Aristotle's Metaphysics Beta: Symposium Aristotelicum

by Michel Crubellier (Editor), André Laks (Editor), Symposium Aristotelicum (Event)

Nine leading scholars of ancient philosophy from Europe, the UK, and North America offer a systematic study of Book Beta of Aristotle's Metaphysics. The work takes the form of a series of aporiai or "difficulties" which Aristotle presents as necessary points of engagement for those who wish to attain wisdom. The topics include causation, substance, constitution, properties, predicates, and generally the ontology of both the perishable and the imperishable world. Each contributor discusses one or two of these aporiai in sequence: the result is a discursive commentary on this seminal text of Western philosophy.

Genres: Metaphysics, Philosophy

304 pages, Kindle Edition

First published May 21, 2009

Reviews

[Riku Sayuj · Rating 5 out of 5]

Book 2: An Introduction to Philosophical Problems

-- The 16th Symposium Aristotelicum, dedicated to Book Beta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, organized by Michel Crubellier and Andre Laks, was held in Lille from 20 to 24 August, 2002, in the premises of the Ecole Superieure de Commerce de Lille. --

For more on the series and to read about Book 1 of The Metaphysics, see here: Book 1: A Preliminary Outline of Philosophy

I am using my parallel reading of Symposium Aristotelicum (SA) to keep my notes/understanding of each book in separate pockets before bringing them together in a final review, if that is possible.

This was a wonderful book to have a Symposium on since Aristotle poses the 14+1 questions and leaves them open ended. So it is good to discuss them further and in detail by ourselves before going on to see how Aristotle resolves them indirectly.

Each of the Aporia are tackled in turn (starting from Zero!) in this SA.

Fifteen Metaphysical Puzzles

The Book Beta consists of a series of fifteen metaphysical puzzles (also called Aporia, since they are left unresolved) on the nature of first principles, substance, and other fundamental concepts. In each case, Aristotle presents a thesis and a contradicting antithesis, both of which could be taken as possible answers to the puzzle.

Here are the puzzles, in summary form:

(i) Can one science treat of all the four causes?

(ii) Are the primary axioms treated of by the science of substance, and if not, by what science?

(iii) Can one science treat of all substances?

(iv) Does the science of substance treat also of its attributes?

(v) Are there any non-sensible substances, and if so, of how many kinds?

(vi) Are the genera, or the constituent parts, of things their first principles?

(vii) If the genera, is it the highest genera or the lowest?

(viii) Is there anything apart from individual things?

(ix) Is each of the first principles one in kind, or in number?

(x) Are the principles of perishable and of imperishable things the same?

(xi) Are being and unity substances or attributes?

(xii) Are the objects of mathematics substances?

(xiii) Do Ideas exist, as well as sensible things and the objects of mathematics?

(xiv) Do the first principles exist potentially or actually?

(xv) Are the first principles universal or individual?

The characteristic structure of these problems is that of a plausible seeming thesis and an equally plausible but contradictory antithesis — well defined questions announced in the form of an alternative: ‘Is it ___ , or rather ___ ?’

The care with which the contrasting arguments are balanced and the constant repetition of the same procedure for each of the fifteen aporiai give the appearance of a practice governed by strict rules. One might well think that such presentation of the question in a standard form, which would require perhaps certain methodological rules and criteria of success for its development and resolution, would constitute part of dialectic, in the Aristotelian sense of the term, that is to say, the technique of discussion.

Usually, the thesis and antithesis are taken one from the extreme naturalists or Atomists, the other from the Idealists, Pythagoreans and Platonists. The purpose of the whole exercise is to illustrate the poverty of both these extreme positions, so as to prepare the way for the exposition of Aristotle’s own solution throughout the rest of the Metaphysics, which will in many respects be a compromise between materialism and idealism.

Thus we could consider them as the statement of Thesis & Antithesis of each of these positions and we can assume the rest of Metaphysics as a mediation, i.e., as a Synthesis.

Aporia as a Dialectical Instrument

In the brief introduction before plunging us into the puzzles, Aristotle gives a quick explanation for the employment of this method:

We must, with a view to the science which we are seeking, first recount the subjects that should be first discussed. These include both the other opinions that some have held on the first principles, and any point besides these that happens to have been overlooked. 

For those who wish to get clear of difficulties it is advantageous to discuss the difficulties well; for the subsequent free play of thought implies the solution of the previous difficulties, and it is not possible to untie a knot of which one does not know. 

But the difficulty of our thinking points to a ‘knot’ in the object; for in so far as our thought is in difficulties, it is in like case with those who are bound; for in either case it is impossible to go forward. Hence one should have surveyed all the difficulties beforehand, both for the purposes we have stated and because people who inquire without first stating the difficulties are like those who do not know where they have to go; […] while to him who has first discussed the difficulties it is clear.

Further, he who has heard all the contending arguments, as if they were the parties to a case, must be in a better position for judging.

This excerpt (slightly modified for brevity) shows clearly that Aristotle sees the Aporia as a the logical next step after the Book 1, which was a literature survey, or a ‘doxographical’ survey.

Doxography and Aporia are two means of beginning a philosophical inquiry, ones which can be rivals, but which can also be employed together. In particular, aporia presupposes, to a certain extent at any rate, the existence and the consideration of opinions on the question, but it is not reducible to this.

Doxography is oriented toward the past, while Aporia anticipates the pursuit of inquiry —

The former is to know what others have thought, to try to under stand what they have wished to say and even, to a certain point, to sort out what is true and what false in this, while the latter is to methodically to construct a philosophical problem in the belief that this represents a step in the apprehension of a matter that is difficult to comprehend.

Book Beta and The Project of Wisdom 

The principal presupposition, which is found in the background of all the books of the Metaphysics is of a programmatic nature: This is the grand project/quest  — of a knowledge called ‘wisdom’, or ‘Primary Knowledge.’ We can call this The Project of Wisdom as short for “The Project of a Primary Knowledge.” Or we can just call it Metaphysics, even though Aristotle never called it that!

Thus this ‘Project of Wisdom’, or 'Metaphysics', mobilizes philosophical material that had been progressively developed, beginning with Plato, right down to Aristotle himself in Book Alpha. And this is why, despite the difference of form, Book Beta is in a sense the proper continuation of Book Alpha. It takes up the story where the other left it off, since the sequence covered by the Aporia of Beta proceeded from Thales to Plato — proving clearly that Aristotle was continuing his presentation in this book.

Aristotelian doxography of Book Alpha presents us the views of his predecessors, even if in a slightly sarcastic and personal way — Aristotle must have realized that his listeners might be tempted to take sides in such a presentation, even (occasionally) against his own very strong position. At least, this reader was!

But the Aristotelian Aporia of Book 2 submits the contents of their statements (of the predecessors’) to the test of argumentation and to a standard that requires rational coherence. When the aporia is presented as a contradiction, the tension is maximal — Here the serious reader will have to let go of any last whimsical fancies and biases; and one finds oneself in definite impasses, where the choice between two given theoretical positions presents itself as being at once necessary — and yet impossible.

Aristotle audaciously assures us, though, that the formal structure of the difficulty, once well understood, can teach us something about the nature of the object that has given birth to the difficulty, and that if we move forward with him, we will reach satisfactory resolutions.

This is an assurance that is hard to believe easily after this harrowing Book, but Aristotle now has our undivided attention!

And that was the whole point.