Sources of Japanese Tradition: 1600 to 2000

by William Theodore de Bary (editor), Donald Keene (Editor), George Tanabe (Editor)

Sources of Japanese Tradition is a best-selling classic, unrivaled for its wide selection of source readings on history, society, politics, education, philosophy, and religion in the Land of the Rising Sun. In this long-awaited second edition, the editors have revised or retranslated most of the texts in the original 1958 edition, and added a great many selections not included or translated before. They have also restructured volume 1 to span the period from the early Japanese chronicles to the end of the sixteenth century. New additions readings on early and medieval Shinto and on the tea ceremony,* readings on state Buddhism and Chinese political thought influential in Japan, and* sections on women's education, medieval innovations in the uses of history, and laws and precepts of the medieval warrior houses.Together, the selections shed light on the development of Japanese civilization in its own terms, without reference to Western parallels, and will continue to assist generations of students and lay readers in understanding Japanese culture.

Genres: Japan, History, Nonfiction, Philosophy, Japanese History, Asia, Reference

552 pages, ebook

First published April 15, 1964

About the author

William Theodore de Bary was an East Asian studies expert at Columbia University, with the title John Mitchell Mason Professor of the University and Provost Emeritus.

De Bary graduated from Columbia College in 1941, where he was a student in the first iteration of Columbia's famed Literature Humanities course. He then briefly took up graduate studies at Harvard before the US entered the Second World War. De Bary left the academy to serve in American military intelligence in the Pacific Theatre. Upon his return, he resumed his studies at Columbia, where he earned his PhD.

He has edited numerous books of original source material relating to East Asian (primarily Japanese and Chinese) literature, history, and culture, as well as making the case, in his book Nobility and Civility, for the universality of Asian values. He is recognized as essentially creating the field of Neo-Confucian studies.

Additionally, DeBary was active in faculty intervention during the Columbia University protests of 1968 and served as the university's provost from 1971 to 1978. He has attempted to reshape the Core Curriculum of Columbia College to include Great Books classes devoted to non-Western civilizations. DeBary is additionally famous for rarely missing a Columbia Lions football game since he began teaching at the university in 1953. A recognized educator, he won Columbia's Great Teacher Award in 1969, its Lionel Trilling Book Award in 1983 and its Mark Van Doren Award for Great Teaching in 1987.

Now the director of the Heyman Center for the Humanities and still teaching, De Bary lives in Rockland County, New York.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ted_de_Bary

Reviews

[Smiley · Rating 4 out of 5]

Having read the first volume some four years ago, I have since longed to read its 8-chapter sequel; however, I found it tough and thus concentration required due to academic narratives and translations based on related Japanese texts and sources. I had no choice but kept going, off and on, consoling myself as another way to amuse my mind toward more understanding on Japan from her history, tradition, culture, politics, education, etc. in which they have shaped, restored and modernized into one of the forward countries in the 21st century.

The following extracted synopsis should, I think, suffice to readers for its scope and key themes:

. . . Modern movements such as liberalism, nationalism, and socialism are presented. The selections deal not only with religious and philosophical speculations but with political, economic, and aesthetic questions as well. . . .
The volume consists of translations from Japanese sources, made especially for this work or taken from other published sources, in addition to extensive introductory essays and commentary to assist the reader in understanding their historical setting and significance. (back cover)

One of the famous sources was, I think, The Imperial Rescript of Education officially announced on October 30, 1890 [in the reign of Emperor Meiji (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emperor...)] in which its full translated text would be taken from approximately half of the first paragraph to reveal as follows:

Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore, advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; . . . (pp. 139-40)

Compared to one of the recent worldwide policies, e.g. UNESCO's Education For All (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Educati...), the above-mentioned Rescript seemingly suggested highly-practical to the Japanese subjects for the nation's advancements and prosperity. Taken the first three clauses into account, they would cause chaotic and unwanted impacts if the subjects were not filial to their parents, not affectionate to their brothers and sisters; not harmonious husbands and wives, not true friends; did not bear themselves in modesty and moderation. In other words, provided that the subjects in question kept the requisites in mind and duly did their best in terms of such required characters, the nation's overall potentiality as regards her economy, politics, education, public health, culture, etc. would definitely be enhanced, improved and advanced dramatically.

Having recently reread my review on Volume I (https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...) mentioning all translations as "source readings" in the first paragraph, I think this term also implies to this Volume II and I'd like to add an idea, to those who know and are capable of reading Japanese, in that they could definitely enjoy finding out and reading the cited original sources in Japanese as an L1, not as an L2.

In brief, this book is worth reading and studying since, along the ancient-to-modern timeline in her history, Japan has long proved to the world her Japaneseness, an abstract term simply defined as "the quality of being Japanese" (https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Japane...) which guides the readers to gradually realize with authoritative, clear and convincing evidence of her quality as discussed, argued and reflected in those innumerable Japanese source translations with introductory essays and commentary encapsulated as her key "tradition" in this amazingly informative book.

[Bernard English · Rating 4 out of 5]

There are selections from about 40 authors here. Much ground is covered, not just political, but I found the political writing is what stands out. We read that Sato Nobuhiro had dreams of a world empire as early as the 1700's, to be sure only for achieving world peace, all to be facilitated by totalitarian nationalism of course. As a first step China had to be absorbed, says Nobuhiro. The more immediate concern however was the Western barbarians and Mito school tried to unite the Japanese against the threat with slogans such as "Shinto and Confucianism are one!". And just as importantly had to try to reorient Japanese towards military needs, hence "literary and military [training] are not incompatible." It was around this time that the concept of national polity [kokutai] came into being. According to the editors kokutai has "simultaneous religious, moral, and political overtones" and manifested itself in the "national character." This was the basis of Japanese nationalistic ideology [kokutai]. It all sounds so ominous, but in the context of a relatively isolated island feeling besieged, recourse to such nationalism makes perfect sense.

From the very outset, the relation between science (the means by which the "barbarians" would be repelled) and Japanese culture became an issue. Sasuma Shozan, in the mid 1800's, writes that the gentleman should employ "the ethics of the East and scientific technique of the West, neglecting neither the spiritual nor material aspects of life." Fukuzawa Yurichi, the "pioneer of Westernization '' claimed that "Chinese philosophy as the root of education was responsible for our obvious shortcomings. . . ." and that was due to it's lack of attention to "number and reason" That's just one example of what I think is a gross exaggeration which is at the basis of caricatures of Eastern and Western ways of thinking. It's nice to note that Fukuzawa's Westernization didn't necessarily mean state worship. His personal creed was to find "faith in independence and self-respect." It seems that precluded him from seeking government employment: "the first reason for my avoiding a government post is my dislike of the arrogance of all officials." He adds that "the low moral standard of the average officials" is another mark against them. Another anti-state sentiment is his belief that "the independence of a nation springs from the independent spirit of its citizens." Doesn't sound like he would happily travel down the road of later totalitarian Japan.

It's interesting that the samurai spirit which one imagines would foster independence and be somewhat anti-totalitarian did in its martial capacity foster militarism, one aspect of totalitarianism. Saigo Takamori (1827-1877) was the military leader of Satsuma forces which helped overthrow the Tokugawa. Knowing that going to Korea as an envoy and making demands would lead to certain execution by the Koreans, he wanted to offer himself, I suppose in the Samurai spirit, as the ambassador, the purpose of which was to provide a pretext for Japan to take over Korea. However, the editors say that he was sure that "Japan could not resist the West, he was convinced, unless she had Korea and China at her side." So it's a little unclear how militarily defeating Korea would win it to Japan's side. Saigo's desire to be killed as an ambassador almost seems like a blind desire for martyrdom and war, neither of which would be of any help in resisting the West. As always, there were cool heads in government, and at this time in the Meiji period, they won out and a Korean war was averted. A document apparently prepared for Prince Sanjo by Okubo Toshimichi made a strong (and I'd say more generally applicable) case for peace with Korea. Apart from ignoring the safety of Japan and interests of the people, he writes that even if total victory should be had "in considering the costs of the campaign, and of occupation and defense of Korea, it is unlikely that it could be met by the products of the entire country of Korea."

The rather mixed origins of Japan's restoration are typified by Ito Hirobumi, Japan's first prime minister. It's interesting to see that Japan adopted a Western style constitution which gained it respect from Western powers, but strangely the emperor was seen as its guarantor. Ito wrote that the "Constitution is the gift of a benevolent and charitable emperor to the people of his country." This is a sentiment in line with Ito's apparent preference for the German governmental system in which the emperor was more dominant than the British system with it's parliament in the driver's seat. He wrote that "since the tripartite theory lost favor it has come to be recognized that the supreme right must be vested in one person and be indivisible. . . ."

The West was a driving force for Meiji modernization. However, it seems to also have been a bogeyman and fostered Japanese development in unhealthy ways. For example Itagaki Taisuke who founded Japan's first national political organization, the misleadingly named Liberal Party, could express democratic statements such as "the object of our union is to institute a form of government wherein the PEOPLE shall have a voice in public affairs. Public opinion is the axis around which government policy should revolve." Yet so much of the modernization was actually reflecting the leadership's will with its goal to "work to increase the speed of national progress and thus overtake the West. . . ." I would say to a large extent these two goals do not overlap.

In many ways Yamagata Aritomo (1838-1922) was one of the most surprising figures included in this book. A military man who according to the editors "distinguished himself against the forces of the shogunate" he was a Samurai who of the Big Three of the Meiji era was viewed as a traditionalist. However, he was sensitive to the message of equality. He had implemented conscription, which led to peasants carrying weapons, a privilege which had always been reserved for the samurai. To top it off, he wrote that it was "the way to restore the balance between the high and the low and grant equal rights to all," not sounding like a traditional samurai at all. Yamagata also had some wise things to sayabout politics. He initiated local self-rule in 1887 in order to (1) inculcate, he says, "experience in public administration" in Japanese and (2) to insulate local administration from what he thought was the poisonous national political scene. He condemned abandoning one's "occupational pursuit for the sake of a political cause" and generally felt that there was far too much politicization of community life because of political strife. He believed that much world conflict was driven by racial conflict. In particular he thought that after WW I, the white races will focus their attention on the Far East and "when that day comes, the rivalry between the white and the non-white races will become violent, and who can say that the white races will not unite with one another to oppose the colored peoples?" Demonstrating that he was more than just a rabid Japanese racialist, he actually thought that to avoid a catastrophic fate at the hands of the white races, his goal of competing with them could only be attained by having Japan and China "become friendly and promote each other's interests." And he endorsed the fact that Japan "is now in alliance with England; it has agreements with Russia and France; and we are mutually striving to promote both the peace of the Orient and the independence of China." However, his peaceful and relatively conciliatory approach to international relations had a blind spot, namely Manchuria. He wrote that "Manchuria is for the Japanese the only region for expansion. Manchuria is Japan's life-line." He opposed the strong arm tactics of the Okuma liberal document which made the Twenty-One Demands on the Chinese. However, he still insisted on convincing the Chinese that allowing the Japanese into Manchuria by arguing that the Chinese need Japan to fend off Russian encroachments into Manchuria. At least according to this one short selection, it seems that Yamagata's Japan wasn't going to accept a no from China.
It's amazing how the liberal 1920's was followed by nationalist 1930's. Apart from the usual nationalist tropes, there is a lot of animosity towards the rich. For example, Asahi Heigo, who personally assissinated the head of a zaibatsu, made a list of nine steps his "young idealists'' should begin with in bringing about the so called Taisho Restoration. A number of the related to wealth redistribution (keeping his numbering):
1. Bury the traitorous millionaires.
6. Nationalize the land and bring relief to tenant farmers.
7. Confiscate all fortunes above 100,000 yen.
8. Nationalize big business
Then there is Gondo Seikei who complained that the country's resources "land, raw materials, the machinery of transport and finance, mines, fishing grounds--are, for the most part becoming the private property of a small number of powerful capitalists." One last example is Kita Ikki, whose Japanism is described as a mixture of oriental wisdom and Western revolutionary thinking by the editors. Kito complained about the selfish zaibatsu and called for the "seizure and nationalization of major industries and fortunes." Other than some mysterious inevitability of a war between the East and West or in Okawa Shumei's version, a champion of the East, destined to be Japan, and a champion of the West, there were some other reasons given for Japan taking a belligerent pose. Most plausibly was Hashimoto Kingoro's view that the Japanese population pressure could be relieved in only one of three ways: "emigration, advance into world markets, and expansion of territory" which he claims were all being blocked, in the first case, by anti-Japanese immigration policies of other countries (e.g., the U.S. Immigration Act of 1924, which completely barred entry to Japanese). It's hard to believe every country in the world blocked Japanese immigration. The second option was being blocked by tariffs and "abrogation of commercial treaties." According to Hashimoto, that only left the expansion of territory as the way out. He writes that "It is just that since the Powers have suppressed the circulation of Japanese materials and merchandise abroad, we are looking for some place overseas where Japanese capital, Japanese skills, and Japanese labor can have free play, free from the oppression of the white race." The Manchuran Incident led to the "establishment of the splendid new nation of Manchuria" which is being aided by it's friend Japan.

The motives for going to war were partly racial, the East vs. white West theme, but also nationalistic. Tokutomi Ichiro insists on Japan's uniqueness as have so many other writers. His version is that "Nippon is not a country of individualism [as are Western countries] nor a country of the [Chinese] family system." He further explains that in "China, one speaks first of the family and then next of the nation, but, in Nippon, the nation comes first and next the family." Seems he smarts at the thought that "various races of East Asia look upon the British and Americans as superior to the Nippon race." So in part a war against Western aggression is to elevate Japan in the eyes of other Asians, not just to right an imperialist wrong. Disingenuously or not, in making Japan the "Light of Greater East Asia" and subsequently the "Light of the World," in part by "annihilating" the Anglo-Saxons in Asia (an object lesson in facts, as he describes it) which would yield recognition by other Asians that Japan is their leader--Tokutomi then states that benevolence must be shown other Asians in the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere which will be establish by Japan.
By the time war is imminent, some Japanese seem to be skirting with lunacy or megalomania. In 1942 the Total war Research Institute came up with a "Basic Plan" for of course the war. In part, it's a blueprint for how to divide up Asia, but that shouldn't be threatening to other Asian peoples because the document starts out pompously tell readers that the "Japanese empire is a manifestation of morality," but the sentence continues that the "propagation of the Imperial Way" is on the agenda. Asia was to be divided up into the East Asiatic Union (Japan, Manchuria, North China, lower Yangtze River, and the Russian Maritime Province) which will be further divided into the Inner Sphere of the East Asiatic Sphere, and the Smaller and Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere. Military conflict with the Soviets, and Britain and its allies was expected. It was a secret document for good reason. In case there was any doubt, the document states that the "Japanese empire is to the center and pioneer of Oriental moral and cultural reconstruction." I just don't know how other Asians would react, since the document goes out of its way to demonstrate the benefits of Japanese military plans. After all, as part of the establishment of the New Order in East Asia, the Americans and Europeans will be driven out, presumably a welcome event to most Asians. Mutual assistance and a mild peace (whatever that means) will be delivered since the aim is co-prosperity not exploitation. Sounds so promising, until you read that the New Order will be "based on righteous classification, not an idea of rights, but an idea of service, and not seeral world views but one unified world view (an Asian or Japanese?).
It would be unfair not to mention Japanese who did challenge the authorities rather than obsequiously taking to jingoism. Some of these men can be found in the chapter entitled "The Japanese Social Movement" Just to list some, Kawakami Hajime spent several years in prison due to his Marxist activities. And he didn't rejoice in the upcoming world war of which he sensed the beginnings. "[I]f we reflect on the extraordinary advancement in weapons since the last World War--especially of the air forces--the coming Second World War, with the misery it will bring to humanity, is truly a cause for alarm." One might compare FDR's attitude towards war or even current Western leaders' view. Unfortunately, not all Marxists felt quite the same. The Socialist Masses Party, just like the German socialist during World War I , felt the need to support the war effort. The editors write that in 1937 "it was decided, in effect, that as a mass party the "Shakai taishu to" had to identify itself with the whole Japanese people rather than with the proletariat as a separate class. . . ." Thus, as explained in their 1937 policy statement, they supported the theory of "national defense in the broad sense" and write that "in a wartime situation, these people [presumably other leftists] are nothing but cowardly, negative pacifists who shrivel up, folding their arms and lamenting that the times are against them," though it's unclear how involved they were in any actual governing. The editors note that "[I]ts only left-wing rival, the Japanese Proletarian Party which had proposed an 'anti-fascist popular front,' was suppressed that same year." Another non-compliant Japanese was Kawai Eijiro who did not recant his socialist position, and incredibly, not even when on trial for an "antiwar" article. This was after he had already lost his teaching position at Tokyo Imperial University. In defending his socialist views, he courageously, and one might say correctly, called out the government for its own socialist policies. He stated "the present system of economic controls restricts everything from management to profits, and salthough ownership exists in name, so many restrictions have been placed on it in actuality it is almost as if it does not exist at all." He might as well have been addressing FDR!

Hard to tell from a few selections, but it sure seems the early post-war Japanese intellectuals were much more forthright about Japan's war experience than contemporary Japanese politicians. Oyama Ikuo was a left-wing professor of political science at Waseda University. He bemoans the fact that the widespread resistance to the military regime were "smashed before they could develop into nationwide insurrection. . . ." He cites these movements as evidence that they "clearly disproved the idea that the Japanese were an essentially authoritarian people" Perhaps this authoritarian image was imposed on them by the victors since it doesn't seem to reflect the Japanese writers whose writings make up this book. Oyama writes that because the "militarists established complete control over the national public opinion" the "intelligence and conscience of the people were completely benumbed." The tragic result is that "abroad, soldiers left the worst stains on our history by their atrocities." Again, you might hear German politicians express sentiments but I can't think of too many Japanese politicians nowadays talking like this, though perhaps they are making news locally and just not getting enough international coverage. Finally, for Oyama the "establishment of a democratic Japan cannot be separated from establishment of a pacifistic Japan" which he certainly seems to approve of.
In the last chapter, "The Japanese Tradition in the Modern World," we find the Christian Uchimura Kanzo's interesting selection asserting his dual identity as a Japanese and Christian, as well as his apparently famous tomb inscription called the "Two J's" with the same theme. The first two lines of this inscription read "I love two J's and no third; one is Jesus, and the other is Japan. I do not know which I love more, Jesus or Japan." Listing several Christian denominations and pointing out there are hundreds of others, he rhetorically asks, "Why blame me for upholding Japanese Christianity? If it is not a mistake to uphold any one of the six-hundred different forms of Christianity, why is it wrong for me to uphold my Japanese Christianity?" Throughout the period covered, there are countless quotes asserting Japanese uniqueness, even when acknowledging that Japanese culture and religion have derived much from outside Japan. This isn't surprising since it is a cultural universal to highlight one's own culture as unique. (There are many other great examples, but I ran out of room)
In any case, reading these reflections on Japan and its interactions with other nations all the while going through dramatic political and economic changes, one realizes how incredibly difficult it is to really get a handle on the essence of a culture, if indeed there is such a thing. Please note, there are no female authors represented in the selections.

[James Violand · Rating 3 out of 5]

You must have a thorough knowledge of Japanese history before you pick up this work. It is especially worthwhile for the emphasis on the rise of militant nationalism.

[Chant · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting book on the history of Japanese politics and westernization, I however am not far too interested in these aspects of Japan.

[Alice Jennings · Rating 5 out of 5]

An encyclopaedia of sources. Perfect if your essay needs a primary source- its got someone on every time period (depending on the volume of course)

[William · Rating 5 out of 5]

intro to modern Japan