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Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam
In the annals of Vietnam War history, no figure has been more controversial than Ngo Dinh Diem. During the 1950s, U.S. leaders hailed Diem as "the miracle man of Southeast Asia" and funneled huge amounts of aid to his South Vietnamese government. But in 1963 Diem was ousted and assassinated in a coup endorsed by President John F. Kennedy. Diem's alliance with Washington has long been seen as a Cold War relationship gone bad, undone either by American arrogance or by Diem's stubbornness. In Misalliance, Edward Miller provides a convincing new explanation for Diem's downfall and the larger tragedy of South Vietnam.
For Diem and U.S. leaders, Miller argues, the alliance was more than just a joint effort to contain communism. It was also a means for each side to pursue its plans for nation building in South Vietnam. Miller's definitive portrait of Diem—based on extensive research in Vietnamese, French, and American archives—demonstrates that the South Vietnamese leader was neither Washington's pawn nor a tradition-bound mandarin. Rather, he was a shrewd and ruthless operator with his own vision for Vietnam's modernization. In 1963, allied clashes over development and reform, combined with rising internal resistance to Diem's nation building programs, fractured the alliance and changed the course of the Vietnam War.
In depicting the rise and fall of the U.S.-Diem partnership, Misalliance shows how America's fate in Vietnam was written not only on the battlefield but also in Washington's dealings with its Vietnamese allies.
For Diem and U.S. leaders, Miller argues, the alliance was more than just a joint effort to contain communism. It was also a means for each side to pursue its plans for nation building in South Vietnam. Miller's definitive portrait of Diem—based on extensive research in Vietnamese, French, and American archives—demonstrates that the South Vietnamese leader was neither Washington's pawn nor a tradition-bound mandarin. Rather, he was a shrewd and ruthless operator with his own vision for Vietnam's modernization. In 1963, allied clashes over development and reform, combined with rising internal resistance to Diem's nation building programs, fractured the alliance and changed the course of the Vietnam War.
In depicting the rise and fall of the U.S.-Diem partnership, Misalliance shows how America's fate in Vietnam was written not only on the battlefield but also in Washington's dealings with its Vietnamese allies.
432 pages, Hardcover
First published April 15, 2013
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October 21, 2021
In his book, Edward Miller attempts to revise the controversial figure of South Vietnam's Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem and the American-Vietnamese "nation-building" efforts.
In 1963, journalist Bernard Fall observed that nearly everything written about Diem consisted either “of totally uncritical eulogy or of equally partisan condemnation." As the author laments, not much has changed since then. Most of the existing literature about Diem defends one of a few myths.
The oldest myth about Diem represents him as an American puppet. This view was expressed in the term “My-Diem” (America-Diem), a derisive slogan made up by Vietnamese communist propagandists to refer to Diem’s government. The circumstances of Diem's 1963 overthrow dispel this myth, though. If he was a puppet, why did the American government want him removed? Furthermore, the evidence provided by Miller shows that Diem disregarded American advice more often than he followed it.
Another myth depicts Diem as a product of "tradition." According to this perspective, Diem’s actions and policies were determined not by his dependence on Washington but by his devotion to hopelessly backward ideas. Diem is believed to have been bent on restoring ancient Confucian norms about governance and the deference of subjects to their rulers. His eventual demise is explained as the inevitable result of traditionalist norms being crushed by the tide of modernity.
A third myth maintains it that Diem's Confucian norms were an advantage. By upholding ancient Vietnamese ideals of governance and leadership, Diem allegedly was on his way to victory over his Communist enemies — and would have claimed this victory, if his fickle American allies had not betrayed and killed him in 1963.
According to the author, all those myths are based on wrong assumptions. Contrary to what the puppet myth suggests, Diem obtained power in 1954 through his own efforts and those of his brothers, not because the American government helped. At the time American officials were deeply divided on the "Diem experiment." His subsequent success in establishing his power in South Vietnam was also mainly the result of his own strategies.
Diem’s ideas about Confucianism also had little to do with restoring the practices of past centuries. He was much more interested in how he might use certain Confucian principles to design what he believed to be a special Vietnamese vision of development for Vietnam. His mistakes in 1963 did not derive from his determination to uphold ancient Asian norms about wise rulership. They stemmed from his erroneous belief that his "nation-building" – authoritarian and despised by the rural population – was succeeding brilliantly and that he was on the verge of spectacular new achievements.
From its formation to its dissolution, the alliance between Diem and the United States was plagued exactly by that controversial "nation-building." Unlike what is generally believed, for both Americans and South Vietnamese, the alliance was more than a joint effort to stop a North Vietnamese invasion and Communism. It was also an opportunity to promote their respective visions of how Vietnam should be modernized. In the victorious early days of Diem’s rule, officials in both governments were optimistic that the alliance would serve its purpose. Both Diem and the American government invested great resources and fervent hopes in numerous nation-building projects in South Vietnam for a decade. However, between 1954 and 1963, nation-building in South Vietnam was a subject of competition and contention, as Americans and Vietnamese advanced diverse ideas and plans. This conflict helped shape the early history of the Vietnam War.
Most importantly, Diem's view on South Vietnam’s transformation clashed with the American officials' development ideas. American experts, such as Wesley Fishel, Wolf Ladejinsky, and Edward Lansdale, were hopeful that Diem would follow their advice on administrative reform, rural reconstruction, and counterinsurgency. They were encouraged in this belief by Diem himself, who, despite his concern about potential American colonialism, accepted American aid and advice as a necessary risk. It soon became clear, though, that the divide between the two sides was wider than it had first appeared. The problems did not derive only from the Ngo brothers’ confusing pronouncements. The Ngos and the Americans also disagreed about democracy, community, security, and social change.
Such disagreements did not mean that every American-Vietnamese initiative or the whole alliance was doomed to failure. The two sides did reconcile their notions to collaborate. Nevertheless, argues Miller, the differences between them were real and considerable.
The means and ends of nation-building in South Vietnam were a constant bone of contention among Americans there. Even before Diem came to power in 1954, Americans in Vietnam frequently disagreed with one another and with their colleagues in Washington over how best to pursue American goals in the Southeast Asian country. While some of those conflicts were provoked by bureaucratic rivalries or personal ambitions, others revealed reflected different ideas about development. "American thinking about development and modernization during the 1950s and early 1960s was not merely a function of Cold War geostrategic imperatives . . . ," argues Miller. Many Americans supported a more low-scale approach to development.
The American-Vietnamese efforts in South Vietnam were also affected by the interactions and rivalries among Vietnamese groups. Nationalism in twentieth-century Vietnam was nothing if not contested and fragmented. The diversity of notions of Vietnam’s post-colonial destiny was apparent as early as the 1920s and had been characterizing Vietnamese political life ever since. Therefore, Diem’s government and its nation-building efforts could not depend only on his ability to give the people a credible alternative to the revolution embraced by the Communists in North Vietnam. The popularity of Diem's regime also relied on his ability to deal with the myriad nationalist movements within South Vietnam, especially those of other non-Communist groups. Diem’s mistakes in this regard were the most glaring and contributed the most to his fall.
That is why the alliance between Diem and the American government was ruined exactly by South Vietnam’s revolutionary politics. Their grandiose plans were undermined by their inability and unwillingness to reconcile the many and diverse South Vietnamese aspirations for reform, which culminated in Diem's crackdowns on dissidents and especially in his cruel response to Buddhist unrest that ignited the 1963 crisis.
MISALLIANCE is an insightful, well-researched study that traces the early years of American involvement in Vietnam and demonstrates where and how exactly an initially promising alliance between two countries with the common goals of stopping Communism and building a non-Communist nation went downhill. Edward Miller's style is rather dry, but Vietnam buffs will enjoy this useful book.
In 1963, journalist Bernard Fall observed that nearly everything written about Diem consisted either “of totally uncritical eulogy or of equally partisan condemnation." As the author laments, not much has changed since then. Most of the existing literature about Diem defends one of a few myths.
The oldest myth about Diem represents him as an American puppet. This view was expressed in the term “My-Diem” (America-Diem), a derisive slogan made up by Vietnamese communist propagandists to refer to Diem’s government. The circumstances of Diem's 1963 overthrow dispel this myth, though. If he was a puppet, why did the American government want him removed? Furthermore, the evidence provided by Miller shows that Diem disregarded American advice more often than he followed it.
Another myth depicts Diem as a product of "tradition." According to this perspective, Diem’s actions and policies were determined not by his dependence on Washington but by his devotion to hopelessly backward ideas. Diem is believed to have been bent on restoring ancient Confucian norms about governance and the deference of subjects to their rulers. His eventual demise is explained as the inevitable result of traditionalist norms being crushed by the tide of modernity.
A third myth maintains it that Diem's Confucian norms were an advantage. By upholding ancient Vietnamese ideals of governance and leadership, Diem allegedly was on his way to victory over his Communist enemies — and would have claimed this victory, if his fickle American allies had not betrayed and killed him in 1963.
According to the author, all those myths are based on wrong assumptions. Contrary to what the puppet myth suggests, Diem obtained power in 1954 through his own efforts and those of his brothers, not because the American government helped. At the time American officials were deeply divided on the "Diem experiment." His subsequent success in establishing his power in South Vietnam was also mainly the result of his own strategies.
Diem’s ideas about Confucianism also had little to do with restoring the practices of past centuries. He was much more interested in how he might use certain Confucian principles to design what he believed to be a special Vietnamese vision of development for Vietnam. His mistakes in 1963 did not derive from his determination to uphold ancient Asian norms about wise rulership. They stemmed from his erroneous belief that his "nation-building" – authoritarian and despised by the rural population – was succeeding brilliantly and that he was on the verge of spectacular new achievements.
From its formation to its dissolution, the alliance between Diem and the United States was plagued exactly by that controversial "nation-building." Unlike what is generally believed, for both Americans and South Vietnamese, the alliance was more than a joint effort to stop a North Vietnamese invasion and Communism. It was also an opportunity to promote their respective visions of how Vietnam should be modernized. In the victorious early days of Diem’s rule, officials in both governments were optimistic that the alliance would serve its purpose. Both Diem and the American government invested great resources and fervent hopes in numerous nation-building projects in South Vietnam for a decade. However, between 1954 and 1963, nation-building in South Vietnam was a subject of competition and contention, as Americans and Vietnamese advanced diverse ideas and plans. This conflict helped shape the early history of the Vietnam War.
Most importantly, Diem's view on South Vietnam’s transformation clashed with the American officials' development ideas. American experts, such as Wesley Fishel, Wolf Ladejinsky, and Edward Lansdale, were hopeful that Diem would follow their advice on administrative reform, rural reconstruction, and counterinsurgency. They were encouraged in this belief by Diem himself, who, despite his concern about potential American colonialism, accepted American aid and advice as a necessary risk. It soon became clear, though, that the divide between the two sides was wider than it had first appeared. The problems did not derive only from the Ngo brothers’ confusing pronouncements. The Ngos and the Americans also disagreed about democracy, community, security, and social change.
Such disagreements did not mean that every American-Vietnamese initiative or the whole alliance was doomed to failure. The two sides did reconcile their notions to collaborate. Nevertheless, argues Miller, the differences between them were real and considerable.
The means and ends of nation-building in South Vietnam were a constant bone of contention among Americans there. Even before Diem came to power in 1954, Americans in Vietnam frequently disagreed with one another and with their colleagues in Washington over how best to pursue American goals in the Southeast Asian country. While some of those conflicts were provoked by bureaucratic rivalries or personal ambitions, others revealed reflected different ideas about development. "American thinking about development and modernization during the 1950s and early 1960s was not merely a function of Cold War geostrategic imperatives . . . ," argues Miller. Many Americans supported a more low-scale approach to development.
The American-Vietnamese efforts in South Vietnam were also affected by the interactions and rivalries among Vietnamese groups. Nationalism in twentieth-century Vietnam was nothing if not contested and fragmented. The diversity of notions of Vietnam’s post-colonial destiny was apparent as early as the 1920s and had been characterizing Vietnamese political life ever since. Therefore, Diem’s government and its nation-building efforts could not depend only on his ability to give the people a credible alternative to the revolution embraced by the Communists in North Vietnam. The popularity of Diem's regime also relied on his ability to deal with the myriad nationalist movements within South Vietnam, especially those of other non-Communist groups. Diem’s mistakes in this regard were the most glaring and contributed the most to his fall.
That is why the alliance between Diem and the American government was ruined exactly by South Vietnam’s revolutionary politics. Their grandiose plans were undermined by their inability and unwillingness to reconcile the many and diverse South Vietnamese aspirations for reform, which culminated in Diem's crackdowns on dissidents and especially in his cruel response to Buddhist unrest that ignited the 1963 crisis.
MISALLIANCE is an insightful, well-researched study that traces the early years of American involvement in Vietnam and demonstrates where and how exactly an initially promising alliance between two countries with the common goals of stopping Communism and building a non-Communist nation went downhill. Edward Miller's style is rather dry, but Vietnam buffs will enjoy this useful book.
February 27, 2021
Edward Miller's Misalliance revisits the fraught Cold War alliance between the United States and Ngo Dinh Diem, the ill-fated ruler of South Vietnam. Much of what's been written about Diem, Miller comments, resorts to caricature: either he's a feckless puppet of the United States, or (for his admirers) a noble hero unjustly betrayed by his allies. Miller's book, then, is valuable for adding dimensions to Diem's rule. He shows that Diem was less a puppet than a shrewd politician who used Indochinese nationalism, and later the Cold War, to advance himself and his family to positions of power. He also shows that Diem's ideology of Personalism, a blend of Catholicism, Confucianism and land-reform socialism, was idiosyncratic but far more coherent (if not successful) than generally credited. The book does feel overly generous towards Diem in some respects: there's little discussion of his regime's massive corruption, with the thuggish antics of his vicious brother and sister-in-law sidelined. But Miller isn't an apologist, either: he shows that, however sincere Diem might have been, he was still an autocrat who rarely hesitated to inflict violence to enforce his policies, whose brutality alienated his people, and that his misreading of the Buddhist Crisis and the limits of American tolerance for his misdeeds sowed the seeds for his downfall. A worthy reconsideration of a contentious historical figure.
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September 10, 2020Tác giả dày công chứng minh luận điểm: sự sụp đổ của nền cộng hòa đầu tiên tại miền Nam Việt Nam là do sự khác biệt trong quan điểm xây dựng đất nước giữa Ngô Đình Diệm và phía Mỹ. Một điều được khẳng định là Đệ Nhất Cộng Hòa của Diệm là một nhà nước có một đường lối phát triển riêng biệt hơn so với các giai đoạn khác của miền Nam Việt Nam. Tuy nhiên luôn có một cảm giác rằng sự độc lập chính trị của Diệm trong mối quan hệ với Mỹ đã được đề qua cao quá mức và thực tế, ngay khi phía Mỹ thay đổi cách thức can thiệp thì Đệ Nhất Cộng Hòa đã sụp đổ.
June 30, 2016
Tác giả tiếp cận Đệ Nhất Cộng Hòa dưới góc độ những xung đột giữa Hoa Kỳ và VNCH trong việc tìm kiếm những mô hình xây dựng và phát triển Nhà nước. Ngô Đình Diệm nhìn chung khá độc lập trong việc tự xây dựng mô hình riêng cho Việt Nam theo điều kiện VH-XH cụ thể của Việt Nam, trên cơ sở học thuyết Nhân vị, những giá trị của Công Giáo và cả Nho Giáo mà ông lĩnh hội được.
Với những ai quan tâm đến Đệ Nhất Cộng Hòa thì cuốn này có thể coi là một bách khoa toàn thư nho nhỏ về giai đoạn này. Những dấu ấn lớn của thời kỳ 'Nhà Ngô' như cuộc di cư 1954, chương trình cải cách điền địa, ấp chiến lược, khu trù mật, biến cố Phật Giáo, đều được mô tả và lý giải căn nguyên đầy đủ.
Enjoy reading.
Với những ai quan tâm đến Đệ Nhất Cộng Hòa thì cuốn này có thể coi là một bách khoa toàn thư nho nhỏ về giai đoạn này. Những dấu ấn lớn của thời kỳ 'Nhà Ngô' như cuộc di cư 1954, chương trình cải cách điền địa, ấp chiến lược, khu trù mật, biến cố Phật Giáo, đều được mô tả và lý giải căn nguyên đầy đủ.
Enjoy reading.
December 12, 2020
A clear, nuanced and well-researched work, mostly a narrative of Diem’s rule.
A lot of the book deals with the conflicts between Diem and the US over nation building. Miller covers the birth of the Republic of Vietnam up until the Diem coup, as well as America’s relationship with it, mostly from Diem’s perspective. Miller emphasizes the agency and independence of Diem and how often consequential decisions were made by Diem without any American influence (he disputes the influence Edward Lansdale had over Diem, for example). He describes how Diem made these decisions both for expediency and because of his own vision for South Vietnam. He argues that the US lacked influence over Diem most of the time. He also doubts that the coup against Diem was the miscalculation that doomed the US war effort; he doesn’t even consider the US the main force behind it.
The narrative is straightforward and well-organized. Miller gets into a lot of detail when it comes to the episodes that shaped the relationship. He does a great job covering the religious and political factors that complicated Diem’s rule, how Diem attempted to manipulate the US into supporting his own agendas, and how difficult it is to fit Diem’s vision into a simplistic caricature.
There could have been a little more discussion of why Diem lost American support, on the North Vietnamese, on the politics in Saigon, and on why the South Vietnamese elite and middle class opposed Diem. When describing the NLF, Miller doesn’t really make clear how dependent they were on the North Vietnamese. Miller also covers incidents where Diem refused US aid, but doesn’t cover exactly what he did with the US aid he did accept.
Still, a well-written, judicious and readable work.
A lot of the book deals with the conflicts between Diem and the US over nation building. Miller covers the birth of the Republic of Vietnam up until the Diem coup, as well as America’s relationship with it, mostly from Diem’s perspective. Miller emphasizes the agency and independence of Diem and how often consequential decisions were made by Diem without any American influence (he disputes the influence Edward Lansdale had over Diem, for example). He describes how Diem made these decisions both for expediency and because of his own vision for South Vietnam. He argues that the US lacked influence over Diem most of the time. He also doubts that the coup against Diem was the miscalculation that doomed the US war effort; he doesn’t even consider the US the main force behind it.
The narrative is straightforward and well-organized. Miller gets into a lot of detail when it comes to the episodes that shaped the relationship. He does a great job covering the religious and political factors that complicated Diem’s rule, how Diem attempted to manipulate the US into supporting his own agendas, and how difficult it is to fit Diem’s vision into a simplistic caricature.
There could have been a little more discussion of why Diem lost American support, on the North Vietnamese, on the politics in Saigon, and on why the South Vietnamese elite and middle class opposed Diem. When describing the NLF, Miller doesn’t really make clear how dependent they were on the North Vietnamese. Miller also covers incidents where Diem refused US aid, but doesn’t cover exactly what he did with the US aid he did accept.
Still, a well-written, judicious and readable work.
March 3, 2017
Long story made short: The US thought Diem (and the Ngos in general) wanted to be in a relationship badly with them, regardless of all costs, even their own sense of sovereignty.
They were wrong, killed the Ngos and the rest was history.
They were wrong, killed the Ngos and the rest was history.
February 14, 2025
3.5 stars. This is a fairly thoughtful and readable history of Ngo Dinh Diem and his relationship with the US. It's one of the more oft-cited works on Diem and I can see why: Miller clearly did a tremendous amount of research prior to writing this and does a great job of telling the story from the Vietnamese perspective. Miller clearly empathises with Diem and is seeking to provide a corrective to what he sees as the myths surrounding Ngo and US involvement in Vietnam.
Miller has clearly done his homework and there are a number of great anecdotes and profiles which I quite enjoyed. Seeing that Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu was talking about a "clash of civilizations" a good few decades before Huntington popularized the term made me chuckle, as did learning that elements within Imperial Japan were lobbying to install Diem as Prime Minister in 1945, which I think tells you something about the man and his career. I also found Miller's telling of Diem's telling of his one and only encounter with Ho Chi Minh quite amusing, in which he basically states that he stared down Ho, spurned his offer of partnership and basically told him to go screw himself: "Am I a man who fears oppression or death?" - Considering he was literally Ho's prisoner at the time I suspect Diem might have been a little less bold then his recollection suggests.
There are a few main arguments Miller advances, I find all of them interesting and thought provoking to varying degrees, though I think all of them are probably overstated.
US nation-building in Vietnam. Miller's point that there was a broad effort of US national-building going on at the time around the world which was premised on modernization theory and which impacted how US engagement in Vietnam played out is interesting and well-taken. Miller does a great job of profiling the conflicting US and Vietnamese ideas for how Vietnam ought to modernize, with sometimes surprising results. Hearing Diem's brother Nhu talk about the necessity of a "social revolution" in the countryside in which "village bullies and tyrants be liquidated" sounds an awful lot like what the communists were talking about at this time. This is probably overstated though, I'm not sure I buy that the US had much of an interest in helping these countries modernize minus Cold War calculations.
Miller's point that there were also "contingent factors" (i.e. specific historical events and decisions) which shaped the US alliance with Diem is also well-taken. But again, I'm not sure this point or the point about nation-building really substantiates Miller's contention that "Cold War geostrategic calculations" are insufficient to explain the US alliance with Diem. Were they not? Especially when coupled with economic concerns, I think one could plausibly argue such geostrategic calculations were precisely and exclusively what led to US involvement in Vietnam, and had it not been Diem it would have been somebody else.
Diem was not a US puppet. This point about Diem being a puppet has become something like a straw man in the literature which it's mandatory to knock down a few times, so perhaps it's worth lingering on. It probably wasn't the knock out punch Miller thought it was when he wrote: "if he was a puppet why did the US want him removed?" - That the US could essentially wave its hand to greenlight a coup tells you something about the relationship. It also doesn't mean Diem wasn't a puppet, it means he forgot his place and found himself murdered for not satisfying his US "partners". To be sure, the "puppet" narrative was popularized in North Vietnamese propaganda and is a disparaging term which elides quite a bit of nuance. But it also draws our attention to something true. Evidently, Diem served at the pleasure of the US, and when they withdrew their support for an instant he fell from power. That Diem was cunning and had dreams and bit the hand that fed him doesn't change this. Indeed, the story of Diem's career is one of him trying to find a patron to install him in power.
There is no clear evidence the US installed Diem as leader leader of the State of Vietnam. Miller's main contention here is that no documentary evidence has come to light explicitly proving that they did, and furthermore even if the US did joystick Diem into power, the former Emperor Bao Dai would have chosen him anyways. I find this pretty lame and unconvincing. There's ample circumstantial evidence to suggest Diem was lobbying hard on three continents to be appointed to the role, while there's also readily available evidence that the Americans were actively looking for someone to take the role in a repeat of what they'd recently pulled off in the Philippines. I guess the thinking here is that if Diem convinced the US to back his selection or even nominate him for the role, then this means he rose to power on his own, which is one way of looking at it.
Finally, at times I found the book takes some digressions into the weeds of modernization theory and various programs which I found kind of dragged on, at least for me.
All and all, worth reading if you're very into the subject matter, but probably not for a general readership.
Miller has clearly done his homework and there are a number of great anecdotes and profiles which I quite enjoyed. Seeing that Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu was talking about a "clash of civilizations" a good few decades before Huntington popularized the term made me chuckle, as did learning that elements within Imperial Japan were lobbying to install Diem as Prime Minister in 1945, which I think tells you something about the man and his career. I also found Miller's telling of Diem's telling of his one and only encounter with Ho Chi Minh quite amusing, in which he basically states that he stared down Ho, spurned his offer of partnership and basically told him to go screw himself: "Am I a man who fears oppression or death?" - Considering he was literally Ho's prisoner at the time I suspect Diem might have been a little less bold then his recollection suggests.
There are a few main arguments Miller advances, I find all of them interesting and thought provoking to varying degrees, though I think all of them are probably overstated.
US nation-building in Vietnam. Miller's point that there was a broad effort of US national-building going on at the time around the world which was premised on modernization theory and which impacted how US engagement in Vietnam played out is interesting and well-taken. Miller does a great job of profiling the conflicting US and Vietnamese ideas for how Vietnam ought to modernize, with sometimes surprising results. Hearing Diem's brother Nhu talk about the necessity of a "social revolution" in the countryside in which "village bullies and tyrants be liquidated" sounds an awful lot like what the communists were talking about at this time. This is probably overstated though, I'm not sure I buy that the US had much of an interest in helping these countries modernize minus Cold War calculations.
Miller's point that there were also "contingent factors" (i.e. specific historical events and decisions) which shaped the US alliance with Diem is also well-taken. But again, I'm not sure this point or the point about nation-building really substantiates Miller's contention that "Cold War geostrategic calculations" are insufficient to explain the US alliance with Diem. Were they not? Especially when coupled with economic concerns, I think one could plausibly argue such geostrategic calculations were precisely and exclusively what led to US involvement in Vietnam, and had it not been Diem it would have been somebody else.
Diem was not a US puppet. This point about Diem being a puppet has become something like a straw man in the literature which it's mandatory to knock down a few times, so perhaps it's worth lingering on. It probably wasn't the knock out punch Miller thought it was when he wrote: "if he was a puppet why did the US want him removed?" - That the US could essentially wave its hand to greenlight a coup tells you something about the relationship. It also doesn't mean Diem wasn't a puppet, it means he forgot his place and found himself murdered for not satisfying his US "partners". To be sure, the "puppet" narrative was popularized in North Vietnamese propaganda and is a disparaging term which elides quite a bit of nuance. But it also draws our attention to something true. Evidently, Diem served at the pleasure of the US, and when they withdrew their support for an instant he fell from power. That Diem was cunning and had dreams and bit the hand that fed him doesn't change this. Indeed, the story of Diem's career is one of him trying to find a patron to install him in power.
There is no clear evidence the US installed Diem as leader leader of the State of Vietnam. Miller's main contention here is that no documentary evidence has come to light explicitly proving that they did, and furthermore even if the US did joystick Diem into power, the former Emperor Bao Dai would have chosen him anyways. I find this pretty lame and unconvincing. There's ample circumstantial evidence to suggest Diem was lobbying hard on three continents to be appointed to the role, while there's also readily available evidence that the Americans were actively looking for someone to take the role in a repeat of what they'd recently pulled off in the Philippines. I guess the thinking here is that if Diem convinced the US to back his selection or even nominate him for the role, then this means he rose to power on his own, which is one way of looking at it.
Finally, at times I found the book takes some digressions into the weeds of modernization theory and various programs which I found kind of dragged on, at least for me.
All and all, worth reading if you're very into the subject matter, but probably not for a general readership.
May 27, 2016
Một cuốn sách lịch sử tương đối khách quan về nền Đệ nhất VNCH và Tổng thông Ngô Đình Diệm
April 20, 2021
Clearly written and well researched, this is a narrative history of Ngô Đình Diệm’s journey to the presidency of South Vietnam and his eventual downfall and death in the coup of 1963. Edward Miller goes beyond the accepted, stereotypical view of Diệm as either an American puppet or an autocrat, showing him to be a shrewd and skilled political operative, with his own political philosophy rooted in his Catholic faith and the idea of a personalist revolution, balanced between communism and individualism.
Yet, Miller doesn’t write a hagiographic review of Diệm’s rule either. He is clear to show where Diệm resorted, too often, to autocratic tendencies, especially in how he misread the Buddhist crisis and his dealings with the National Assembly. Miller generally treats Diệm evenhandedly though his brother Ngô Đình Nhu and Nhu’s wife almost get a pass despite their own autocratic and thuggish tendencies that damaged the regime.
Diệm was definitely a much more complex figure than both North Vietnamese propaganda and American domestic politicians viewed him as. He was a committed nationalist and staunch anti-communist, with his own vision for a free Vietnam. The problems with the Americans came because of conflicting ideas on nation building that often failed to take heed of Diệm’s ideology and the situation in the countryside. This is a much-needed and valuable reässessment of Diệm and the early days of the RVN; the legacies of Diệm’s nation building and the Americans’ many attempts to steer and lead it still echo loudly both in Vietnam and in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in American politics today.
Yet, Miller doesn’t write a hagiographic review of Diệm’s rule either. He is clear to show where Diệm resorted, too often, to autocratic tendencies, especially in how he misread the Buddhist crisis and his dealings with the National Assembly. Miller generally treats Diệm evenhandedly though his brother Ngô Đình Nhu and Nhu’s wife almost get a pass despite their own autocratic and thuggish tendencies that damaged the regime.
Diệm was definitely a much more complex figure than both North Vietnamese propaganda and American domestic politicians viewed him as. He was a committed nationalist and staunch anti-communist, with his own vision for a free Vietnam. The problems with the Americans came because of conflicting ideas on nation building that often failed to take heed of Diệm’s ideology and the situation in the countryside. This is a much-needed and valuable reässessment of Diệm and the early days of the RVN; the legacies of Diệm’s nation building and the Americans’ many attempts to steer and lead it still echo loudly both in Vietnam and in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in American politics today.
October 2, 2024
Có lẽ mọi người quan tâm đến lịch sử Việt nam đều đòi hỏi khắt khe hơn ở một tác phẩm viết về Diêm, Nhu và Việt Nam cộng hòa giai đoạn 1954 – 1963 đặc biệt nó đến từ một tác giả Mỹ. Tuy nhiên dưới góc độ tham khảo cho người đọc thông thường thì tác phẩm theo tôi đã làm khá tốt. Không tập trung mô tả về cuộc chiến ý thức hệ giữa 2 miền Nam Bắc, tác phẩm trình bày những mánh khóe chính trị, cách thức quản trị quốc gia của Diêm, Nhu trong mối liên minh với Hoa Kỳ. Tác phẩm là kênh tham khảo cho người đọc hiểu thêm về tình trạng rối ren phe cánh của nền chính trị Sài Gòn , tính chất độc đoán và gia đình trị của Diêm, Nhu, những thất bại và thành công trong việc phát triển quốc gia đặc biệt là phát triển nông thôn thông qua các mô hình phát triển ở Cái Sắn, khu trù mật hay Ấp chiến lược Thất bại của Diệm Nhu theo tác giả có nguyên nhân sâu xa là do thất bại trong mối quan hệ với Hoa Kỳ Những khác biệt căn bản trong quan điểm về tự do dân chủ, chính trị đa nguyên, phát triển quốc gia đã dẫn đến đổ vỡ trong mối quan hệ giữa 2 bên mà kết cục là Diêm và Nhu đã phải trả giá bằng cả tính mạng của mình. Rất mong chờ những tác phẩm khác viết về giai đoạn này
November 16, 2019
4.5 stars
October 7, 2021
"Nếu miền Nam Việt Nam vẫn dưới sự "hỗ trợ" của Mỹ, liệu nó có trở thành một "Hàn Quốc" thứ hai?"
Tôi luôn nghe câu hỏi này vào nhiều thời điểm trong suốt thời gian học lịch sử, trao đổi bài vở với bạn bè. Bất cứ câu trả lời nào trên các hội nhóm đều chỉ ra rằng trước khi Miền Nam Việt Nam nghĩ đến viễn cảnh ấy, tình hình chính trị thời điểm đấy mới là thứ cần quan tâm hơn hết.
Cuốn sách của Edward Miller theo đuổi luận điểm mà ông đặt ra ngay từ đầu: Sự hình thành và rạn nứt mối quan hệ đồng minh Mỹ - Diệm không xuất phát từ bối cảnh chính trị, kinh tế hay văn hóa vào thời điểm đó. Nó xuất phát từ một số cá nhân nào của của Mỹ và Việt Nam.
Để đánh giá cuốn sách này được viết một cách trung lập hay không, cá nhân mình thấy rất khó. Nhưng nếu xét trên phương diện bài về lịch sử từ phía "bên thua cuộc" thì cuốn sách tạm ở ngưỡng gần như trung lập. Từ thời điểm đưa quân ra khỏi miền Nam Việt Nam, chính phủ Mỹ chưa bao giờ thừa nhân đây là cuộc chiến tranh phi nghĩa hay một cuộc chiến xâm lược, thay vào đó, Mỹ sử khái niệm chống Cộng (chế độ cộng sản) bành trước trong thời kì chiến tranh lạnh trở thành lý do đưa quân vào một nhà nước đã được công nhận bới Pháp. Đó có lẽ là tinh thần mà xuyên suốt cuốn sách của Miller, tôi cảm nhận rõ nhất - tránh đề cập những tính chất khác ngoài bất đồng giữa hai liên minh.
Quay lại với nội dung, Miller tập trung đưa ra các sự kiện chứng mình cho việc sụp đổ giữa hai nền chính trị xuất phát từ suy nghĩ của một số cá nhân trước bất kì một tư tưởng nào được đưa ra. Quy chung lại, nếu đọc cuốn sách theo hướng tiếp thu kiến thức, sẽ là một góc nhìn rộng hơn về người đứng đầu chính phủ miền Nam Việt Nam thời điểm đó. Còn nếu tiếp cận theo hướng tìm thêm bằng chứng về sự "thất bại" của một cá nhân nào đó, có lẽ cũng sẽ đạt được nốt. Đến đoạn này tôi viết bắt đầu khó hiểu rồi.
Nhìn chung có thể đánh giá cuốn sách cung cấp một lượng kiến thức, với tôi, lớn về tình hình miền Nam Việt Nam thời điểm bấy giờ. Ngôn từ chính trị được điều chỉnh dễ hiểu, phù hợp với mức độ nhận thức của cá nhân tôi. Đọc xong lại muốn đọc tiếp những cuốn khác về Việt Nam thời kì sau năm 1945.
Sách đáng đọc!
Tôi luôn nghe câu hỏi này vào nhiều thời điểm trong suốt thời gian học lịch sử, trao đổi bài vở với bạn bè. Bất cứ câu trả lời nào trên các hội nhóm đều chỉ ra rằng trước khi Miền Nam Việt Nam nghĩ đến viễn cảnh ấy, tình hình chính trị thời điểm đấy mới là thứ cần quan tâm hơn hết.
Cuốn sách của Edward Miller theo đuổi luận điểm mà ông đặt ra ngay từ đầu: Sự hình thành và rạn nứt mối quan hệ đồng minh Mỹ - Diệm không xuất phát từ bối cảnh chính trị, kinh tế hay văn hóa vào thời điểm đó. Nó xuất phát từ một số cá nhân nào của của Mỹ và Việt Nam.
Để đánh giá cuốn sách này được viết một cách trung lập hay không, cá nhân mình thấy rất khó. Nhưng nếu xét trên phương diện bài về lịch sử từ phía "bên thua cuộc" thì cuốn sách tạm ở ngưỡng gần như trung lập. Từ thời điểm đưa quân ra khỏi miền Nam Việt Nam, chính phủ Mỹ chưa bao giờ thừa nhân đây là cuộc chiến tranh phi nghĩa hay một cuộc chiến xâm lược, thay vào đó, Mỹ sử khái niệm chống Cộng (chế độ cộng sản) bành trước trong thời kì chiến tranh lạnh trở thành lý do đưa quân vào một nhà nước đã được công nhận bới Pháp. Đó có lẽ là tinh thần mà xuyên suốt cuốn sách của Miller, tôi cảm nhận rõ nhất - tránh đề cập những tính chất khác ngoài bất đồng giữa hai liên minh.
Quay lại với nội dung, Miller tập trung đưa ra các sự kiện chứng mình cho việc sụp đổ giữa hai nền chính trị xuất phát từ suy nghĩ của một số cá nhân trước bất kì một tư tưởng nào được đưa ra. Quy chung lại, nếu đọc cuốn sách theo hướng tiếp thu kiến thức, sẽ là một góc nhìn rộng hơn về người đứng đầu chính phủ miền Nam Việt Nam thời điểm đó. Còn nếu tiếp cận theo hướng tìm thêm bằng chứng về sự "thất bại" của một cá nhân nào đó, có lẽ cũng sẽ đạt được nốt. Đến đoạn này tôi viết bắt đầu khó hiểu rồi.
Nhìn chung có thể đánh giá cuốn sách cung cấp một lượng kiến thức, với tôi, lớn về tình hình miền Nam Việt Nam thời điểm bấy giờ. Ngôn từ chính trị được điều chỉnh dễ hiểu, phù hợp với mức độ nhận thức của cá nhân tôi. Đọc xong lại muốn đọc tiếp những cuốn khác về Việt Nam thời kì sau năm 1945.
Sách đáng đọc!
November 23, 2025
A tremendously readable book on South Vietnam under the Diem regime, centered on how its alliance with the US was shaped by conflicting visions of nationbuilding in the country. Reading about how various Americans perceived and understood the Diem regime, Diem's rise to power and his ability to weather the various crises he faced, and the failures of Diem's ideologically-driven countryside reform agenda is all very fascinating and presented in a very readable fashion akin to popular history. With its attention to the importance of a good narrative in history writing and the refreshingly high premium it places on understanding the Vietnamese perspective, most history writing could stand to learn from Miller's book.
May 16, 2014
Edward Miller's "Misalliance" is the finest book I have read on the controversial former President of South Vietnam. Miller's study of Diem is, what has been called by one historian, "a ground level approach"
That is to say Miller work is an in depth study of Diem and his American allies. Diem proves to be a much more complex and sophisticated individual than previously portrayed by Dennis Warner, Ellen Hammer and more recently by Seth Jacobs. Diem was not the "Last Mandarin" nor was he "America's Miracle Man in Asian". Diem was a strong nationalist who had established political ties throughout South Vietnam well before he returned from his American exile in 1954.
That is to say Miller work is an in depth study of Diem and his American allies. Diem proves to be a much more complex and sophisticated individual than previously portrayed by Dennis Warner, Ellen Hammer and more recently by Seth Jacobs. Diem was not the "Last Mandarin" nor was he "America's Miracle Man in Asian". Diem was a strong nationalist who had established political ties throughout South Vietnam well before he returned from his American exile in 1954.
September 1, 2014
This book is one of the few I've been able to find that actually has early biographical information on Diem, in ch. 1. It also argues well against the common theses that he was a puppet of the US and that he won his election by fraud rather than hard work.
July 6, 2016
Good book on the subject
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