Kant and Skepticism (Princeton Monographs in Philosophy) by Michael N. Forster

by Michael N. Forster

This book puts forward a much-needed reappraisal of Immanuel Kant's conception of and response to skepticism, as set forth principally in the Critique of Pure Reason . It is widely recognized that Kant's theoretical philosophy aims to answer skepticism and reform metaphysics--Michael Forster makes the controversial argument that those aims are closely linked. He distinguishes among three types of "veil of perception" skepticism, which concerns the external world; Humean skepticism, which concerns the existence of a priori concepts and synthetic a priori knowledge; and Pyrrhonian skepticism, which concerns the equal balance of opposing arguments. Forster overturns conventional views by showing how the first of these types was of little importance for Kant, but how the second and third held very special importance for him, namely because of their bearing on the fate of metaphysics. He argues that Kant undertook his reform of metaphysics primarily in order to render it defensible against these types of skepticism. Finally, in a critical appraisal of Kant's project, Forster argues that, despite its strengths, it ultimately fails, for reasons that carry interesting broader philosophical lessons. These reasons include inadequate self-reflection and an underestimation of the resources of Pyrrhonian skepticism.

Genres: Philosophy

Paperback

First published January 3, 2008

Reviews

[Aung Sett Kyaw Min · Rating 3 out of 5]

This excellent monograph by Forster confirms my suspicions that the Kant's defense of critical philosophy from skeptical attacks, specifically of the ancient Pyrrhonean sort, is not as robust as it initially appears. Due to his obsession with synthetic a priori knowledge Kant was lead to believe that skeptics whether Humean, Pyrrhonean or Cartesian (veil of perception) would not go as far as to the doubt the laws of mathematics, logic (including analytic and synthetic posteriori truths) and ordinary subjective experience. As a result Kant in the process of proving and explaining the possibility of synthetic a priori concepts and principles helped himself to certain assumptions that would be seen as problematic by any ancient skeptic worth their salt. Arguments in the the First Critique are also marred by what Forster calls failure of self reflection. One of the most devastating objections in this respect has to do with the status of conditional propositions in the acclaimed transcendental arguments (necessarily if there is experience of x type, then synthetic proposition y is true). Are these propositions analytic a priori or synthetic a priori? Forster convincingly demonstrates that the first option is self defeating and the other leads to an infinite regress.
Incidentally, I found the alleged 'systematicity' of the First Critique to be one of its least convincing features. And I think Forster and most level headed Kantians would agree with me on this point.

[Derek · Rating 3 out of 5]

It's been so long since I've read Kant that I'm kinda out on the conversation, but there were some good tidbits in here.