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The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West
Here, for the first time in English, is an illuminating German perspective on the decisive blitzkrieg campaign. The account, written by the German historian Karl-Heinz Frieser and edited by American historian John T. Greenwood, provides the definitive explanation for Germany's startling success and the equally surprising military collapse of France and Britain on the European continent in 1940. In a little over a month, Germany defeated the Allies in battle, a task that had not been achieved in four years of brutal fighting during World War I.
First published in 1995 as the official German history of the 1940 campaign, this book goes beyond standard explanations to show that the German victory was not inevitable and that French defeat was not preordained. Contrary to most accounts of the campaign, Frieser's illustrates that the military systems of both Germany and France were solid and that their campaign plans were sound. The key to victory or defeat, Frieser argues, was the execution of operational plans--both preplanned and ad hoc--amid the eternal Clausewitzian combat factors of friction and the fog of war. He shows why, on the eve of the campaign, the British and French leaders had good cause to be confident and why many German generals were understandably concerned that disaster was looming for them.
This study explodes many of the myths concerning German blitzkrieg warfare and the planning for the 1940 campaign. Frieser's groundbreaking interpretation of the topic has been the subject of discussion since the German edition first appeared. This English translation is published in cooperation with the Association of the United States Army.
First published in 1995 as the official German history of the 1940 campaign, this book goes beyond standard explanations to show that the German victory was not inevitable and that French defeat was not preordained. Contrary to most accounts of the campaign, Frieser's illustrates that the military systems of both Germany and France were solid and that their campaign plans were sound. The key to victory or defeat, Frieser argues, was the execution of operational plans--both preplanned and ad hoc--amid the eternal Clausewitzian combat factors of friction and the fog of war. He shows why, on the eve of the campaign, the British and French leaders had good cause to be confident and why many German generals were understandably concerned that disaster was looming for them.
This study explodes many of the myths concerning German blitzkrieg warfare and the planning for the 1940 campaign. Frieser's groundbreaking interpretation of the topic has been the subject of discussion since the German edition first appeared. This English translation is published in cooperation with the Association of the United States Army.
536 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1996
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September 11, 2022
This is a good book if you are interested in a very detailed description of the Battle of France, 1940. Having been an Army officer, and served in an armored cavalry unit, I have always wondered how the Germans pulled this off - how did they defeat the French Army, which was equivalent in size, had more artillery and roughly equal numbers of tanks, in just six weeks? It is interesting to hear the answer from a German military historian, because it is rather different than what one hears from British or American historians.
Let me first get my quibbles out of the way. First, Herr Frieser overrates the French Air Force, in my opinion. The Armee de l'Air did not have a single fighter equivalent in quality to the ME-109 in 1940. The Dewoitine 520 which was a rough match for the 109, had not yet been delivered to the French Air Force in numbers, and no units equipped with the Dewoitine 520 were operational. Also, Churchill held back the greater part of RAF from supporting the French from French bases, and significantly, he held back the Spitfires, which were a match for the ME-109. So the Germans had air superiority until Dunkirk, when the RAF began flying in earnest in support of the British Army in the Dunkirk pocket. Second, Frieser goes out of his way to say how weak the Germans were relative to the French & British. While much of what he says is true, like citing the amount of armor of size of cannons on tanks, I think he somewhat overstates the case to make the Germans look even more impressive. But this is, as I said at the outset, a quibble, not a major flaw in the book.
The other small complaint I have is that the book is almost too detailed. But this is easily overcome by skimming the sections that deal with, for example, The Raid on Mouzaive, Or the Niwi Airlanding, and this fault is largely obviated by the placement of summaries at the end of most major sections of the book. And some of the detailed sections are interesting in how they reveal tactics and mindset of the German forces.
The Germans defeated the French and British by using massed panzer divisions to break through the Allied line at Sedan, and then by getting into the rear areas and sowing panic and destroying logistics and reserve forces that were parked / bivouac'd and not deployed for combat. Then they drove to the coast and would have destroyed the British Army at Dunkirk if not for Hitler's three day halt order.
So, the author's major points are the following:
- The breakout of the Germans through the French lines at Sedan almost did not happen. It was not really part of the high command's plan.
- In large part, it happened because panzer commanders, Guderian and Rommel, took the initiative, in some cases disobeying orders, attacked and kept moving, until they were stopped by Hitler's orders in front of Dunkirk.
- It also happened because the Allied air forces inexplicably ignored an opportunity to destroy German panzer divisions transiting the Ardennes.
- French and British battlefield communication via radio were horrible, while German use of radios was excellent (each tank had a radio), and their command and control skills had been honed by repeated training exercises.
- More generally, German leadership was energetic and bold. Among the Allies, the generals were simply too old for the jobs they had, and all of their thinking was circa 1918. They could not deal with the incredibly fast pace of German panzer operations. As a side note, General George Marshall understood the danger of having old generals in charge. One of his first acts as Chief of Staff of the US Army in 1939 was to force the retirement of over 200 older (or incompetent) colonels and generals, telling them bluntly that they were too old to lead regiments or divisions in the coming war of movement that he knew WW2 would be, unlike the trench warfare those old soldiers had experienced in WW1.
- German generals, Guderian and Rommel in particular, led their units from the front so they were able to make decisions on the spot, lead by example, and drive their units forward. This was a risky approach, because the key leaders were frequently under fire, but this courageous style inspired their soldiers while also allowing them to make rapid, on-the-spot decisions. Allied generals simply did not do this - the model was to be in the headquarters well to the rear of front-line units, as in WW1.
- Critically, the Germans understood the need to use panzer divisions, operating as separate attack forces, massed at key (Schwerpunkt) points. The Allies were still using WW1 tactics where tanks could not advance faster than the infantry. As an aside, the American TRADOC commander, General Leslie McNair was still dictating the teaching of the WW1 tactics at stateside training facilities until 1944 when Eisenhower (at Patton's urging) formally requested that Marshall direct McNair to update his training approach. And one could argue that the British never did adopt rapid massed armor tactics, as evidenced by their slowness during Operation Market Garden, and Montgomery's failure to take the eastern side of Antwerp harbor, which probably probably the war by several months.
The German approach to war was active, the Allied approach was passive defense.
One interesting anecdote I did not know was that Hitler was shocked when the UK and France declared war on him after his invasion of Poland. He sat with von Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister, looking paralyzed with fear, and kept asking Ribbentrop, in an accusatory tone, "What now?" But since there was no real action by the Allies against Germany for nine months following their declarations, the war declarations ultimately meant little to the outcome in 1940.
Part of the reason Guderian's river crossing at Sedan worked is that he had established an excellent working relationship with the commander of Luftwaffe forces in his sector, and the commander cooperated with Guderian in ignoring inappropriate orders from higher HQ, orders that would have changed the attack plan at the last minute to something much less bold. The Luftwaffe provided a "rolling barrage", bombing French positions across the river to substitute for the artillery that the Germans lacked. This was critical to demoralizing the French forces and allowing Guderian's forces to get across.
The author points out clearly how much Hitler's halt order at Dunkirk cost the Germans - the Germans could have literally destroyed or captured the greater part of the British Army with one final attack, but instead, the halt gave the British and French time to establish a defense in depth in front of the Dunkirk, and time for the British to organize the evacuation of 300,000 of their trained soldiers. The author points out that this was made possible by the bitter defense put up by the 80,000 French troops who stayed behind and ultimately became prisoners. Frieser calls Hitler's halt order the greatest mistake of WW2, and, in fact, it's hard to think of a bigger one. By the way, his feeling was that the order was given, not because of any sentimental feelings by Hitler about the Brits, but because Hitler was a) having another attack of nerves, and b) arguing with his generals. So incompetence was the primary factor, not warm feelings toward fellow Aryans or other such excuses.
Ultimately the French soldiers were failed by their leaders. The French generals were stuck in the past; in the 1930's they failed to modernize their tactics, their air force, and their communications ability, despite clear evidence of the path the German Army was taking in modernization, and 120,000 French soldiers paid the price in 1940 for the generals' willful blindness. Individual French units fought bravely, and French tankers were particularly feared by the Germans, but their actions were not coordinated by the generals quickly enough in such a way as to stop the Germans, which at many points would have been entirely possible. Only de Gaulle, commanding a tank division, made a really successful attack against the German flank after the breakout, but by then it was too little too late.
Two final points which were very perceptive observations by the author:
The failure to destroy the British Army meant that Britain stayed in the war, and that Hitler had a two front war to deal with after he attacked Russia, and it also meant that ultimately the US came to Britain's aid. This disaster for Germany could have been avoided, because despite Churchill's bold talk, there would have been no way for the British to stop the professional, highly-trained German army with only British reservists and territorials had the Germans mounted a cross channel attack in Summer 1940. Britain would have fallen like Poland and France. Instead, 40 German divisions were pinned down for four years in the west, waiting for the Allies to attack cross channel, and those divisions could have been used in Russia in 1941. As close as the Germans came to taking Moscow, it is hard to believe that an additional 40 divisions would not have turned the tide in front of Moscow.
The second point is that the German success in 1940 was like a drug to Hitler; this tactical success, largely the result of the unlikely smaller tactical success at Sedan, led Hitler to believe his Armies were invincible. He failed to grasp that strategically he had failed by not knocking Britain out of the war, and that ultimately, the industrial economies of the US and USSR would crank out enough weapons to crush him. If you read US history of the 1930's, it is hard to believe that the US would have tried to help a UK that had lost its Army, just as they did not try to help France in 1940. So in that scenario, the US would never have come into the war against Germany. But, of course, this is all speculation. Thank God Hitler made the mistakes he did.
If you are interested in this subject, Marc Bloch's book, Strange Defeat, gives perspective from the French side, and Shirer's The Fall of the Third Republic is also helpful. And there are many other military histories of 1940 by British and American writers, but I find Frieser's account better and more detailed from a military perspective than any of those, and more fair to all involved.
Let me first get my quibbles out of the way. First, Herr Frieser overrates the French Air Force, in my opinion. The Armee de l'Air did not have a single fighter equivalent in quality to the ME-109 in 1940. The Dewoitine 520 which was a rough match for the 109, had not yet been delivered to the French Air Force in numbers, and no units equipped with the Dewoitine 520 were operational. Also, Churchill held back the greater part of RAF from supporting the French from French bases, and significantly, he held back the Spitfires, which were a match for the ME-109. So the Germans had air superiority until Dunkirk, when the RAF began flying in earnest in support of the British Army in the Dunkirk pocket. Second, Frieser goes out of his way to say how weak the Germans were relative to the French & British. While much of what he says is true, like citing the amount of armor of size of cannons on tanks, I think he somewhat overstates the case to make the Germans look even more impressive. But this is, as I said at the outset, a quibble, not a major flaw in the book.
The other small complaint I have is that the book is almost too detailed. But this is easily overcome by skimming the sections that deal with, for example, The Raid on Mouzaive, Or the Niwi Airlanding, and this fault is largely obviated by the placement of summaries at the end of most major sections of the book. And some of the detailed sections are interesting in how they reveal tactics and mindset of the German forces.
The Germans defeated the French and British by using massed panzer divisions to break through the Allied line at Sedan, and then by getting into the rear areas and sowing panic and destroying logistics and reserve forces that were parked / bivouac'd and not deployed for combat. Then they drove to the coast and would have destroyed the British Army at Dunkirk if not for Hitler's three day halt order.
So, the author's major points are the following:
- The breakout of the Germans through the French lines at Sedan almost did not happen. It was not really part of the high command's plan.
- In large part, it happened because panzer commanders, Guderian and Rommel, took the initiative, in some cases disobeying orders, attacked and kept moving, until they were stopped by Hitler's orders in front of Dunkirk.
- It also happened because the Allied air forces inexplicably ignored an opportunity to destroy German panzer divisions transiting the Ardennes.
- French and British battlefield communication via radio were horrible, while German use of radios was excellent (each tank had a radio), and their command and control skills had been honed by repeated training exercises.
- More generally, German leadership was energetic and bold. Among the Allies, the generals were simply too old for the jobs they had, and all of their thinking was circa 1918. They could not deal with the incredibly fast pace of German panzer operations. As a side note, General George Marshall understood the danger of having old generals in charge. One of his first acts as Chief of Staff of the US Army in 1939 was to force the retirement of over 200 older (or incompetent) colonels and generals, telling them bluntly that they were too old to lead regiments or divisions in the coming war of movement that he knew WW2 would be, unlike the trench warfare those old soldiers had experienced in WW1.
- German generals, Guderian and Rommel in particular, led their units from the front so they were able to make decisions on the spot, lead by example, and drive their units forward. This was a risky approach, because the key leaders were frequently under fire, but this courageous style inspired their soldiers while also allowing them to make rapid, on-the-spot decisions. Allied generals simply did not do this - the model was to be in the headquarters well to the rear of front-line units, as in WW1.
- Critically, the Germans understood the need to use panzer divisions, operating as separate attack forces, massed at key (Schwerpunkt) points. The Allies were still using WW1 tactics where tanks could not advance faster than the infantry. As an aside, the American TRADOC commander, General Leslie McNair was still dictating the teaching of the WW1 tactics at stateside training facilities until 1944 when Eisenhower (at Patton's urging) formally requested that Marshall direct McNair to update his training approach. And one could argue that the British never did adopt rapid massed armor tactics, as evidenced by their slowness during Operation Market Garden, and Montgomery's failure to take the eastern side of Antwerp harbor, which probably probably the war by several months.
The German approach to war was active, the Allied approach was passive defense.
One interesting anecdote I did not know was that Hitler was shocked when the UK and France declared war on him after his invasion of Poland. He sat with von Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister, looking paralyzed with fear, and kept asking Ribbentrop, in an accusatory tone, "What now?" But since there was no real action by the Allies against Germany for nine months following their declarations, the war declarations ultimately meant little to the outcome in 1940.
Part of the reason Guderian's river crossing at Sedan worked is that he had established an excellent working relationship with the commander of Luftwaffe forces in his sector, and the commander cooperated with Guderian in ignoring inappropriate orders from higher HQ, orders that would have changed the attack plan at the last minute to something much less bold. The Luftwaffe provided a "rolling barrage", bombing French positions across the river to substitute for the artillery that the Germans lacked. This was critical to demoralizing the French forces and allowing Guderian's forces to get across.
The author points out clearly how much Hitler's halt order at Dunkirk cost the Germans - the Germans could have literally destroyed or captured the greater part of the British Army with one final attack, but instead, the halt gave the British and French time to establish a defense in depth in front of the Dunkirk, and time for the British to organize the evacuation of 300,000 of their trained soldiers. The author points out that this was made possible by the bitter defense put up by the 80,000 French troops who stayed behind and ultimately became prisoners. Frieser calls Hitler's halt order the greatest mistake of WW2, and, in fact, it's hard to think of a bigger one. By the way, his feeling was that the order was given, not because of any sentimental feelings by Hitler about the Brits, but because Hitler was a) having another attack of nerves, and b) arguing with his generals. So incompetence was the primary factor, not warm feelings toward fellow Aryans or other such excuses.
Ultimately the French soldiers were failed by their leaders. The French generals were stuck in the past; in the 1930's they failed to modernize their tactics, their air force, and their communications ability, despite clear evidence of the path the German Army was taking in modernization, and 120,000 French soldiers paid the price in 1940 for the generals' willful blindness. Individual French units fought bravely, and French tankers were particularly feared by the Germans, but their actions were not coordinated by the generals quickly enough in such a way as to stop the Germans, which at many points would have been entirely possible. Only de Gaulle, commanding a tank division, made a really successful attack against the German flank after the breakout, but by then it was too little too late.
Two final points which were very perceptive observations by the author:
The failure to destroy the British Army meant that Britain stayed in the war, and that Hitler had a two front war to deal with after he attacked Russia, and it also meant that ultimately the US came to Britain's aid. This disaster for Germany could have been avoided, because despite Churchill's bold talk, there would have been no way for the British to stop the professional, highly-trained German army with only British reservists and territorials had the Germans mounted a cross channel attack in Summer 1940. Britain would have fallen like Poland and France. Instead, 40 German divisions were pinned down for four years in the west, waiting for the Allies to attack cross channel, and those divisions could have been used in Russia in 1941. As close as the Germans came to taking Moscow, it is hard to believe that an additional 40 divisions would not have turned the tide in front of Moscow.
The second point is that the German success in 1940 was like a drug to Hitler; this tactical success, largely the result of the unlikely smaller tactical success at Sedan, led Hitler to believe his Armies were invincible. He failed to grasp that strategically he had failed by not knocking Britain out of the war, and that ultimately, the industrial economies of the US and USSR would crank out enough weapons to crush him. If you read US history of the 1930's, it is hard to believe that the US would have tried to help a UK that had lost its Army, just as they did not try to help France in 1940. So in that scenario, the US would never have come into the war against Germany. But, of course, this is all speculation. Thank God Hitler made the mistakes he did.
If you are interested in this subject, Marc Bloch's book, Strange Defeat, gives perspective from the French side, and Shirer's The Fall of the Third Republic is also helpful. And there are many other military histories of 1940 by British and American writers, but I find Frieser's account better and more detailed from a military perspective than any of those, and more fair to all involved.
April 25, 2018
"Hegel noted somewhere that all major events in world history happen twice. He forgot to add that they take place, the first time, as a tragedy, and the next time, as a farce."
When Wehrmacht triumphed quickly in the campaign against France (a widely acknowledged superior power in terms of industrial capacity and military strategy), the entire world, especially Hitler himself and his generals, was nonplussed. An explanation was then found: Germany has invented the revolutionary strategy of Blitzkrieg. What does the term mean other than surprise attack? How to actually implement it? Neither the victor or the vanquished had any idea. The Nazi propagandists soon adopted the notion of the Blitzkrieg as the magic weapon and declared: yes, we are the geniuses that invented Blitzkrieg which would help us defeat opponents way superior in the long term like France; and of course, in comparison with France, Soviet Union would definitely be easy picking.
This book does a great job debunking the myth of Blitzkrieg; there is a lot of military concepts that I don't get, and I cannot evaluate whether it is a valid account. Nonetheless, I do learn a lot from this book especially about how human psychology is too vulnerable to distinguish between reality and delusion even when the delusion is created by its own propaganda. There are a lot of such myths like Blitzkrieg which work surprisingly well the first time but the mechanisms behind which are not well understood: in contemporary American politics, there is Trumpism or Bernie-Sanders-fake-socialism or MeToo movement for example. Such myth is then quickly legendized, and people actually think it is a coherent, plausible formula that can be used over and over again.
First time is a tragedy, second time is a farce, and hopefully there won't be a third time.
When Wehrmacht triumphed quickly in the campaign against France (a widely acknowledged superior power in terms of industrial capacity and military strategy), the entire world, especially Hitler himself and his generals, was nonplussed. An explanation was then found: Germany has invented the revolutionary strategy of Blitzkrieg. What does the term mean other than surprise attack? How to actually implement it? Neither the victor or the vanquished had any idea. The Nazi propagandists soon adopted the notion of the Blitzkrieg as the magic weapon and declared: yes, we are the geniuses that invented Blitzkrieg which would help us defeat opponents way superior in the long term like France; and of course, in comparison with France, Soviet Union would definitely be easy picking.
This book does a great job debunking the myth of Blitzkrieg; there is a lot of military concepts that I don't get, and I cannot evaluate whether it is a valid account. Nonetheless, I do learn a lot from this book especially about how human psychology is too vulnerable to distinguish between reality and delusion even when the delusion is created by its own propaganda. There are a lot of such myths like Blitzkrieg which work surprisingly well the first time but the mechanisms behind which are not well understood: in contemporary American politics, there is Trumpism or Bernie-Sanders-fake-socialism or MeToo movement for example. Such myth is then quickly legendized, and people actually think it is a coherent, plausible formula that can be used over and over again.
First time is a tragedy, second time is a farce, and hopefully there won't be a third time.
December 26, 2014
As part of the planning for the megagame War in the West I bought myself a copy of Blitzkrieg Legend because it is the German Army’s official history (although it didn't get written until the 1990s).
From reading the first couple of chapters and looking through the maps you can see the evolution of the German plan. You can see why the directive was written the way that it was in October 1939.
The most interesting thing for me is that there is no concept of a lightning war, the general staffs & high command all believe that the start of the world war was a gross mistake and spells certain doom for Germany as being too soon to be winnable. the strong belief is that the strength of the economy is what wins wars, not surprise attacks (and for my money they were right).
After the planning phase there is a fairly detailed examination of the attacks themselves. What becomes clear is how lucky the Germans were, although some of this is down to the way that the 100,000 man army has trained its troops, and this training continues into the expanded army. It is human factors rather than technology that makes the blitzkreig work. The Germans were exceedingly lucky, when they infiltrate forward and put small parties over rivers and obstacle the enemy retires rather than counter-attacks.
I would certainly recommend this book strongly to anyone who has an interest in WW2, and particularly the Fall of France in 1940.
From reading the first couple of chapters and looking through the maps you can see the evolution of the German plan. You can see why the directive was written the way that it was in October 1939.
The most interesting thing for me is that there is no concept of a lightning war, the general staffs & high command all believe that the start of the world war was a gross mistake and spells certain doom for Germany as being too soon to be winnable. the strong belief is that the strength of the economy is what wins wars, not surprise attacks (and for my money they were right).
After the planning phase there is a fairly detailed examination of the attacks themselves. What becomes clear is how lucky the Germans were, although some of this is down to the way that the 100,000 man army has trained its troops, and this training continues into the expanded army. It is human factors rather than technology that makes the blitzkreig work. The Germans were exceedingly lucky, when they infiltrate forward and put small parties over rivers and obstacle the enemy retires rather than counter-attacks.
I would certainly recommend this book strongly to anyone who has an interest in WW2, and particularly the Fall of France in 1940.
October 17, 2014
This book was excellent. For those interested in the study of warfare, it is essential. Unfortunately, I am unable to find his other book, "German Military Operations on the Eastern Front, 1943-44." I think that this book would serve as a fascinating comparison in the application of maneuver warfare when the enemy has its back to a coast versus the vastness of the Russian state.
"Blitzkrieg Legend" illuminates several myths about Germany's 1940 campaign in France. First, that the French were subpar soldiers and/or the Germans were superior soldiers; second, that the Germans overwhelmed the Allies with numerical superiority; third, that the German General Staff was aware of, had been indoctrinated into, and agreed upon a strategy of "Blitzkrieg;" fourth, that Germany had a political and popular will for the invasion of France; fifth, the "miracle" at Dunkirk was no miracle at all. In each case the author dismantles these myths with fact. The sum of this illumination is that the German Army's success was due to decentralized control of the execution of a brilliant operational plan which (at the time) was viewed as risky and potentially disastrous.
There were two things that bothered me about the book. First, it is interesting that the book was written by a German Army colonel - throughout the book he seems to be defending the German Army and underscoring Hitler's madness. However, recognizing this bias early did not change my reading of the text or undermine his analysis.
Second, Col Frieser consistently mentions that the "nature" of warfare has changed, but I think that he simply is using the wrong word as he then describes "characteristics" of warfare and discusses almost nothing above the operational level of war.
"Blitzkrieg Legend" illuminates several myths about Germany's 1940 campaign in France. First, that the French were subpar soldiers and/or the Germans were superior soldiers; second, that the Germans overwhelmed the Allies with numerical superiority; third, that the German General Staff was aware of, had been indoctrinated into, and agreed upon a strategy of "Blitzkrieg;" fourth, that Germany had a political and popular will for the invasion of France; fifth, the "miracle" at Dunkirk was no miracle at all. In each case the author dismantles these myths with fact. The sum of this illumination is that the German Army's success was due to decentralized control of the execution of a brilliant operational plan which (at the time) was viewed as risky and potentially disastrous.
There were two things that bothered me about the book. First, it is interesting that the book was written by a German Army colonel - throughout the book he seems to be defending the German Army and underscoring Hitler's madness. However, recognizing this bias early did not change my reading of the text or undermine his analysis.
Second, Col Frieser consistently mentions that the "nature" of warfare has changed, but I think that he simply is using the wrong word as he then describes "characteristics" of warfare and discusses almost nothing above the operational level of war.
May 14, 2016
This volume, part of the German official history of the Second World War, must stand as a classic example of the General Staff tradition of history. Frieser demonstrates the typical German focus on essentials - the aspects of the campaign in Belgium and the Netherlands, and then after the Dunkirk evacuation, are treated almost in passing, as the key element of the campaign was the development of the operational plan and the thrust by the panzer forces through Sedan and to the sea.
This is no triumphalist account (not that one would expect such a thing from a modern German). Frieser focuses as much of his attention on demonstrating that the campaign led to the development of the concept of Blitzkrieg, rather than being an expression of it, and that the concept was fundamentally flawed. He is also merciless in revealing the many and frequent errors made by the German forces.
What makes the book so powerful, however, is its concentration on the element of command, which Frieser continually demonstrates was the critical factor in the outcome of the campaign. Despite their inferior numbers and equipment, the German commanders were able to draw upon an approach to command that was based on low level initiative, rapid decision making, a complete focus on the critical point, and boldness in seizing fleeting opportunities as they arose. By contrast, the French commanders sought to maintain an even linear posture, with all details controlled by the most senior officers, placed far behind the front line. Frieser brings out the impact of their passive reliance on following outdated orders, coupled with a terror of being outflanked.
In short, this should be the starting point for anyone wanting to understand why the 1940 campaign turned out as it did, as well as readers looking for an example of military history writing at its very best.
This is no triumphalist account (not that one would expect such a thing from a modern German). Frieser focuses as much of his attention on demonstrating that the campaign led to the development of the concept of Blitzkrieg, rather than being an expression of it, and that the concept was fundamentally flawed. He is also merciless in revealing the many and frequent errors made by the German forces.
What makes the book so powerful, however, is its concentration on the element of command, which Frieser continually demonstrates was the critical factor in the outcome of the campaign. Despite their inferior numbers and equipment, the German commanders were able to draw upon an approach to command that was based on low level initiative, rapid decision making, a complete focus on the critical point, and boldness in seizing fleeting opportunities as they arose. By contrast, the French commanders sought to maintain an even linear posture, with all details controlled by the most senior officers, placed far behind the front line. Frieser brings out the impact of their passive reliance on following outdated orders, coupled with a terror of being outflanked.
In short, this should be the starting point for anyone wanting to understand why the 1940 campaign turned out as it did, as well as readers looking for an example of military history writing at its very best.
September 11, 2022
An insightful and detailed analysis of Germany’s campaign against France in May 1940 and the French defeat. I read the Kindle edition, which unfortunately delays many of the maps into some sort of appendix to chapters. But Frieser’s descriptions of the battle of movement are lucid and well structured, so that the reader can follow events in a chaotic battle. An impressive achievement.
There are a few flaws. The English translation from German is imperfect, often by being rather too literal when similar words in the two languages have different meanings. Some of the sources consulted by Frieser, especially on the subject of the combat in the air, are outdated.
The striking feature of Frieser’s account is that under the stress of battle and the unexpected speed of events, the command structures of both opponents started to fail. But German command failures were largely overcome because the initiative rested with local commanders to flexibly adapt. French command failures were irretrievable because officers were trained to wait for written orders and those failed to come in time to be implemented. Geometrically, the French expectation of fighting in a linear formation implied that their leadership was in a central spot in the rear, roughly equidistant from all their units, but thus that distance was long. German expectation of fighting in a compact penetrating wedge implied that command distances were short for officers travelling with the advancing group. Those, and a greater willIngness to use radio, was decisive differences.
This book sweeps away many of the wrong assumptions that have characterised the popular view of May 1940. Still I would argue that Frieser’s account is not entirely groundbreaking. It’s outline is much the same as the brief history of the same battle given by Raymond Cartier in 1965 in his two-volume history of WWII. What makes it different and highly valuable is the great amount of detail that Frieser uncovered, and the clarity of his analysis.
There are a few flaws. The English translation from German is imperfect, often by being rather too literal when similar words in the two languages have different meanings. Some of the sources consulted by Frieser, especially on the subject of the combat in the air, are outdated.
The striking feature of Frieser’s account is that under the stress of battle and the unexpected speed of events, the command structures of both opponents started to fail. But German command failures were largely overcome because the initiative rested with local commanders to flexibly adapt. French command failures were irretrievable because officers were trained to wait for written orders and those failed to come in time to be implemented. Geometrically, the French expectation of fighting in a linear formation implied that their leadership was in a central spot in the rear, roughly equidistant from all their units, but thus that distance was long. German expectation of fighting in a compact penetrating wedge implied that command distances were short for officers travelling with the advancing group. Those, and a greater willIngness to use radio, was decisive differences.
This book sweeps away many of the wrong assumptions that have characterised the popular view of May 1940. Still I would argue that Frieser’s account is not entirely groundbreaking. It’s outline is much the same as the brief history of the same battle given by Raymond Cartier in 1965 in his two-volume history of WWII. What makes it different and highly valuable is the great amount of detail that Frieser uncovered, and the clarity of his analysis.
March 5, 2024
“The Art of warfare can be boiled down to a single principle: concentrate a greater mass than the enemy at one single point.”
Key reasons contributing to breakthrough on the western front:
-Allies World War I mindset of positional warfare & defense v. Operational war of Movement (Sickle Cut Plan, encirclement - replicated “Battle of Cannae”)
-Initiative/decentralized command on the Axis side: “order what is to be done, but not how to do it”
- Combined Arms (Air Force & Armor: force multiplier
- leveraged new radio technology, allowing quick communication and ability to pivot in a moments notice
1940 campaign in the west was an unplanned but successful blitzkrieg, whereas the 1941 campaign in the east was a planned blitzkrieg but unsuccessful.
Key reasons contributing to breakthrough on the western front:
-Allies World War I mindset of positional warfare & defense v. Operational war of Movement (Sickle Cut Plan, encirclement - replicated “Battle of Cannae”)
-Initiative/decentralized command on the Axis side: “order what is to be done, but not how to do it”
- Combined Arms (Air Force & Armor: force multiplier
- leveraged new radio technology, allowing quick communication and ability to pivot in a moments notice
1940 campaign in the west was an unplanned but successful blitzkrieg, whereas the 1941 campaign in the east was a planned blitzkrieg but unsuccessful.
June 24, 2024
This book is also explaining tactics through lens of WWI
One of the biggest mistakes of that century. The French broke into the cauldron planned by Schlieffen, but the Germans decisively repelled their opponents from there, who were determinedly throwing themselves into the abyss. Joffrey's offensive collapsed after just a few kilometers, and his troops were pushed back beyond the border fortifications. In this way, the implementation of the Schlieffen Plan in 1914 became the persiflage of the Battle of Cannae, with the right wing apparently not knowing what the left wing was doing. Schlieffen's successor, Helmuth v. Moltke, reduced the power ratio between the two wings from 7:1 to 3:1.
In fact, the mistake was not to weaken the right wing, but to strengthen the left. For this reason, the French forces were unable to penetrate Lorraine, despite Schlieffen's tactics. The spontaneous counterattack of the Bavarian heir to the throne was planned in the diametrically opposite direction to that intended. Schlieffen's tactics degenerated into absurdity. Well, the Bavarians on the left wing did not want to voluntarily withdraw while the Prussians were winning on the right wing. And there are also ideological considerations: "If the French cross the Rhine, we will resist them in the Black Forest." And the imperial patriotic districts did not want to give up the land to the Alsatians and Lorraines. The equivalent of the Schlieffen plan was the so-called XVII plan of the French general staff of General Joffre. This plan was characterized by a mystical belief in the offensive. General Joffre almost followed in the footsteps of the Roman leader Terence Varro, because he planned to launch an offensive into the middle of a trap.
On April 15, 1914, Plan XVII came into force. This is a document prepared under the supervision of the Chief of Staff, General Joffre. It organizes the procedure for mobilization and concentration of troops at the front in the event of war with Germany in the smallest detail.
Schlieffen's plan was that instead of a "frontal" engagement, which would lead to a trench war of incalculable length, the enemy should be surrounded and his armies attacked from the flanks and rear. The command was completely blinded by encircling the enemy as if with a sickle.
In 1940, the dictator seemed haunted by the vision of returning from the entertainment, the "Miracle on the Marne", which in September 1914 led to the collapse of the Schlieffen Plan. Then the German army, operating on the right wing, approached Paris, crossing the Marne. Seeing the Eiffel Tower rising in the distance, the German troops thought they had victory at their fingertips. Then there was an unexpected French counterattack on the exposed flank.
The Battle of the Marne, also known as the "Miracle of the Marne", ended the German plan for a blitz; it was considered the 17th breakthrough battle in the history of the world. Another bloody battle on the Western Front was the fighting at Ypres in Flanders, as part of the so-called race to the sea – completed in November 1914
General Gallieni commandeered 1,200 taxis and transported 6,000 soldiers from the Paris garrison. Losses in the French army: 21,000 killed, 30,000 wounded and 4,000 missing. In the German army: 43,000 killed, 173,000 wounded and 40,000 missing.
Gallieni from 1891 was the commander of the expeditionary forces in Vietnam (so-called French Indochina), where he crushed the uprising of the local population. In the years 1896–1905 he served as Governor-General of Madagascar, where he led the pacification of the uprising of the largest Malagasy tribe.
On August 26, 1914, Messimy appointed General Gallieni military governor of Paris and commandant of the fortress, subordinating him directly to the government, bypassing the commander-in-chief. At the same time, he demanded that the commander-in-chief allocate three corps to defend Paris.
---
Pierre Laval, French lawyer and left-wing politician, four-time Prime Minister of France. Disgraced by his collaboration with the Germans during World War II, he was sentenced to death. Pierre Laval was arrested on December 13, 1940. The Germans demanded his release and in 1942 imposed it on Marshal Pétain as head of government. Pierre Laval increased cooperation to meet German demands and established "relève" (sending handicrafts in Germany).
On July 4, 1942, Pierre Laval proposed the deportation of Jewish children under 16 years of age. In France, the German implementation of the Final Solution, to which the French administration is submitting, will cost the lives of almost 11,000 children.
On January 20, 1942, about fifteen Nazi dignitaries and SS officers met in a villa in the exclusive suburbs of the German capital. They planned to deport Jews from Western Europe to extermination camps located in Poland. At the age of 20, he joined the Socialist Party, in 1909 he became a lawyer in Paris and began to defend trade unionists and other representatives of the political left. He held various public offices starting in 1914 and became Prime Minister for the first time in 1931. Defeated a year later, Laval was re-elected in 1935, but his cabinet collapsed in 1936. Laval wanted to build lasting peace in Europe and create anti-German coalition. In order to stop the expansion of Nazi Germany, he unsuccessfully sought to improve relations with Benito Mussolini's neighboring fascist Italy.
On July 25, King Victor Emmanuel and Marshal Pietro Badoglio conspired in Rome to arrest Mussolini. On July 25, 1943, the party organ, the Grand Fascist Council, and the King of Italy deprived Benito Mussolini of power and arrested him. The consequence of this was the capitulation of Italy to the Western Allies. The troops of the Third Reich entered the country and began the occupation of Italy. Pietro Badoglio As an artillery lieutenant, he took part in the colonial wars: the Ethiopian campaign, where he fought, among others, near Adua (1896) and in the Libyan campaign against Turkey in 1911–1912.
---
On May 15, 1940, the 3rd Spahis Brigade resisted the German armored vehicles of the 1st Armored Division for 10 hours. The survivors were grouped into squadrons and took part in the fighting until the armistice. The inscription on the monument: "In honor of the Spahi who died on the field of honor.
Retired General Balck later wrote about the battles that the 1st Rifle Regiment had to fight at La Horgne.
"In both wars I fought with different opponents and was always in the center of the fighting. Rarely has anyone fought so bravely as the 3rd Spahis Brigade. Its commander, Colonel Maré, was wounded and taken prisoner. Of the 27 officers of this brigade, 12 were killed and 7 remained wounded. Together with them, 610 spahis were killed or wounded. This brigade ceased to exist. It sacrificed itself for France. I ordered (the general writes) special treatment of these prisoners."
In the afternoon, the village fell to the Germans, but it delayed their advance and caused more losses to the regiment than on any other day of the campaign.
The Germans of the 1st Armored Division lost 31 killed and 102 wounded in capturing La Horgne, a small village in the Ardennes, located despite itself on the main axis of the German operational effort, General Guderian's Schwerpunkt.
Spahis were light cavalry regiments of the French army, recruited from the Arab and Amazigh populations of French colonies in North Africa, including Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco.
Balck gained recognition as a commander during World War II. He started the war as a lieutenant colonel, commander of a rifle regiment. At the end of the war, he was promoted to the rank of general der panzertruppe (lieutenant general), commander of a German army group.
---
Rundstedt was the commander of group A, at the end of the campaign in France the command transferred the entire armored group A to group B, which meant that Rundstedt effectively lost his command at the very end of the campaign.
Rundstedt was considered the best commander, but he delayed further actions, which caused the miracle at Dunkirk and gave the English a chance to return to the country.
By the way, the weather was also wonderful for Britain, it was overcast during the planned bombing raids, and during the evacuation from Dunkirk, it was perfectly calm.
Historian Marc Bloch presented an unequivocal criticism of pacifism. As a reserve officer, he witnessed the complete incompetence of the military command and blamed him for the unimaginable disaster. In his book titled L'Étrange Défaite (The Strange Defeat), he accused the French generals of being incapable of thinking in terms of war. According to him, it has lost contact with reality and isolating itself from the realities of modern war.
Socialist, communist workers in arms factories sabotaged production, how? The planes exploded suddenly, why? Workers cut cables and fuel dripped onto hot engines, causing explosions. In other cases, tanks broke down after traveling a few kilometers, why? Workers were putting screws into the engines.
Marc Bloch French medieval historian, editor and resistance leader, known for his innovative work in social and economic history.
On June 16, 1944, the Gestapo shot thirty resistance fighters, including Marc Bloch, Lucien Bonnet and Hector Isabella. They were taken in the middle of the night from the prison in Lyon to a nearby field in the town of Les Roussilles, where they were to be shot. Tortured in the military health school, interned in the prison in Montluc, Marc Bloch was shot on June 16, 1944, along with 29 other fighters of the movement resistance in Saint-Didier-de-Formans.
After World War II, Bloch's legacy was particularly important to historians working under repressive regimes in Eastern Europe and the non-Western world, where he became a model of a courageous citizen who transcended intellectual and national boundaries.
Bloch believed that political history alone could not explain deeper socioeconomic trends and influences. Bloch did not perceive social history as a separate field of historical research. Rather, he believed that all aspects of history were part and parcel of social history.
Bloch worked in Montpellier until November 1942, when Germany invaded Vichy France. He then joined the non-communist section of the French Resistance and played a leading role in its united regional structures in Lyon.
It was alright to read but I did not liked cold numbers that sometimes was the only narrative.
One of the biggest mistakes of that century. The French broke into the cauldron planned by Schlieffen, but the Germans decisively repelled their opponents from there, who were determinedly throwing themselves into the abyss. Joffrey's offensive collapsed after just a few kilometers, and his troops were pushed back beyond the border fortifications. In this way, the implementation of the Schlieffen Plan in 1914 became the persiflage of the Battle of Cannae, with the right wing apparently not knowing what the left wing was doing. Schlieffen's successor, Helmuth v. Moltke, reduced the power ratio between the two wings from 7:1 to 3:1.
In fact, the mistake was not to weaken the right wing, but to strengthen the left. For this reason, the French forces were unable to penetrate Lorraine, despite Schlieffen's tactics. The spontaneous counterattack of the Bavarian heir to the throne was planned in the diametrically opposite direction to that intended. Schlieffen's tactics degenerated into absurdity. Well, the Bavarians on the left wing did not want to voluntarily withdraw while the Prussians were winning on the right wing. And there are also ideological considerations: "If the French cross the Rhine, we will resist them in the Black Forest." And the imperial patriotic districts did not want to give up the land to the Alsatians and Lorraines. The equivalent of the Schlieffen plan was the so-called XVII plan of the French general staff of General Joffre. This plan was characterized by a mystical belief in the offensive. General Joffre almost followed in the footsteps of the Roman leader Terence Varro, because he planned to launch an offensive into the middle of a trap.
On April 15, 1914, Plan XVII came into force. This is a document prepared under the supervision of the Chief of Staff, General Joffre. It organizes the procedure for mobilization and concentration of troops at the front in the event of war with Germany in the smallest detail.
Schlieffen's plan was that instead of a "frontal" engagement, which would lead to a trench war of incalculable length, the enemy should be surrounded and his armies attacked from the flanks and rear. The command was completely blinded by encircling the enemy as if with a sickle.
In 1940, the dictator seemed haunted by the vision of returning from the entertainment, the "Miracle on the Marne", which in September 1914 led to the collapse of the Schlieffen Plan. Then the German army, operating on the right wing, approached Paris, crossing the Marne. Seeing the Eiffel Tower rising in the distance, the German troops thought they had victory at their fingertips. Then there was an unexpected French counterattack on the exposed flank.
The Battle of the Marne, also known as the "Miracle of the Marne", ended the German plan for a blitz; it was considered the 17th breakthrough battle in the history of the world. Another bloody battle on the Western Front was the fighting at Ypres in Flanders, as part of the so-called race to the sea – completed in November 1914
General Gallieni commandeered 1,200 taxis and transported 6,000 soldiers from the Paris garrison. Losses in the French army: 21,000 killed, 30,000 wounded and 4,000 missing. In the German army: 43,000 killed, 173,000 wounded and 40,000 missing.
Gallieni from 1891 was the commander of the expeditionary forces in Vietnam (so-called French Indochina), where he crushed the uprising of the local population. In the years 1896–1905 he served as Governor-General of Madagascar, where he led the pacification of the uprising of the largest Malagasy tribe.
On August 26, 1914, Messimy appointed General Gallieni military governor of Paris and commandant of the fortress, subordinating him directly to the government, bypassing the commander-in-chief. At the same time, he demanded that the commander-in-chief allocate three corps to defend Paris.
---
Pierre Laval, French lawyer and left-wing politician, four-time Prime Minister of France. Disgraced by his collaboration with the Germans during World War II, he was sentenced to death. Pierre Laval was arrested on December 13, 1940. The Germans demanded his release and in 1942 imposed it on Marshal Pétain as head of government. Pierre Laval increased cooperation to meet German demands and established "relève" (sending handicrafts in Germany).
On July 4, 1942, Pierre Laval proposed the deportation of Jewish children under 16 years of age. In France, the German implementation of the Final Solution, to which the French administration is submitting, will cost the lives of almost 11,000 children.
On January 20, 1942, about fifteen Nazi dignitaries and SS officers met in a villa in the exclusive suburbs of the German capital. They planned to deport Jews from Western Europe to extermination camps located in Poland. At the age of 20, he joined the Socialist Party, in 1909 he became a lawyer in Paris and began to defend trade unionists and other representatives of the political left. He held various public offices starting in 1914 and became Prime Minister for the first time in 1931. Defeated a year later, Laval was re-elected in 1935, but his cabinet collapsed in 1936. Laval wanted to build lasting peace in Europe and create anti-German coalition. In order to stop the expansion of Nazi Germany, he unsuccessfully sought to improve relations with Benito Mussolini's neighboring fascist Italy.
On July 25, King Victor Emmanuel and Marshal Pietro Badoglio conspired in Rome to arrest Mussolini. On July 25, 1943, the party organ, the Grand Fascist Council, and the King of Italy deprived Benito Mussolini of power and arrested him. The consequence of this was the capitulation of Italy to the Western Allies. The troops of the Third Reich entered the country and began the occupation of Italy. Pietro Badoglio As an artillery lieutenant, he took part in the colonial wars: the Ethiopian campaign, where he fought, among others, near Adua (1896) and in the Libyan campaign against Turkey in 1911–1912.
---
On May 15, 1940, the 3rd Spahis Brigade resisted the German armored vehicles of the 1st Armored Division for 10 hours. The survivors were grouped into squadrons and took part in the fighting until the armistice. The inscription on the monument: "In honor of the Spahi who died on the field of honor.
Retired General Balck later wrote about the battles that the 1st Rifle Regiment had to fight at La Horgne.
"In both wars I fought with different opponents and was always in the center of the fighting. Rarely has anyone fought so bravely as the 3rd Spahis Brigade. Its commander, Colonel Maré, was wounded and taken prisoner. Of the 27 officers of this brigade, 12 were killed and 7 remained wounded. Together with them, 610 spahis were killed or wounded. This brigade ceased to exist. It sacrificed itself for France. I ordered (the general writes) special treatment of these prisoners."
In the afternoon, the village fell to the Germans, but it delayed their advance and caused more losses to the regiment than on any other day of the campaign.
The Germans of the 1st Armored Division lost 31 killed and 102 wounded in capturing La Horgne, a small village in the Ardennes, located despite itself on the main axis of the German operational effort, General Guderian's Schwerpunkt.
Spahis were light cavalry regiments of the French army, recruited from the Arab and Amazigh populations of French colonies in North Africa, including Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco.
Balck gained recognition as a commander during World War II. He started the war as a lieutenant colonel, commander of a rifle regiment. At the end of the war, he was promoted to the rank of general der panzertruppe (lieutenant general), commander of a German army group.
---
Rundstedt was the commander of group A, at the end of the campaign in France the command transferred the entire armored group A to group B, which meant that Rundstedt effectively lost his command at the very end of the campaign.
Rundstedt was considered the best commander, but he delayed further actions, which caused the miracle at Dunkirk and gave the English a chance to return to the country.
By the way, the weather was also wonderful for Britain, it was overcast during the planned bombing raids, and during the evacuation from Dunkirk, it was perfectly calm.
Historian Marc Bloch presented an unequivocal criticism of pacifism. As a reserve officer, he witnessed the complete incompetence of the military command and blamed him for the unimaginable disaster. In his book titled L'Étrange Défaite (The Strange Defeat), he accused the French generals of being incapable of thinking in terms of war. According to him, it has lost contact with reality and isolating itself from the realities of modern war.
Socialist, communist workers in arms factories sabotaged production, how? The planes exploded suddenly, why? Workers cut cables and fuel dripped onto hot engines, causing explosions. In other cases, tanks broke down after traveling a few kilometers, why? Workers were putting screws into the engines.
Marc Bloch French medieval historian, editor and resistance leader, known for his innovative work in social and economic history.
On June 16, 1944, the Gestapo shot thirty resistance fighters, including Marc Bloch, Lucien Bonnet and Hector Isabella. They were taken in the middle of the night from the prison in Lyon to a nearby field in the town of Les Roussilles, where they were to be shot. Tortured in the military health school, interned in the prison in Montluc, Marc Bloch was shot on June 16, 1944, along with 29 other fighters of the movement resistance in Saint-Didier-de-Formans.
After World War II, Bloch's legacy was particularly important to historians working under repressive regimes in Eastern Europe and the non-Western world, where he became a model of a courageous citizen who transcended intellectual and national boundaries.
Bloch believed that political history alone could not explain deeper socioeconomic trends and influences. Bloch did not perceive social history as a separate field of historical research. Rather, he believed that all aspects of history were part and parcel of social history.
Bloch worked in Montpellier until November 1942, when Germany invaded Vichy France. He then joined the non-communist section of the French Resistance and played a leading role in its united regional structures in Lyon.
It was alright to read but I did not liked cold numbers that sometimes was the only narrative.
August 27, 2016
Un livre d'histoire analytique et détaillé qui se lit comme un roman. Les deux premiers chapitres évaluent finement les armées en présence en 1939 puis en 1940, le rapport de force et les plans d'Hitler.
La thèse défendue par l'auteur est évidente dès la lecture du titre et chaque étape de l'argumentation est parfaitement structurée, faisant monter une forme de suspense parfaitement amené : comment les alliés ont bien pu perdre cette fameuse campagne de l'ouest en 1940 ? Tous les aspects sont étudiés comme par exemple la production industrielle de chars et d'avions dans chaque camp ou les documents historiques montrant que Hitler lui-même, en 1939, ne souhaitait pas engager l'offensive sous la forme d'un "blitzkrieg".
Il étudie ensuite les différents plans de déploiement envisagés par Hitler, le fameux "coup de faucille" et les erreurs de jugement de chaque camp.
Les nombreuses analogies avec le plan Schlieffen et la bataille de Cannes sont extrêmement claires, et m'ont même permis de mieux comprendre le plan Schlieffen que certains ouvrages dédiés à la première guerre mondiale.
Le rôle de chaque général allemand, conservateur ou audacieux est détaillé pour permettre de comprendre qui a fini par convaincre Hitler de prendre tous les risques.
Le déroulé chronologique des opérations est limpide, chaque chapitre correspondant à une phase décisive jusqu'à la prise de Dunkerque.
Quelques exemples détaillés d'offensives illustrent le propos, accompagnés de cartes, démontrant à chaque fois les raisons fondamentales pour lesquelles l'armée allemande était supérieure aux alliés (prise de décision très rapide, gestion des blindés, utilisation de la radio, capacité d'adaptation des armées et autonomie à tous les niveaux, coordination, logistique millimètrée etc.).
Les erreurs critiques d'Hitler, en particulier le fameux coup d'arrêt de Dunkerque, sont finement analysées et on ne perd jamais de vue, tout au long de l'ouvrage, le schéma général de la campagne de l'ouest.
Un livre qui se lit très facilement, d'une grande clarté, jamais confus, argumenté, et même parfois mieux structuré que certains classiques de la littérature sur la seconde guerre mondiale.
Tout juste pourrait-on éventuellement reprocher le fait que certaines cartes sont ultra-détaillées alors qu'on ne retrouve pas autant de détails dans le texte, ce qui noie parfois un peu le lecteur qui étudie la carte attentivement (alors qu'un schéma plus général suffirait pour coller au texte).
J'ai aussi regretté qu'il n'y ait pas un petit peu plus d'anecdotes ou de retranscriptions de dialogues pour donner de l'épaisseur aux personnages principaux (Guderian, Gamelin, von Runstedt, Halder...), même s'il y en a quand même déjà pas mal.
Au global un excellent livre !
La thèse défendue par l'auteur est évidente dès la lecture du titre et chaque étape de l'argumentation est parfaitement structurée, faisant monter une forme de suspense parfaitement amené : comment les alliés ont bien pu perdre cette fameuse campagne de l'ouest en 1940 ? Tous les aspects sont étudiés comme par exemple la production industrielle de chars et d'avions dans chaque camp ou les documents historiques montrant que Hitler lui-même, en 1939, ne souhaitait pas engager l'offensive sous la forme d'un "blitzkrieg".
Il étudie ensuite les différents plans de déploiement envisagés par Hitler, le fameux "coup de faucille" et les erreurs de jugement de chaque camp.
Les nombreuses analogies avec le plan Schlieffen et la bataille de Cannes sont extrêmement claires, et m'ont même permis de mieux comprendre le plan Schlieffen que certains ouvrages dédiés à la première guerre mondiale.
Le rôle de chaque général allemand, conservateur ou audacieux est détaillé pour permettre de comprendre qui a fini par convaincre Hitler de prendre tous les risques.
Le déroulé chronologique des opérations est limpide, chaque chapitre correspondant à une phase décisive jusqu'à la prise de Dunkerque.
Quelques exemples détaillés d'offensives illustrent le propos, accompagnés de cartes, démontrant à chaque fois les raisons fondamentales pour lesquelles l'armée allemande était supérieure aux alliés (prise de décision très rapide, gestion des blindés, utilisation de la radio, capacité d'adaptation des armées et autonomie à tous les niveaux, coordination, logistique millimètrée etc.).
Les erreurs critiques d'Hitler, en particulier le fameux coup d'arrêt de Dunkerque, sont finement analysées et on ne perd jamais de vue, tout au long de l'ouvrage, le schéma général de la campagne de l'ouest.
Un livre qui se lit très facilement, d'une grande clarté, jamais confus, argumenté, et même parfois mieux structuré que certains classiques de la littérature sur la seconde guerre mondiale.
Tout juste pourrait-on éventuellement reprocher le fait que certaines cartes sont ultra-détaillées alors qu'on ne retrouve pas autant de détails dans le texte, ce qui noie parfois un peu le lecteur qui étudie la carte attentivement (alors qu'un schéma plus général suffirait pour coller au texte).
J'ai aussi regretté qu'il n'y ait pas un petit peu plus d'anecdotes ou de retranscriptions de dialogues pour donner de l'épaisseur aux personnages principaux (Guderian, Gamelin, von Runstedt, Halder...), même s'il y en a quand même déjà pas mal.
Au global un excellent livre !
August 28, 2019
I am being distracted now by reading Frieser's The Blitzkrieg Legend about the German attack on France in 1940. This in preparation for the War in the West megagame in May. Although not on topic, it is interesting to see WWI influencing German (and French) decision making a generation later. Friesser makes a direct comparison of the two German war plans, saying that they both required co-operation of the enemy to succeed. And while the French both cases dutifully stuck their heads in the trap, the Schlieffen plan failed because the German troops on the 'weak' flank (Alsace-Lorraine) threw back the French attacks. This made it easier for the French to effect the strategic redistribution of troops to the threatened area around Paris, once they spotted the danger. Also the French and German strategic planners planned for a long war in 1940, trusting that strategic breakthrough was impossible. Therefore, the French airforce held back many airplanes for later use and the Germans called up many half- and untrained troops.
I was distracted from Friesser by my brother's PhD, but now back on track. Should have it finished before the megagame in two weeks. I'm trying to get a grip of the speed of advance in this war. In WWI a few miles a day is considered lightning. At Sedan on May 13th 1940, the German infantry (supported mostly by air attacks, tanks not crossing the Meuse until the morning of the 14th) advances two miles in 4 hours. Pretty good by WWI, I'd say. But the French could have dealt with that. Friesser gives an interesting comparison of French and German activities from the German river crossing on the 13th (1600 hours) to the meeting engagement next morning. While it took the French 15 hours to transmit the orders for attack and then to get to the starting line, the Germans were sent straight into battle coming from the bridge in an hour and 15 minutes. So the Germans had both the speed of the tanks, combined with the speed of command.
I was distracted from Friesser by my brother's PhD, but now back on track. Should have it finished before the megagame in two weeks. I'm trying to get a grip of the speed of advance in this war. In WWI a few miles a day is considered lightning. At Sedan on May 13th 1940, the German infantry (supported mostly by air attacks, tanks not crossing the Meuse until the morning of the 14th) advances two miles in 4 hours. Pretty good by WWI, I'd say. But the French could have dealt with that. Friesser gives an interesting comparison of French and German activities from the German river crossing on the 13th (1600 hours) to the meeting engagement next morning. While it took the French 15 hours to transmit the orders for attack and then to get to the starting line, the Germans were sent straight into battle coming from the bridge in an hour and 15 minutes. So the Germans had both the speed of the tanks, combined with the speed of command.
September 24, 2014
While the book has its share of problems in the second half, the first half is a terrific perspective on the conquest of France in 1940, how it was a tremendous gamble for the Nazis and how the strategy was born of desperation and later over-interpreted by victors and vanquished alike. The title refers to the fact that "blitzkrieg" didn't really exist yet at this time, and the series of gambles and improvisations would be retroactively knit together into a narrative. It's well-written, well-translated, and offers a fresh perspective.
When it veers towards German nationalism in the second half, it goes a bit off the rails. It spends a considerable amount of time trying to figure out who was to blame for the halt orders that took the pressure off the evacuating BEF momentarily, and appears to be lamenting that the war could have been won then and there. Let's remember here: Hitler the Nazis, and the Germans in this context were bad dudes. He is also constantly playing up the inferiority of German tanks, which is certainly debatable (lack of radios, one-man turrets, very limited operating range, and exposed exhaust ports were serious technical deficiencies in French armor, which he does admit, but never makes it into the tables of weapon and armor thickness specs).
Anyway, this is still really interesting reading for students of the period, and has many great insights. Just be prepared to filter the PoV from time to time.
When it veers towards German nationalism in the second half, it goes a bit off the rails. It spends a considerable amount of time trying to figure out who was to blame for the halt orders that took the pressure off the evacuating BEF momentarily, and appears to be lamenting that the war could have been won then and there. Let's remember here: Hitler the Nazis, and the Germans in this context were bad dudes. He is also constantly playing up the inferiority of German tanks, which is certainly debatable (lack of radios, one-man turrets, very limited operating range, and exposed exhaust ports were serious technical deficiencies in French armor, which he does admit, but never makes it into the tables of weapon and armor thickness specs).
Anyway, this is still really interesting reading for students of the period, and has many great insights. Just be prepared to filter the PoV from time to time.
March 28, 2014
With the title as is, most people are going to say no to this book from the get to. That's fair, this one is not for everyone. But if you like reading military history and enjoying interesting analysis, this book is for you. Frieser attacks a number of notions in this book. Notably, that Germany and Hitler in particular dreamed up a blitzkrieg strategy because of their economy and then revealed it to the world. Rather, Frieser argues, blitzkrieg arose as an operational response to a troubling strategic situation. Hitler gambled that France and Britain would not respond to the attack on Poland. having lost that bet, the country was in a pickle. The staff and Hitler had a range of unworkable plans and it was only for a fortuitous (for Germany, for the rest of the world not so much) chain of circumstances that allowed Germany to prevail.
The analysis of German military history, strategic culture, planning and policy are fantastic. I also found his reading of the Halt Order convincing.
I did find the tactical descriptions a bit much, but you don't need to read them closely to understand his argument.
The analysis of German military history, strategic culture, planning and policy are fantastic. I also found his reading of the Halt Order convincing.
I did find the tactical descriptions a bit much, but you don't need to read them closely to understand his argument.
June 2, 2013
Karl-Heinz Frieser offers a well written and well researched account of Germany's 1940 campaign in France and the genesis of the form of warfare that came to be known as "blitzkreig". Frieser's primary thesis (which is well and convincingly supported) is that what we now refer to as blitzkreig was not the predominant doctrine for land warfare for the Wehrmacht at the time. Frieser goes on to show that the wild success of the German campaign in May 1940 was due more to the daring and insubordination of commanders such as Heinz Guderian and Erwin Rommel. Frieser clearly shows (and supports) his premise that on more than one occasion Guderian and Rommel willfully chose to ignore orders and continued tto press the attack well beyond what was explicitly authorized.
In addition to being a well written account of the German invasion of France, it is a good study in the development of military theory.
Highly recommended for the serious student not only of the Second World War, but also for the student of the development of military theory.
In addition to being a well written account of the German invasion of France, it is a good study in the development of military theory.
Highly recommended for the serious student not only of the Second World War, but also for the student of the development of military theory.
July 27, 2020
O kampanii francuskiej wiemy niewiele. W Polsce zwykło się ją lekceważyć i zrzucać na tchórzostwo i niechęć do wojny. W pisarstwie anglosaskim są raczej anglosaskie zwycięstwa, a przynajmniej bitwy z wielkim anglosaskim udziałem - sporo więc o Dunkierce, ale Dunkierka to sam finał. Na tym tle to bardzo wartościowa pozycja.
Zresztą nie tylko. Książkę napisał historyk wojskowości, jest więc dość mocno analityczna. Że niemiecki? Tak, preferuje punkt widzenia jednej strony, bardziej pochyla się nad jej problemami -- myślę, że punkt widzenia francuski, czy belgijski byłby ciekawszy. Ale też jest na tyle zdystansowanym i obiektywnym obserwatorem, że nikogo nie poniża, a jeśli wywyższa niemieckich oficerów, to bez przesady.
Jeśli chodzi o samą wojnę... Cóż, najkrótsze podsumowanie -- Niemcy pobiegli w sprincie, alianci -- w maratonie. To strategia, przygotowanie, dysponowanie siłami. Strategia niemiecka była bardzo ryzykowna (nawiasem mówiąc, szkoda, że nie ma tu odwołań do Tooze'a, bo gospodarka wiele tłumaczy), ale się opłaciła. (Inna rzecz, że wbiła w pychę, czyli była też jakąś składową ostatecznej klęski i jej głębokości.)
Ta różnica oznacza inne podejście do dowodzenia (przez "zadania", a nie szczegółowe rozkazy; ze świetną łącznością -- ograniczenia łączności francuskiej są wręcz niewiarygodne, a trudno tu mówić o złej woli -- to raczej myślenie kategoriami wojny pozycyjnej), taktyki, budowy czołgów (zasięg), czy logistyki ich obsługi (cysterny, bez przygotowanych kanistrów -- co oznaczało niemożność szybkiego przerzucenia czołgów na zagrożony odcinek. W efekcie alianci nie wykorzystali błędów i słabości niemieckich, których było całkiem sporo.
Zresztą nie tylko. Książkę napisał historyk wojskowości, jest więc dość mocno analityczna. Że niemiecki? Tak, preferuje punkt widzenia jednej strony, bardziej pochyla się nad jej problemami -- myślę, że punkt widzenia francuski, czy belgijski byłby ciekawszy. Ale też jest na tyle zdystansowanym i obiektywnym obserwatorem, że nikogo nie poniża, a jeśli wywyższa niemieckich oficerów, to bez przesady.
Jeśli chodzi o samą wojnę... Cóż, najkrótsze podsumowanie -- Niemcy pobiegli w sprincie, alianci -- w maratonie. To strategia, przygotowanie, dysponowanie siłami. Strategia niemiecka była bardzo ryzykowna (nawiasem mówiąc, szkoda, że nie ma tu odwołań do Tooze'a, bo gospodarka wiele tłumaczy), ale się opłaciła. (Inna rzecz, że wbiła w pychę, czyli była też jakąś składową ostatecznej klęski i jej głębokości.)
Ta różnica oznacza inne podejście do dowodzenia (przez "zadania", a nie szczegółowe rozkazy; ze świetną łącznością -- ograniczenia łączności francuskiej są wręcz niewiarygodne, a trudno tu mówić o złej woli -- to raczej myślenie kategoriami wojny pozycyjnej), taktyki, budowy czołgów (zasięg), czy logistyki ich obsługi (cysterny, bez przygotowanych kanistrów -- co oznaczało niemożność szybkiego przerzucenia czołgów na zagrożony odcinek. W efekcie alianci nie wykorzystali błędów i słabości niemieckich, których było całkiem sporo.
November 24, 2022
Operational history of the German invasion of France in the spring of 1940, describing the "blitzkrieg" as not a coherent concept at that point, and that German success was built more upon multiple contingent, even "accidental" factors (2). Instead of a specific strategy, Frieser instead emphasizes 1) the rapid technological changes since 1918 which meant that traditional pre-1933 German command principles such as rapid attacks and lower-level initiative had become more effective; 2) the multiple serious mistakes of the Western Allies; and 3) the fact that local commanders on the German side continued to act independently and disregard orders and only stopped until the 'halt order' at Dunkirk (Ch. 11, passim); von Manstein's plan, which was to be implemented by some of the more cautious members of the German general staff, appears as a wild and desperate gamble.
Frieser asserts that as a result, the German high command became fixated on the story of the Blitzkireg and imagined that the whole war would be won by single and decisive actions. But thankfully it was instead the combined might of the Allied war machines which ground down the Wehrmacht.
The entire argument is not entirely novel to me as I had first read Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France by Ernest May first, but this translated volume provides an outstanding operational history as well as a close understanding of German language sources.
Frieser asserts that as a result, the German high command became fixated on the story of the Blitzkireg and imagined that the whole war would be won by single and decisive actions. But thankfully it was instead the combined might of the Allied war machines which ground down the Wehrmacht.
The entire argument is not entirely novel to me as I had first read Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France by Ernest May first, but this translated volume provides an outstanding operational history as well as a close understanding of German language sources.
January 1, 2019
This is a must read for those who want to know how and why the German offensive against the western Allies succeeded. The author, along with the translator, writes in an animated fashion with many quotes and notable anecdotes. The maps and charts I consider to be a mixed bag in part because they are in German, although there is explanatory text. I've known about the general campaign but never the specifics and the author does a magnificent job of clearly explaining the campaign and its aftermath.
July 4, 2020
Detailed and meticulous this book is worth reading twice or more to examine the information in each line. This German writer clears up a lot of the mystery and myth about the so-called Blitzkrieg in the West, which was an accident, not a planned Blitzkrieg, and very successful while the planned Blitzkrieg against Russia a year later was a failure in the end. For any student of World War II when our entire civilization was on the line this is an important work. You will not be sorry for reading it. Take notes.
October 17, 2025
Frieser’s The Blitzkrieg Legend is one of the most rewarding works of military history I’ve read in a long time. I went in expecting another retelling of the Fall of France in 1940, as another boring historical account, but what I found was a detailed dismantling of the entire “Blitzkrieg" myth. Frieser convincingly shows that there was no grand master plan, no revolutionary doctrine masterminded by Hitler or the German high command. Instead, the victory came out of improvisation, unauthorized initiative by bold commanders like Guderian, and a string of catastrophic Allied mistakes. The myth was only anachronistically applied after 1940.
I completely agree with Frieser’s central argument: Blitzkrieg was not the cause of German success in 1940 but the legend created afterward. The Germans stumbled onto something that worked almost by accident, and then fooled themselves into believing they could repeat it at will. That hubris paved the way for the disaster in the East.
What I especially enjoyed were the small nuggets Frieser scatters throughout the narrative: those revealing moments when Hitler comes across as a deranged gambler who had no idea how to actually fight a battle. Goebbels might have painted him as the architect of victory, but Frieser demonstrates with painstaking primary-source evidence that Hitler often hesitated, misunderstood, or flat-out failed, while real innovation came from officers acting against orders. You know, the ones that actually knew what they were doing.
Frieser’s use of quotes and diaries is fantastic. He backs up his claims with the words of the men who lived it. Reading this book was engaging. It strips away the myth, exposes the reality, and makes the story of 1940 even more fascinating than the old “lightning war” cliché. For anyone interested in World War II, operational history, or just understanding how legends can blind even the victors, this is essential reading.
I completely agree with Frieser’s central argument: Blitzkrieg was not the cause of German success in 1940 but the legend created afterward. The Germans stumbled onto something that worked almost by accident, and then fooled themselves into believing they could repeat it at will. That hubris paved the way for the disaster in the East.
What I especially enjoyed were the small nuggets Frieser scatters throughout the narrative: those revealing moments when Hitler comes across as a deranged gambler who had no idea how to actually fight a battle. Goebbels might have painted him as the architect of victory, but Frieser demonstrates with painstaking primary-source evidence that Hitler often hesitated, misunderstood, or flat-out failed, while real innovation came from officers acting against orders. You know, the ones that actually knew what they were doing.
Frieser’s use of quotes and diaries is fantastic. He backs up his claims with the words of the men who lived it. Reading this book was engaging. It strips away the myth, exposes the reality, and makes the story of 1940 even more fascinating than the old “lightning war” cliché. For anyone interested in World War II, operational history, or just understanding how legends can blind even the victors, this is essential reading.
October 20, 2023
AN incredibly detailed book about how the Germans accidentally fell into Blitzkrieg. Intense will, chance, and risk (the human dimension) played just as big a role as technology. It also points out that technology in itself is nothing unless tactically and operationally employed right. Great read!!
January 20, 2026
Detailed analysis of German campaign in Western Europe in 1940. Relied heavily on primary sourcing, and not too difficult to read. Dispels some pretty common misconceptions about German military technological superiority at the start of the conflict. Good discussion of doctrine at strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
March 11, 2021
A military play-by-play of the Blitzkrieg. A recommended book for students of WWII military history.
May 29, 2023
Essential
November 18, 2025
El libro definitivo sobre la guerra en Francia en 1940, al menos desde la parte alemana.
August 13, 2021
By far this is the authoritative book on the 1940 campaign in the West. This book debunks all the myths (and there are many) about this decisive campaign and is based on the official German history. The opening battles in the west are covered here until Dunkirk with a little bit of an explanation about what happened afterwards during Operation Fall Red. A must read if this is a campaign that is of particular interest to you.
January 14, 2023
Blitzkrieg Legend , la campaña de Francia en 1940.
Por que legend? Porque hay mucho mito respecto a las capacidades de las Fuerzas Armadas alemanas durante la segunda guerra mundial. No eran superiores a las francesas en términos materiales , menos frente a la coalición aliada europea.
Por que les fue bien? La campaña de 1940 fue una confrontación de estados mentales. Francia pretendía que el mismo método empleado en la Gran Guerra , le funcionase 20 años después. Peor aún , la
soberbia les nubló el juicio. El empleo de los tanques alemanes en el nivel operacional también fue gravitante ( los franceses los veían como meras Armas de apoyo para la Infantería)
Por otro lado, un grupo muy reducido de Oficiales Alemanes, apelaba a la filosofía prusiana: campañas cortas y enérgicas. Klotzen, nicht kleckern! Como diría Heinz Guderian.
La campaña de 1940 es ,probablemente , el mejor ejemplo de guerra de maniobra en toda la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Empleo a nivel operacional del esfuerzo principal, lanzar el centro de gravedad propio sobre la vulnerabilidades del enemigo, armas combinadas (Luftwaffe fue gravitante), mandó tipo misión , iniciativa, toma de desiciones en momentos críticos (incluso implicando desobediencia)
El libro es espectacular , no solo porque el grado de detalle histórico , sino más importante, por el nivel de análisis.
Por que legend? Porque hay mucho mito respecto a las capacidades de las Fuerzas Armadas alemanas durante la segunda guerra mundial. No eran superiores a las francesas en términos materiales , menos frente a la coalición aliada europea.
Por que les fue bien? La campaña de 1940 fue una confrontación de estados mentales. Francia pretendía que el mismo método empleado en la Gran Guerra , le funcionase 20 años después. Peor aún , la
soberbia les nubló el juicio. El empleo de los tanques alemanes en el nivel operacional también fue gravitante ( los franceses los veían como meras Armas de apoyo para la Infantería)
Por otro lado, un grupo muy reducido de Oficiales Alemanes, apelaba a la filosofía prusiana: campañas cortas y enérgicas. Klotzen, nicht kleckern! Como diría Heinz Guderian.
La campaña de 1940 es ,probablemente , el mejor ejemplo de guerra de maniobra en toda la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Empleo a nivel operacional del esfuerzo principal, lanzar el centro de gravedad propio sobre la vulnerabilidades del enemigo, armas combinadas (Luftwaffe fue gravitante), mandó tipo misión , iniciativa, toma de desiciones en momentos críticos (incluso implicando desobediencia)
El libro es espectacular , no solo porque el grado de detalle histórico , sino más importante, por el nivel de análisis.
December 11, 2012
This was an excellent book. It is focused on the 1940 campaign that resulted in the surprise German victory over the various Western Allies.
The author presents that case that the Germans were not describing their mechanized form of warfare as blitzkrieg as they planned for the campaign against France. In fact the army high command was quite pedestrian in their planning.
Manstein's plan eventually found its way to Hitler who liked it and eventually behaved as if he, Hitler, had come up with the entire plan. The army high command shunted Manstein off to an out of the way command and he had nothing to do with the campaign against the Western Allies.
Guderian receives a lot of the book's focus as he was a very forceful commander during the German advance.
The French commander's made almost no good decisions and the book became depressing for me.
The author also focuses on the high command halt that let the W. Allies evacuate so many troops from the Dunkirk area.
The maps are all in German but I felt they were very informative.
This is the best book on this campaign although I really like Rothbrust's and Doughty's books when I read them many years ago.
The author presents that case that the Germans were not describing their mechanized form of warfare as blitzkrieg as they planned for the campaign against France. In fact the army high command was quite pedestrian in their planning.
Manstein's plan eventually found its way to Hitler who liked it and eventually behaved as if he, Hitler, had come up with the entire plan. The army high command shunted Manstein off to an out of the way command and he had nothing to do with the campaign against the Western Allies.
Guderian receives a lot of the book's focus as he was a very forceful commander during the German advance.
The French commander's made almost no good decisions and the book became depressing for me.
The author also focuses on the high command halt that let the W. Allies evacuate so many troops from the Dunkirk area.
The maps are all in German but I felt they were very informative.
This is the best book on this campaign although I really like Rothbrust's and Doughty's books when I read them many years ago.
November 29, 2014
Excellent work from a German perspective of the 1940 French invasion. Demonstrates how initiative tied to well understood plan can gain catastrophic success. German speed led to French disintegration (defeat mechanism). Most interesting was the German approach to a quick war where the French prepared for a long one. Cannot win the long war when the first battle is a route. Lastly, this ties the tactical and operational together well.
Germany's ultimate strategic goal was left out (see Blitzkrieg to Defeat; Hitler sought to seize only northern France.) This helps with understanding the operational plans. The main thesis is weakly supported: that Blitzkrieg was not by design. While true, German training and war preparation led to the Blitzkrieg (albeit unplanned). Great book and worth a look.
Germany's ultimate strategic goal was left out (see Blitzkrieg to Defeat; Hitler sought to seize only northern France.) This helps with understanding the operational plans. The main thesis is weakly supported: that Blitzkrieg was not by design. While true, German training and war preparation led to the Blitzkrieg (albeit unplanned). Great book and worth a look.
August 18, 2015
One of the best WWII books I've read and the best on the blitzkrieg. The author accomplishes the exceedingly difficult task of delving into details, some too esoteric for a casual and handsome military history student like me, without distracting from the big picture narrative. So many great passages. One of my favorites, on Erwin Rommel:
"As a Panzer leader in the campaign in the West, Rommel won breathtaking victories, ironically because he knew so little about Pander operational principles. The old rules, as spelled out in regulations, no longer applied because the entire nature of the war had been revolutionized. Instead, Rommel acted intuitively to the particular situation he faced."
"As a Panzer leader in the campaign in the West, Rommel won breathtaking victories, ironically because he knew so little about Pander operational principles. The old rules, as spelled out in regulations, no longer applied because the entire nature of the war had been revolutionized. Instead, Rommel acted intuitively to the particular situation he faced."
November 11, 2016
The no 1 book on the initial battle on the Western Front in 1940. This is where we find most of the principles for todays maneuver warfare; operational and tactical mobility within the German forces; indirect approach, infiltration and bypass; combined arms within and between services, close air support etc.
The paradox of this novel is the legend of the blitzkrieg phenomenon: had it not been for the success of the campaign on the Western Front, Blitzkrieg would probably not have existed as a concept, because the Germans did not have it as an official concept.
The paradox of this novel is the legend of the blitzkrieg phenomenon: had it not been for the success of the campaign on the Western Front, Blitzkrieg would probably not have existed as a concept, because the Germans did not have it as an official concept.
August 25, 2014
Very thought-provoking as expected. Jackson's is a better campaign history. What makes this particularly pointed is not so much the debunking of the legend, but the discussion of how the German Army got to the position where it was possible to run the operation organizationally.
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