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Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam
Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl--a veteran of both Operation Desert Storm and the conflict in Iraq--considers the now crucial question of how armies adapt to changing circumstances during the course of conflicts.
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First published January 1, 2002
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June 4, 2017
If you are looking for the one book that is going to make it all clear; LCOL John Nagl's Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife is not it. It is, however an important addition to a larger reading list. Learning to Eat Soup will be an easier read than most of your more valuable selections. To the degree that it points to specific methods to make an army into a "Learning Organization" it is more than worth your time.
At the time LCOL Nagl was writing this book (it was originally part of a doctoral thesis) American strategy in Iraq at devolved into "driving around until you find an IED". A result of this book in conjunction with a number of people working from outside of the then existing army decision-making structure was that what became known as "the Surge". The Surge would provide an acceptable method for America to end its combat engagement in Iraq.
On a side note: some will argue that the Surge constituted an American victory. It is my opinion that a military situation that ends when one side leaves the field at a time and under conditions of its own choosing it is legitimate to call that a victory. In this case I temper the claim of American victory with the observable fact that Iraq remains a bleeding ground with no reason to expect the emergence of a stable pro-Western, pro-American government.
It is worth noting that LCOL Nagl was a combat officer and commander of an army battalion in operation Desert Storm and therefore can include significant front line and operations experience along with his academic qualifications. All of these experiences are evident in this book.
The central thesis of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife is that armies can either promote and develop the skills needed to be a Learning Organization or expect to suffer needless losses while hoping to stumble into victory. The classical cliche; is that armies routinely prepare to fight the last war. Whatever truth there may be in this cliche, most Army leadership is aware of it. Meaning that it is hard to find senior officers inflexible to the needs to adapt battle plans to existing battlefield dynamics. In promoting the concept of Learning Organizations I suggest that the author was expressing frustrations based on a command structure that had achieved success in the field but had not planned for an exit.
To simplify the concept of Learning Organization, it is one wherein the culture is constantly open to new ideas especially those based on an analysis of existing conditions and alternate methods to improve on those existing conditions. That is the organization cannot be satisfied with where it is and must promote problem solving based on finding paths forward.
The quote learning to eat soup with a knife is part of a larger quotation from British Col. TE Lawrence aka Lawrence of Arabia. The point of Col. early Laurence's aphorism is that fighting a counterinsurgency operation - COIN is messy and slow. As we turn from the LCOL's. central thesis to his effort to apply it to specific examples in the history of COIN, there may be problems with his examples and his cherry picking history.
It is for this reason that I am going to encourage reviewers of my review to spend some time with the longer reviews among the one and two star posters. With virtually all published history there is going to be dissension and debate. I am not going to claim for myself sufficient expertise to judge LCOL Nagl's read of events in Malaysia 1948 1957 or in Vietnam 1950 to 1972. I raise this point and invite you to read some dissenting opinion because the issues raised in this book are too important. It is also for this reason that I strongly recommend that Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife is essential reading but only if it is part of a larger study of modern military issues and events.
At the time LCOL Nagl was writing this book (it was originally part of a doctoral thesis) American strategy in Iraq at devolved into "driving around until you find an IED". A result of this book in conjunction with a number of people working from outside of the then existing army decision-making structure was that what became known as "the Surge". The Surge would provide an acceptable method for America to end its combat engagement in Iraq.
On a side note: some will argue that the Surge constituted an American victory. It is my opinion that a military situation that ends when one side leaves the field at a time and under conditions of its own choosing it is legitimate to call that a victory. In this case I temper the claim of American victory with the observable fact that Iraq remains a bleeding ground with no reason to expect the emergence of a stable pro-Western, pro-American government.
It is worth noting that LCOL Nagl was a combat officer and commander of an army battalion in operation Desert Storm and therefore can include significant front line and operations experience along with his academic qualifications. All of these experiences are evident in this book.
The central thesis of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife is that armies can either promote and develop the skills needed to be a Learning Organization or expect to suffer needless losses while hoping to stumble into victory. The classical cliche; is that armies routinely prepare to fight the last war. Whatever truth there may be in this cliche, most Army leadership is aware of it. Meaning that it is hard to find senior officers inflexible to the needs to adapt battle plans to existing battlefield dynamics. In promoting the concept of Learning Organizations I suggest that the author was expressing frustrations based on a command structure that had achieved success in the field but had not planned for an exit.
To simplify the concept of Learning Organization, it is one wherein the culture is constantly open to new ideas especially those based on an analysis of existing conditions and alternate methods to improve on those existing conditions. That is the organization cannot be satisfied with where it is and must promote problem solving based on finding paths forward.
The quote learning to eat soup with a knife is part of a larger quotation from British Col. TE Lawrence aka Lawrence of Arabia. The point of Col. early Laurence's aphorism is that fighting a counterinsurgency operation - COIN is messy and slow. As we turn from the LCOL's. central thesis to his effort to apply it to specific examples in the history of COIN, there may be problems with his examples and his cherry picking history.
It is for this reason that I am going to encourage reviewers of my review to spend some time with the longer reviews among the one and two star posters. With virtually all published history there is going to be dissension and debate. I am not going to claim for myself sufficient expertise to judge LCOL Nagl's read of events in Malaysia 1948 1957 or in Vietnam 1950 to 1972. I raise this point and invite you to read some dissenting opinion because the issues raised in this book are too important. It is also for this reason that I strongly recommend that Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife is essential reading but only if it is part of a larger study of modern military issues and events.
August 14, 2011
Simply put, possibly the best book on Counterinsurgency written. Either before or after you read this, you should make sure to pick up the official US Army FM on Counterinsurgency, but that makes for some very dry reading. This is a fantastic book that should be required reading for all NCO's and company grade officers. What it essentially boils don to is the difference in mindsets between British and US forces and how that led to a difference in tactics between Vietnam and Malaya. The British are generally much more willing to learn from their mistakes and more likely to flow along the path of least resistance, while the US tends to try to force the environment, the natives, and the world itself into conforming to what shape we want it to have.
November 3, 2011
Surprisingly, one of the best books I've read this year was this application of organization-learning theory to national armies fighting colonial insurgencies. A tight, compelling read, fascinating in detail and meticulously well-researched, in addition to being an outstanding academic work applying theory to case studies.
Probably the only academic book in the past few years I've read in lieu of a novel, staying up too late to get one more chapter in before passing out.
Very highly recommended for the general reader, as well as anyone interested in critical military history, organizational theory or learning theory.
Probably the only academic book in the past few years I've read in lieu of a novel, staying up too late to get one more chapter in before passing out.
Very highly recommended for the general reader, as well as anyone interested in critical military history, organizational theory or learning theory.
July 12, 2009
Absolutely brilliant - Colonel Nagl should have been a senior general, and I hoped that one day he would be, but he wound up retiring as a lieutenant colonel. He would be a valuable choice as a national security advisor, too.
The gist of the book is a heavily researched and deeply insightful analysis of the factors that govern an army's success or failure in learning as an organization. In that respect, it will be a worthwhile study for leaders and managers in organizations of any kind. The author offers checklists for self-review by an organization; he focuses on openness to new ideas and experimentation, actively seeking the learned wisdom of the junior folks - privates, sergeants, lieutenants, captains, or assembly line and warehouse workers, line managers, or their equivalent in any other organization - and then spreading the things that work throughout the organization, and not mistaking the 'how ' for the 'what', i.e. keeping the ultimate desired end state in mind and not being locked into one particular way to achieve it.
Anyone interested in military history, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, counterinsurgency in general, or organizational systems theory will find this one of the most enlightening and useful books he or she will ever read.
The gist of the book is a heavily researched and deeply insightful analysis of the factors that govern an army's success or failure in learning as an organization. In that respect, it will be a worthwhile study for leaders and managers in organizations of any kind. The author offers checklists for self-review by an organization; he focuses on openness to new ideas and experimentation, actively seeking the learned wisdom of the junior folks - privates, sergeants, lieutenants, captains, or assembly line and warehouse workers, line managers, or their equivalent in any other organization - and then spreading the things that work throughout the organization, and not mistaking the 'how ' for the 'what', i.e. keeping the ultimate desired end state in mind and not being locked into one particular way to achieve it.
Anyone interested in military history, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, counterinsurgency in general, or organizational systems theory will find this one of the most enlightening and useful books he or she will ever read.
August 17, 2021
I write this in August 2021, the day after Kabul fell to the Taliban. This is the book that George W. and Dick Cheney should have read before getting us into Afghanistan. Certainly it should have been applied in the twenty years of war. If I had known of the existence of this volume I would have sent copies of it to my daughter and my son-in-law, both Army officers who saw combat there. This book is the best analysis of fighting an insurgency in existence today.
August 9, 2007
Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife takes its title from a work by T. E. Lawrence, who was the British advisor to the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Turks during World War One. Lawrence (known as Lawrence of Arabia) is said to have said he felt sorry for the Turkish officers who had to oppose the Arab forces he was advising. In Malaya and in Vietnam, the post-WWII British and Americans had their chance to be on that other side. As part of his Ph. D. work in at Oxford, John Nagl examined the British and American experiences in counterinsurgency. And while he finds that "I [Nagl] had the good sense to study something they [British] were good at and we [United States] were not" the real question is why. And here, Nagl looks at the idea that the institutional abilities of the British and American Armies to learn and adapt was part of the difference.
Going into the later half of the 20th century, both the British and Americans have a history of wars involving unconventional warfare. In fact, both actively engaged in this type of warfare as recently as WWII, in the China-Burma-India theater against the Japanese, and both in their history have 'won' such wars, both as the insurgent (or supporter of the insurgent) and as the occupying force. And Nagl finds that in opposing their respective insurgencies that both were institutionally focused on conventional war, having chosen to turn their backs on the experiences on the asian continent and looking toward continental europe as their reason for being. So Nagl then asks, how does an organization adapt when it finds itself in an environment very different than the environment it prepared for.
Nagl then provides a framework for measuring organizational learning. If an organization is a "Learning institution" than the following questions should be answered in the affirmative: (biased for a military example)
1. Does the army promote suggestions from the field?
2. Are subordinates encouraged to question superiors and policies?
3. Does the organization regularly question its basic assumptions?
4. Are high-ranking officers routinely in close contact with those on the ground and open to their suggestions?
5. Are Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) generated locally and informally or imposed from the center?
And then Nagl has a second set of questions around the question "Did the Army Develop a Successful Conterinsurgency Doctrine?
1. Victory - Did the doctrine adopted achieve national goals in the conflict?
2. Objective - Did the army contribute to the setting of realistic national goals in the conflict?
3. Unity of Command - Did the military accept subordination to political objectives?
4. Minimum Force - Did the military use the minimum amount of force necessary to accomplish the mission?
5. Mass - Did the military structure itself in an appropriate manner to deal with the threat at hand?
He then examines both the Malaya (British) and Vietnam (American) cases in both their early years as well as the years of ongoing conflict and evalutes them against both set of criteria.
With the value of hindsight, you almost expect that the conclusions are that the British started bad, then improved and became a learning organization, and the Americans were not. And it would be easy to write something that said "If the Americans were a little more wise they could have won it?" and to dismiss this work as something like that. But the questions Nagl asks are better and deeper than that and so this work becomes of use not just to historians, but for any organization who finds that they were in an unexpected environment. Not just if the British figured out that their ultimate objective was not the defeat of the communist forces, but an independent Malaysia, but when did they realize this? What was the mindset of the people who came to this conclusion? How did this group communicate this to thier army culture, whose institutional memory was filled with images of tanks and planes crossing western europe to clash against German armies, and were expecting to repeat this? How did this group of people communicate this fact to their political masters, who were far away and listening to a fickle media? How did this group convince the Malaysians, and even the Chinese that the communists drew their support from that their vision and future was a better one than the communists, and to take the British side was in their best interests?
Looking at the Vietnam example, there are many books that say how ignorant and close minded the American leadership was, but Nagl goes further? Why did the Americans not even follow the British example, when the architects and implementors of the Malaysia counter insurgency were willing and available to provide their expertise and even their presence in Vietnam? Was there anything in the American ethos that prevented their receiving this advice? Was there anything culturally that prevented American decisionmakers from realizing that what they were doing was not working and not making cultural and doctrinal changes to adapt?
He has numerous thoughts on this. Surprisingly, one of them is the American 'can do' attitude which encourages people to 'make it work' that is pervasive in the American officer corps. Competence in the face of adversity is a good thing, but this warning gives one pause and you understand that it can cloud the ability to make a proper assessment.
One of the unique things about this work is the stage of life Nagl was in when he researched this. He was in the first Gulf War as a Lieutenant in the U.S. Army commanding a platoon of tanks. Then he did his Ph.D. at Oxford, where this was written. And after that, he was the operations officer of an American armor battalion, participating in the Iraqi invasion, where the opposition was to be the Iraqi armored divisions, much like the soviet armored divisions the British officers in Malaya and the American officers in Vietnam were trained to face. And like those officers in Malaya and Vietnam, he found himself facing an insurgency, only this time he had the 'benefit' of a Ph.D. in the subject. In his own view, he was completely unprepared. Did he adapt? Yes. Well. Maybe. He has returned the U.S. and after a tour of duty in the United States he is preparing to return to Iraq. As a battalion commanding officer where he makes decisions and is responsible for the consequences for the Iraqis and his own troops. And he, and the rest of us, will learn if that Ph.D. was of any use.
Going into the later half of the 20th century, both the British and Americans have a history of wars involving unconventional warfare. In fact, both actively engaged in this type of warfare as recently as WWII, in the China-Burma-India theater against the Japanese, and both in their history have 'won' such wars, both as the insurgent (or supporter of the insurgent) and as the occupying force. And Nagl finds that in opposing their respective insurgencies that both were institutionally focused on conventional war, having chosen to turn their backs on the experiences on the asian continent and looking toward continental europe as their reason for being. So Nagl then asks, how does an organization adapt when it finds itself in an environment very different than the environment it prepared for.
Nagl then provides a framework for measuring organizational learning. If an organization is a "Learning institution" than the following questions should be answered in the affirmative: (biased for a military example)
1. Does the army promote suggestions from the field?
2. Are subordinates encouraged to question superiors and policies?
3. Does the organization regularly question its basic assumptions?
4. Are high-ranking officers routinely in close contact with those on the ground and open to their suggestions?
5. Are Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) generated locally and informally or imposed from the center?
And then Nagl has a second set of questions around the question "Did the Army Develop a Successful Conterinsurgency Doctrine?
1. Victory - Did the doctrine adopted achieve national goals in the conflict?
2. Objective - Did the army contribute to the setting of realistic national goals in the conflict?
3. Unity of Command - Did the military accept subordination to political objectives?
4. Minimum Force - Did the military use the minimum amount of force necessary to accomplish the mission?
5. Mass - Did the military structure itself in an appropriate manner to deal with the threat at hand?
He then examines both the Malaya (British) and Vietnam (American) cases in both their early years as well as the years of ongoing conflict and evalutes them against both set of criteria.
With the value of hindsight, you almost expect that the conclusions are that the British started bad, then improved and became a learning organization, and the Americans were not. And it would be easy to write something that said "If the Americans were a little more wise they could have won it?" and to dismiss this work as something like that. But the questions Nagl asks are better and deeper than that and so this work becomes of use not just to historians, but for any organization who finds that they were in an unexpected environment. Not just if the British figured out that their ultimate objective was not the defeat of the communist forces, but an independent Malaysia, but when did they realize this? What was the mindset of the people who came to this conclusion? How did this group communicate this to thier army culture, whose institutional memory was filled with images of tanks and planes crossing western europe to clash against German armies, and were expecting to repeat this? How did this group of people communicate this fact to their political masters, who were far away and listening to a fickle media? How did this group convince the Malaysians, and even the Chinese that the communists drew their support from that their vision and future was a better one than the communists, and to take the British side was in their best interests?
Looking at the Vietnam example, there are many books that say how ignorant and close minded the American leadership was, but Nagl goes further? Why did the Americans not even follow the British example, when the architects and implementors of the Malaysia counter insurgency were willing and available to provide their expertise and even their presence in Vietnam? Was there anything in the American ethos that prevented their receiving this advice? Was there anything culturally that prevented American decisionmakers from realizing that what they were doing was not working and not making cultural and doctrinal changes to adapt?
He has numerous thoughts on this. Surprisingly, one of them is the American 'can do' attitude which encourages people to 'make it work' that is pervasive in the American officer corps. Competence in the face of adversity is a good thing, but this warning gives one pause and you understand that it can cloud the ability to make a proper assessment.
One of the unique things about this work is the stage of life Nagl was in when he researched this. He was in the first Gulf War as a Lieutenant in the U.S. Army commanding a platoon of tanks. Then he did his Ph.D. at Oxford, where this was written. And after that, he was the operations officer of an American armor battalion, participating in the Iraqi invasion, where the opposition was to be the Iraqi armored divisions, much like the soviet armored divisions the British officers in Malaya and the American officers in Vietnam were trained to face. And like those officers in Malaya and Vietnam, he found himself facing an insurgency, only this time he had the 'benefit' of a Ph.D. in the subject. In his own view, he was completely unprepared. Did he adapt? Yes. Well. Maybe. He has returned the U.S. and after a tour of duty in the United States he is preparing to return to Iraq. As a battalion commanding officer where he makes decisions and is responsible for the consequences for the Iraqis and his own troops. And he, and the rest of us, will learn if that Ph.D. was of any use.
October 28, 2020
I listened to this while I was walking, so I did not take any notes. One big disadvantage to not having a paperback book.
One of the great classics on military strategy. I hope it is required reading at military academies.
I was also amazed at how much it applied to civilian life. The first half deals with the fight agains insurgents in Malaya. One of the ways that the government was able to establish order and civilization was by including the minority Chinese population in feeling a part of security. Isn't that part of America's problem right now? Why do we have an administration which does not establish a better outlook for the African-American community. The same principles apply.
Once again I say, progressives need to take over the word "conservative" and the phrases "security" or "law and order" and how about a "balanced budget" by taxing the rich more. We are the ones who offer a stable and sustainable society. Don't let anyone take that away from us for the sake of those damn tax cuts for the rich.
One of the great classics on military strategy. I hope it is required reading at military academies.
I was also amazed at how much it applied to civilian life. The first half deals with the fight agains insurgents in Malaya. One of the ways that the government was able to establish order and civilization was by including the minority Chinese population in feeling a part of security. Isn't that part of America's problem right now? Why do we have an administration which does not establish a better outlook for the African-American community. The same principles apply.
Once again I say, progressives need to take over the word "conservative" and the phrases "security" or "law and order" and how about a "balanced budget" by taxing the rich more. We are the ones who offer a stable and sustainable society. Don't let anyone take that away from us for the sake of those damn tax cuts for the rich.
March 28, 2022
Was not sure what to expect. Had assumed that it would be mostly theory and hard to get through. Happy to report that that was not the case. Really enjoyed how the author compared and contrasted Great Britain’s experience in Malaya with ours in Vietnam. I was surprised at how basic our short comings were, and his arguments were very convincing. It boiled down to our inability to adapt to conditions on the ground. Trying to fight a conventional war when it was not one at all.
Instead it was a war that required counterinsurgency measures. Something the US Army was unprepared for and unwilling to adapt to. While on the other hand, the British Army had years of Colonial policing that enabled them to adapt much more quickly to “small wars” such as what they were experiencing in Malaya.
Some time was spent on theory. Which again was quite interesting as Nagl compared the US Army to a typical corporate entity. He was able to provide the evidence that the “business” culture of the US Army was such that change was not as easily implemented as was necessary. Not that the need for change was not recognized but that years of planning during the Cold War and the successes of WWII had engrained conventional warfare so deeply into the organization (US Army) that they could not implement the changes quick enough for ultimate success.
Instead it was a war that required counterinsurgency measures. Something the US Army was unprepared for and unwilling to adapt to. While on the other hand, the British Army had years of Colonial policing that enabled them to adapt much more quickly to “small wars” such as what they were experiencing in Malaya.
Some time was spent on theory. Which again was quite interesting as Nagl compared the US Army to a typical corporate entity. He was able to provide the evidence that the “business” culture of the US Army was such that change was not as easily implemented as was necessary. Not that the need for change was not recognized but that years of planning during the Cold War and the successes of WWII had engrained conventional warfare so deeply into the organization (US Army) that they could not implement the changes quick enough for ultimate success.
November 13, 2023
LTC Nagle uses organizational learning theory to dissect development of counterinsurgency at the tactical, strategic, and operational levels.
Comparative study of British success and American failure.
Anyone interested in the development of military doctrine or just organizational adaptation needs to read this book.
The focus on factors in American failure to adapt such as the “burning of the books” on COIN after every COIN campaign the US engaged in- Philippines, Cuba, Vietnam, etc., preferring to focus on large scale organized conflict, compared to British longterm colonial security/administrative missions was especially informative.
Great read, highly recommend!
Comparative study of British success and American failure.
Anyone interested in the development of military doctrine or just organizational adaptation needs to read this book.
The focus on factors in American failure to adapt such as the “burning of the books” on COIN after every COIN campaign the US engaged in- Philippines, Cuba, Vietnam, etc., preferring to focus on large scale organized conflict, compared to British longterm colonial security/administrative missions was especially informative.
Great read, highly recommend!
May 21, 2008
Organizational culture is central to John Nagl’s comparative study of counter-insurgencies. Born out of his dissertation, Nagl’s title borrows from T.E. Lawrence, who noted that fighting guerilla warfare was slow and difficult—like “learning to eat soup with a knife.” Both the author’s historical research and personal experience in Iraq confirm this idea. Nagl compares British and American experiences with counterinsurgency—in Malaya and Vietnam respectively—and discovers that flexibility in organizational military culture makes a difference. American forces in SE Asia approached insurgency with tried (and until then true) methods of total war. By relying heavily on firepower and tactical intelligence, American forces blasted away at an enemy that never relented. Conversely, the British in Malaya succeed in a situation very similar to America’s quandary in Vietnam. The British were victorious by employing a political campaign to win the hearts and minds of Malayans. In short, fighting insurgency is a political as well as a military campaign. Nagl implores military leaders to give locals reasons to want democracy and stability; in time they will quit supporting insurgents.
Nagl is a true student of military theory and history, one that has taken Clauswitz’s dictum that war is an extension of politics. Learning to Eat Soup has a clear political message. It implies that the United States needs to reflect on its failures in Vietnam, no matter how painful. The American military must learn from its mistakes—as well as British military history—to have any chance of successfully stopping insurgents in modern day Iraq. Although Nagl contends that military culture is slow to evolve, his work should be scrutinized by a U.S. Military staff that currently finds itself in quite a quandary. Nagl’s book, however, never speculates beyond the technical and organizational levels of warfare, and certainly the American military’s current state of affairs in the Middle East has something to do with Grand Strategy. While the initial military thrust into Iraq was extremely successful, for any long term stability to take hold in the region policymakers must think beyond the almost certain successes of conventional warfare.
Nagl’s arguments could be bolstered by some cultural analysis. Bridging the divide between counterinsurgents and civilians—a central point in Nagl’s argument—requires more nuanced understanding of a region and people’s continually torn apart by imposed nationalistic borders and neo-imperialist designs. Regardless of the U.S. military’s good intentions in Iraq, it must be difficult (if not impossible) for those living in war-torn Iraq to view the actions of the western military powers as altruistic. In short, Nagl’s book is a must read for those on the ground dealing with insurgents, but should also be read by policymakers who need to consider the time, resources, and historical understanding needed to fight insurgents successfully.
October 5, 2019
Very interesting reading. Good book.
The way J. Nagl organizes the book makes it difficult to follow, it seems repetitive at points, and his work is ethnocentric (i.e. he compares size of territories to U.S. states). His main argument, that “the British army was a learning institution and the American army was not” (xxii), is wrongly expressed; Both armies learnt from their experiences, the Brits and American drew different conclusions out of them, and reacted in different ways, but both learned from those practices.
The Lawrence of Arabia’s metaphor used to name his work is almost perfect, but his analysis does not conclude that there are different soups... culture is one of the central topics in this book, and as the author underlines the consequences of it in COIN operations, he could have explained each one of culture’s elements, even better, he could have identified the significant ones with COIN actions (language, technologies, values, religion, education, history, military environment, regime, etc.) and their particular impacts in these two conflicts. Then, the points of his argument are based on certain case studies, however, the same ones are repeated throughout this book. He offers his personal opinions repeatedly (i. e. why and how the U.S. intervention in Vietnam was winnable).
Regarding the influence of organizational culture, the two chosen cases (Malaya 1948-60, Vietnam 1961-75) are constrained to a sub-Asian, regional, time-framed (post WWII), colonial history, determined one, which makes the case hardly applicable to a universal context (xxii). Grand conclusions cannot derive from a case or two if the author fails to justify that those are typical; Certainly, the case here.
Then, his triple understanding that the British had a broad view of the conflict, that they acted as a police force, more than an army, and that they integrated a social, political and military solution, whilst the Americans approached from a conventional perspective of war, always engaging the enemy with firepower, is extreme; The Brits engaged in conventional military operations (mostly at the beginning of the Malayan conflict) and the Americans tried social and political actions in Vietnam. He could have compared the Brits versus the Brits, in such previous and post conflicts as Palestine, Cyprus or even Northern-Ireland in which cases, his argument would be invalidated. During the last-mentioned conflict (speaking of organizational culture), the Brits were facing a same language enemy (language as identity), close to their supply bases, command, etc. The implied territory was minuscule in comparison. It took them around 20 years to stop the insurgents over there.
Nagl acknowledges that “the two conflicts were very different in scale, geography, and
level of external support provided to the insurgents” (xxv), however he doesn’t take into
consideration that the Brits counted on years and years of experience in Malaya, the Americans, none in Vietnam, that means much more previous experience/learning that precedes the study case time frame. Also, another key difference that makes the two cases hardly comparable: Malaya was surrounded by pro-Western countries at the time (Thailand), Vietnam was not, and this was not a small factor in U.S. defeat in that country; this key point has nothing to do with organizational learning culture, but was determinant in that the conflict was concentrated within borders; not so Vietnam.
Also, it took over 10 years to the Brits to defeat the insurgents, so their victory was not
that clear for years. Another remarkable difference that he does not implicate is the ratio
superiority of the Brits versus the Americans in their areas of conflict (28 to 1 and 1.6 to 1,
respectively). Even when circumstances were different, this kind of a ratio could by itself, have made a great difference without considering the organizational learning element.
The author recognizes that General C. Abrams created a COIN operative by “developing
new courses of action to be taken in South Vietnam by the United States and its allies, which will, with current actions, changed as necessary, lead in due time to successful accomplishment of U.S. aims and objectives.” (159), but then he downplays it. Other, several important outcomes happened under Abrams’ command, but Nagl doesn’t consider them. One example is the third phase of the Tet Offensive in which the Viet Cong was stopped.
A major flaw in this work is that Nagl doesn’t consider in his method the difference of
surrounding circumstances for the two conflicts; The Americans were also fighting a regular army (the North Vietnamese), the British were not. The effect of mass media (TV notably) on the development of the Vietnam war, which led to opposition from a significant sector of the
American public. The Brits were supported by half of the population of Malaya. The Americans did not get this kind of support, on the contrary, as the conflict moved on, they were losing it.
During the Vietnam war, logistics were of strategic importance (particularly the Ho Chi Minh
trial); Not so in the Malayan one. In Vietnam Soviet implication was overwhelming.
Towards the end, Nagl affirms that “the demands of conventional and unconventional
warfare differ so greatly that an organization optimized to succeed in one will have great difficulty in fighting the other” (219), however he doesn’t provide with an analysis to sustain such affirmation, and in fact, it would depend on the organizational culture of the armed forces in question. Nagl sustains that the Americans lost in Vietnam because of their “inability to learn” (221), however, the facts of the war show that they learned, what (mainly) they didn’t do correctly (at some points) was to get ahead of events impossible to predict and/or adapt to the ever evolving circumstances.
Another idea that he doesn’t explain is how “the very attributes that allowed the British
Army to respond to the demands of counterinsurgency in Malaya [...] made it a less effective
learning organization on the conventional battlegrounds of World War II” (219).
Finally, the author has some dates wrong; i.e. “...nor the Mexican-American War of 1849”
(45); The Mexican-American conflict was the consequence of the 1845 U.S. annexation of Texas, also a conflict on the treaties of Velasco, signed by A. López de Santa Ana; the war went from April 1846 to May 1848 (treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo). No war in 1849.
The way J. Nagl organizes the book makes it difficult to follow, it seems repetitive at points, and his work is ethnocentric (i.e. he compares size of territories to U.S. states). His main argument, that “the British army was a learning institution and the American army was not” (xxii), is wrongly expressed; Both armies learnt from their experiences, the Brits and American drew different conclusions out of them, and reacted in different ways, but both learned from those practices.
The Lawrence of Arabia’s metaphor used to name his work is almost perfect, but his analysis does not conclude that there are different soups... culture is one of the central topics in this book, and as the author underlines the consequences of it in COIN operations, he could have explained each one of culture’s elements, even better, he could have identified the significant ones with COIN actions (language, technologies, values, religion, education, history, military environment, regime, etc.) and their particular impacts in these two conflicts. Then, the points of his argument are based on certain case studies, however, the same ones are repeated throughout this book. He offers his personal opinions repeatedly (i. e. why and how the U.S. intervention in Vietnam was winnable).
Regarding the influence of organizational culture, the two chosen cases (Malaya 1948-60, Vietnam 1961-75) are constrained to a sub-Asian, regional, time-framed (post WWII), colonial history, determined one, which makes the case hardly applicable to a universal context (xxii). Grand conclusions cannot derive from a case or two if the author fails to justify that those are typical; Certainly, the case here.
Then, his triple understanding that the British had a broad view of the conflict, that they acted as a police force, more than an army, and that they integrated a social, political and military solution, whilst the Americans approached from a conventional perspective of war, always engaging the enemy with firepower, is extreme; The Brits engaged in conventional military operations (mostly at the beginning of the Malayan conflict) and the Americans tried social and political actions in Vietnam. He could have compared the Brits versus the Brits, in such previous and post conflicts as Palestine, Cyprus or even Northern-Ireland in which cases, his argument would be invalidated. During the last-mentioned conflict (speaking of organizational culture), the Brits were facing a same language enemy (language as identity), close to their supply bases, command, etc. The implied territory was minuscule in comparison. It took them around 20 years to stop the insurgents over there.
Nagl acknowledges that “the two conflicts were very different in scale, geography, and
level of external support provided to the insurgents” (xxv), however he doesn’t take into
consideration that the Brits counted on years and years of experience in Malaya, the Americans, none in Vietnam, that means much more previous experience/learning that precedes the study case time frame. Also, another key difference that makes the two cases hardly comparable: Malaya was surrounded by pro-Western countries at the time (Thailand), Vietnam was not, and this was not a small factor in U.S. defeat in that country; this key point has nothing to do with organizational learning culture, but was determinant in that the conflict was concentrated within borders; not so Vietnam.
Also, it took over 10 years to the Brits to defeat the insurgents, so their victory was not
that clear for years. Another remarkable difference that he does not implicate is the ratio
superiority of the Brits versus the Americans in their areas of conflict (28 to 1 and 1.6 to 1,
respectively). Even when circumstances were different, this kind of a ratio could by itself, have made a great difference without considering the organizational learning element.
The author recognizes that General C. Abrams created a COIN operative by “developing
new courses of action to be taken in South Vietnam by the United States and its allies, which will, with current actions, changed as necessary, lead in due time to successful accomplishment of U.S. aims and objectives.” (159), but then he downplays it. Other, several important outcomes happened under Abrams’ command, but Nagl doesn’t consider them. One example is the third phase of the Tet Offensive in which the Viet Cong was stopped.
A major flaw in this work is that Nagl doesn’t consider in his method the difference of
surrounding circumstances for the two conflicts; The Americans were also fighting a regular army (the North Vietnamese), the British were not. The effect of mass media (TV notably) on the development of the Vietnam war, which led to opposition from a significant sector of the
American public. The Brits were supported by half of the population of Malaya. The Americans did not get this kind of support, on the contrary, as the conflict moved on, they were losing it.
During the Vietnam war, logistics were of strategic importance (particularly the Ho Chi Minh
trial); Not so in the Malayan one. In Vietnam Soviet implication was overwhelming.
Towards the end, Nagl affirms that “the demands of conventional and unconventional
warfare differ so greatly that an organization optimized to succeed in one will have great difficulty in fighting the other” (219), however he doesn’t provide with an analysis to sustain such affirmation, and in fact, it would depend on the organizational culture of the armed forces in question. Nagl sustains that the Americans lost in Vietnam because of their “inability to learn” (221), however, the facts of the war show that they learned, what (mainly) they didn’t do correctly (at some points) was to get ahead of events impossible to predict and/or adapt to the ever evolving circumstances.
Another idea that he doesn’t explain is how “the very attributes that allowed the British
Army to respond to the demands of counterinsurgency in Malaya [...] made it a less effective
learning organization on the conventional battlegrounds of World War II” (219).
Finally, the author has some dates wrong; i.e. “...nor the Mexican-American War of 1849”
(45); The Mexican-American conflict was the consequence of the 1845 U.S. annexation of Texas, also a conflict on the treaties of Velasco, signed by A. López de Santa Ana; the war went from April 1846 to May 1848 (treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo). No war in 1849.
October 19, 2014
With apologies to the author, I had to stop reading about half way through this book. Unfortunately, some of impact of Nagl's book was undercut by already having read about the General Petraeus approach to counterinsurgency in Iraq. Much of the Petraeus approach apparently uses the lessons and understanding outlined by Nagl in "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, so the book, and its lessons from history, weren't really new enough nor groundbreaking enough to hold my interest. Because of that, it seemed dry and repetitive to me, and my interest faded. I think we all saw how poorly prepared we were to handle political and civil unrest in Iraq, and we subsequently came to understand the benefits of the counterinsurgency as generally credited to General Petraeus. So the value in Nagl's writing seems validated. However, my interest in the subject just wasn't strong enough to sustain me, and I put the book down, never to pick it up again.
February 24, 2013
There are some wars where the conventional wisdom is so overwhelming that it has become dogma and an author can avoid establishing and defending judgments. World War I is one such war. The dogma is that the war's leaders were incompetent and one just has to write about how their incompetence manifested itself. The Vietnam War is another. It is just accepted that the leaders of the United States effort were incompetent, thus relieving an author the chore of making the argument. Unfortunately, Nagl falls into this trap. This book compares the performance of the British in Malaya with the Americans in Vietnam. This, however, is a false comparison. Had Nagl made any analysis of the two opponents, he would have seen their significant dissimilarity. Instead, he ignores the opponent, and because of that, his conclusions, whether correct or not, are not defensible.
September 21, 2015
Nagl compares the organizational behavior of the US Army in Vietnam and the British Army in Malaya, specifically if it was a learning organization. He compares their codify doctrines, their informal passing of information and their ability and willingness to work with civilian leaders.
Why I started reading this book: Vietnam is my black hole. I have only read a few books about it, and I was eager to learn more about counterinsurgency, especially considering our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Why I finished it: Quick book, engaging but also extremely focused. Helpful for anyone who works in or for a large company. It is surprising how hard it is to change a large organization even when there is an obvious problem. I would recommend this to business students and managers in addition to military personal eager to learn the lessons of the past.
Why I started reading this book: Vietnam is my black hole. I have only read a few books about it, and I was eager to learn more about counterinsurgency, especially considering our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Why I finished it: Quick book, engaging but also extremely focused. Helpful for anyone who works in or for a large company. It is surprising how hard it is to change a large organization even when there is an obvious problem. I would recommend this to business students and managers in addition to military personal eager to learn the lessons of the past.
March 1, 2024
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife attempts to examine the United States’ failure in Vietnam and England’s success in ending the Malayan Emergency through the lens of organizational theory. Both conflicts saw enemies with similar tactics, weaponry, and ideologies, but the outcomes couldn’t have been further apart. Nagl posits that the organizational culture of each countries’ military determined whether they were able to adapt to revolutionary warfare or not.
The book is divided into four sections: the first lays out Nagl’s process for the study and a brief history on revolutionary warfare, the second analyzes England’s performance throughout the Malayan Emergency, the third analyzes the US’ performance throughout the Vietnam War, and the fourth draws conclusions from both performances and looks towards the future of insurgencies.
I rather enjoyed the first section because it does a good job introducing organizational theory and revolutionary warfare to the reader. I have read a decent amount about insurgencies, but never organizational theory. The basis of this theory is that organizations are created to accomplish a mission. As time progresses, the leadership will gravitate towards certain aspects of the mission based on perceived importance. These aspects will become the primary objective of the organization and its members, as contributing to these aspects will overall increase the strength of the organization. But what happens if the organization encounters a problem that it isn’t geared to solve? The organization must undergo a learning process, which Nagl believes the US failed to accomplish. In regards to revolutionary action, Nagl briefly discusses the military theories of Clausewitz and Jomini. Jomini believed that victory could only be achieved through total annihilation of the enemy. Clauswitz recognized that military force consisted of more than just soldiers and weaponry, there are the people and the state that form a "remarkable trinity". As revolutionary warfare by definition is a "peoples' war", a Clausewitzian approach should have better results.
Nagl presents the British and US strategies during the second and third sections. At the beginning of each conflict, both countries had analogous strategies. Large sweeping search and destroy operations accompanied by overwhelming firepower. The British decided to replace the High Commissioner of Malaya with Gerald Templer, who ultimately ended the Emergency by switching the operational doctrine. Large operations were replaced by small patrols acting on intel. Institutions were specifically created for intelligence gathering and dissemination. Programs that rewarded citizens for turning in insurgents or for insurgents surrendering were implemented. Templer also had some controversial policies, like his “New Village”, defoliation of crops, and “scorched earth” tactics, but ultimately his policies led the military to “hearts and minds” as opposed to outright destruction of the enemy. The US stayed its course throughout the war, despite multiple studies saying Vietnam could not be won through conventional means. The CIA’s training of Vietnamese locals for security and the USMC’s Combined Action Platoons both showed great promise and results, but ultimately the US leadership wouldn’t budge from its conventional doctrine. Commander of MACV at the time, General Westmoreland, stated that the initiatives and studies in favor of switching to counter-insurgency doctrine were too theoretical in nature. He, like most of the US leadership, were held back by doctrine they were taught and experienced both through WWII and the Korean War. One officer, General Creighton Abrams, saw promise in counter-insurgency instead of “Victory by Annihilation”. When Westmoreland was eventually replaced by Abrams as commander of MACV, the situation stayed the same. Despite Abrams insistence on switching to a counter-insurgency, a dominant portion of the military still believed the war could be won through overwhelming firepower. Unlike Templer, Abrams was not able to claim victory in Vietnam, and the US eventually withdrew from the country entirely.
In the last section, Nagl states that the United States was unable to overcome its organizational culture to enact a successful plan to defeat the Vietcong. The United States Army was created with the sole mission to defeat a conventional army with overwhelming force. Even though a good majority of the wars and conflicts the US participated in were low-intensity conflicts, our doctrine has stayed the same (especially with the success of WWII and Korea). The British on the other hand, had employed its armies with the mission of maintaining order in its colonies for the last few centuries. This merging of policing, administrative functions, and military action, coupled with a culture that praised problem-solving from all ranks, made it easy for the British to adapt to the Malayan Emergency. With this culture absent (especially the problem-solving aspect) from the US military, the organizational learning process could not be completed, primarily due to the step that new doctrine needs to be accepted by a dominant portion of the organization.
Even though a good majority of the book is an examination of military decision-making and policy formation, Nagl presents the material in a way that keeps the reader interested. The book is also well cited and sourced, with Nagl drawing from dozens of studies, archived military documents, and even interviews with persons present in the conflicts. Overall, I would recommend this book to anyone who is interested in military theory, or is just a history buff in general.
The book is divided into four sections: the first lays out Nagl’s process for the study and a brief history on revolutionary warfare, the second analyzes England’s performance throughout the Malayan Emergency, the third analyzes the US’ performance throughout the Vietnam War, and the fourth draws conclusions from both performances and looks towards the future of insurgencies.
I rather enjoyed the first section because it does a good job introducing organizational theory and revolutionary warfare to the reader. I have read a decent amount about insurgencies, but never organizational theory. The basis of this theory is that organizations are created to accomplish a mission. As time progresses, the leadership will gravitate towards certain aspects of the mission based on perceived importance. These aspects will become the primary objective of the organization and its members, as contributing to these aspects will overall increase the strength of the organization. But what happens if the organization encounters a problem that it isn’t geared to solve? The organization must undergo a learning process, which Nagl believes the US failed to accomplish. In regards to revolutionary action, Nagl briefly discusses the military theories of Clausewitz and Jomini. Jomini believed that victory could only be achieved through total annihilation of the enemy. Clauswitz recognized that military force consisted of more than just soldiers and weaponry, there are the people and the state that form a "remarkable trinity". As revolutionary warfare by definition is a "peoples' war", a Clausewitzian approach should have better results.
Nagl presents the British and US strategies during the second and third sections. At the beginning of each conflict, both countries had analogous strategies. Large sweeping search and destroy operations accompanied by overwhelming firepower. The British decided to replace the High Commissioner of Malaya with Gerald Templer, who ultimately ended the Emergency by switching the operational doctrine. Large operations were replaced by small patrols acting on intel. Institutions were specifically created for intelligence gathering and dissemination. Programs that rewarded citizens for turning in insurgents or for insurgents surrendering were implemented. Templer also had some controversial policies, like his “New Village”, defoliation of crops, and “scorched earth” tactics, but ultimately his policies led the military to “hearts and minds” as opposed to outright destruction of the enemy. The US stayed its course throughout the war, despite multiple studies saying Vietnam could not be won through conventional means. The CIA’s training of Vietnamese locals for security and the USMC’s Combined Action Platoons both showed great promise and results, but ultimately the US leadership wouldn’t budge from its conventional doctrine. Commander of MACV at the time, General Westmoreland, stated that the initiatives and studies in favor of switching to counter-insurgency doctrine were too theoretical in nature. He, like most of the US leadership, were held back by doctrine they were taught and experienced both through WWII and the Korean War. One officer, General Creighton Abrams, saw promise in counter-insurgency instead of “Victory by Annihilation”. When Westmoreland was eventually replaced by Abrams as commander of MACV, the situation stayed the same. Despite Abrams insistence on switching to a counter-insurgency, a dominant portion of the military still believed the war could be won through overwhelming firepower. Unlike Templer, Abrams was not able to claim victory in Vietnam, and the US eventually withdrew from the country entirely.
In the last section, Nagl states that the United States was unable to overcome its organizational culture to enact a successful plan to defeat the Vietcong. The United States Army was created with the sole mission to defeat a conventional army with overwhelming force. Even though a good majority of the wars and conflicts the US participated in were low-intensity conflicts, our doctrine has stayed the same (especially with the success of WWII and Korea). The British on the other hand, had employed its armies with the mission of maintaining order in its colonies for the last few centuries. This merging of policing, administrative functions, and military action, coupled with a culture that praised problem-solving from all ranks, made it easy for the British to adapt to the Malayan Emergency. With this culture absent (especially the problem-solving aspect) from the US military, the organizational learning process could not be completed, primarily due to the step that new doctrine needs to be accepted by a dominant portion of the organization.
Even though a good majority of the book is an examination of military decision-making and policy formation, Nagl presents the material in a way that keeps the reader interested. The book is also well cited and sourced, with Nagl drawing from dozens of studies, archived military documents, and even interviews with persons present in the conflicts. Overall, I would recommend this book to anyone who is interested in military theory, or is just a history buff in general.
April 8, 2011
While I do not necessarily agree with all of Dr. Nagl's conclusions, this is a well written and extremely thought-provoking study. In addition, the bibliography is fairly extensive and quite useful, despite the author's having relied largely on interviews, oral histories, official documents, etc. I look forward to comparing this book with those written on the same topic by Sir Robert Thompson, Sam Sarkasian, and others.
July 23, 2017
It's a very well documented book, but if you are looking for management lessons, those are scarce. For someone with interest in military operations, might be a gold mine.
November 2, 2021
This book was recommended to me by a friend who also happens to be ex-SF and who has extensive combat and training experience. I thank him for the suggestion. I think this is the sort of book whose value depends in part on where you’re at going into it. While women like me were barred from the honor of serving, especially in combat arms, when I was young enough for my service to matter, I have had the privilege of studying the lessons of unconventional and guerrilla warfare extensively since the mid 1990s. Back then, while pursuing a doctorate in an unrelated subject, I had academic access to a great deal of excellent but neglected scholarship coming from the Army historical service and other places, much of which taught many of the general lessons of this book. And I’ve continued that study over the decades since. The author is certainly not wrong to point up the ongoing arrogance and amnesia one finds so often in Big Green and the highest levels of the United States government. I do think he is a bit off base in praising the “learning culture” of British armed forces as highly as he seems to, under emphasizing important differences between the Malayan Emergency and what became the Vietnam War. More importantly I think the 19 years of American combat involvement since this book was first published demonstrates a more fundamental truth about fighting insurgencies - no matter the level of tactical excellence achieved, you have to offer something the indigenous personnel want and believe will succeed and that they invest in, and do it early before your chances are lost forever (if you even have a chance). Tactical excellence is not a substitute for a viable strategic vision. Furthermore I have come to believe that some insurgencies are fundamentally literally incapable of being defeated by Western powers. We can change regimes, certainly. But the experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq certainly drive the limits of regime change, and the unpleasant sequelae, home with an exclamation point.
One finds in this book an earnest ongoing optimism that maybe next time the United States can study harder and learn more and then it’ll win these kinds of wars. While learning is imperative and this book underscores several methods of doing so, I think the fundamental optimism about winning-with-homework is misplaced in certain conflicts.
So I think this is a good book, very much worth reading as part of inquiries into COIN and military learning theory at the operational level. It might seem like a revolutionary book depending on where you are coming from in your studies. For me it simply is a good book, not a great or revolutionary one.
One finds in this book an earnest ongoing optimism that maybe next time the United States can study harder and learn more and then it’ll win these kinds of wars. While learning is imperative and this book underscores several methods of doing so, I think the fundamental optimism about winning-with-homework is misplaced in certain conflicts.
So I think this is a good book, very much worth reading as part of inquiries into COIN and military learning theory at the operational level. It might seem like a revolutionary book depending on where you are coming from in your studies. For me it simply is a good book, not a great or revolutionary one.
February 19, 2023
Took up this book based on recommendation, it was published more than 20 years ago but feels quite relevant on the topic of counterinsurgency and organizational learning in military. The author mainly compares UK army during Malaysia communist insurgency 1948 to 1957 and US military in Vietnam war 1950-1972, several other military conflicts are mentioned to a lesser degree. More recent books and several leadership books from authors with military background from Afganistan and Iraq also touch the topic of adapting to the nature of situation and local conditions instead of just appealing to superiority in military force. I did like the description why during a long career in the same organization it becomes more and more difficult to think outside the box. A new leader has not yet created anything on his/her own and can thus be extremely flexible, but as long time goes past then there are too many constraints imposed by self-creation which the "owner" subconsciously "protects" from change.
Author proposes framework for measuring organizational learning in military with the following questions:
1. Does the army promote suggestions from the field?
2. Are subordinates encouraged to question superiors and policies?
3. Does the organization regularly question its basic assumptions?
4. Are high-ranking officers routinely in close contact with those on the ground and open to their suggestions?
5. Are Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) generated locally and informally or imposed from the center?
Second part for assessing "Did the Army Develop a Successful Conterinsurgency Doctrine?
*Victory - Did the doctrine adopted achieve national goals in the conflict?
*Objective - Did the army contribute to the setting of realistic national goals in the conflict?
*Unity of Command - Did the military accept subordination to political objectives?
*Minimum Force - Did the military use the minimum amount of force necessary to accomplish the mission?
*Mass - Did the military structure itself in an appropriate manner to deal with the threat at hand?
Author proposes framework for measuring organizational learning in military with the following questions:
1. Does the army promote suggestions from the field?
2. Are subordinates encouraged to question superiors and policies?
3. Does the organization regularly question its basic assumptions?
4. Are high-ranking officers routinely in close contact with those on the ground and open to their suggestions?
5. Are Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) generated locally and informally or imposed from the center?
Second part for assessing "Did the Army Develop a Successful Conterinsurgency Doctrine?
*Victory - Did the doctrine adopted achieve national goals in the conflict?
*Objective - Did the army contribute to the setting of realistic national goals in the conflict?
*Unity of Command - Did the military accept subordination to political objectives?
*Minimum Force - Did the military use the minimum amount of force necessary to accomplish the mission?
*Mass - Did the military structure itself in an appropriate manner to deal with the threat at hand?
June 22, 2020
I don't generally read books sympathetic to the US military, but I have to concede that "Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife" by John A. Nagle is an intriguing and thoughtful reflection on counterinsurgency despite its biases towards American empire.
Nagl begins the book tossing around phrases like "defending freedom" and "protecting Democracy" in the early pages of "Learning to Eat Soup With A Knife," while also brandishing his military bonafides. But, in short order, he gets down to the business at hand and delivers a brisk, thoughtful, rigorous introduction to evaluating counterinsurgency strategy.
The book is a straight-forward organizational analysis of two counterinsurgencies: Britain's efforts in Malaysia in the 1950s and America's war in Vietnam in the 60s and 70s. Through his detailed yet concise analysis, Nagl argues that Britain succeeded in its aims in Malaysia thanks to the military's dynamic organizational structure that made room for learning, feedback, growth, and adaptation. By contrast, America's military, so confidently built for overwhelming use of force, was incapable of adapting to insurgent warfare in Vietnam. America's military is lumbering, conservative, and stringently hierarchical: a perfect recipe for losing to insurgents. And that is exactly what happened.
For someone who knows very little about military strategy, "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" provides a handy starting point for understanding how colonial empires try to combat insurgency and how Maoist guerilla tactics have forever altered warfare throughout the world. The days of great powers meeting on the battlefield seem to be over, and Nagl's proposed lessons are ones that America seems to continue to learn the hard way in every war their pick across the globe. Which is to say, Nagl's analysis will likely remain useful for some time.
Nagl begins the book tossing around phrases like "defending freedom" and "protecting Democracy" in the early pages of "Learning to Eat Soup With A Knife," while also brandishing his military bonafides. But, in short order, he gets down to the business at hand and delivers a brisk, thoughtful, rigorous introduction to evaluating counterinsurgency strategy.
The book is a straight-forward organizational analysis of two counterinsurgencies: Britain's efforts in Malaysia in the 1950s and America's war in Vietnam in the 60s and 70s. Through his detailed yet concise analysis, Nagl argues that Britain succeeded in its aims in Malaysia thanks to the military's dynamic organizational structure that made room for learning, feedback, growth, and adaptation. By contrast, America's military, so confidently built for overwhelming use of force, was incapable of adapting to insurgent warfare in Vietnam. America's military is lumbering, conservative, and stringently hierarchical: a perfect recipe for losing to insurgents. And that is exactly what happened.
For someone who knows very little about military strategy, "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" provides a handy starting point for understanding how colonial empires try to combat insurgency and how Maoist guerilla tactics have forever altered warfare throughout the world. The days of great powers meeting on the battlefield seem to be over, and Nagl's proposed lessons are ones that America seems to continue to learn the hard way in every war their pick across the globe. Which is to say, Nagl's analysis will likely remain useful for some time.
May 19, 2021
This was a good (random) choice to read after finishing A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. Neil Sheehan details the Army's inability to adjust their strategy in Vietnam or, really, confront what was actually happening in Vietnam. Nagl uses an MBA approach to analyzing influence within organizations to analyze failings of the US army in Vietnam compared to the British experience in Malaya (Britain initially struggled in Malaya before succeeding under new leadership). I think he may have an oversimplified approach because the British legitimately wanted to transfer control of the state to Malayans; whereas the US was supporting corrupt regimes and it may have been impossible to gain the same popular support that the British were able to do.
However, the overarching takeaway at the end is hard to argue with: Armies struggle with situations outside their core competency. Britain struggled more in the conventional wars of WWII than did the US, because the US was more focused on conventional wars. Similarly, Britain was more practiced in maintaining stability in far-flung regions with few troops and therefore had more success when dealing with small wars and counterinsurgency.
It was fascinating to gain a military strategy perspective on the Vietnam War soon after reading Sheehan's book.
However, the overarching takeaway at the end is hard to argue with: Armies struggle with situations outside their core competency. Britain struggled more in the conventional wars of WWII than did the US, because the US was more focused on conventional wars. Similarly, Britain was more practiced in maintaining stability in far-flung regions with few troops and therefore had more success when dealing with small wars and counterinsurgency.
It was fascinating to gain a military strategy perspective on the Vietnam War soon after reading Sheehan's book.
March 30, 2019
Short and interesting book discussing organizational theory in the military using two examples of counter-insurgency policies by the British and US military. The British had a long history of avoiding large-scale continental conflict and pushing colonial policies so they had created the decentralized, police-like military necessary to adapt to conflicts with insurgents and pursue integrated military-political goals in Malaya. The US military had maintained a highly hierarchical military culture with a clear policy of conventional warfare against a symmetrical enemy which promoted officers with expertise in conventional warfare. When faced with unconventional warfare civilian leaders in the US advocated a change of strategy but the military culture was too embedded. COIN strategy entails: setting realistic national goals, using minimum force, using appropriate troop mass and subordinating military to political objectives. Learning organization entails: bottom-up suggestions, questioning superiors, local training and doctrine development, development of theories.
April 4, 2021
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam by John A. Nagl left me nostalgic for a class I took at Johns Hopkins called Adaptation Under Fire. There's a decent amount of that class that has some precedents here, and I was left wondering if this was an overlooked footnote at some point. Nagl examines the the course of two case studies in counterinsurgency, compares the two, and argues both for lessons learned, and lessons to be adapted to current armed forces. I thought the text was pretty neat, and I enjoyed Nagl's narrative and derivations. I learned a bit too, as there were several things that I did not know - including a nearly prophetic approach to the Vietnam War that was abandoned, and that the British advisors were ignored (though I think I heard that last bit earlier a couple years back, but memory is a fickle thing).
This book was a pleasant surprise, one that if I had more time to, I would have studied a bit, rather than just going through it lightly.
86/100
This book was a pleasant surprise, one that if I had more time to, I would have studied a bit, rather than just going through it lightly.
86/100
November 26, 2018
I did a research paper years ago on the counterinsurgency Malayan emergency way back when it was CAS3, so was very interested in John's work when years later I discovered it in 2008. Providentially, I had an instructor that also recommended the book, so being already familiarized, I did a formal JPMEII review that I think is still on file at NDU. Although not a SFer, I sure got along well with fellow SF planners and almost always asked if they had read John's book. If I could live life over again...
Time will tell but I'm pretty sure Nagl made a stellar contribution to the country in general, and in particular with a signature COIN approach developed or refined from lessons learned in previous communist insurgency operations. To this day, I reflect back on this book from time to time and highly recommend people getting it. I support John Nagl in a position of power and policymaking in our government.
Time will tell but I'm pretty sure Nagl made a stellar contribution to the country in general, and in particular with a signature COIN approach developed or refined from lessons learned in previous communist insurgency operations. To this day, I reflect back on this book from time to time and highly recommend people getting it. I support John Nagl in a position of power and policymaking in our government.
July 1, 2017
A very good account of the differing tactics and thus results of the successful British counterinsurgency efforts in Malaya and of the mixed outcome of the Americans in Vietnam. Nagl's central thesis is that the British responded to challenges in Malaya by innovating and seeking alternative solutions through rigorous internal debate and problem-solving. That is contrasted with the American failure to innovate on a large scale, and the American military's internal resistance to both policy directives from above and innovation and suggestions from below. The results speak for themselves. Nagl is a very good writer, and is extremely judicious in his praise and critique. There is much to glean about culture, innovation, and leadership in this book.
September 19, 2025
Nagl provides a compelling and well-evidenced case as to why British counterinsurgency operations in Malaya succeeded vis a vis American efforts in Vietnam. He highlights institutional culture and capacity for change, particularly the U.S. Army’s focus on trying to fight a conventional war, as well as lack of a unified command, an emphasis on technology over pacification, and an unwillingness to use low-intensity but personnel-intensive approaches (such as popular forces advising).
Pairs really well with “Corps Competency?,” an evaluation of the USMC’s performance in I Corps which details much of their more pacification-focused work.
A very good read, and definitely worth meditating on with the still recent withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Pairs really well with “Corps Competency?,” an evaluation of the USMC’s performance in I Corps which details much of their more pacification-focused work.
A very good read, and definitely worth meditating on with the still recent withdrawal from Afghanistan.
June 16, 2019
A fascinating history and equally a work on organizational history.
Nagl's comparative history makes the case that the British army succeeded supressing a communist rebellion in one Southeast Asian country by fostering a culture of learning within its military, while the American army failed because to suppress a communist rebellion in another Southeast Asian country because it failed to have a culture of learning.
This book is interesting for anyone interested in the history of the Vietnam war, the history of 20th Century Southeast Asia and also for anyone interested in thinking about how large organizations succeed and fail when they try to adapt.
Nagl's comparative history makes the case that the British army succeeded supressing a communist rebellion in one Southeast Asian country by fostering a culture of learning within its military, while the American army failed because to suppress a communist rebellion in another Southeast Asian country because it failed to have a culture of learning.
This book is interesting for anyone interested in the history of the Vietnam war, the history of 20th Century Southeast Asia and also for anyone interested in thinking about how large organizations succeed and fail when they try to adapt.
October 23, 2021
Interesting book with a lot of general management and organizational concepts/learning that could be applied in many different business environments outside the military. The book makes a compelling case that organizational culture is primary influence on innovation and adaptability, and that even in those cultures innovative concepts created and advocated at an individual level often decrease the longer the person has been in that organization.
February 25, 2022
A well written comparison of British counterinsurgency efforts in Malaya versus the US response to same in Viet Nam. The lessons have not been learned: the US is still geared to large scale events and not ready to be flexible enough for the predictable non-state actions we will face yet again in the future.
March 18, 2025
Fighting a rebellion is like eating soup with a knife...messy and slow.
An interesting comparison between the Malaya insurgency (1948-1960) and the Vietnam war (1950-1975). It details the ability of the British army to adapt to a guerrilla war and the inability of the US army to adapt from an organisation structured to conventional warfare to an unconventional war.
An interesting comparison between the Malaya insurgency (1948-1960) and the Vietnam war (1950-1975). It details the ability of the British army to adapt to a guerrilla war and the inability of the US army to adapt from an organisation structured to conventional warfare to an unconventional war.
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