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Kaigun
One of the great spectacles of modern naval history is the Imperial Japanese Navy's instrumental role in Japan's rise from an isolationist feudal kingdom to a potent military empire stridently confronting, in 1941, the world's most powerful nation. Years of painstaking research and analysis of previously untapped Japanese-language resources have produced this remarkable history of the navy's dizzying development, tactical triumphs, and humiliating defeat. Unrivaled in its breadth of coverage and attention to detail, this important new study explores the foreign and indigenous influences on the navy's thinking about naval warfare and how to plan for it. Focusing primarily on the much-neglected period between the world wars, David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, two widely esteemed historians, persuasively explain how the Japanese failed to prepare properly for the war in the Pacific despite an arguable advantage in capability.
696 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1997
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 33 reviews
June 11, 2020
Kaigun is an important read for someone with both a strong background and a keen interest in naval history and the Pacific War. In great detail it goes through the history of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) from Perry's Black Ships right up to (but excluding) the Pacific War. It’s a history of men, organizations, machines and doctrine. Doctrine includes the evolution of strategy and tactics. I had several revelations on 19th and early 20th century naval history reading this book.
However, this book is not perfect. The level of detail can vary, sometimes greatly between the sections, although it is generally quiet high. The book has a laser focus on the IJN. Yet it purposefully avoids details of Imperial Japanese: politics, diplomacy and the Army that greatly affected the IJN during its history. A reader without a background in late 19th to early 20th century Japanese Imperial history will only benefit from a small part of this book. Having written that, to a serious student of late 19th and early 20th century naval history this is a must read.
In general, the book was well edited. The book's prose is good. It is less technically dense than strictly militarily-authored works I’ve read. Very occasionally I found awkward sentence constructions, but information was conveyed in a clear and unambiguous fashion.
Use of maps was good. I would have liked there to have been more and more detailed maps. In addition, I would have liked them to have used standard military symbols.
Diagrams usage was excellent. I found myself poring at length over the ship and aircraft diagrams.
Chart and graph usage was fair. Some were not immediately understandable to me. Their usage would have benefited from some information design and data visualization analysis. Compared to the quality of the maps and diagrams the charts and graphs appeared amateurish.
The authors wrote this book to describe the IJN’s organization, technology, strategy and tactics. To this end, they were very successful. I felt they were most successful in describing the: technology, strategy and tactics. The organization somewhat less so. In particular there was a concentration on the air and surface ship arms of the IJN. Any issues I have with these are merely quibbles.
A quibbling example would be, is that without Japanese language or cultural training, the IJN’s ship naming conventions will be opaque. Most western naval historians understand the naming conventions used for 19th and early 20th century American warships. For example, an American ship named Arizona is immediately recognized as a battleship (BB) because it’s a US state name. The IJN’s convention was more complex. For example, the Shōkaku-class fleet carriers might translate to the Crane-class after the waterfowl with mythical Japanese significance. The authors did explain the naming of the Yamato-class battleships but no other ship classes received this attention.
The discussion of the IJN’s submarine service was more detailed than any I’ve ever encountered. However, it was considerably less detailed than the air or surface ship discussions. For example, still left largely unexplained was why despite having German Allies and earlier observing WWI submarine tactics wolfpacking and preying on the extensive supply train the Americans was never adopted as part of overall strategy?
An area I thought was not covered adequately was the effect of geography on strategy and logistics. Study of additional smaller scaled maps was called-for by me to understand the progressive construction of IJN home islands fleet bases and air stations. In addition, the final evolution of the attritive strategy against the American advance across the Pacific was dependent on island airfields fortified with land based naval bombers. The the entirety of the: names, locations and the operation of this interlocking network of island naval bases and airfields were never described. Truk being an exception.
My great caution over this book is that the authors break the link between “cause and effect”. This book is about the Navy. They took a very parochial approach to the IJN’s story to keep their page count manageable. You will find a superb discussion of the Battle of Tsushima Strait. However, the IJN was greatly affected by Japanese: politics, diplomacy and the IJN’s nemesis the Imperial Japanese Army. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 had at least as much effect on the development of the IJN as the Battle of Tsushima Strait. The authors decline to delve into the politics of the naval limitation treaties despite their effect on naval construction. A reader who is not cognizant of late 19th and early 20th century world and Japanese history is frequently going to be left wondering, Why did they (the IJN) do it that way?
Finally, the IJN’s story is about men, machines and organizations in contention. The IJN spanned almost one hundred years in a time of rapid technological and political change. The book was a worthwhile read for someone interested in naval history and the lead-up to the Pacific War. The narrative is authoritative in the changes in the IJN’s : military technology, organizational behavior, strategy and tactics for the period covered, which is just short of the Pacific War. However, to get a full(er) picture of the IJN previous knowledge of late 19th and early 20th century Imperial Japanese diplomatic and political history is needed .
Readers of this book may also be interested in: War Plan Orange: The U. S. Strategy To Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 by Edward S. Mille (my review).
However, this book is not perfect. The level of detail can vary, sometimes greatly between the sections, although it is generally quiet high. The book has a laser focus on the IJN. Yet it purposefully avoids details of Imperial Japanese: politics, diplomacy and the Army that greatly affected the IJN during its history. A reader without a background in late 19th to early 20th century Japanese Imperial history will only benefit from a small part of this book. Having written that, to a serious student of late 19th and early 20th century naval history this is a must read.
In general, the book was well edited. The book's prose is good. It is less technically dense than strictly militarily-authored works I’ve read. Very occasionally I found awkward sentence constructions, but information was conveyed in a clear and unambiguous fashion.
Use of maps was good. I would have liked there to have been more and more detailed maps. In addition, I would have liked them to have used standard military symbols.
Diagrams usage was excellent. I found myself poring at length over the ship and aircraft diagrams.
Chart and graph usage was fair. Some were not immediately understandable to me. Their usage would have benefited from some information design and data visualization analysis. Compared to the quality of the maps and diagrams the charts and graphs appeared amateurish.
The authors wrote this book to describe the IJN’s organization, technology, strategy and tactics. To this end, they were very successful. I felt they were most successful in describing the: technology, strategy and tactics. The organization somewhat less so. In particular there was a concentration on the air and surface ship arms of the IJN. Any issues I have with these are merely quibbles.
A quibbling example would be, is that without Japanese language or cultural training, the IJN’s ship naming conventions will be opaque. Most western naval historians understand the naming conventions used for 19th and early 20th century American warships. For example, an American ship named Arizona is immediately recognized as a battleship (BB) because it’s a US state name. The IJN’s convention was more complex. For example, the Shōkaku-class fleet carriers might translate to the Crane-class after the waterfowl with mythical Japanese significance. The authors did explain the naming of the Yamato-class battleships but no other ship classes received this attention.
The discussion of the IJN’s submarine service was more detailed than any I’ve ever encountered. However, it was considerably less detailed than the air or surface ship discussions. For example, still left largely unexplained was why despite having German Allies and earlier observing WWI submarine tactics wolfpacking and preying on the extensive supply train the Americans was never adopted as part of overall strategy?
An area I thought was not covered adequately was the effect of geography on strategy and logistics. Study of additional smaller scaled maps was called-for by me to understand the progressive construction of IJN home islands fleet bases and air stations. In addition, the final evolution of the attritive strategy against the American advance across the Pacific was dependent on island airfields fortified with land based naval bombers. The the entirety of the: names, locations and the operation of this interlocking network of island naval bases and airfields were never described. Truk being an exception.
My great caution over this book is that the authors break the link between “cause and effect”. This book is about the Navy. They took a very parochial approach to the IJN’s story to keep their page count manageable. You will find a superb discussion of the Battle of Tsushima Strait. However, the IJN was greatly affected by Japanese: politics, diplomacy and the IJN’s nemesis the Imperial Japanese Army. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 had at least as much effect on the development of the IJN as the Battle of Tsushima Strait. The authors decline to delve into the politics of the naval limitation treaties despite their effect on naval construction. A reader who is not cognizant of late 19th and early 20th century world and Japanese history is frequently going to be left wondering, Why did they (the IJN) do it that way?
Finally, the IJN’s story is about men, machines and organizations in contention. The IJN spanned almost one hundred years in a time of rapid technological and political change. The book was a worthwhile read for someone interested in naval history and the lead-up to the Pacific War. The narrative is authoritative in the changes in the IJN’s : military technology, organizational behavior, strategy and tactics for the period covered, which is just short of the Pacific War. However, to get a full(er) picture of the IJN previous knowledge of late 19th and early 20th century Imperial Japanese diplomatic and political history is needed .
Readers of this book may also be interested in: War Plan Orange: The U. S. Strategy To Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 by Edward S. Mille (my review).
December 6, 2019
This is a massive and sprawling book, considered the best on the Imperial Japanese Navy. I have to agree. Evans and Peattie are fair to the Japanese, documenting strengths and weaknesses, and the evolution of doctrine, strategy, and technology and the interconnection between them, as well as Japanese culture. Yamamoto, now often seen as borderline incompetent, is treated with a fairness one rarely sees today. Same is true for their take on the design of the Yamato class battleships.
The book is not for the faint of heart, but the prose is better than expected and illustrations are wonderful. The book avoids the common pitfalls of hindsight. This is military history at its peak.
The book is not for the faint of heart, but the prose is better than expected and illustrations are wonderful. The book avoids the common pitfalls of hindsight. This is military history at its peak.
June 21, 2024
One critic pointed out that this was the book the US Navy needed in World War II. This portrait and narrative of the former Imperial Japanese Navy from its founding in the Meiji era up until the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack is the definitive work. As with so many other institutions and accoutrements of modernity, the Japanese quickly established themselves as a major naval power, at first with foreign-built (mostly British) ships but the Japanese, having sent bright young officers abroad to study, rapidly developed their own shipyards. Just as important was the growth of a forward-thinking and technically-adept officer corps, whose tactical and strategic thinking was amongst the best in the world, and these men and their ships would prove themselves and defeat the Chinese (25 July 1894 – 17 April 1895) and Russian (1904-05) navies. Kaigun (the name refers to Dai-Nippon Teikoku Kaigun 'Navy of the Greater Japanese Empire', or 日本海軍 Nippon Kaigun, 'Japanese Navy') delves deeply into ship and weapon designs, and is richly illustrated with beautifully-drawn ship views and other pictures and charts. Most interesting was the authors' takes on how the Japanese saw their strategic problems and how they expected to fight; the influence of the victory over the Russians at Tsu-Shima on Japan's strategy in the Second World War was her obsession with the "decisive battle." Perhaps best of all was the sharp and savvy prose, which made the most technical of subjects pleasurable reads. Potential readers might want to take note: this volume is not lightly picked up, or even carried. Some might say that it crosses the line between non-fiction and reference but don't let that deter you. I know that there are many on this page with a serious interest in WWII in the Pacific, and this book will provide much information on Japan's naval development and why they fought the way they did, for better or worse. The authors are to be commended for bringing all this information together and presenting it in such a reader-friendly volume. The result is a rich and brilliant narrative of the rise and development, both technological and intellectual, of a modern military force. There is a separate volume on the development of IJN aviation by Mark Peattie entitled Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909-1941.
July 31, 2018
When it comes to history books, there are good ones and there are great ones. And then there are a few that are truly groundbreaking in their ability to take a subject that has been studied before and address it with such insight that it changes fundamentally the way we think about it. This is one of those books. For in describing the development of the Imperial Japanese Navy from the late 19th century to the attack on Pearl Harbor David Evans and Mark Peattie offers readers a revolutionary look at the thinking and planning that defined the shape of the Pacific War (as the war against the United States and the European imperial powers is called in Japan) before its first shot was ever fired.
Perhaps one of the most surprising things about the Imperial Japanese Navy is how relatively late it was established, for in spite of being an island nation Japan had no naval arm. This changed after the Meiji Restoration, as Japan began to look outward for the first time in centuries. Quickly appreciating the importance of naval arms to national power, the Japanese created a naval force tasked with protecting its shores. Turning to the British the Japanese not only brought over advisers from there to train their officers but purchased many of its first vessels from its shipbuilders — a necessary step given the undeveloped state of Japanese industry at that time.
By the 1890s the Japanese possessed a small but respectable force, yet the navy still was junior to the army in both status and planning. This changed with Japan's wars of expansion, first with China in 1894-5, then with Russia ten years later. It was then that the Imperial Japanese Navy shifted from a coastal-defense role to one designed to project Japanese power in accordance with the dominant Western strategic thinking of that time. Japan's navy impressed observers with their performance in these two wars, especially with their defeat of the Russians. Here Evans and Peattie stress the importance of the battle of Tsushima both in establishing the navy's reputation and in defining its subsequent thinking. The clash was decisive in ending Russia's hopes for victory in the Russo-Japanese War, and — even more significantly — cemented the idea of the kantai kessen, or decisive battle, in Japanese naval thinking, which would define both the development of the IJN for the remainder of its existence and its conduct of the war against the United States forty years later.
This path was set virtually from the start. For the first decades of its existence Japanese naval strategists regarded regional powers — first China, then Russia — as their most likely opponents. Having defeated both countries, and with an alliance with Great Britain securely in place the United States now became the most likely opponent in a future war. Japan's response to international trends, from the arms races of the 1910s to the arms control treaties of the 1920s were shaped by this, as were ideas about warship design. This did not necessarily have to lead to war, but as Japan contemplated further expansion of its empire it always did so with an eye towards a possible challenge from the Americans, and prepared accordingly.
The result was a fleet designed to defeat the United States Navy in accordance with kantai kessen. Accepting that the United States would possess an unavoidable numerical advantage, the Japanese emphasized quality in naval design and the development of weapons such as the "Long Lance" torpedo and tactics such as night-time fighting that would offset the Americans' superior numbers. These were tested in maneuvers that sometimes cost lives, but resulted in a force which was ready to implement doctrine in practice when war came. The opportunity arose first in China in 1937; here Evans and Peattie stress the often underappreciated advantage four years of combat experience gave the IJN at the start of their conflict with the United States -- experience which the United States would offset only after months of bloody lessons in the South Pacific in 1942 and 1943.
Evans and Peattie conclude their book with a short chapter summarizing the impact of this development on Japan's conduct of the Pacific War. Yet the relative brevity of this section understates the value of this book for readers interested in the Japanese Navy's performance in the Second World War. This is by far the single best book in English on the history of the Imperial Japanese Navy, one that is likely to remain the definitive text on the subject and necessary reading for anyone who wants to learn about Japanese military history or the development of naval combat in the Pacific during the war.
Perhaps one of the most surprising things about the Imperial Japanese Navy is how relatively late it was established, for in spite of being an island nation Japan had no naval arm. This changed after the Meiji Restoration, as Japan began to look outward for the first time in centuries. Quickly appreciating the importance of naval arms to national power, the Japanese created a naval force tasked with protecting its shores. Turning to the British the Japanese not only brought over advisers from there to train their officers but purchased many of its first vessels from its shipbuilders — a necessary step given the undeveloped state of Japanese industry at that time.
By the 1890s the Japanese possessed a small but respectable force, yet the navy still was junior to the army in both status and planning. This changed with Japan's wars of expansion, first with China in 1894-5, then with Russia ten years later. It was then that the Imperial Japanese Navy shifted from a coastal-defense role to one designed to project Japanese power in accordance with the dominant Western strategic thinking of that time. Japan's navy impressed observers with their performance in these two wars, especially with their defeat of the Russians. Here Evans and Peattie stress the importance of the battle of Tsushima both in establishing the navy's reputation and in defining its subsequent thinking. The clash was decisive in ending Russia's hopes for victory in the Russo-Japanese War, and — even more significantly — cemented the idea of the kantai kessen, or decisive battle, in Japanese naval thinking, which would define both the development of the IJN for the remainder of its existence and its conduct of the war against the United States forty years later.
This path was set virtually from the start. For the first decades of its existence Japanese naval strategists regarded regional powers — first China, then Russia — as their most likely opponents. Having defeated both countries, and with an alliance with Great Britain securely in place the United States now became the most likely opponent in a future war. Japan's response to international trends, from the arms races of the 1910s to the arms control treaties of the 1920s were shaped by this, as were ideas about warship design. This did not necessarily have to lead to war, but as Japan contemplated further expansion of its empire it always did so with an eye towards a possible challenge from the Americans, and prepared accordingly.
The result was a fleet designed to defeat the United States Navy in accordance with kantai kessen. Accepting that the United States would possess an unavoidable numerical advantage, the Japanese emphasized quality in naval design and the development of weapons such as the "Long Lance" torpedo and tactics such as night-time fighting that would offset the Americans' superior numbers. These were tested in maneuvers that sometimes cost lives, but resulted in a force which was ready to implement doctrine in practice when war came. The opportunity arose first in China in 1937; here Evans and Peattie stress the often underappreciated advantage four years of combat experience gave the IJN at the start of their conflict with the United States -- experience which the United States would offset only after months of bloody lessons in the South Pacific in 1942 and 1943.
Evans and Peattie conclude their book with a short chapter summarizing the impact of this development on Japan's conduct of the Pacific War. Yet the relative brevity of this section understates the value of this book for readers interested in the Japanese Navy's performance in the Second World War. This is by far the single best book in English on the history of the Imperial Japanese Navy, one that is likely to remain the definitive text on the subject and necessary reading for anyone who wants to learn about Japanese military history or the development of naval combat in the Pacific during the war.
September 22, 2022
I think this fascinating book is best described by the following quote from the Mystery Science Theatre 3000 movie...
Crow: Believe me, Mike, I calculated the odds of this succeeding against the odds I was doing something incredibly stupid… and I went ahead anyway.
If the IJN is of interest to you, you can't really do better. Still an important work 25 years or so after it was originally published.
Crow: Believe me, Mike, I calculated the odds of this succeeding against the odds I was doing something incredibly stupid… and I went ahead anyway.
If the IJN is of interest to you, you can't really do better. Still an important work 25 years or so after it was originally published.
June 29, 2025
Didn't finish entirely, but read this for my revolutions in military affairs class. First heavy non-fiction book I have touched in a while. Taught me so much about Japanese history and culture and was a great primer before my trip. Helped me understand a lot of the culture now and how they go about doing things. Need to do more research on the War. It changed everyone everywhere.
December 17, 2012
This was a very enjoyable read. The author's writing style made it flow very smoothly and it wasn't a chore. Another aspect of the book that made it so good was how the author seamlessly transitioned between the three levels of war and described how each level impacted the other. The most significant portions of the book were on the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, and the author does an outstanding job in showing how these experiences significantly impacted the IJN up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, which mirrored the attack on Port Arthur in so many ways. The development of improved torpedo design and improved naval design of battleships and aircraft carriers was shown to play a significant role in the development strategy, and the author demonstrated its impact on IJN operations in the late 30s and early 40s. Overall an excellent book which shows the enduring influence of Corbett and Mahan.
August 12, 2021
An excellent study of the rise of the Imperial Japanese Navy and how their rigid pre-war decisions, doctrines, and failure to plan for a long term war was the main factors for their defeat in WW2. It is an important read if you have an a serious interest in WW2, especially in naval warfare and / or the war in the Pacific. I would also encourage reading Miller’s book, “War Plan Orange” to see the other side of the coin with American’s 30+ years planning a naval war with Japan. I have not read one of these authors follow up book to this one about the rise of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s air power, “Sunburst”, but if it is like this book, then it will be well worth the read.
November 14, 2017
This is an excellent book. It does not go into specific battles or campaigns of the Second World War but it does a fantastic job describing the birth, growth and maturation of the Imperial Japanese Navy to the eve of the Second World War. The evolution of strategy, tactics and military philosophy and views are discussed in great detail. Many of the key figures as well as previously lesser known ones and their respective impact are discussed. My favorites parts were the evolution of weapons systems such as their torpedoes and carrier doctrine.
May 5, 2020
A detailed, very well-written and thorough examination of strategy, tactics and technology in the Japanese Navy between 1887 and 1941, also including discussions of the years prior to, and the two years immediately following, this period.
While well researched and often exhibiting considerable depth in its discussion, it’s also particularly strong as it is suitably presented to be accessible to people with relatively little knowledge of naval tactics, technology, history or warship design. The scope of the book is also exceptional, touching on auxiliary warships, naval intelligence, logistics, personnel and the rivalry with the Imperial Japanese Army, as well as the strategy, tactics and technology.
It’s not perfect, however, and there are some issues when the authors stray aware from their key areas of expertise. When discussing issues relating to the RN, the authors (in company with many US naval historians that focus more on the Pacific War) more-often-than-I’d expect stray into commonly but incorrectly held myths. The discussion on warship design is generally sound, but at times not as informed as it could be, occasionally making statements that stretch the truth, and on at least one occasion getting things outright incorrect (there were good reasons for the Japanese Navy to procede with a mixed main battery for Kawachi and Settsu despite their awareness of the complications of different length 12 inch guns in the main battery – see the article on the class in Warship 2017). While generally sound, the sections on warship design and development are the weakest in the book (particularly the comparisons between Japanese designs and those in other navies).
These are relatively small issues though, as the book is neither intended as a design history, nor a work on the RN. The characteristics of the Japanese warships are accurately relayed, with appropriate focus on their key features, and how these related to Japanese strategy and doctrine. The developments of strategy (often driven by political rivalries and nationalism) are well explained (and the hostile point of view of the Japanese militarists towards both the treaty limitations and submarines used for commerce reading are placed in their context here, whereas they’re frequently misrepresented in other books), and the information on tactics (and the factors driving it) is insightful. The author’s use of a range of Japanese sources is particularly helpful.
There are also more than a few issues of editing when it comes to fact, either in the main text or the appendix of biographies at the back, with numerous inconsistencies of rank and year between the two. While these don’t take away from the core argument of the work, it is disappointing. The editing of things I was familiar with was sound, however, and the grammatical editing excellent.
It is a well illustrated work given that its not the focus, with portrait photographs of key personalities, maps of key areas, track charts of key battles and diagrams of tactical plans and formations. Further, the quality of writing and the structure of the information is excellent, with the writing both at the sentence, paragraph and sub-chapter level guiding the reader through and forming a cohesive discussion. Sections within each chapter are helpfully broken up into sub-headings (although, sadly, these sub-headings are not listed in the table of contents). There’s also an appendix with brief biographies of key people in the Japanese Navy in the period covered by the book, extensive (and informative) notes, an extensive bibliography and a 28-page index, which is to be commended.
All-in-all, it’s an excellent piece of work, and read for an understanding of Japanese strategic, tactical and technological developments as a whole between 1887-1941, and the people behind them, as well as the consequences of those developments, it’s best-in-class. Pretty much required reading for anyone looking to understand the Imperial Japanese Navy of the period, or the first half of the naval conflict in the Pacific during World War II. However, the biographical editing errors and lack of attention to detail in some points mean that its best read for its broad scope, and should not be taken as authoritative when it comes to technical or biographical data (indeed, it is not internally consistent with its biographical information!). I still rate it 4.5 stars, rounding up to five, because it’s a work of broad strategic argument rather than detailed fact.
While well researched and often exhibiting considerable depth in its discussion, it’s also particularly strong as it is suitably presented to be accessible to people with relatively little knowledge of naval tactics, technology, history or warship design. The scope of the book is also exceptional, touching on auxiliary warships, naval intelligence, logistics, personnel and the rivalry with the Imperial Japanese Army, as well as the strategy, tactics and technology.
It’s not perfect, however, and there are some issues when the authors stray aware from their key areas of expertise. When discussing issues relating to the RN, the authors (in company with many US naval historians that focus more on the Pacific War) more-often-than-I’d expect stray into commonly but incorrectly held myths. The discussion on warship design is generally sound, but at times not as informed as it could be, occasionally making statements that stretch the truth, and on at least one occasion getting things outright incorrect (there were good reasons for the Japanese Navy to procede with a mixed main battery for Kawachi and Settsu despite their awareness of the complications of different length 12 inch guns in the main battery – see the article on the class in Warship 2017). While generally sound, the sections on warship design and development are the weakest in the book (particularly the comparisons between Japanese designs and those in other navies).
These are relatively small issues though, as the book is neither intended as a design history, nor a work on the RN. The characteristics of the Japanese warships are accurately relayed, with appropriate focus on their key features, and how these related to Japanese strategy and doctrine. The developments of strategy (often driven by political rivalries and nationalism) are well explained (and the hostile point of view of the Japanese militarists towards both the treaty limitations and submarines used for commerce reading are placed in their context here, whereas they’re frequently misrepresented in other books), and the information on tactics (and the factors driving it) is insightful. The author’s use of a range of Japanese sources is particularly helpful.
There are also more than a few issues of editing when it comes to fact, either in the main text or the appendix of biographies at the back, with numerous inconsistencies of rank and year between the two. While these don’t take away from the core argument of the work, it is disappointing. The editing of things I was familiar with was sound, however, and the grammatical editing excellent.
It is a well illustrated work given that its not the focus, with portrait photographs of key personalities, maps of key areas, track charts of key battles and diagrams of tactical plans and formations. Further, the quality of writing and the structure of the information is excellent, with the writing both at the sentence, paragraph and sub-chapter level guiding the reader through and forming a cohesive discussion. Sections within each chapter are helpfully broken up into sub-headings (although, sadly, these sub-headings are not listed in the table of contents). There’s also an appendix with brief biographies of key people in the Japanese Navy in the period covered by the book, extensive (and informative) notes, an extensive bibliography and a 28-page index, which is to be commended.
All-in-all, it’s an excellent piece of work, and read for an understanding of Japanese strategic, tactical and technological developments as a whole between 1887-1941, and the people behind them, as well as the consequences of those developments, it’s best-in-class. Pretty much required reading for anyone looking to understand the Imperial Japanese Navy of the period, or the first half of the naval conflict in the Pacific during World War II. However, the biographical editing errors and lack of attention to detail in some points mean that its best read for its broad scope, and should not be taken as authoritative when it comes to technical or biographical data (indeed, it is not internally consistent with its biographical information!). I still rate it 4.5 stars, rounding up to five, because it’s a work of broad strategic argument rather than detailed fact.
January 31, 2019
Superb analysis about the military preparedness within the global context of Japanese society. The authors provide lucid explanations for the strategic choices made by Japanese leaders. Oil was an achille's heel for Japan and an immediate cause of war. The authors demonstrate that the Japanese military leadership underestimated logistics and their inability to replace capital ships and pilots as major sources of defeat. The book Japan 1941 by Eri Hotta provides a complementary view of the political context to the decision making process for going to war. The decision to go to war was based on some weak assumptions that could not or would not be properly questioned at the time. Both sides made military errors but Japan had no possibility to recover from any strategic blunder just as the battle of Midway showed.
February 11, 2023
Kaigun. The word means “navy” in Japanese. And no, it's not a story about what known now as Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) it was a story about its predecessor, Nihon Teikoku Kaigun. Which once upon a time hailed as the mightiest among the mightiest. A king of the kings. A force to be reckoned with.
At the time, Japanese naval aviation was world-class (arguably the best in the world at that time) its ships were among the world’s finest, and its crews unquestionably the best trained and most experienced in the world.
This is a tale of how Kaigun rose and how they eventually fell. It encompasses everything you need to know about Kaigun. It sure gets boring at one point, but I still like it.
At the time, Japanese naval aviation was world-class (arguably the best in the world at that time) its ships were among the world’s finest, and its crews unquestionably the best trained and most experienced in the world.
This is a tale of how Kaigun rose and how they eventually fell. It encompasses everything you need to know about Kaigun. It sure gets boring at one point, but I still like it.
January 2, 2025
Truly one of the most comprehensive texts on the Imperial Japanese Navy's tactical and doctrinal evolution that you can find. It's important to note that this book is not so concerned with the political evolutions of the service except in reference to the impact on war planning, doctrine, and acquisitions. I'm surprised by how insightful I find this work to my overall understanding of the path from the Meijin Revolution to WWII. There are direct lines of misinterpreted success taken from Yalu and Tsushima that ultimately led to the Navy's unraveling in the war of the Pacific. Even if you want to study these political evolutions more than just ship design, this book is worth a read.
February 20, 2025
Extremely well written. Closely covers the development of the Imperial Japanese Navy as an organization, including its outlook, technology, and structure. Relatively easy to read, and well paced. I recommend some prior study into world, and specifically East Asian and Oceanic history before reading the book, as the book is at its best when put into context with the broader development of Imperial Japan. Best part of the book comes in the last third, with the discussion of the flaws that led to the IJN’s annihilation in WW2.
July 19, 2020
Detailed book that actually debunked some of the things I was taught in grad school about the Imperial Japanese Navy. I really enjoyed learning about the new technologies the Japanese developed and perfected as well as the tactics that made them a formidable enemy in the Pacific War. It was also interesting to learn what caused the downfall of the Japanese Navy (and it's not just sheer numbers of American forces, though that definitely played a role). Definitely a great read!
September 26, 2024
A great book that offers an in-depth look at the development and ultimate downfall of the Imperial Japanese Navy. The authors detail how Japan transformed from having no formal navy before 1853 (Commodore Perry's arrival) to building a formidable naval force. However, internal issues—such as interservice rivalry with the army, outdated naval doctrine, and the lack of a cohesive grand strategy—contributed to their defeat in the Pacific War. A really important and fantastic case study!
April 24, 2025
This book is a bit dry but it gives a fascinating and detailed view of the evolution of the Japanese navy from its foundation to just before the Pacific War. Behaviors and doctrine that seems strange from our modern perspective becomes very reasonable when seen from the point of view of the IJN during this period, and understanding this is a key to getting a deeper understanding of Japanese actions during the war. Highly recommend.
August 10, 2018
Great book. Filled in a lot of gap I had from only reading western oriented history. Recommended.
September 19, 2019
Read this book several years ago. I highly recommend it. Very thorough, showing how the Japanese deluded themselves into losing the empire they created.
January 7, 2022
Extremely clear prose. Fascinating subject.
August 4, 2022
Simply a must-read for any WW2 naval history initiates.
October 18, 2022
Doesn't read like a novel but lots of interesting information.
October 21, 2023
Fantastic book!
July 1, 2024
Excellent analysis of the Imperial Navy, from its birth through its death in WWII. I would strongly recommend it to any professional military officer.
February 13, 2012
Outstanding in both scope and readability, this brilliant volume covers the entire history of the Imperial Japanese Navy from the moment Perry's Black Ships entered Tokyo Bay and opened Japan to the world to the return of the US Navy to the same body of water nearly 100 years later, this time in the form of the USS Missouri arriving to receive Japan's formal surrender, in 1945. The main focus is the period from the Sino-Japanese War, when the new fleet first saw action until just before the fateful attack on Pearl Harbor. The authors cover every pertinent detail, from the personalities, weapons systems and tactics to the role of culture and spirit, that led to the initial success, and ultimate defeat, of the Imperial Japanese Navy. A first rate history and essential reading for any student of the Pacific War.
February 11, 2024
A must-read for any student of military affairs. The subtitle could easily be expanded to include people, politics and culture, that is how broad the outlook on the development of the IJN is.
November 11, 2019
Let’s start by acknowledging this book isn’t so much a book but a technical manual for carrier warfare. I read this because it was an oft cited source for another book on Midway I read and decided to go for it.
The level of research and detail the authors manage, along with the good job balancing fairness to the Japanese is an impressive feat. I would definitely recommend this book to someone with a strong interest in WW2 naval history.
The level of research and detail the authors manage, along with the good job balancing fairness to the Japanese is an impressive feat. I would definitely recommend this book to someone with a strong interest in WW2 naval history.
June 9, 2011
Eloquently written treatment of the rise of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Lots of good maps and line drawings of ships. Focuses on the development of strategy, especially that for the early defeat of the USN, and of the development of battleships, carrier aviation, and submarines. The only game in town on this topic.
March 27, 2014
So to summarize, the Japanese had a plan for a war that was really a plan for a battle. A plan in which the US react the way the Japanese predicted and not deviate in any way. There was also willful ignorance of US industrial capacity. The key takeaway: between 1942 and 1945, the IJN commissioned ~500,000 tons of warships while the USN commissioned 3,000,000+ tons.
March 27, 2012
This was a long and detailed slog to read. I think the best summary is in the epilogue, stating that the IJN failed to prepare for war, per se, but prepared almost exclusively for battle.
I expect to use it for reference at some future date.
I expect to use it for reference at some future date.
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