The book responsible for revitalizing moral philosophy after the logical empiricists had relegated ethical talk to the realm of nonsensical pseudo-propositions. Hare's central thesis is that ethical terms—like "good," "bad," "right," "wrong," and so on—are governed by two logical properties: universalizability and prescriptivity. In saying that anything is good, bad, right, or wrong, we commit ourselves, first, to willing that it be chosen or avoided, and second, to do so in all relevantly similar circumstances. The upshot is to provide a framework for ethical reasoning that makes it more than just expressions of emotions or preferences. Hare's universal prescriptivism may be a bit dated by now, but it represents a crucial, and absolutely brilliant, stage in the development of analytic meta-ethics.
Que tédio! O livro foi suplantado por *Freedom and Reason*, que, por sua vez, foi suplantado por *Moral Thinking*. Este último, sim, vale a pena e proporciona a melhor forma de conhecer a teoria moral de R. M. Hare.
I'm not sure how many people read Hare's book anymore - it was once an important book in philosophy exploring the use of core moral terms such as "good", "right" and "ought". Nowadays it seems that it is often relegated merely to the source of a single thought experiment concerning the meaning of good, in the example of missionaries and cannibals. In some ways this is understandable as philosophy has moved on, and this does read at times like a book form a past age with its quirky and dated examples. Written in the early 1950s this is not one of those books that reads like a timeless classic. But on the other hand, this is a pity as Hare writes with a clarity, and at times charm, that many other philosophers writing books could learn from.
Hare's book is a classic of analytic moral philosophy. He defends a theory of moral language where notions like 'good' and 'ought' are conceptualized as intrinsically universal, linked with commendation, and action guiding. To say that 'that car is good' is to say that is should be chosen by someone looking for a car of that type in similar circumstances. Hare's treatment of moral principles, his argument against their self-evidence, and account of their historical revisability has much to recommend it to readers (and I mean by this that readers similarly situated should choose to read it).
Likewise, his account of supervenience and treatment of the naturalistic fallacy is also very interesting. Hare argues that naturalism is false because if it were true one would be unable to commend something for possessing the property or properties identified with good by one's substantive theory. So in a familiar example if one equates pleasure with goodness, one could not commend a nice soup for its pleasant taste since saying 'that is a good soup' means no more than saying that the soup is pleasant. Hare's point is that naturalism makes it impossible to say that something is choiceworthy and that this is what we use the term 'good' for.
The final part of the book deals with more substantive issues. Hare attempts to show that terms like 'good' and 'ought' can be reduced to imperatives. But to do this he has to invent a form of imperative that is never or very rarely used: a universal imperative that is not indexed to a particular time or audience. So we might say 'you ought to mow the lawn,' speaking to a neighbor with an aversion to yard work. But we can hardly find intelligible the idea of a universal imperative that states: 'mow the lawn!' (Said by whom? God?) It seems almost ridiculous to attempt to make sense of ordinary moral language by introducing a term - the universal imperative - that is seemingly senseless. But despite this, the book is well worth reading.
I want to briefly note briefly several criticisms of Hare's offered by MacIntyre in an early paper (1957) and to briefly suggest how Hare might respond. MacIntyre's argues that Hare is not analyzing moral language so much as prescribing a substantive moral theory by introducing definitions of moral terms. MacIntyre argues convincingly that Hare has to ignore much moral language that conflicts with his views to defend his theory. For instance, MacIntyre argues that Hare defines moral notions as inherently universal by ignoring instances when they are not intended to be so. This seems to be true but regardless, it seems clear that universalizability is a key component of much that we would recognize as moral language. Second MacIntyre argues that universalizability should be seen as a substantive rather than logical requirement of moral language. He defends this by saying that hypocrisy is perfectly intelligible though it wouldn't be if Hare's claim that universalizability was part of the definition of moral language was true. But MacIntyre seems off-base here. We do find it unintelligible when someone sincerely committed to moral theory x, a person who judges other's actions in terms of x, acts in his own case according to rival theory y. In order to preserve intelligibility, we typically assume that he actually never accepted x or went through some type of moral conversion. Finally MacIntyre argues that universalizability becomes vacuous since in some cases no one ever will be in the same circumstances as an agent faced with a particular decision. This, again, seems true but it merely suggests that Hare's account is incomplete.
Many times, if not most of the times, we take what we say for granted when pronouncing judgment. Do this. Do that. You ought to this. This thing is good. That man isn't good. No stealing.... many judgments are made, yet language has the capacity to not only alter the meaning of a sentence, but also alter and affect its ethical and moral value. Assessing the role of language in moral and ethical judgment is the main focus of The Language of Morals by the analytical philosopher R.M. Hare. Hare aimes to analyse how a sentence can move from being prescriptive to eventually forming singular or universal imperative on the one hand, or eventually becoming a value judgment which can form a moral judgment. By focusing on some key important value-words such as "good", "ought", and "right", we see how language with its grammar can qualify our judgment, which eventually reflects upon our understanding of these words.
Hare's book works as a good introduction to the role played by language in ethics and moral philosophy, as well as to Here's own theory of ethics. It is clearly written and his examples are meant to attract the general reader. It remains accessible to the general reader ans to those of you who are interested in moral philosophy, i really recommend passing by Hare's work.
I have never read much about moral language, so Hare's book was my first major experience with these sorts of arguments. I found his refutation of moral naturalism extremely compelling - and was initially familiar with it from reading Parfit's On What Matters Vol. 1 - and his general contention, that moral words are value-judgements and kinds of imperative sentences, also fairly convincing. That said, I am very unfamiliar with these sorts of arguments so cannot conclusively state my acceptance of Hare's contention. Still, Hare has a very pleasant writing style and the book was overall an enjoyable read.
Quite contrary to what author claims, this book is not an introduction but a survey and outline of author's main opinions and methods on meta-ethics. Despite the difficulty, reading the book clarifies many confusions I had about moral languages.
This is only my first read. I intended to read it again, probably after another book 'Sorting out Ethics', a more recent work by the author which may cover author's points in a more accessible way.
Hare’s prose is super dry, but his piecemeal, repetitive style is very pedagogical. This is a good book to get a starting grasp on the workings of philosophical reasoning. The argument itself is quite specific and not very ambitious – the book could’ve been a paper, theory wise. But it is generally plausible and still somewhat relevant.
The classic early statement of prescriptivism, setting it against the earlier failings of Moore and Ayer. Although offered as a logical analysis, there is no abstract symbolism here, but neither is the informal study carried out with the rigour that Austin brought to bear in studying the intricacy of "ordinary language".