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Harpers Ferry Armory and the New Technology: The Challenge of Change
Focusing on the day-to-day operations of the U.S. armory at Harpers Ferry, Virginia, from 1798 to 1861, this book shows what the "new technology" of mechanized production meant in terms of organization, management, and worker morale. A local study of much more than local significance, it highlights the major problems of technical innovation and social adaptation in antebellum America.
Merritt Roe Smith describes how positions of authority at the armory were tied to a larger network of political and economic influence in the community; how these relationships, in turn, affected managerial behavior; and how local social conditions reinforced the reactions of decision makers. He also demonstrates how craft traditions and variant attitudes toward work vis-a-vis New England created an atmosphere in which the machine was held suspect and inventive activity was hampered.
Of central importance is the author's analysis of the drastic differences between Harpers Ferry and its counterpart, the national armory at Springfield, Massachusetts, which played a pivotal role in the emergence of the new technology. The flow of technical information between the two armories, he shows, moved in one direction only north to south. "In the end," Smith concludes, "the stamina of local culture is paramount in explaining why the Harpers Ferry armory never really flourished as a center of technological innovation."
Pointing up the complexities of industrial change, this account of the Harpers Ferry experience challenges the commonly held view that Americans have always been eagerly receptive to new technological advances.
"
Merritt Roe Smith describes how positions of authority at the armory were tied to a larger network of political and economic influence in the community; how these relationships, in turn, affected managerial behavior; and how local social conditions reinforced the reactions of decision makers. He also demonstrates how craft traditions and variant attitudes toward work vis-a-vis New England created an atmosphere in which the machine was held suspect and inventive activity was hampered.
Of central importance is the author's analysis of the drastic differences between Harpers Ferry and its counterpart, the national armory at Springfield, Massachusetts, which played a pivotal role in the emergence of the new technology. The flow of technical information between the two armories, he shows, moved in one direction only north to south. "In the end," Smith concludes, "the stamina of local culture is paramount in explaining why the Harpers Ferry armory never really flourished as a center of technological innovation."
Pointing up the complexities of industrial change, this account of the Harpers Ferry experience challenges the commonly held view that Americans have always been eagerly receptive to new technological advances.
"
- GenresHistory
364 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1977
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January 15, 2018
In his "Introduction," Smith points to labor saving machinery is America's genius. As Hindle and Lubar describe in their Engines of Change, for many reasons, mechanization found a welcome environment in the United States. As early as 1842, the year the Tsar commissioned the construction of a railroad, America was exporting technology to Europe. The 1851 Crystal Palace Exhibition in London demonstrated that American technology had come of age, especially with the production of small arms based upon interchangeable parts manufacture. Dubbed the "American System," by the British, the evolution of this armory practice in the US is the subject of Smith's study. Recounting what we already know about the impact of work discipline on time, culture and society, he points to arms manufacture as a place where industrialization threatened to bastardize craft. Having studied the armory at Harpers Ferry, he argues that "the story of Harper's Ferry, most notably the efforts of its inhabitants to preserve accustomed life styles and practices in the wake of accelerating technology, presents a microcosmic view of the industrial revolution which is perhaps more suggestive of America's bittersweet relationship with the machine than many historians have heretofore recognized." (p. 21)
The very selection of the site at Harper's Ferry was from the beginning an exercise of regional interest. As we learn in "Regional Interests and Military Needs: Founding the 'Mother Arsenal,' 1794-1801," George Washington selected the site for the armory to foster the local economy in the western part of Virginia and to help in building the environment for a "Great Federal City" along the Potomac River. Opposition from the war department made the process drag on slowly, with purchase and work on a canal and dam progressing slowly. In keeping with the localism of this frontier-like location, the man chosen for the work gave the work to less-than-capable locals -- and this slowed the process down quite a bit. In the end, they turned to the Army to complete the canal, with federal troops being stationed at Harper's Ferry to work on the canal.
In "The Craft Origins of Production, 1798-1816," we learn that the armorers who worked at the Ferry were mostly from the Pennsylvania craft community. Indeed "the roster of early armorers at Harpers Ferry reads like a 'Who's Who' of Pennsylvania gun making." (p. 59) Sustaining their craft tradition through the apprenticeship system, many young boys came to Harper's Ferry to learn the trade to 1809. At that time, however, the introduction of the piece-rate accounting procedures began the bastardization of the craft. Viewing the workers at the armory through Thompson, he points to the impact of time and work discipline on the armory workers. Though they worked hard, the armorers did it at their own pace. Preindustrial culture at Harper's Ferry included drinking and brawling at the workplace. They resisted the trend toward becoming machine tenders, instead insisting on the ability to make a complete product - "lock, stock and barrel." (p. 67)
Though the superintendent of the Harper's Ferry Armory, James Stubblefield, attempted to the put in place the division of labor and time accounting practices pioneered at Springfield, by 1820 Harper's Ferry had fallen way behind Springfield in productivity. Smith explains the cultural reasons for this in "Production, Labor and Management, 1801-1816." It came down to craft resistance to the new system "So long as craft-trained artisans occupied key decision-making positions a the factory, the likelihood of substituting machinery for traditional hand methods was remote." (p. 84) "Early Manufacturing Techniques, 1816" pioneered at Springfield were only half heartedly implemented at Harper's Ferry, if at all.
The "Cooperation between the Armories, 1815-1829" was very much a result of the personal and professional relationship between their superintendents. Roswell Lee, superintendent at Springfield, was a devotee of mechanization. Working in close concert with Colonel George Bomford, head of Army Ordinance, he implemented a series of "go-no go" gages for weapons components. On many occasions Lee sent armorers of Harper's Ferry and invited Stubblefield to the Springfield arsenal. The Blanchard Lathe, developed under contract for the Springfield Armory and producing major improvements in production there, was resisted mightily at Harper's Ferry upon its introduction.
We learn a great deal about Harper's Ferry's Superintendent Stubblefield in "James Stubblefield: Virginia Entrepreneur, 1815-1829." He came from a local gentry family and sought above all to foster the local economy, with which he was tied by birth, marriage and other kinship ties. The local community was tied together by paternalistic bonds which made it absolutely essential that Stubblefield dispense patronage to suit local political needs as opposed to heeding the demands of Washington for mechanization and greater efficiency. In particular, he clashed with Colonel George Bomford, the Army's head of ordinance, who insistently pushed Stubblefield to put national over local goals. If he disliked Bomford, he liked David D. Hall even less. Sent by the ordinance department in 1819 to head up a new rifle works, Hall was a Yankee mechanic will ties to Secretary of War Calhoun. From the very start he clashed with Stubblefield. Both former employees and jilted vendors complained to the War Dept. and to Congress about corrupt practices at Harper's Ferry. As a result Stubblefield's last years at the armory witnessed a good deal of outside criticism, which hardly sat well with xenophobic Harper's Ferry. Beset by a set of investigations by committees appointed by the federal government that produced critical reports, Stubblefield had the pleasure of adding Hall to his growing list of "outside" critics. Though the Wool Commission absolved Stubblefield of wrongdoing, a second investigation found his inept (though not criminal), it was a bumpy ride for the last few years.
In "John H. Hall: Yankee in the Garden, 1819-1841," we learn about this enterprising mechanic from Maine, who build a coalition of influential lobbyists to get an army contract to build his breach loading rifle. After a great deal of persistent lobbying, he got the contract to produce rifles as a private contractor at Harper's Ferry in 1919. Setting up shop at Harper's Ferry, Hall encountered technical and political difficulties. Stubblefield demanded an inquiry by Secretary of War Barbour. The committee came back with a glowing report in 1826. A difficult man on a personal level, he was driven by his devotion to the idea of interchangeability and actually succeeded in producing the elusive technical feat of interchangeability. Though his rifles were never cheaper for the Army than hand crafted ones. That was never the goal.
In "Hall and the American System, 1824-1840," Smith summarizes Hall's importance -- "John H. Hall stood foremost among those who combined inventiveness with entrepreneurial skill in blending men, machinery, and precision measurement methods into a workable system of production. The achievement formed the taproot of American industrialism." (p. 21() To achieve this he put a great deal of emphasis on machine making and quality controls. Instead of employing the Blanchard lathe, he built his own custom lathe. The result of his use of machines was, as the craft-oriented armorers around him at Harper's Ferry feared, that he could employ inexperienced boys to do their jobs.
In "Politics and Technology, 1829-1859," Smith discusses the continuing saga of localism in conflict with national goals and the jockeying of the factions to protect their positions. Harper's Ferry is turned over to military control but not before one of the superintendents is killed by a disaffected former employee. As a result of local protest and jockeying for position in Washington, the armory returns to civilian hands right before John Brown's raid occurs. "The Community in Crisis, 1859-1861" recounts the events of the raid and its aftermath, including the construction of the Richmond Armory that would serve the Confederacy.
In his final chapter he reviews the reasons why Springfield modernized and Harper's Ferry did not. "Cultural Conditions and Technological Change: In Retrospect" could be read as an explanation of why the Confederacy started with one hand tied behind their backs. The persistence of localism and the craft tradition in the south seems one more set of reasons for the South's inability to match the north in the war of production that ran through the course of the Civil War.
The very selection of the site at Harper's Ferry was from the beginning an exercise of regional interest. As we learn in "Regional Interests and Military Needs: Founding the 'Mother Arsenal,' 1794-1801," George Washington selected the site for the armory to foster the local economy in the western part of Virginia and to help in building the environment for a "Great Federal City" along the Potomac River. Opposition from the war department made the process drag on slowly, with purchase and work on a canal and dam progressing slowly. In keeping with the localism of this frontier-like location, the man chosen for the work gave the work to less-than-capable locals -- and this slowed the process down quite a bit. In the end, they turned to the Army to complete the canal, with federal troops being stationed at Harper's Ferry to work on the canal.
In "The Craft Origins of Production, 1798-1816," we learn that the armorers who worked at the Ferry were mostly from the Pennsylvania craft community. Indeed "the roster of early armorers at Harpers Ferry reads like a 'Who's Who' of Pennsylvania gun making." (p. 59) Sustaining their craft tradition through the apprenticeship system, many young boys came to Harper's Ferry to learn the trade to 1809. At that time, however, the introduction of the piece-rate accounting procedures began the bastardization of the craft. Viewing the workers at the armory through Thompson, he points to the impact of time and work discipline on the armory workers. Though they worked hard, the armorers did it at their own pace. Preindustrial culture at Harper's Ferry included drinking and brawling at the workplace. They resisted the trend toward becoming machine tenders, instead insisting on the ability to make a complete product - "lock, stock and barrel." (p. 67)
Though the superintendent of the Harper's Ferry Armory, James Stubblefield, attempted to the put in place the division of labor and time accounting practices pioneered at Springfield, by 1820 Harper's Ferry had fallen way behind Springfield in productivity. Smith explains the cultural reasons for this in "Production, Labor and Management, 1801-1816." It came down to craft resistance to the new system "So long as craft-trained artisans occupied key decision-making positions a the factory, the likelihood of substituting machinery for traditional hand methods was remote." (p. 84) "Early Manufacturing Techniques, 1816" pioneered at Springfield were only half heartedly implemented at Harper's Ferry, if at all.
The "Cooperation between the Armories, 1815-1829" was very much a result of the personal and professional relationship between their superintendents. Roswell Lee, superintendent at Springfield, was a devotee of mechanization. Working in close concert with Colonel George Bomford, head of Army Ordinance, he implemented a series of "go-no go" gages for weapons components. On many occasions Lee sent armorers of Harper's Ferry and invited Stubblefield to the Springfield arsenal. The Blanchard Lathe, developed under contract for the Springfield Armory and producing major improvements in production there, was resisted mightily at Harper's Ferry upon its introduction.
We learn a great deal about Harper's Ferry's Superintendent Stubblefield in "James Stubblefield: Virginia Entrepreneur, 1815-1829." He came from a local gentry family and sought above all to foster the local economy, with which he was tied by birth, marriage and other kinship ties. The local community was tied together by paternalistic bonds which made it absolutely essential that Stubblefield dispense patronage to suit local political needs as opposed to heeding the demands of Washington for mechanization and greater efficiency. In particular, he clashed with Colonel George Bomford, the Army's head of ordinance, who insistently pushed Stubblefield to put national over local goals. If he disliked Bomford, he liked David D. Hall even less. Sent by the ordinance department in 1819 to head up a new rifle works, Hall was a Yankee mechanic will ties to Secretary of War Calhoun. From the very start he clashed with Stubblefield. Both former employees and jilted vendors complained to the War Dept. and to Congress about corrupt practices at Harper's Ferry. As a result Stubblefield's last years at the armory witnessed a good deal of outside criticism, which hardly sat well with xenophobic Harper's Ferry. Beset by a set of investigations by committees appointed by the federal government that produced critical reports, Stubblefield had the pleasure of adding Hall to his growing list of "outside" critics. Though the Wool Commission absolved Stubblefield of wrongdoing, a second investigation found his inept (though not criminal), it was a bumpy ride for the last few years.
In "John H. Hall: Yankee in the Garden, 1819-1841," we learn about this enterprising mechanic from Maine, who build a coalition of influential lobbyists to get an army contract to build his breach loading rifle. After a great deal of persistent lobbying, he got the contract to produce rifles as a private contractor at Harper's Ferry in 1919. Setting up shop at Harper's Ferry, Hall encountered technical and political difficulties. Stubblefield demanded an inquiry by Secretary of War Barbour. The committee came back with a glowing report in 1826. A difficult man on a personal level, he was driven by his devotion to the idea of interchangeability and actually succeeded in producing the elusive technical feat of interchangeability. Though his rifles were never cheaper for the Army than hand crafted ones. That was never the goal.
In "Hall and the American System, 1824-1840," Smith summarizes Hall's importance -- "John H. Hall stood foremost among those who combined inventiveness with entrepreneurial skill in blending men, machinery, and precision measurement methods into a workable system of production. The achievement formed the taproot of American industrialism." (p. 21() To achieve this he put a great deal of emphasis on machine making and quality controls. Instead of employing the Blanchard lathe, he built his own custom lathe. The result of his use of machines was, as the craft-oriented armorers around him at Harper's Ferry feared, that he could employ inexperienced boys to do their jobs.
In "Politics and Technology, 1829-1859," Smith discusses the continuing saga of localism in conflict with national goals and the jockeying of the factions to protect their positions. Harper's Ferry is turned over to military control but not before one of the superintendents is killed by a disaffected former employee. As a result of local protest and jockeying for position in Washington, the armory returns to civilian hands right before John Brown's raid occurs. "The Community in Crisis, 1859-1861" recounts the events of the raid and its aftermath, including the construction of the Richmond Armory that would serve the Confederacy.
In his final chapter he reviews the reasons why Springfield modernized and Harper's Ferry did not. "Cultural Conditions and Technological Change: In Retrospect" could be read as an explanation of why the Confederacy started with one hand tied behind their backs. The persistence of localism and the craft tradition in the south seems one more set of reasons for the South's inability to match the north in the war of production that ran through the course of the Civil War.
August 31, 2014
A. Synopsis: Answering the central question of How did the US move from a European technological dependent to a worldwide leader, this book focuses on the daily operations of the US armory at Harpers Ferry, Virginia from 1798 to 1861. Essentially it remained “aloof” from the new industrial forces. This is opposite from the other national armory in Springfield which was at the forefront of the American System. Some of the problems that Harpers Ferry endured was bad location, poor administration (except for the period from 1841 to 1854 when it was run by the military. This book challenges the convention view that technology was greeted with open arms by Americans. This book is a social history that uses policy to examine technology. The policy was to set up an armory for the national governments weapons supply.
B. Regional interests and military needs; Founding the mother arsenal, 1794-1801
1. Prior to 1794 the government received their arms through private contracts. This system had many faults and they decided to build a national arsenal
2. This large arsenal was to be located in Harpers Ferry
3. Harpers Ferry greatest liability was its location. It was isolated in the mountains and all equipment had to be hauled 100 miles to get there.
4. The provincial attitudes of the residents also opposed the government infringing
C. The craft origins of production, 1798-1816
1. The model 1803 rifle was the first rifle to be manufactured by the armory
2. This rifle had a great deal of hand craft work on it
3. It was hand-crafted because a significant number of the workers had previously been artisans and craftsmen from Pennsylvania
4. These workers were task oriented (socialize, drink whiskey, work till the job was done) rather than time oriented
5. Because so many men were part of the craft ethos they found it difficult to adjust to the demands of industrial civilization
D. Production, labor and management, 1801-1816
1. There was little growth between 1801-16 due mainly to Jefferson’s restrictive fiscal program to reduce the national debt
2. With the Nonimportation Act (1806) and conflict erupting between England and France, production was stepped up
3. James Stubblefield was hired to increase the size of the armory. He also introduced division of labor
4. There was also a labor problem during this period (recruiting, retaining, unhealthy climate hot, cold, and wet)
E. Early manufacturing techniques, 1816
1. In 1815 the Springfield armory was smaller and outproducing Harpers Ferry
2. This chapter reviews the technology of arms manufacturing
3. Discussion of the 4 main parts of the rifle; lock, stock, barrel, mounting
4. Work on the lock was divided and mechanized.
5. The stock was a one man, hand wrought operation.
6. Barrel making consisted of 14 separate jobs
7. In the adoption of new manufacturing techniques, Stubblefield and Harpers Ferry fell behind Springfield
F. Cooperation between the armories, 1815-1829
1. Springfield prospered from gaining a flow of information about technological developments
2. Harpers Ferry located among the rocks and mountains did not benefit from such a flow. This reinforced provincial attitudes.
3. In 1815 the Ordnance Department (an agency for the inspection and distribution of military supplies) gained control of both Springfield and HF
4. The ordnance department was interested in the “uniformity system” and increased standards of manufacturing
5. Establishment of standards was a very difficult task
6. The ordnance department did stress close cooperation between the 2 armories as they shared men, machines, and raw materials
7. This sharing most clearly benefited HF while Springfield only borrowed a description of a forge furnace at HF
G. James Stubblefield: Virginia entrepreneur, 1815-1828
1. Stubblefield spent 22 erratic years at the armory (1807-1829)
2. From 1807-15 he did a good job and was somewhat of an innovator introducing division of labor, piece rates, and increased machines
3. All of this changed when the Ordnance department took over
4. IN 1815 when significant changes were occurring at Springfield Stubblefield became wary of outsiders and took a conservative technological approach
5. He developed outside entrepreneurial business interests and began to dissociate himself from armory affairs
6. Despite the cooperation between the armories he could not close the technological gap in the 1820s
H. John H. Hall: Yankee in the Garden, 1819-1841
1. Government operation do not by nature discourage mechanical creativity
2. A case of this is Hall who labored for 20 years under special contract at Harpers Ferry
3. Hall introduced a breech loading rifle
4. In 1820 the separate rifle works was established
5. It was praised as the best rifle available and military officers claimed that it was fully interchangeable
6. The rifle works had independent status until 1834 when it was placed under the ordnance department
I. Hall and the American System, 1824-1840
1. Hall made the greatest contribution to the American System (division of labor, change from craft to factory production)
2. This chapter discusses his tools and machines
3. He was celebrated as being the first to put the uniformity system into practical operation
4. Hall built most all of his own machines
5. Many others adopted his techniques and machinery. When his employees left they took his techniques with them
J. Politics and Technology, 1829-1859
1. Those who presided over the armory had little administrative experience
2. Spoils minded Jacksonians applied for positions at the armory
3. Inept superintendents occurred with the Van Buren administration
4. When the armory was downsized good laborers were fired as political sympathizers were kept
5. Paymasters and clerks often used armory funds for their own business
6. This state of affairs produced serious discontent with the ordnance department. By 1841 it was a serious embarrassment to the military
7. This was compounded by strikes in 1846 by artisans who complained about the devaluation of their own skills
8. A rebuilding process began including the new waterworks, workshops, machinery, and ended in 1854
9. The Ordnance dept. was delighted. The rebuilding occurred under control of the military led by Colonel Hughes
K. The community in crisis, 1859-61
1. In 1859 John Brown and other insurgents invaded HF
2. The town regrouped and attacked them
3. Brown was hailed as a saint for his abolitionist stance
4. The town remained in crisis from 1860-61 as it feared other Northern abolitionists might live in town
5. At the outset of the war the Confederate army confiscated the equipment at the armory
B. Regional interests and military needs; Founding the mother arsenal, 1794-1801
1. Prior to 1794 the government received their arms through private contracts. This system had many faults and they decided to build a national arsenal
2. This large arsenal was to be located in Harpers Ferry
3. Harpers Ferry greatest liability was its location. It was isolated in the mountains and all equipment had to be hauled 100 miles to get there.
4. The provincial attitudes of the residents also opposed the government infringing
C. The craft origins of production, 1798-1816
1. The model 1803 rifle was the first rifle to be manufactured by the armory
2. This rifle had a great deal of hand craft work on it
3. It was hand-crafted because a significant number of the workers had previously been artisans and craftsmen from Pennsylvania
4. These workers were task oriented (socialize, drink whiskey, work till the job was done) rather than time oriented
5. Because so many men were part of the craft ethos they found it difficult to adjust to the demands of industrial civilization
D. Production, labor and management, 1801-1816
1. There was little growth between 1801-16 due mainly to Jefferson’s restrictive fiscal program to reduce the national debt
2. With the Nonimportation Act (1806) and conflict erupting between England and France, production was stepped up
3. James Stubblefield was hired to increase the size of the armory. He also introduced division of labor
4. There was also a labor problem during this period (recruiting, retaining, unhealthy climate hot, cold, and wet)
E. Early manufacturing techniques, 1816
1. In 1815 the Springfield armory was smaller and outproducing Harpers Ferry
2. This chapter reviews the technology of arms manufacturing
3. Discussion of the 4 main parts of the rifle; lock, stock, barrel, mounting
4. Work on the lock was divided and mechanized.
5. The stock was a one man, hand wrought operation.
6. Barrel making consisted of 14 separate jobs
7. In the adoption of new manufacturing techniques, Stubblefield and Harpers Ferry fell behind Springfield
F. Cooperation between the armories, 1815-1829
1. Springfield prospered from gaining a flow of information about technological developments
2. Harpers Ferry located among the rocks and mountains did not benefit from such a flow. This reinforced provincial attitudes.
3. In 1815 the Ordnance Department (an agency for the inspection and distribution of military supplies) gained control of both Springfield and HF
4. The ordnance department was interested in the “uniformity system” and increased standards of manufacturing
5. Establishment of standards was a very difficult task
6. The ordnance department did stress close cooperation between the 2 armories as they shared men, machines, and raw materials
7. This sharing most clearly benefited HF while Springfield only borrowed a description of a forge furnace at HF
G. James Stubblefield: Virginia entrepreneur, 1815-1828
1. Stubblefield spent 22 erratic years at the armory (1807-1829)
2. From 1807-15 he did a good job and was somewhat of an innovator introducing division of labor, piece rates, and increased machines
3. All of this changed when the Ordnance department took over
4. IN 1815 when significant changes were occurring at Springfield Stubblefield became wary of outsiders and took a conservative technological approach
5. He developed outside entrepreneurial business interests and began to dissociate himself from armory affairs
6. Despite the cooperation between the armories he could not close the technological gap in the 1820s
H. John H. Hall: Yankee in the Garden, 1819-1841
1. Government operation do not by nature discourage mechanical creativity
2. A case of this is Hall who labored for 20 years under special contract at Harpers Ferry
3. Hall introduced a breech loading rifle
4. In 1820 the separate rifle works was established
5. It was praised as the best rifle available and military officers claimed that it was fully interchangeable
6. The rifle works had independent status until 1834 when it was placed under the ordnance department
I. Hall and the American System, 1824-1840
1. Hall made the greatest contribution to the American System (division of labor, change from craft to factory production)
2. This chapter discusses his tools and machines
3. He was celebrated as being the first to put the uniformity system into practical operation
4. Hall built most all of his own machines
5. Many others adopted his techniques and machinery. When his employees left they took his techniques with them
J. Politics and Technology, 1829-1859
1. Those who presided over the armory had little administrative experience
2. Spoils minded Jacksonians applied for positions at the armory
3. Inept superintendents occurred with the Van Buren administration
4. When the armory was downsized good laborers were fired as political sympathizers were kept
5. Paymasters and clerks often used armory funds for their own business
6. This state of affairs produced serious discontent with the ordnance department. By 1841 it was a serious embarrassment to the military
7. This was compounded by strikes in 1846 by artisans who complained about the devaluation of their own skills
8. A rebuilding process began including the new waterworks, workshops, machinery, and ended in 1854
9. The Ordnance dept. was delighted. The rebuilding occurred under control of the military led by Colonel Hughes
K. The community in crisis, 1859-61
1. In 1859 John Brown and other insurgents invaded HF
2. The town regrouped and attacked them
3. Brown was hailed as a saint for his abolitionist stance
4. The town remained in crisis from 1860-61 as it feared other Northern abolitionists might live in town
5. At the outset of the war the Confederate army confiscated the equipment at the armory
February 17, 2019
This is an excellent book for research on the Harpers Ferry Armory, and a bit on the history of the Springfield Armory as well. It is incredibly fact-based vice narrative, although there are passages that are much easier to read. I bought this to do research, not only on my family history, as I have several ancestors who worked at the armories, but also for background material for a historical fiction book I was working on. I think in general, you get a good feel for life at the armory, and a good bit of background on how things were made at that time (early nineteenth century).
It has been at least five years since I read this book. I just recommended it to a friend and thought I'd post a review here.
It has been at least five years since I read this book. I just recommended it to a friend and thought I'd post a review here.
July 13, 2014
I picked up this book on a visit to Harpers Ferry; a helpful bookseller found me a book that dealt with the Armory's important role in the development of American manufacturing technology. This armory and the one in Springfield MA played important roles in the development of interchangeable parts and high production manufacturing, including the use of specialized machine tools and measurement instruments. The book is not for everyone, but Merritt Roe Smith is a very competent historian and the book will greatly interest those seeking new insights into American history in the first half of the 19th century. Here are a couple of blog posts I did while reading the book:
http://stconsultant.blogspot.com/2013...
http://stconsultant.blogspot.com/2013...
http://stconsultant.blogspot.com/2013...
http://stconsultant.blogspot.com/2013...
January 9, 2017
As a purely historical account, this book deserves five stars. I rate it, though, as a casual reader. The problem is not the writing, but the subject. Based on Smith's own account, Harpers Ferry Armory -- built in an isolated, malaria-infested spot and grossly mismanaged for most of its history -- would probably best be simply forgotten, if it were not for two things: it was the main site of work which resulted in interchangeable-part manufacturing, and it happened to be a location which ushered in the Civil War. For other casual readers, I recommend the three chapters which cover those subjects, plus the final summary chapter, and skip the rest.
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