This is the third of Kyle Harper’s books I have read and I found it the least impressive. This is not to say there was anything wrong with it. It just proved to have relatively uninteresting and unsurprising content.
Harper opens the Preface of From Shame To Sin. The Christian Transformation of Sexual Morality in Late Antiquity > by stating, “This book presents an effort to summarize, between two covers, what difference Christianity made in the history of sexual morality. It does so by exploring the late classical world out of which Christianity emerged and following the story of the religion’s expansion down to the age of the emperor Justinian. That is an enormous topic and this is a short book, which can only claim to draw out some of the main lines of such a complex development.”
I am not sure why an author would choose to write a “short book” on “an enormous topic”. I suspect that this was really an academic study which escaped from the academy and found its way to a publishing house.
The thing that really seemed to interest the author was a number of obscure fictional works – which he calls novels – mainly dating from the second to the fourth centuries. However, I felt what he was really writing was more of a literary analysis of the various “novels”; albeit, the commentary was interesting. In addition, there was examination of various more orthodox Christian sources.
There are a number of issues which arise from the approach Harper takes.
1. In the pre-Christian Empire, there was little sense of shame or sin regarding sex. The main factor in play was legality. Morality really was not a part of the matter.
2. The writings to which Harper refers concentrate on rape, prostitution, adultery and homosexuality (including paedophilia), with some treatment also of sexual drive and lust. There are many elements of sexual activity outside these areas which might valuably have been included (even allowing for Harper’s claim that homosexuality and prostitution have been inadequately considered in earlier studies and, by implication, needed redressing).
3. While there was a clear change from pre-Christian to Christian times, this also incorporated a change from an early legal framework which essentially related to property rights (including the rights of slave-owners) to a more moral framework in the later injunctions by the church on acceptable Christian behaviour. And it turns out that the change took centuries to achieve.
4. The documents to which Harper refers reflect a range of points of view in both pre-Christian and Christian eras, so it is problematical trying to identify a representative outlook for either.
5. It is questionable whether the mores posited as Christian are uniquely Christian (as distinct from Hebraic) or, indeed, derive from Jesus rather than from apostolic or later ecclesiastical polemicists. Although Harper does note that “The Jesus of the canonical gospels had warned that lust itself was a sexual crime and hinted that ‘becoming a eunuch for the kingdom of God’ was a supreme state.”
Harper does a sound job of describing attitudes to sexual activity in the early Empire, at least as regards the sexual relationship between man and wife, the position of adultery, homosexual behaviours, prostitution, and sex with slaves. He notes that “the adultery legislation of Augustus was… one of the most intrusive and enduring creations in the history of criminal law. Adulterium meant the violation of a respectable woman. The true significance of the Augustan law against adulterium lay not in the imposition of repressive norms on a libertine society, but in the assumption by the state of an ever greater role in the regulation of sexual morality, along solidly traditional lines.” These areas were not the exclusive domain of the laws. Society’s unwritten prejudices were also of importance and presupposed a sort of implicit embryonic moral code. Harper provides a useful summary of contemporary terms expressing disapproval: “In Latin, the notion of shame was centered around a cluster of words including pudicitia (sexual modesty) and its opposite impudicitia (sexual immodesty), as well as the more concretized states of being, honestas (social respectability) and infamia (dishonor). In Greek, sōphrosynē was used to denote both a virtue (self-control) and the possession of sexual respectability. Shame was expressed as aischynē — an act which brought dishonor on the actor, or the emotional experience of moral failure. Aidōs drew closer to the individual’s “sense of shame,” both positively, in the proper respect for others’ opinions that evoked honorable behavior (similar to the Latin pudor ), or negatively as the embarrassment that follows upon misconduct. In Greek the more concrete states of honor and dishonor were expressed by timē and atimia , respectively.”
He cites various sources which reveal disapproval of either the passive male in homosexuality, or homosexuality in general. Slaves, men, women or children, had virtually no rights or protections. The issue of freeborn women consorting with a male slave was not so much an infringement against a moral code as against honour and respectability. Women had equal access to divorce, and had access to their dowry in the event of divorce. Girls were considered women as young as twelve, so the concept of paederasty mainly applied to boys and, while the law only prohibited that with free-born boys, Harper claims that such activity was nevertheless relatively common. Rape, as such, receives little treatment but Harper does note that women victims did not lose honour as a result. Nevertheless, virginity was very positively regarded.
Outside these matters, all of them the subject of either laws or a sense of public honour, there is not much more.
Harper then follows a variety of changes that occur within the Roman empire as Christendom builds in strength. It is noticeable in relation to this that an element of changed response to sexual activity derives from the emperor and senate, and an element from the church hierarchy and bureaucracy. Even though Constantine became a Christian as a result of his victory in the Battle of Milvian Bridge, and subsequently took on some leadership of the church, there was not much evidence of Christian doctrine in Roman lawmaking of the time, especially regarding the sexual issues with which Harper is concerned. Mind you, a part of this must be attributed to the fact that any orthodox Christian perspective on sex would take some time to evolve. As Harper rightly points out, Christianity in the second century was a minor provincial cult and then, fairly suddenly, it had to adjust to an entirely new role: “But the men and women of the first centuries did not imagine a future where the sexual protocols they formed would be placed in the hands of a powerful institutional church. Indeed, the strident tone of so much early Christian writing on sexuality was nurtured in an atmosphere where the advocates of the religion were a small, persecuted minority.” “The Christian vision of sexual humanity, incubated in the radical air of persecution, was forced, unexpectedly, into the mold of a regulatory system.”
The morality of sexual matters was also being considered during this period by the Stoics and the Cynics and, again, we find different writers within these movement espousing different points of view. Harper distils their ideas down to seeking virtue, which leaves the question of where virtue is to identified, but then “sexual morality was primarily about the internal regulation of desires.” And this certainly goes beyond the pure legalism of the state. Mixed up in these concepts, there was the question of the degree to which we are the driver of our own actions. Harper claims that one of the significant outcomes of Christian thinking was to make a clear statement that humans were agents of free will, so that they, and not some astrological destiny, carried full moral responsibility for their actions.
The complexity that was confronting early writers is evident in the various attitudes to marriage. It was variously argued that sex within marriage was immoral and that complete abstinence was necessary for cleanliness; that sex within marriage was acceptable as long as its sole purpose was the intention to procreate; and that lust or the pursuit of pleasure within marital sex were immoral. And presumably, there were ordinary people whose lives were not regulated by any of these strictures!
Harper marks a major landmark when in AD 428 the Christian emperor Theodosius II enacted a law banning the use of coercion in the sex industry. This was twenty emperors and seventy years after Constantine. “The law wished to repress the prostitution of slaves, daughters, and other vulnerable members of society, which was anything but a marginal part of the classical sexual order. The moral foundations of the law were, there can be no doubt, Christian.” He sees this as “the diffusion of a new pattern of moral reasoning.”
Harper makes the interesting point that Hebraic attitudes to sex were more similar in some ways to early Roman than to Christian: monogamy was Roman rather than Hebraic, and “Because legitimate female sexuality was strictly confined to marriage, a woman who engaged in any extramarital sex was guilty of zenuth . In the patriarchal logic of early Hebrew culture, she became a ‘whore’, and the feminine participle, zonah , was the primary word for prostitute throughout the biblical period. The Hebrew Bible is decidedly tepid in its condemnation of males patronizing the brothel.”
Harper notes several severe sixth century Roman laws and comments: “What is notable about this promulgation is not the headlong intrusion of moralism into lawgiving, but the subtle disappearance of old modes of regulation, in which status above all framed the dynamics of power between state and society.” Although this change has not really been a focus in the book, it is an important point well made.
Late in the book, Kyle Harper reiterates a claim he made back at the beginning. “Stories have a claim, just as much as formal philosophical literature, to a privileged place in the history of sexuality. The narrative literature of the late classical world proved capable, like no other medium, of representing the pattern and experience of sexual morality, measured against the shape of life.”
I think he can claim to have incorporated that genre effectively; I just wish the book had been more adventurous in its examination of the morality of sex. As it is, I doubt any reader will be surprised by the judgments he makes.