le varie decisioni. L'autore del libro afferma che questo non vuol dire niente, perché quest'attivazione pre-conscia del cervello potrebbe essere dovuta ad altri motivi, e non essere legata alla decisione che poi viene presa. Mi sembra un'affermazione debole, perché questo "potrebbe" non è certo un "è". Di seguito l'autore fa l'esempio di decisioni più elaborate che non quelle sottoposte da Libet a esperimento: dice di immaginare qualcuno che in un supermercato decide quale confezione da mezzo chilo di noccioline acquistare, e afferma che una decisione del genere, frutto di accurate ponderazioni, di soppesamenti di pro e contro, non rientrerebbe nelle situazioni analizzate dall'esperimento di Libet, in quanto situazione in cui la coscienza, di fronte agli scaffali coi diversi tipi di noccioline, analizza con cura i diversi impulsi che le giungono vagliando quali accettare e quali scartare. A me sembra un'obiezione piuttosto debole, perché, se l'esperimento di Libet è vero, anche tutti i pensieri che vanno a comporre una decisione ponderata ed articolata devono comunque partire preventivamente da quella zona del cervello che è esterna alla coscienza e che già opera preventivamente l'opzione di vagliare quali siano le decisioni da prendere (che comprendono anche i pensieri coscienti da fare riguardo all'azione poi intrapresa dal corpo).
Che la coscienza possa invece avere un potere di vaglio l'autore cerca di corroborarlo con un'esperimento mentale ispirato a delle obiezioni di Ramachandran sull'esperimento di Libet. L'autore dice di immaginare una situazione in cui un dispositivo visualizza su uno schermo le decisioni adottate dalla parte pre-conscia del cervello, in modo da "informare" la parte conscia di queste scelte, che a questo punto avrebbe la possibilità di vagliare queste decisioni e, per così dire, anche ribellarsi a quanto deciso dalla parte pre-conscia, ovvero di decidere diversamente. Ma di nuovo mi chiedo, quest'ultima scelta da dove proverrebbe, da dove partirebbe? Io direi che la visualizzazione su schermo innescherebbe un nuovo processo decisionale, che però coinvolgerebbe di nuovo la parte pre-cosciente del cervello, e dunque si sarebbe da capo. Il nocciolo della questione resta sembra se il punto di partenza delle decisioni risieda dentro la coscienza umana oppure lo precede. Se lo precede, lo precederebbe sempre, anche quando si tratta di ripensare una decisione X per arrivare a una decisione Y, che sia davanti a uno scaffale pieno di confezioni di noccioline o davanti a uno scherma che cerca di sussurrare alla coscienza quel che sta facendo la parte pre-cosciente della mente.
Di seguito l'autore affronta gli esperimenti "sociali" di Zimbardo e Milgram, esperimenti che dimostrano come determinate circostanze e situazioni siano in grado di ridurre la possibilità degli individui di controllarsi. E qui secondo me siamo fuori strada sin dall'inizio, perché il libero arbitrio di cui si parla in questo caso è diverso, molto diverso da quello dell'esperimento di Libet: da una parte c'è la libertà empirica, quella che può essere coartata, ad esempio, mettendo un individuo in prigione o sottoponendolo agli ordini di un'autorità; dall'altra c'è la libertà metafisica, che dovrebbe afferire alla struttura profonda della realtà, che o c'è o non c'è. Secondo me si tratta di due concetti di libertà radicalmente diversi, che richiedono trattamenti teorici diversi e la cui negazione inoltre porterebbe a conclusioni diverse se non opposte; e se pure l'autore riconosce questa differenza, esplicitandola più volte, secondo me non la pone in maniera abbastanza netta.
Anche nel caso degli esperimenti di Zimbardo e Milgram, l'autore sostiene che per ridare agli individui il controllo su se stessi e renderli resistenti ai condizionamenti esterni, basterebbe informarli su come funziona il meccanismo di condizionamento. Può essere che questo sposti qualcosa, ma lo farebbe in maniera decisiva? Non dimentichiamo che molti dei partecipanti all'esperimento di Milgram affermavano, prima di prendervi parte, di essere persone in grado di ribellarsi a degli ordini ingiusti dati da un'autorità... salvo poi cascarci una volta immersi nella situazione dell'esperimento. Inoltre questa, dell'autore, resta una supposizione, perché non riporta dati di eventuali esperimenti per corroborarla.
In ogni caso, anche se l'autore avesse ragione, non cambierebbe la mia obiezione fatta alle sue contestazioni verso chi nega l'esistenza del libero arbitrio nel senso "metafisico" del termine (come nell'esperimento di Libet): anche le nuove informazioni e le nuove reazioni a esse farebbero comunque parte dell'intero sistema della mente umana e verrebbero processate inizialmente da quelle parti che sfuggono alla coscienza umana. Detto con una metafora: se inseriamo nuovi dati in un computer ottenendo così risultati diversi da quelli precedenti, possiamo affermare che quel computer ha ottenuto dei gradi di libertà? Il punto non è la quantità di informazioni maggiori o minori ottenute dal sistema, o se gli viene concesso più tempo per elaborarle, il punto è il modo in cui è interamente strutturato quel sistema, se davvero contiene in sé quel qualcosa di così sfuggente che si definisce libero arbitrio. Forse il cervello umano è solo una macchina particolarmente complessa e sofisticata.
Concludo dicendo che io per istinto non crederei all'esistenza del libero arbitrio (nel senso "metafisico" del termine), anche se ammetto che esistono argomentazioni interessanti a suo favore; il problema del libero arbitrio, per chi ne sostiene l'esistenza, trovo rimanga sempre come concettualizzarlo, come immaginare e descrivere qualcosa che funzioni e che corrisponde alla concezione intuitiva che sembrano avere tutti del libero arbitrio. Si tratta di una questione puramente filosofica. Tuttavia, almeno per quanto riguarda il cervello umano (e di conseguenza la mente umana), sapere se esso ospita o meno il libero arbitrio così inteso spetterà, forse, un giorno alla scienza dimostrarlo: abbiamo avuto i "Newton del filo d'erba", forse arriveranno anche dei "Newton della mente umana".
Del resto da questo punto di vista il libro è anche onesto, perché afferma che il suo intento non è discutere se il libero arbitrio sia possibile o addirittura reale, o portare prove filosofiche o scientifiche a suo favore, ma unicamente tentare di smentire una serie di esperimenti scientifici che, nei tempi recenti, sembrerebbero aver negato il libero arbitrio. Ovviamente, anche se l'autore non lo dice con la chiarezza che secondo me sarebbe necessaria, anche se che questi esperimenti non fossero davvero così decisivi come credono alcuni (e come contesta l'autore) questo non esclude che in un futuro prossimo o remoto ci siano altri esperimenti coronati da successo. Insomma, la porta resta aperta.
Inoltre, da quel che son riuscito a capire leggendo il libro con le mie ridotte facoltà mentali, a me sembra che anche le confutazioni mosse dall'autore del libro agli esperimenti che cita non siano sufficientemente decisive. Parte dal celebre esperimento di Libet, che avrebbe riscontrato come il cervello si attivi per eseguire determinate azioni prima che la coscienza che ne sia al corrente. In pratica la centrale decisionale della mente umana si troverebbe al di fuori dell'autocoscienza, che si limiterebbe a illudersi solo in seconda battuta di aver preso lei le varie decisioni. L'autore del libro afferma che questo non vuol dire niente, perché quest'attivazione pre-conscia del cervello potrebbe essere dovuta ad altri motivi, e non essere legata alla decisione che poi viene presa. Mi sembra un'affermazione debole, perché questo "potrebbe" non è certo un "è". Di seguito l'autore fa l'esempio di decisioni più elaborate che non quelle sottoposte da Libet a esperimento: dice di immaginare qualcuno che in un supermercato decide quale confezione da mezzo chilo di noccioline acquistare, e afferma che una decisione del genere, frutto di accurate ponderazioni, di soppesamenti di pro e contro, non rientrerebbe nelle situazioni analizzate dall'esperimento di Libet, in quanto situazione in cui la coscienza, di fronte agli scaffali coi diversi tipi di noccioline, analizza con cura i diversi impulsi che le giungono vagliando quali accettare e quali scartare. A me sembra un'obiezione piuttosto debole, perché, se l'esperimento di Libet è vero, anche tutti i pensieri che vanno a comporre una decisione ponderata ed articolata devono comunque partire preventivamente da quella zona del cervello che è esterna alla coscienza e che già opera preventivamente l'opzione di vagliare quali siano le decisioni da prendere (che comprendono anche i pensieri coscienti da fare riguardo all'azione poi intrapresa dal corpo).
Che la coscienza possa invece avere un potere di vaglio l'autore cerca di corroborarlo con un'esperimento mentale ispirato a delle obiezioni di Ramachandran sull'esperimento di Libet. L'autore dice di immaginare una situazione in cui un dispositivo visualizza su uno schermo le decisioni adottate dalla parte pre-conscia del cervello, in modo da "informare" la parte conscia di queste scelte, che a questo punto avrebbe la possibilità di vagliare queste decisioni e, per così dire, anche ribellarsi a quanto deciso dalla parte pre-conscia, ovvero di decidere diversamente. Ma di nuovo mi chiedo, quest'ultima scelta da dove proverrebbe, da dove partirebbe? Io direi che la visualizzazione su schermo innescherebbe un nuovo processo decisionale, che però coinvolgerebbe di nuovo la parte pre-cosciente del cervello, e dunque si sarebbe da capo. Il nocciolo della questione resta sembra se il punto di partenza delle decisioni risieda dentro la coscienza umana oppure lo precede. Se lo precede, lo precederebbe sempre, anche quando si tratta di ripensare una decisione X per arrivare a una decisione Y, che sia davanti a uno scaffale pieno di confezioni di noccioline o davanti a uno scherma che cerca di sussurrare alla coscienza quel che sta facendo la parte pre-cosciente della mente.
Di seguito l'autore affronta gli esperimenti "sociali" di Zimbardo e Milgram, esperimenti che dimostrano come determinate circostanze e situazioni siano in grado di ridurre la possibilità degli individui di controllarsi. E qui secondo me siamo fuori strada sin dall'inizio, perché il libero arbitrio di cui si parla in questo caso è diverso, molto diverso da quello dell'esperimento di Libet: da una parte c'è la libertà empirica, quella che può essere coartata, ad esempio, mettendo un individuo in prigione o sottoponendolo agli ordini di un'autorità; dall'altra c'è la libertà metafisica, che dovrebbe afferire alla struttura profonda della realtà, che o c'è o non c'è. Secondo me si tratta di due concetti di libertà radicalmente diversi, che richiedono trattamenti teorici diversi e la cui negazione inoltre porterebbe a conclusioni diverse se non opposte; e se pure l'autore riconosce questa differenza, esplicitandola più volte, secondo me non la pone in maniera abbastanza netta.
Anche nel caso degli esperimenti di Zimbardo e Milgram, l'autore sostiene che per ridare agli individui il controllo su se stessi e renderli resistenti ai condizionamenti esterni, basterebbe informarli su come funziona il meccanismo di condizionamento. Può essere che questo sposti qualcosa, ma lo farebbe in maniera decisiva? Non dimentichiamo che molti dei partecipanti all'esperimento di Milgram affermavano, prima di prendervi parte, di essere persone in grado di ribellarsi a degli ordini ingiusti dati da un'autorità... salvo poi cascarci una volta immersi nella situazione dell'esperimento. Inoltre questa, dell'autore, resta una supposizione, perché non riporta dati di eventuali esperimenti per corroborarla.
In ogni caso, anche se l'autore avesse ragione, non cambierebbe la mia obiezione fatta alle sue contestazioni verso chi nega l'esistenza del libero arbitrio nel senso "metafisico" del termine (come nell'esperimento di Libet): anche le nuove informazioni e le nuove reazioni a esse farebbero comunque parte dell'intero sistema della mente umana e verrebbero processate inizialmente da quelle parti che sfuggono alla coscienza umana. Detto con una metafora: se inseriamo nuovi dati in un computer ottenendo così risultati diversi da quelli precedenti, possiamo affermare che quel computer ha ottenuto dei gradi di libertà? Il punto non è la quantità di informazioni maggiori o minori ottenute dal sistema, o se gli viene concesso più tempo per elaborarle, il punto è il modo in cui è interamente strutturato quel sistema, se davvero contiene in sé quel qualcosa di così sfuggente che si definisce libero arbitrio. Forse il cervello umano è solo una macchina particolarmente complessa e sofisticata.
Concludo dicendo che io per istinto non crederei all'esistenza del libero arbitrio (nel senso "metafisico" del termine), anche se ammetto che esistono argomentazioni interessanti a suo favore; il problema del libero arbitrio, per chi ne sostiene l'esistenza, trovo rimanga sempre come concettualizzarlo, come immaginare e descrivere qualcosa che funzioni e che corrisponde alla concezione intuitiva che sembrano avere tutti del libero arbitrio. Si tratta di una questione puramente filosofica. Tuttavia, almeno per quanto riguarda il cervello umano (e di conseguenza la mente umana), sapere se esso ospita o meno il libero arbitrio così inteso spetterà, forse, un giorno alla scienza dimostrarlo: abbiamo avuto i "Newton del filo d'erba", forse arriveranno anche dei "Newton della mente umana".
April 16, 2021
An excellent, very short introduction to the scientific problems with the claim that free will is an illusion. It does a good job of tearing apart the methodology of the studies of Benjamin Libet and Libet-like follow-ups, the man who inaugurated the tradition among determinists in neuroscience of claiming that brain scans show that free will is somehow an illusion; they demonstrate no such thing.
Of course, the philosophical defenses for free will are more important, since it is proven by mere introspection combined with clearly defining one's terms --
Free will is merely reason -- that is, man's ability to make sense of the data provided to him by the senses -- applied to human action. Free will is merely man's ability to consciously engage in cost-benefit analysis before acting, ultimately choosing some courses of action at the expense of others.
When we clearly define our terms like this, free will is proven by mere introspection: you can "observe" yourself consciously engaging in cost-benefit analysis throughout your entire waking life.
(This is why even the mere attempt to try to argue that free will is an illusion ends up affirming free will, since it assumes those who listen have the free will to change their minds and you had the free will to adopt the belief that free will is an illusion.)
Nevertheless, given the philosophical disintegration of the West since the death of Immanuel Kant, science too has adopted a disintegrated view of existence and a cynical attitude toward the ability to truly explain the universe. Given the massive influence of mental cripples like Sam Harris on this issue, it is essential to supplement the philosophical proof of free will with scientific proof.
Of course, the philosophical defenses for free will are more important, since it is proven by mere introspection combined with clearly defining one's terms --
Free will is merely reason -- that is, man's ability to make sense of the data provided to him by the senses -- applied to human action. Free will is merely man's ability to consciously engage in cost-benefit analysis before acting, ultimately choosing some courses of action at the expense of others.
When we clearly define our terms like this, free will is proven by mere introspection: you can "observe" yourself consciously engaging in cost-benefit analysis throughout your entire waking life.
(This is why even the mere attempt to try to argue that free will is an illusion ends up affirming free will, since it assumes those who listen have the free will to change their minds and you had the free will to adopt the belief that free will is an illusion.)
Nevertheless, given the philosophical disintegration of the West since the death of Immanuel Kant, science too has adopted a disintegrated view of existence and a cynical attitude toward the ability to truly explain the universe. Given the massive influence of mental cripples like Sam Harris on this issue, it is essential to supplement the philosophical proof of free will with scientific proof.
July 5, 2018
"If the meaning you assign to free will is not outlandish, I predict I will persuade you that science has not closed the door on free will."
Opening the book with such a quote, and then directing the reader to a previous book as justification for certain definitions of free will, yields an overall frustrating introduction, but I suppose that's what you gotta do when you write such a short book. However, such analysis is critical when trying to actually make conclusions about this sort of stuff, as evidence by the interesting but borderline futile conclusions Mele draws about science and its relationship to free will here.
After researching the author a bit more at the end, it's to know surprise that much of his funding comes from the John Templeton Foundation.
Opening the book with such a quote, and then directing the reader to a previous book as justification for certain definitions of free will, yields an overall frustrating introduction, but I suppose that's what you gotta do when you write such a short book. However, such analysis is critical when trying to actually make conclusions about this sort of stuff, as evidence by the interesting but borderline futile conclusions Mele draws about science and its relationship to free will here.
After researching the author a bit more at the end, it's to know surprise that much of his funding comes from the John Templeton Foundation.
December 4, 2022
The last chapter really saved the book. Definitions are important when debating against somebody and it seems everyone has their own definition of free will. I agree that setting the bar too high for free will, will conclude that it’s an illusion but for me personally, I just can’t get over the predispositions placed in people and how some people are lucky with them and some aren’t. The neurological differences that may lead someone to the road to destruction or to a life of solitude. The external factors and help that can guide someone to a great life and the abandonment and loneliness that can make someone question if life is even worth living. I appreciate the author for the effort and I still think it was worth the read and a good book.
March 1, 2015
Easy to understand and accessible for everyone, but I wanted more!
March 9, 2025
This was a fine little book, well-organized. The thrust of the book is to determine whether there is such a thing as free will. At the end of the book Mele clarifies that one of the problems with this question is scientists and biologists who attempt to answer the question often have drastically different definitions for "free will." More specifically, if some scientists have such a high bar for free will that no experiment would ever prove it, does that mean there is no such thing as free will or rather that the bar has been set too high. The comparison Mele makes is that if a "great" baseball player is only one who hits .400 every year, then there has never been a great baseball player. Obviously, there have been many spectacular players, but none according to this ridiculous metric.
The first part of the book covers some of the famous experiments of the last 40 years that have "proved" free will doesn't exist. These experiments "proved" that we take all sorts of actions unconsciously and only post hoc "decide" to do them. These experiments entailed participants looking at clocks, clicking things, pushing buttons, flexing wrists, and so on. Mele does a fine job of describing in detail each one of these experiments and then showing why they don't prove what they claim to prove, namely that there is no such thing as free will. Mele shows that in all cases the experiments are both methodologically shoddy and also that the conclusions the scientists draws from the experiments are tendentious.
After reading about a few of these experiments, I realized the thought I kept having was "Who cares?" Even if the methodology of these experiments was air-tight and what followed from them was unequivocally that free-will didn't exist, would anyone change how he or she lived? If a baseball is coming at my head at 80 mph and I duck, does it matter if you tell me I didn't have free will to move my head. Or if one's spouse is cheating on him and he files for divorce, does it matter that a scientist can tell that person he doesn't have free will when he decides to file for divorce? In a fundamental way, it's just semantics insofar as how we live our lives when we're discussing whether or not we possess free will.
The next part of the book focuses on social psychology and what that discipline has to say about free will. Here Mele recounts more famous experiments over the last 60 years that, I guess, show people don't have free will because often psychological and environmental factors are so severe that they significantly limit the degree to which people are capable of exercising agency in a given situation. Or, perhaps one could say the people in these experiments lack courage and are behaving cowardly. Like the experiments that examined free will through a neurobiological lens, Mele here shows that these experiments aren't nearly as persuasive as they claim to be, again as a result of poor methodology and tendentious conclusions.
I couldn't help but think of the expression "a little knowledge is a dangerous thing" as I concluded the book. I remember in college being told by a "very smart" friend that we didn't have free will because when we think we're deciding to flick our finger the decision was already made unconsciously before the thought "flick my finger" came into consciousness. Reading Mele's book, I now realize my friend had bought fully into the conclusions neurobiologist Benjamin Libet's experiments had "shown" in the 1980s (where Mele begins the book). Oh, well. Like I said above, does any of this really matter to the average American; to the non-scientist? Would even one of the scientists who is a dyed-in-the-wool determinist do anything other than shoot to kill an intruder who was in his house and attacking his family? Would he hesitate for a split second to factor in that the intruder wasn't exercising free will, either as a result of a terrible childhood, mental illness, or intoxication? The answer is obvious.
So I suppose while on the one hand scientists who are trying to understand how neurobiology interacts with more ancient ideas like the soul will parse these experiments and factor the results into theories of mind and will, the rest of us will continue to live our lives holding others who do us wrong to account, expecting law enforcement and the state to promptly and efficiently keep bad people out of our midst, and remain proud of ourselves for the hard work and ingenuity we put into our accomplishments. In other words, we'll assume both ourselves and those around us are resposible for their actions, which of course doesn't mean that extending grace and forgiveness isn't always also the right way to behave.
The first part of the book covers some of the famous experiments of the last 40 years that have "proved" free will doesn't exist. These experiments "proved" that we take all sorts of actions unconsciously and only post hoc "decide" to do them. These experiments entailed participants looking at clocks, clicking things, pushing buttons, flexing wrists, and so on. Mele does a fine job of describing in detail each one of these experiments and then showing why they don't prove what they claim to prove, namely that there is no such thing as free will. Mele shows that in all cases the experiments are both methodologically shoddy and also that the conclusions the scientists draws from the experiments are tendentious.
After reading about a few of these experiments, I realized the thought I kept having was "Who cares?" Even if the methodology of these experiments was air-tight and what followed from them was unequivocally that free-will didn't exist, would anyone change how he or she lived? If a baseball is coming at my head at 80 mph and I duck, does it matter if you tell me I didn't have free will to move my head. Or if one's spouse is cheating on him and he files for divorce, does it matter that a scientist can tell that person he doesn't have free will when he decides to file for divorce? In a fundamental way, it's just semantics insofar as how we live our lives when we're discussing whether or not we possess free will.
The next part of the book focuses on social psychology and what that discipline has to say about free will. Here Mele recounts more famous experiments over the last 60 years that, I guess, show people don't have free will because often psychological and environmental factors are so severe that they significantly limit the degree to which people are capable of exercising agency in a given situation. Or, perhaps one could say the people in these experiments lack courage and are behaving cowardly. Like the experiments that examined free will through a neurobiological lens, Mele here shows that these experiments aren't nearly as persuasive as they claim to be, again as a result of poor methodology and tendentious conclusions.
I couldn't help but think of the expression "a little knowledge is a dangerous thing" as I concluded the book. I remember in college being told by a "very smart" friend that we didn't have free will because when we think we're deciding to flick our finger the decision was already made unconsciously before the thought "flick my finger" came into consciousness. Reading Mele's book, I now realize my friend had bought fully into the conclusions neurobiologist Benjamin Libet's experiments had "shown" in the 1980s (where Mele begins the book). Oh, well. Like I said above, does any of this really matter to the average American; to the non-scientist? Would even one of the scientists who is a dyed-in-the-wool determinist do anything other than shoot to kill an intruder who was in his house and attacking his family? Would he hesitate for a split second to factor in that the intruder wasn't exercising free will, either as a result of a terrible childhood, mental illness, or intoxication? The answer is obvious.
So I suppose while on the one hand scientists who are trying to understand how neurobiology interacts with more ancient ideas like the soul will parse these experiments and factor the results into theories of mind and will, the rest of us will continue to live our lives holding others who do us wrong to account, expecting law enforcement and the state to promptly and efficiently keep bad people out of our midst, and remain proud of ourselves for the hard work and ingenuity we put into our accomplishments. In other words, we'll assume both ourselves and those around us are resposible for their actions, which of course doesn't mean that extending grace and forgiveness isn't always also the right way to behave.
December 4, 2017
Very nice and concise book that gives powerful arguments against a conclusion that science has disproven free will. Mele looks at attacks coming from neuroscience and social psychology, the two most threatening. He deconstructs their findings and argues that the results cannot extend to a generalized claim that science has disproven free will.
He strays away from other themes in the free will debate and stays on topic throughout the entire book, which is very helpful. He does a nice job explaining the experiments and the results in layman's terms.
My one fault would be that certain sections could do with more clarification and certain arguments he deploys fall flat, in my opinion. Nevertheless, in a controversial sector, certain arguments are bound to and not too much fault can be levied there.
He strays away from other themes in the free will debate and stays on topic throughout the entire book, which is very helpful. He does a nice job explaining the experiments and the results in layman's terms.
My one fault would be that certain sections could do with more clarification and certain arguments he deploys fall flat, in my opinion. Nevertheless, in a controversial sector, certain arguments are bound to and not too much fault can be levied there.
August 24, 2015
Do we have free will? I've written on this a number of times, and I don’t have much patience for those who deny it. I confess some of the scientific studies that demonstrate brain activity prior to consciousness are perplexing. Enter Alfred Mele. His boast is to provide a defeater for those studies. While I'm not sure he succeeds, he did have an interesting thought experiment.
Suppose you're hooked up to a machine that predicts what choice you'll make, but suppose it tells you what your choice will be before you make it. What do you do then?
Suppose you're hooked up to a machine that predicts what choice you'll make, but suppose it tells you what your choice will be before you make it. What do you do then?
March 9, 2015
As someone who supports the notion of Freewill, I was somewhat disappointed by this admittedly shallow book. Personally, I find the work of Daniel Dennett much more satisfying.
January 23, 2025
I expected to love everything about neurology before I had my classes on it in med school, but I ended up hating a big half of it LMAO. the reason for that is the fact that, at its core, I was disappointed by how little of the field was comprised of those fascinating episodes like the ones from the famous case reports by Oliver Shacks, so yeah, I got sad about how many horses and how little zebras there were, and also, I thought studying those tracks was kinda annoying ( tl;dr fuck neuroanatomy, make believe tracts can take a hike).
Okay, that is a slight exaggeration, neurology is still interesting, even if it's something I don't want to specialize in, and it did make Oliver Shacks books even better, but something unexpectedly amusing happened thanks to my neuroanatomy classes, I've recently acquired a strange hobby of going hunting and diving deep into the rabbit hole of bad YouTube pop-science and it's shallow and pseudoscientific myths that go around being spread like some type of consensus or a normal fun fact about neuroscience.
I started by diving deep into why the "you are two" thing about the brain is nonsense, and now I am doing that with the, "free will doesn't exist" nonsense. the reason why I am doing this during my break is simply because it's fun, spotting misinformation about neuroscience is easy when the fact that it's misinformation is also highly publicized (like how a lot of people know that the idea the right brain is logical and the Left brain is creative is a myth because other people are always reminding the world that it's a myth), But recent neurological pseudoscience is harder to spot.
In part, because it's new, so the debunking has not had as much time to spread and in part, because it often appears in videos by otherwise good science communicators, that out of the blue make a sweeping assumption about a lot from just a few experiments, which then gets copied by a lot of other science communicators who start blindly following it, using the same sources without checking the counterarguments.
So reading up on why these articles and videos are wrong feels fresh since the reasoning is not wildly spread, and it's also engaging trying to find new bad scientific takes in the wild based on flawed reasoning you identify alone, and after that start looking up other reasons why, that thing wasn't true if it really wasn't true (which in the case, the idea free will doesn't exist was not supported by the evidence).
I like how thorough the book is, it describes the key experiments, their limitations, contradicting evidence and experiments, and logical flaws in the conclusions, and it does it from multiple angles (mainly psychological, neurological, and philosophical angles, and it does all that in a succinct but detailed way)
Granted this book doesn't have the most intriguing prose out there, but it's an academic book, that's to be expected, and even if the prose isn't hypnotizing, I still found it inclusive and comprehensive, which is what really matters in science communication
Okay, that is a slight exaggeration, neurology is still interesting, even if it's something I don't want to specialize in, and it did make Oliver Shacks books even better, but something unexpectedly amusing happened thanks to my neuroanatomy classes, I've recently acquired a strange hobby of going hunting and diving deep into the rabbit hole of bad YouTube pop-science and it's shallow and pseudoscientific myths that go around being spread like some type of consensus or a normal fun fact about neuroscience.
I started by diving deep into why the "you are two" thing about the brain is nonsense, and now I am doing that with the, "free will doesn't exist" nonsense. the reason why I am doing this during my break is simply because it's fun, spotting misinformation about neuroscience is easy when the fact that it's misinformation is also highly publicized (like how a lot of people know that the idea the right brain is logical and the Left brain is creative is a myth because other people are always reminding the world that it's a myth), But recent neurological pseudoscience is harder to spot.
In part, because it's new, so the debunking has not had as much time to spread and in part, because it often appears in videos by otherwise good science communicators, that out of the blue make a sweeping assumption about a lot from just a few experiments, which then gets copied by a lot of other science communicators who start blindly following it, using the same sources without checking the counterarguments.
So reading up on why these articles and videos are wrong feels fresh since the reasoning is not wildly spread, and it's also engaging trying to find new bad scientific takes in the wild based on flawed reasoning you identify alone, and after that start looking up other reasons why, that thing wasn't true if it really wasn't true (which in the case, the idea free will doesn't exist was not supported by the evidence).
I like how thorough the book is, it describes the key experiments, their limitations, contradicting evidence and experiments, and logical flaws in the conclusions, and it does it from multiple angles (mainly psychological, neurological, and philosophical angles, and it does all that in a succinct but detailed way)
Granted this book doesn't have the most intriguing prose out there, but it's an academic book, that's to be expected, and even if the prose isn't hypnotizing, I still found it inclusive and comprehensive, which is what really matters in science communication
December 27, 2023
A concise but thorough refutation of some of the most popular arguments against the existence of free will.
The part I found most interesting was Mele's refutation of some of the neuroscientific evidence against free will presented by people like the often cited Benjamin Libet. In the 1980s, Libet conducted various experiments, one of which involved asking participants to flex their wrists whenever they felt like it and noting the moment at which the urge to do so presented itself. He found that, on average, the urge to flex one's wrist occurred about one fifth of a second prior to the action. But what he also discovered using EEG (electroencephalogram) technology is that the initial brain activity associated with the action occurred more than half a second prior to the action, which is about a third of a second prior to the participants' urge to perform the action. This would seem to suggest that there is an unconscious element to our decision-making over which we have no control. And if free will must come from purely conscious decisions, then it appears, based on the results of this experiment, that we don't have free will.
Mele points out a handful of problems with this argument. One is that Libet only observed cases where brain activity was followed by the flexing of the wrist; he did not account for possible cases where there is brain activity but no subsequent wrist-flexing. Thus, there is no reason to suppose that the decision to flex one's wrist was made during the unconscious window after the initial rise in brain activity. Another flaw with the experiment is that it applies the results of a very specific scenario to all kinds of decision-making processes. We needn't assume that our free will operates in such a uniform manner.
I also appreciate that Mele distinguished between what he called modest free will and ambitious free will. Modest free will is the common-sense notion of free will that we are able to rationally choose between different options without force or coercion. Ambitious free will is the idea that we can make choices only in the absence of any influences from genetics, environment, or prior brain activity. It would seem impossible that our actions could be totally independent of any prior or external influences, but that doesn't mean we have to give up on the concept of free will altogether.
The part I found most interesting was Mele's refutation of some of the neuroscientific evidence against free will presented by people like the often cited Benjamin Libet. In the 1980s, Libet conducted various experiments, one of which involved asking participants to flex their wrists whenever they felt like it and noting the moment at which the urge to do so presented itself. He found that, on average, the urge to flex one's wrist occurred about one fifth of a second prior to the action. But what he also discovered using EEG (electroencephalogram) technology is that the initial brain activity associated with the action occurred more than half a second prior to the action, which is about a third of a second prior to the participants' urge to perform the action. This would seem to suggest that there is an unconscious element to our decision-making over which we have no control. And if free will must come from purely conscious decisions, then it appears, based on the results of this experiment, that we don't have free will.
Mele points out a handful of problems with this argument. One is that Libet only observed cases where brain activity was followed by the flexing of the wrist; he did not account for possible cases where there is brain activity but no subsequent wrist-flexing. Thus, there is no reason to suppose that the decision to flex one's wrist was made during the unconscious window after the initial rise in brain activity. Another flaw with the experiment is that it applies the results of a very specific scenario to all kinds of decision-making processes. We needn't assume that our free will operates in such a uniform manner.
I also appreciate that Mele distinguished between what he called modest free will and ambitious free will. Modest free will is the common-sense notion of free will that we are able to rationally choose between different options without force or coercion. Ambitious free will is the idea that we can make choices only in the absence of any influences from genetics, environment, or prior brain activity. It would seem impossible that our actions could be totally independent of any prior or external influences, but that doesn't mean we have to give up on the concept of free will altogether.
November 7, 2019
A very thought provoking book. Throughout its chapters Mele questions the validity of a number fo inferences drawn in modern psychology and neuroscience from a series of experiments conducted in the late 1960's (Stanford prison, electric chair bystander, proximity and touch-proximity). Mele's central premise, drawn upon time and again, is that any modern scientific claims that purport proof of the non-existence of free will do not wholly encapsulate the data from the experiments, and that often the conclusions themselves are based more on the author's personal definition of free-will; those saying it does not exist setting the bar for proof higher than do those will a more liberal definition of what free-will actually means.
An interesting aspect is Mele's contention that knowledge is one of the key components of free will in that after learning of biases or unintentional actions, many people recalibrate their reasoning and incorporate these newly learned facts into future actions-thereby intentionally adjusting actions from previous mistakes, which demonstrates a capacity for free will. Mele also notes how intentional implementation, strategizing, and planning in advance (impulse control) all seem indicative of traits needed in at least some definitions of free will. While not discounting that situations, environments, and personal background histories and experiences help people make sense of and reason through situations, Mele clearly states his belief that this dynamic represents only part of the decision making process and that a broader, much less defined spirit of "free will" is also present in every decision-especially since not all people in similar circumstances make similar decisions.
A very good think-piece to read.
An interesting aspect is Mele's contention that knowledge is one of the key components of free will in that after learning of biases or unintentional actions, many people recalibrate their reasoning and incorporate these newly learned facts into future actions-thereby intentionally adjusting actions from previous mistakes, which demonstrates a capacity for free will. Mele also notes how intentional implementation, strategizing, and planning in advance (impulse control) all seem indicative of traits needed in at least some definitions of free will. While not discounting that situations, environments, and personal background histories and experiences help people make sense of and reason through situations, Mele clearly states his belief that this dynamic represents only part of the decision making process and that a broader, much less defined spirit of "free will" is also present in every decision-especially since not all people in similar circumstances make similar decisions.
A very good think-piece to read.
December 9, 2020
Given its delimited subject as defined by the subtitle, this is a pretty solid book. I already knew about most of the science discussed in the book so there wasn't much new for me, but the author did a good job presenting the material logically, and being fairly clear about the various definitions of free will floating about in the culture. I think this would be good reading for a curious high school or college student who might be confused by the misleading interpretations of the research. The book also got me thinking about conscious implementation intentions, and how I might hack some stumbling blocks in my life.
May 19, 2021
Quite a philosopher
Alfred Mele is a sharp thinker and he makes me want to learn more about his work on free will. The book is very readable and convincingly arguing that (“modest” and “ambitious”) free will is empirically supported. BTW, having read this book, I now understand why philosophers and psychologists have difficulties communicating with each other. For philosophers like Alfred Mele, exceptions definitively say something, while psychologists seem to take exceptions as noise.
Alfred Mele is a sharp thinker and he makes me want to learn more about his work on free will. The book is very readable and convincingly arguing that (“modest” and “ambitious”) free will is empirically supported. BTW, having read this book, I now understand why philosophers and psychologists have difficulties communicating with each other. For philosophers like Alfred Mele, exceptions definitively say something, while psychologists seem to take exceptions as noise.
September 12, 2022
I love reading about the topic of free will, and I just learned about Alfred Mele’s work. He’s written quite a few books, and this was one of the short ones, so I decided to go with it to get a feel for his thoughts. This is a great book that dives into the scientific research around free will, and Alfred provides some good arguments when looking at the results of the studies and debates around free will. Although I usually enjoy the philosophical look at free will, it was a nice change to see it combined more with the science. I definitely look forward to reading more of Mele’s work.
July 20, 2020
Solid piece of work for any layman reader. I think the structure of the book could have been tidied up and it was a bit too layman for me at times (and I am for sure not a pro). Why I cannot give it 5 stars: while the authors dispatches the usual lame arguments for determinism very well and very swiftly - he actually has not so much to offer so much against indeterminism I feel - and this is a much more potent position against the notion of free will.
April 24, 2021
The author does what he says in the title - kind of successfully refutes conclusions of scientific experiments against free will. Although some conclusions he make himself seems weak as well. Disregarding 80% rate as insignificant or when discussing situationalism, seems to ignore all the individuality of brain and environment that person comes from.
Well the short book as it is can only be with so much details. Would be still interested to check other work of Mele.
Well the short book as it is can only be with so much details. Would be still interested to check other work of Mele.
June 22, 2025
A short book that I read in tandem with Sam Harris' book, "Free Will." It essentially deconstructs the narratives underpinning most free will "deniers" arguments (like Harris). Very direct and an easy read. Not truly comprehensive, but it definitely goes over many topics and notable criticisms. Could substitute as an "Introduction to Free Will" college class, given it was more of a reflection piece.
March 13, 2023
Interesting little book about science and free will. I don't think I would have believed anyone that told me "Science has disproved free will" but it is good to see how flimsy the evidence for that is regardless. A lot of this is common sense stuff.
I needed a short book to offset all these longer books I have been reading.
I needed a short book to offset all these longer books I have been reading.
June 25, 2024
I found this slim volume, in hardcover, for $6.50 at the Dickson Street Bookshop in my adopted hometown, Fayetteville, Arkansas. It's a great, reasonable, and mercifully brief rejoinder to the common claims that free will is an illusion. If you have any choice in the matter, give it a read.
October 12, 2017
Good rebuttal of flawed studies
Melee provides a good conscience survey of several scientific studies that claim to disprove the existence of free will while pointing out the fatal flaws in there logic in layman's terms.
Melee provides a good conscience survey of several scientific studies that claim to disprove the existence of free will while pointing out the fatal flaws in there logic in layman's terms.
June 2, 2019
Addresses the same scientific challenges to free will (from neuroscience and social psychology) as Mele’s Dialogue on Free Will and Science, but this is more streamlined.
Want to read
November 1, 2024The point he's trying to make is correct, the way he's getting there is not as proper
March 3, 2025
Interesting concept on free will and its existence.
January 19, 2022
This is a nice little book that looks at the arguments made against free will by scientists of various sorts over the past forty years. He apparently was one of Libet’s subjects in his tests. He points out how he was thinking about things while he waited to randomly hit the button. Good point.
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