What do you think?
Rate this book
Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal
This is the first paperback edition of the revisionist work about Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, who won his battles at sea but lost the war of public opinion. A surface warrior, Fletcher led the carrier forces in the Pacific that won against all odds at Coral Sea, Midway, and the Eastern Solomon's. Despite these successes, during the post-war Fletcher had become one of the most controversial figures in U.S. naval history and was portrayed as a timid bungler who failed to relieve Wake Island and who deliberately abandoned the Marines at Guadalcanal.
664 pages, Paperback
First published June 1, 2006
23 people are currently reading
145 people want to read
About the author
John B. Lundstrom
14 books14 followersJohn B. Lundstrom is Curator Emeritus of History at the Milwaukee Public Museum where he has worked since 1967.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
December 30, 2019
This is a book strictly for people obsessed with the Pacific Theater. It is an exhaustive and thorough account of Fletcher's nine months in command of carriers, from raids and simple fleet movements to the battles of the Coral Sea, Midway, and the Eastern Solomons. I cannot call it a great read because the detail is extreme, but that is the book's charm too. As a resource, it is invaluable, and the prose is better than most books that get this detailed.
Fletcher was wrongfully portrayed by historians and his contemporaries (many of them jealous or covering their errors) as cowardly, stupid, or at best cautious. Lundstrom lays that to rest, his finest part being a discussion of Fletcher's role at Midway. One thing in the book's corner is a lack of rancor. While Lundstrom dislikes how Turner, Sherman, and King treated Fletcher, he also notes they were talented. If there is one thing I fault the book for it is not being clear enough as to why Fletcher suffered this fate. To my mind it was his inability to form many close friendships. As such, he lacked loud defenders in the decades after World War II.
Fletcher was wrongfully portrayed by historians and his contemporaries (many of them jealous or covering their errors) as cowardly, stupid, or at best cautious. Lundstrom lays that to rest, his finest part being a discussion of Fletcher's role at Midway. One thing in the book's corner is a lack of rancor. While Lundstrom dislikes how Turner, Sherman, and King treated Fletcher, he also notes they were talented. If there is one thing I fault the book for it is not being clear enough as to why Fletcher suffered this fate. To my mind it was his inability to form many close friendships. As such, he lacked loud defenders in the decades after World War II.
September 8, 2017
The "Black Shoe" in the title refers to the fact that Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher was a surface ship (destroyers & cruisers) naval commander, as opposed to the "Brown Shoe" naval aviators that felt that they should be commanding aircraft carriers. Admiral Fletcher commanded carrier task forces sent to try to relieve the Marines at Wake Island, at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal. Admiral Fletcher's reputation suffered, both during and after the war. He's been accused of abandoning the Marines to their fate on Wake Island, abandoning the Marines at Guadalcanal by withdrawing his carriers, and being overcautious and obsessed with refueling his ships.
Ernest King, the naval commander in chief in Washington D.C. certainly had it in for Fletcher. Admiral Turner, in command of the transport and supply fleet at Guadalcanal & Tulagi, (who was never one to admit that he made a mistake) was an enemy of Fletcher. Several key naval historians also severely criticized Fletcher.
This book attempts a more objective review of Admiral Fletcher's actions. The author carefully reviewed both Japanese and American naval records and the interviews of key figures that were still alive. You will learn a lot about logistics, especially fuel supply, which played a critical role in several battles. You'll also see that American naval intelligence scored some major triumphs by breaking the Japanese naval code before Coral Sea & Midway, but changes in the Japanese naval code and other problems illustrate that the intelligence wasn't always right. Poor communications severely hampered Fletcher's options. Ship sightings weren't relayed in a timely manner or messages were sent but never received by Fletcher. The book does a good job showing how muddled the intelligence picture was during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. Many of these problems also affected the Japanese. You get the sense that a lot of the key battles were crap shoots that could have gone either way and were won or lost more due to luck than skillful planning.
Fletcher wasn't perfect. He made a mistake at Coral Sea by leaving the oiler Neosho and its escort destroyer Sims within range of Japanese land based planes. Both ships were sunk. On the other hand, Fletcher was one of the most experienced American carrier commanders in 1942. His planes on the Yorktown and those on the Enterprise were responsible for sinking the Japanese carriers at Midway. Marc Mitscher (who went on to be very successful as a carrier task force commander in 1944-45) sent his planes on Hornet off in the wrong direction at Midway.
The author makes a compelling case that Fletcher did a good job given all the limitations imposed on him and that he deserves more credit.
This is a long book and can be slow going at times when the author digs down into the technical details, but I recommend it to anyone who is interested in naval warfare in the Pacific in World War II.
Ernest King, the naval commander in chief in Washington D.C. certainly had it in for Fletcher. Admiral Turner, in command of the transport and supply fleet at Guadalcanal & Tulagi, (who was never one to admit that he made a mistake) was an enemy of Fletcher. Several key naval historians also severely criticized Fletcher.
This book attempts a more objective review of Admiral Fletcher's actions. The author carefully reviewed both Japanese and American naval records and the interviews of key figures that were still alive. You will learn a lot about logistics, especially fuel supply, which played a critical role in several battles. You'll also see that American naval intelligence scored some major triumphs by breaking the Japanese naval code before Coral Sea & Midway, but changes in the Japanese naval code and other problems illustrate that the intelligence wasn't always right. Poor communications severely hampered Fletcher's options. Ship sightings weren't relayed in a timely manner or messages were sent but never received by Fletcher. The book does a good job showing how muddled the intelligence picture was during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. Many of these problems also affected the Japanese. You get the sense that a lot of the key battles were crap shoots that could have gone either way and were won or lost more due to luck than skillful planning.
Fletcher wasn't perfect. He made a mistake at Coral Sea by leaving the oiler Neosho and its escort destroyer Sims within range of Japanese land based planes. Both ships were sunk. On the other hand, Fletcher was one of the most experienced American carrier commanders in 1942. His planes on the Yorktown and those on the Enterprise were responsible for sinking the Japanese carriers at Midway. Marc Mitscher (who went on to be very successful as a carrier task force commander in 1944-45) sent his planes on Hornet off in the wrong direction at Midway.
The author makes a compelling case that Fletcher did a good job given all the limitations imposed on him and that he deserves more credit.
This is a long book and can be slow going at times when the author digs down into the technical details, but I recommend it to anyone who is interested in naval warfare in the Pacific in World War II.
March 27, 2009
An absolutely excellent book from John Lundstrom. More than any other book I've read, it gives a thoroughly detailed description of the early USN carrier operations, and provides a well-crafted defense of RADM Fletcher. Lundstrom takes great pains to illustrate exactly who knew what during the course of the early WW2 carrier battles, and how communication miscues, misunderstandings, and misperceptions (helped in great measure by postwar historians) to unfairly paint RADM Fletcher as a bumbler and/or coward.
April 4, 2022
Deep research, as I expected from Lundstrom. He worked hard to repair the tarnished reputation of one of America's better naval leaders.
June 18, 2022
Well-researched, thorough book that provides a more in-depth insight into the key early (carrier) engagements of the Pacific War.
"The common perception of an historical figure is far more influential than reality itself"
This, the first line of Lundstrom's conclusion is in my opinion the main reason you should read this book.
He provides great insight into how clashing egos, hindsight/post-action knowledge, and political backstabbery can easily build up a rather imprecise image. Sure, Fletcher did have faults, and made wrong calls during his career - and the book does not shy from pointing these out. What Lundstrom does is to provide context for these questionable calls, and in almost all cases it goes back to the available information being either incorrect or late, mostly thanks to weather or technical bottlenecks.
Or simply to the tiredness of an officer who was practically constantly on the frontlines, fought the early decisive battles of the Pacific on essentially a shoestring budget, without the huge task forces and carrier/plane numbers that the US fielded from late '43 onwards.
All in all, great book.
"The common perception of an historical figure is far more influential than reality itself"
This, the first line of Lundstrom's conclusion is in my opinion the main reason you should read this book.
He provides great insight into how clashing egos, hindsight/post-action knowledge, and political backstabbery can easily build up a rather imprecise image. Sure, Fletcher did have faults, and made wrong calls during his career - and the book does not shy from pointing these out. What Lundstrom does is to provide context for these questionable calls, and in almost all cases it goes back to the available information being either incorrect or late, mostly thanks to weather or technical bottlenecks.
Or simply to the tiredness of an officer who was practically constantly on the frontlines, fought the early decisive battles of the Pacific on essentially a shoestring budget, without the huge task forces and carrier/plane numbers that the US fielded from late '43 onwards.
All in all, great book.
October 25, 2017
An in-depth look at Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher as a task force carrier commander in the most important sea battles of the Second World War. John B. Lundstrom is a historian who is an expert on the time period that the book clovers.
Lundstrom has done extensive research of original documents and resources from this time period. He did not rely on the work of previous authors. In fact, he goes into a fair amount of detail about why his high opinion of the performance of Amiral Fletcher differs from many others. Reading the well-researched book will allow you to determine for yourself the competency of this Navy hero.
Lundstrom has done extensive research of original documents and resources from this time period. He did not rely on the work of previous authors. In fact, he goes into a fair amount of detail about why his high opinion of the performance of Amiral Fletcher differs from many others. Reading the well-researched book will allow you to determine for yourself the competency of this Navy hero.
July 8, 2024
Interesting
This tries to objectively look at the WWII record of Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher who is mostly unknown to the history of the war in the pacific thanks to a campaign to blacklist him from it.
I feel though that it ends up being rather tedious and does little to contribute to his legacy.
This tries to objectively look at the WWII record of Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher who is mostly unknown to the history of the war in the pacific thanks to a campaign to blacklist him from it.
I feel though that it ends up being rather tedious and does little to contribute to his legacy.
May 29, 2017
A bit tedious in places, this book defends Frank Jack Fletcher, who fought the first carrier battles in the Pacific.
July 25, 2017
A fair attempt to polish the reputation of Adm. Fletcher
March 2, 2024
An exceptional book. Reveals bias, and bitter infighting in the US Navy before, during and after WWII, which resulted in an unjustified smearing of Admiral Fletcher's reputation.
May 13, 2016
I initially wrote this review for cv5yorktown.com, a website I maintain about the history of the aircraft carrier USS Yorktown (CV-5). Black Shoe Carrier Admiral covers the career of Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, a man closely tied to U.S.S. Yorktown and her career. He moved his flag to her in early 1942 and stayed with her until her loss at Midway. Lundstrom’s book focuses heavily on the first year of the war in the Pacific, and does so at a very high command level. Unlike many WWII histories, this book is much less of the day to day of maintaining and fighting a ship, and a lot more about the intelligence and decisions that brought the ships to the battles. I have to admit that when I first started reading the book, it didn’t hold my attention too well. I like books about specific characters, and while Fletcher is the man followed in this telling, it isn’t as close and personal as Lundstrom’s treatment of the individual fighter pilots in his First Team books. I missed that closeness and familiarity. There is something interesting, though, in reading about the Battle of Midway not as a blow-by-blow of the aircraft hurtling towards the Japanese carriers, but rather as an account of the radio messages coming into Yorktown‘s radio room and the attempts to decipher what it all meant. It’s amazing to see how little Fletcher and Yorktown knew of what Spruance was doing with the other American carriers at Midway, Enterprise and Hornet, even though at times during the battle they came within sight of each other.
Once I got through my initial misgivings of the book, though, I found a lot to like. I am a fan of Fletcher’s and believe that he has been the U.S. Navy and Marine’s scapegoat for the past 70 years. The military always has to blame someone for losses and mistakes (failed reinforcement of Wake Island, Yorktown‘s loss, Savo Island) and Fletcher was a convenient target as he was simply there. Lundstrom points out that the reason Fletcher was there to take all the blame was because Admiral Nimitz trusted him with the aircraft carriers, even though he was a “black shoe” admiral (trained in surface warfare, not aviation). As a result of being trusted and being thrust into a command position that few wanted, Fletcher blazed a trail for those who would follow, and established the carrier doctrine that would be used throughout the war and beyond. Lundstrom clearly shows why Fletcher did what he did and, more importantly, offers examples of others who concurred with Fletcher’s actions at the time, as well as calling out those who changed their stories after the war, in order to paint Fletcher in a less than flattering light.
One of the more interesting takes from Fletcher’s bloody learning curve of the first six to nine months of the war comes from how he is often criticized for refueling excessively. Few of those that criticize him for that, however, bother to cite that pre-war figures for escorting destroyer’s fuel use were off by as much seventy percent (yes, that’s right. They had the numbers wrong by SEVENTY PERCENT), and the admirals and captains found themselves stuck with ships that needed to fuel every few days, at a time when there just weren’t enough oilers to go around. I've studied the war in the Pacific for many years and have never seen these figures cited before.
One aspect of this book that really opened my eyes, that I also I have not seen covered in detail elsewhere, is how much was still simply unknown at the start of the war. The Battle of the Coral Sea was essentially both sides stumbling around with limited current intelligence trying to find each other, and then lashing out as hard and as fast as they could. If the Battle of Friday the Thirteenth off Guadalcanal six months later was “A bar room brawl with all the lights turned out”, then the bulk of the action at Coral Sea can be surmised as the participants stumbling around trying to find the door before they even got into the bar. I really got the sense, for the first time ever while reading about Coral Sea, of how haphazard an event it was. Another eye-opener was how long it took to disseminate information. It's nearly impossible to comprehend, in an instant-information age such as now, that it was nearly a full day after the initial clash at Midway on June 4th, 1942, before Fletcher had a clear picture of how many Japanese carriers were even involved, much less how many of them had been destroyed.
At 638 pages long, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral is a big honkin’ book. It’s packed full of information that you won’t find anywhere else. Presented with Lundstrom’s usual flair for research and putting the words on the page, this is a highly recommended title for those interested in U.S.S. Yorktown, Admiral Fletcher, and the formation of carrier tactics during the first year of WWII in the Pacific.
Once I got through my initial misgivings of the book, though, I found a lot to like. I am a fan of Fletcher’s and believe that he has been the U.S. Navy and Marine’s scapegoat for the past 70 years. The military always has to blame someone for losses and mistakes (failed reinforcement of Wake Island, Yorktown‘s loss, Savo Island) and Fletcher was a convenient target as he was simply there. Lundstrom points out that the reason Fletcher was there to take all the blame was because Admiral Nimitz trusted him with the aircraft carriers, even though he was a “black shoe” admiral (trained in surface warfare, not aviation). As a result of being trusted and being thrust into a command position that few wanted, Fletcher blazed a trail for those who would follow, and established the carrier doctrine that would be used throughout the war and beyond. Lundstrom clearly shows why Fletcher did what he did and, more importantly, offers examples of others who concurred with Fletcher’s actions at the time, as well as calling out those who changed their stories after the war, in order to paint Fletcher in a less than flattering light.
One of the more interesting takes from Fletcher’s bloody learning curve of the first six to nine months of the war comes from how he is often criticized for refueling excessively. Few of those that criticize him for that, however, bother to cite that pre-war figures for escorting destroyer’s fuel use were off by as much seventy percent (yes, that’s right. They had the numbers wrong by SEVENTY PERCENT), and the admirals and captains found themselves stuck with ships that needed to fuel every few days, at a time when there just weren’t enough oilers to go around. I've studied the war in the Pacific for many years and have never seen these figures cited before.
One aspect of this book that really opened my eyes, that I also I have not seen covered in detail elsewhere, is how much was still simply unknown at the start of the war. The Battle of the Coral Sea was essentially both sides stumbling around with limited current intelligence trying to find each other, and then lashing out as hard and as fast as they could. If the Battle of Friday the Thirteenth off Guadalcanal six months later was “A bar room brawl with all the lights turned out”, then the bulk of the action at Coral Sea can be surmised as the participants stumbling around trying to find the door before they even got into the bar. I really got the sense, for the first time ever while reading about Coral Sea, of how haphazard an event it was. Another eye-opener was how long it took to disseminate information. It's nearly impossible to comprehend, in an instant-information age such as now, that it was nearly a full day after the initial clash at Midway on June 4th, 1942, before Fletcher had a clear picture of how many Japanese carriers were even involved, much less how many of them had been destroyed.
At 638 pages long, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral is a big honkin’ book. It’s packed full of information that you won’t find anywhere else. Presented with Lundstrom’s usual flair for research and putting the words on the page, this is a highly recommended title for those interested in U.S.S. Yorktown, Admiral Fletcher, and the formation of carrier tactics during the first year of WWII in the Pacific.
December 27, 2010
Lundstrom does an exellent job of one of ww2 most underated Adm. Well researched as all Lunstom histories are.
May 12, 2012
Well balanced look at Black Shoe admiral who had to learn how to fight carriers when the odds were against us!
Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews